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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the role of skill and tacit knowledge in the form of 
embodied knowledge in researchers, and embedded t£black-boxed” knowledge in the 
form of artefacts, in the development of innovative scientific and technical practices and 
apparatus. What forms does the embodied skill and tacit knowledge of researchers take? 
Is this sort of knowledge required for there to be a transfer of scientific knowledge? Can 
embedded scientific knowledge be uncovered by researchers lacking the acquired tacit 
knowledge and skills to build and/or operate new scientific apparatus if they are in 
possession of that apparatus?
I provide answers to these questions by considering the case of the development of 
microwave radar in Britain, and its later development through the discovery of a British 
example by the Germans. Longer (metre) wave radar was developed simultaneously, 
though independently, in Britain and in Germany during the 1930s. During this pre-war 
period researchers in each country learned basic skills about how to design and build 
working radars at metric wavelengths. On the outbreak of war, strategic pressures 
forced the British to seek to develop radar using the hitherto barely explored microwave 
(centimetric) region of the electromagnetic spectrum. This region was ignored in 
Germany through a combination of a lack of strategic reason to do so, and beliefs that 
microwaves would not prove useful for radar anyway. I have gathered information on 
this topic by using secondary sources such as books and articles, primary sources in 
archive collections, and interviews of some participants.
The importance of tacit knowledge was argued by Ryle in the 1940s and Polanyi in 
the 1950s, but only in the 1970s did it come to be investigated more widely. The work 
done in that period by Collins has been added to by Gooding and now several others. I 
use this work as the basis of my examination of these topics in conjunction with the 
British development of microwave radar between 1940 and 1942, and the German 
copying of this equipment and research programme instigated when they recovered an 
example from an aircraft crash in 1943.
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Glossary
AI Airborne Interception radar: a type of airborne radar used to
locate other aircraft.
AGR Arbeitsgemeinschaft Rotterdam: German committee set up
to investigate the captured H2S, codenamed Rotterdam.
AMRE Air Ministry Research Establishment: the designation of the
radar research establishment during 1939-40.
ASV Anti Surface-Vessel radar: a type of airborne radar used to
locate ships and submarines.
Berlin German redesigned copy of H2S.
Cavity Magnetron Type of thermionic valve producing radiowaves on
centimetric wavelengths at high powers. A central cathode 
is surrounded by an anode block which has cavities arranged 
around the axis (see chapter 3).
Chain Home: coastal early-warning radar.
Chain Home Low: a rotating radar introduced to cover the 
gap where CH couldn’t “see”.
Cathode Ray Tube: type of display valve (or tube) where 
electrons are fired at a screen in a vacuum tube.
Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence
Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Offence.
Co-ordination of Valve Development committee.
Director of Communications Development: a Civil Service 
post in the Air Ministry.
Doorknob Eponymously shaped thermionic valve used in 1.5m AI.
EMI Electrical Musical Industries: an electric and electronic
corporation.
GEC General Electric Company.




















A valve where a beam of electrons pass through two dough­
nut shaped resonant cavities to produce centimetric waves 
(see chapter 3).
German AI radar.
Ministry of Air'™ ft Production.
Royal Aircraft Establishment, Famborough.
Royal Air Force.
Reichsforschnngsrat German Research Bureau.
German rebuild of H2S.
A glass-envelope thermionic valve where the central cathode 
is surrounded by a cylindrical anode, which is divided into 
two or more segments. A magnetic field is applied along the 
axis of the anode/cathode combination.
Main German electronics company, concerned with building 
Rotterdam and Berlin.
Transmit/Receive: unit, or method, to switch a single aerial 
between these two features.
Telecommunications Research Establishment: the 
designation of AMRE after 1940.
Small strips of metal foil dropped by aircraft to confuse 
enemy radars. The clouds of the strips act as tuned 
reflectors.
XAirey, J.E.









Bragg, Sir Lawrence 
Brandt, Dr 
Burcham, Prof. W.E. 
Butt, D.M.
Selected Biography
Bowen’s technician at Orfordness, 1935.
Ionospheric Research pioneer, during the 1920s, and 
Cavendish Physicist.
Cavendish physicist who joined Bawdsey in 1939, and 
worked on the AMRE centimetre team in 1940.
Ionospheric worker in the 1930s, who worked on CH in 
1935-6.
Former Post Office engineer who became a technician on the 
centimetre team at AMRE in 1940.
Head of No. 8 Group, the Pathfinder Force at Bomber 
Command, during the war.
Former Cavendish physicist who was head of Manchester 
University Physics Department before the war. He was a 
member of the CSSAD.
EMI electronic engineer who designed the first usable 
television before the war. Worked on radar during the war, 
and was killed in an aircraft whilst working on H2S in June 
1942.
Research physicist at Birmingham University who invented 
the cavity magnetron with Randall in February 1940.
Originally employed in Watson-Watt’s Radio Research 
Laboratory at Slough, in 1933. Moved to Orfordness in 
1935, and Bawdsey in 1936. Appointed head of British 
airborne team in 1936. Went to USA with Tizard Mission in 
1940.
Head of the Cavendish Laboratory during the 1930s and 
1940s.
German Teleftmken engineer in charge of the centimetre 
research programme after the discover of Rotterdam.
Cavendish physicist, under Dee, conscripted into AMRE at 
the outbreak of war. Worked on centimetre AI 1940-5.
Member of War Cabinet Secretariat who undertook the 



















Lovell’s technician from Manchester University, who 
assisted with Lovell’s experiments during 1939-40
See Lindemann, F.
Member of GEC’s television team pre-war, who worked on 
25cm AI during 1939-40.
Valve designer and engineer, head of Admiralty Signal 
School valve-design group in the late 1930s and during the 
war.
Cavendish physicist who worked on applications of 
centimetre radar. Originator of Operational Research.
AMRE engineer given the job of checking the minimum 
range of AI problem.
Cavendish physicist conscripted into AMRE at the outbreak 
of war. Headed the centimetre team 1940-5.
Assistant to Saward at the Bomber Development Unit, who 
helped with the pre-production design on H2S.
Inventor of GEE system.
Air Member for Research and Development in 1935, who 
voted money for the first CH radar. Better known as head 
of Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain in 1940.
Head of GEC’s television team, who worked on 25cm AI 
during 1939-40.
German physicist in charge of centimetre research at 
Telefunken in the late 1930s, early 1940s, before Brandt.
Head of the Luftwaffe, and number 2 in the Nazi state after 
Hitler.
French engineer with SFR, and inventor of the oxide-coated 
cathode for split-anode magnetrons.
Member of the centimetre AI team at AMRE/TRE, who 
subsequently worked on H2S.
Physicist who was appointed to Bowen’s airborne radar 
team in 1936. He went on to work with metre-wave AI 
during 1940-1.
Hansen, William 











Lee, Sir George 
Lewis, W.B.
Lindemann, F.
American physicist who worked with the Varian brothers to 
design the klystron, at Stanford University between 1936-40.
Commander in Chief of Bomber Command between March 
1942 and 1945. Architect of the Area Bombing policy.
Physiologist at University College, London, and member of 
the CSSAD.
Cambridge physiologist conscripted into AMRE during the 
war. Went to work with Lovell on centimetre research 
during February 1940. Designed the spiral-scanner for 
centimetre AI during 1940.
American inventor of the conventional glass-envelope 
magnetron.
Inventor of the “first” radar, a ship-mounted obstacle- 
detector, patented in 1904.
Manchester University physicist, conscripted into AMRE at 
the outbreak of war, and who joined Lovell’s team at St 
Athan. Killed in an air crash in January 1940.
Physicist under Lindemann at the Clarendon Laboratory 
during the 1930s, who worked in infra-red detection of 
aircraft. At the outbreak of war he was conscripted into 
government service, and worked in scientific intelligence for 
the rest of the war.
Head of Fighter Command 1940-5. Succeeded Dowding.
Member of the Bomber Development Unit, who devised the 
method of navigation using H2 S.
German physicist, and head of GEMA company. First 
person to become interested in radar research in Germany.
Head of the RAF’s Operational Research Section.
Director of Communications Development during the war.
Cavendish physicist appointed in July 1939 by Rowe as 
deputy superintendent of AMRE.
Head of the Clarendon Laboratory, Oxford, during the 
1930s. Became Churchill’s Scientific Advisor during this 
period, a position made official on Churchill’s appointment





O’Kane, Dr B. J.
Oliphant, Sir Mark








Gained PhD in Physics at Bristol University under Skinner in 
1936. Moved to Manchester University under Blackett, 
until conscription into AMRE in 1939. Worked on 
centimetre AI 1940-1, then made head of H2S 1942-5.
Head of the Luftwaffe signals Unit, and in charge of the 
introduction of radar before and during the first part of the 
war.
Engineer and valve-designer with GEC. Worked on split- 
anode magnetrons during the 1930s. Was responsible for 
designing the pre-production cavity magnetron in 1940.
Member of GEC’s television team, who worked on 25cm AI 
during 1939-40 and went on to work with Lovell on H2S 
during 1942-4.
Cavendish physicist from Australia. Moved to become head 
of Birmingham University Physics Department in 1938.
Wartime head of GEC Research Laboratories at Wembley.
Dutch engineer, employed by Phillips, and inventor of the 
split-anode principle for the glass-envelope magnetron in 
1934.
Original owner of Bawdsey Manor, removed in 1936 when 
the radar establishment relocated there.
American head of the Radiation Laboratory at MIT.
Former GEC engineer and physicist who joined Oliphant’s 
team at Birmingham University. Invented the cavity 
magnetron with Boot in February 1940.
Inventor of OBOE system.
In charge of the production of four-engined bombers and 
radio navigation aids at the Ministry of Aircraft Production 
during the war.
Engineer who joined AMRE in 1939. Worked on centimetre 
radar during 1940. Went to USA in 1941 to liase with the 
newly formed MIT Radiation Laboratory.
Rowe, A.P.
Rukop, Dr 
Runge, Dr Wilhelm 
Saward, Dudley 
Saundby, Sir Robert 
Sayers, James
Schoenberg, Sir Isaac 
Schultes, Dr 
Skinner, H.W.B.





Civil Servant made Secretary to the CSS AD in 1934. 
Appointed head of Bawdsey in succession to Watson-Watt 
in 1938.
Head of the Telefunken research & development 
department.
Head of receiver research at the Telefunken laboratory. 
Worked on Rotterdam and Berlin.
Officer in charge of the introduction of radar to Bomber 
Command during the war.
Deputy Commander in Chief of Bomber Command, to 
Harris.
Former Cavendish and ionospheric research physicist who 
joined Oliphant at Birmingham University. Invented the 
strapping principle for cavity magnetrons.
Head of EMI during the war.
German physicist, and Kiihnhold’s deputy at GEMA.
Former Cavendish physicist who was head of Bristol 
University Physics Laboratory during the 1930s. 
Conscripted into AMRE at the outbreak of war, he 
commenced centimetre research in March 1940 and 
eventually became head of centimetre research later that 
year.
Head of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
during the late 1930s and during the war.
American researcher who worked on waveguides during the 
1930s at MIT.
Hitler’s Chief Architect in the late 1930s and the first half of 
the war. He was appointed to run the economy following 
the death of Todt in early 1942, and significantly increased 
production during the period of greatest disruption caused 
by bombing.
German physicist working on centimetre research at 
Telefunken after the discovery of Rotterdam.
Sutton, R.W. Member of the Admiralty Signal School, and designer of the 














Head of the Air Ministry, and head of the sub-committee of 
the Committee for Imperial Defence, set up in 1935 which 
included Lindemann
Rector of Imperial College in 1934, when asked to form a 
committee to review British Air Defence. Continued to 
serve on this committee until 1942, when sidelined due to 
the promotion of Lindemann.
A German civil engineer who came to prominence by 
designing the Autobahn network in the 1930s. He headed 
the Todt Organisation in the Nazi state, which ran all 
construction projects. His responsibilities were taken over 
by Speer after his death.
Clarendon physicist who joined Bowen’s airborne radar team 
in 1937, and who went on to work at AMRE in 1939-41.
Head of the Luftwaffe procurements department, who was a 
former WW1 fighter pilot.
Stanford physicist who worked with his brother and Hansen 
on the klystron, 1936-40.
American Pan-Am pilot who worked with his brother and 
Hansen on the klystron, 1936-40.
Canadian physicist who worked on centimetre receivers at 
AMRE in 1940.
Self-styled “Father of Radar.” An ionospheric worker in the 
early 1930s, he was consulted about the possibility of using 
radio waves to locate and destroy aircraft by members of the 
CSSAD. After using Wilkins to do the calculations, he 
initiated research on radar and was made head of Bawdsey. 
In 1938 he was appointed to the Air Ministry as Director of 
Communications Development.
Ionospheric researcher, who calculated the original radar 
equation in 1935, and who later worked on CH at Bawdsey.
Appointed as Director of Scientific Research, Air Ministry, 
in 1924. Set up CSSAD in 1934
Admiralty Director of Scientific Research, and head of the 
CVD Committee when it was formed in 1939.






Chronology of Radar Development 
Britain Germany
Daventry Experiment
First transmitter working at 
Orfordness.
Kuhnhold begins radar research. 
GEMA founded.
GEMA test their system at 
Friederichshaven.
March 1936 Research group move to Bawdsey. 
Bowen forms airborne group.
Late 1938 Bowen’s group test ASV.
June 1939 Fitting of AI Mark I begins.
Sept. 1939 War breaks out.
Bawdsey moved to Dundee.
Late 1939 Move of airborne group to 
St Athan.
21/2/40 Randall & Boot operate cavity
magnetron.
Early 1940 Commencement of centimetre 
experiments at Dundee and 
St Athan.
May 1940 AMRE moves to Worth Matravers.
Summer 1940 Minimum range problem with 
Marks I-m 1.5m AI.
August 1940 First 10cm echoes. Demonstrations 
to GEC and members of staff.
Freya radar enters service with 
Navy.
German flights over Channel to 
monitor CH transmission.
War beaks out.
Experiments with models indicate 
centimetres unsuitable for aircraft 
detection.
Enquiry by High Command over the 
possibility of airborne radar.
Martini approaches Runge about 
building German AI.
Autumn 1940 Introduction of Mark IV AI. Trials of first Lichtenstein AI.
February 1941 Relaxation of rule disallowing 

















First airborne tests of 10cm AI. German night-fighter pilot
disallowed from using Lichtenstein 
prototype after he is too successful.
Mark IV AI is used increasingly 
successfully against German 
bombing raids.
Germany invades Russia
Investigation into failure of British 
night-bombing.
“Sunday Soviet” meeting about 
bombing aids.
Tests using prototype 10cm AI 
to investigate possibility of 
town-finding.
Secretary of State for Air’s 
meeting orders commencement 
of research into H2S.
Lovell appointed head of H2S 
project.
Bruneval raid captures intact Speer appointed head of German
Wurzburg. war economy. Lichtenstein BC AI
introduced into service.
First flight trials of H2S.
Crash of Halifax V977, killing 
several members of H2S team.
Churchill demands two squadrons 
of H2S-equipped aircraft by autumn.
Restrictions on flying cavity 
magnetron over Germany lifted.
Flight trials of H2S at Bomber 
Development Unit. Introduction 




Nov 1942 Production and equipping of
first PFF squadrons with H2S.
31/1/43 First operational use of H2S.




Beginning of mass-production of 
H2S for main bomber force.




Spring 1944 Heavy losses to bomber force.
6/6/44 Invasion of France
Autumn 1944 Heavy bombing begins to severely 
disrupt German industry. H2S 
cleared of causing heavy losses.
March 1945
Germany
Disarray in German electronics 
industry. Centimetre research again 
rejected as unsuitable for radar.
Capture of H2S, named Rotterdam.
Discovery of purpose of H2S after 
interrogation of operator. First H2S 
severely damaged in raid on 
Telefunken works.
Capture of second, slightly damaged 
H2S to replace severely damaged 
first set.
Preparation of flight-testing for 
rebuilt H2S. Commencement of 
Naxos cm-waming receiver 
programme. Decision to build 
German-designed Berlin.
Capture of Mark VHI 10cm AI.
Installation of Rotterdam into an 
aircraft for flight-trials.
Brandt lecture on state of 
centimetre research in Germany.
Commencement of Rotterdam and 
Berlin flight-trials.
Invasion of France.
Flight-trials of prototype centimetre 
Berlin N l AI.
8/5/45 Surrender of Germany. Surrender of Germany.
June 1945 Capture of German equipment and 
interrogation of radar personnel.
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It is a truism amongst real-ale drinkers that their favourite tipple does not "travel". It can 
only be enjoyed at its best near to its place of origin. Real-ale brewers often assert that the 
particular flavour and colour of their produce is the result of processes that cannot be 
explained "scientifically". Their beer is the product of the brewers art: it comes from the 
skill of its maker. This thesis investigates whether technical knowledge in both its physical 
and embodied forms is like beer. How is it made, and how well does it travel?
1.1 Topic of Investigation
This thesis is a historical investigation into the development of microwave radar in 
Britain, and its subsequent copying in Germany. These events took place during the Second 
World War, with British microwave radar development taking place between October 1939 
and February 1943, and the German development taking place between 1943 and their 
capitulation in May 1945. I will examine the historical events within a theoretical framework 
that I will outline in the next section.
Radar1, a method of object detection using radio-waves, was developed simultaneously 
in several countries during the 1930's. The first systems relied largely on the proven 
components and techniques of the radio industry, of atmospheric research, and of the 
fledgling television industry. Descriptions of these components and techniques were widely 
published in the scientific press during the later 1930’s. However, there was no publication
1 The American acronym ‘radar' (from RAdio Detection And Ranging) only came into widespread use in 
Allied countries in 1944. Prior to this the British used the acronym RDF (from Radio Direction Finding), 
and the Germans refereed to Funkmefiapparat. For clarity’s sake I will refer throughout this thesis to all 
apparatus as being radar, although this usage is strictly anachronisidc in the same way that referring to pre- 
C19th Natural Philosophy as Science is anachronistic. Swords (1986), chapter 2.
2of the radar application of these techniques. As a result, until the outbreak of war scientists 
and engineers in Britain and Germany were unaware of the advances made by in this field by 
their colleagues in the other country2.
During 1939/40 the British became interested in the possibility of using much shorter 
radio waves as a means of producing airborne radars with a longer range and greater 
accuracy than those using the hitherto conventional technology. Such a development was 
encouraged, as senior scientists saw it as the solution to the problem of countering night- 
bombing, something greatly troubling to them and to senior British politicians and military 
leaders. They realised that their newly-developed Coastal Defence Chain radars would 
severely restrict daylight operations by the enemy, who would then be forced to bomb at 
night when the radar chain was useless; British fighters being unable to operate in darkness.
Until this time very short waves were largely ignored for radar purposes, as the means of 
producing them at sufficiently high power did not exist. Similar experiments using them for 
communications links in the mid 1930’s also ceased for the same reason. The propagation 
and transmission characteristics of these microwaves were not studied in any depth in 
Britain. Greater interest was shown by researchers in the United States, which gave the 
British a small body of knowledge in the field on which they could draw. During 1940-41 
British researchers undertook intense activity in this area, and produced suitable components 
for microwave radar including the revolutionary cavity magnetron valve. This proved to be 
the key to high power microwave generation, which then allowed experimentation into 
airborne microwave radars for locating other aircraft (centimetre AI).
In 1942 British researchers carried out experiments to adapt their prototype microwave 
airborne search radar into a terrain-mapping system to be used in bombers. The pressure for 
this system came from a change in the political and military strategy of the Allies, who now 
favoured putting increasing resources into Strategic Bombing. However, an analysis of
2 This also applied to every country who developed radar at around this time, among whom were France, the 
USA, Japan, the Netherlands, and Hungary. Bums (1988, ed.).
3bombing accuracy undertaken during Spring 1941 showed that the majority of bombs 
dropped by the RAF fell nowhere near their intended target. Before wholesale strategic 
bombing could be justified in military terms, a solution to this problem had to be found. One 
of the various solutions proposed was using centimetric radar for terrain-mapping and blind- 
bombing. The system developed form these ideas was known as H2 S, and was first flown on 
operations in February 1943.
The Germans had manufactured well-engineered radar sets using the conventional 
technology well before 1939. Due to a variety of reasons research into microwave radar 
was abandoned by them in 1941. On the second operational mission that H2 S was used by 
the British, an aircraft bearing an example of the apparatus what shot down over Rotterdam 
in Holland. The new equipment was examined by the Germans, and with the help of two or 
three further recovered examples, rebuilt over the following year.
Once the equipment had been examined, a programme of research was initiated in 
Germany to fully understand the technical advances made by the British (and the Americans, 
who had received the cavity magnetron valve in 1940, and had begun a microwave research 
programme themselves). This programme lead to the adaptation of microwave techniques to 
the Germans’ own uses. The first thing they did was to put a detector into their night-fighter 
aircraft which they used to home on to transmissions from British H2 S sets, enabling their 
night-fighters to track the British bomber ‘streams’. The Germans, having first rebuilt H2 S 
as a ground-mapping system named Berlin system, confined their later experimentation into 
turning it into an AI system. They went full circle on the British (who turned their 
centimetre AI into a ground-mapping system for bombers) due to a change in strategic 
priorities that was forced on them by their worsening war situation. No German microwave 
radar equipment was advanced beyond the research stage before hostilities ceased in 1945. 
Some of their apparatus, and some of the scientists who had designed and developed them, 
were captured and interviewed by allied commissions immediately following the capitulation.
4Their testimonies, coupled with Allied assessments of the captured equipment, form an 
important resource about the German side of events.
1.2 Theoretical Basis
As I have outlined very briefly in the previous section, this thesis is a comparative history 
of the development of microwave (centimetric) radar in Britain and Germany during the 
Second World War. What I also wish to do, apart from relate these historical events, is to 
set them in a theoretical framework that will allow me to make an analysis of the material I 
have gathered within the context of historical debate. This framework takes the form of 
three major themes, and one minor theme. These themes have emerged out of issues that are 
important within the field of Science Studies.
I use the term Science Studies to embrace three fields that are inter-related and overlap, 
but that can be defined as three distinct subjects. These are History of Science (and 
Technology), Philosophy of Science, and Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. History of 
Science and Philosophy of Science are disciplines that have had an existence for much of the 
twentieth century, but Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (and its predecessor, Sociology of 
Science) is slightly newer having come into existence in the 1960s. History of Science is and 
has been concerned with studying who has done science, what they have achieved, and how 
they have done it. Philosophy of Science looks at defining if and how Scientific Knowledge 
differs from other forms of knowledge; in other words, it is concerned with epistemology. 
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge grew out of looking at the social aspects of science 
(Sociology of Science), to looking at how the social aspects of science and scientists create 
scientific knowledge.
One of the common themes within these three disciplines is their treatment of the nature 
of Scientific Knowledge from the intellectual angle. In other words, a large proportion of
5work in this area has concentrated on studying scientific theory; looking at scientific ideas, 
or the beliefs of scientists about the way the world is. There has been an emphasis placed on 
scientific ideas and theories as the repositories of knowledge about the world. The role of 
the practical in shaping knowledge about the world, and the nature of practical knowledge as 
a form of knowledge, was largely ignored by these disciplines until the 1980s. The 
development of the debate is summarised extremely well by Pickering in the introduction to 
Science as Practice and Culture.3
Since Kuhn4, Historians of Science have been prepared to use other philosophical and 
historiographical resources apart from treating the subject from an Empiricist5 perspective. 
The field has adopted some of the methodologies of SSK, especially in relation to looking at 
Science as a social phenomenon.6 Several of these authors have chosen to look at how the 
social relations of scientists have shaped their beliefs about the world. For example, the 
social conditions of Seventeenth Century England had a marked influence on the 
development of observation within a defined experimental space (the Royal Society), and the 
social status of the observers conferred legitimacy on their observations when they described 
these experiments to others.7 Some within the field of SSK, particularly those associated 
with Bath and Edinburgh, have chosen to study contemporary science in order to form 
theories about the nature of scientific knowledge.8 Part of their methodology has been to 
trace events as they happened. This has enabled them to use participant interview as a major 
resource. This is unavailable as a resource to historically minded Sociologists of Scientific 
Knowledge, such as Latour, who has studied Louis Pasteur.9
3 Pickering (1992b).
4 Kuhn (1962).
5 See, for example, Putnam (1978).
6 Examples of this are Shapin (1979), Shapin & Schaffer (1985), Schaffer (1989) and Smith & Wise (1989).
7 Shapin & Schaffer (1985).
8 See, for example, Collins (1985), and Bloor (1976). Edge & Mulkay (1976) differs in being historical.
9 Latour (1988).
6The history of radar development has been well documented by participants10, and in the 
secondary literature in the form of reportative recounting of events.11 The only exception to 
this is Susskind’s analysis of radar as an example of simultaneous invention.12 Certainly, no- 
one has attempted a history of radar along the lines that I have as far as I am awar^J3 
However the history of radar, and in particular that of microwave radar in Britain and 
Germany, is ripe for analysis under exactly the sort of theoretical framework that is used by 
historians and sociologists such as Gooding14, Pickering15 and Collins.16 They are amongst 
those who have looked very carefully at the role of human skill and agency in creating 
scientific knowledge. In the next four sections I shall explicate the form of analysis which I 
will bring to bear on the historical material I have gathered, and define it in terms of how it 
fits in with the wider literature of Scientific practice.17
1.2.1 Learning to “See”.
Put in very basic terms, the whole point of a radar set is that it is a device that extends 
the human eye’s ability; it allows people to “see” objects under conditions where the naked 
eye is unable to perform this task, as when the object is too far away, or obscured through 
fog or at night. The history of the development of radar is full of examples of the problems 
of trying to establish a link between an object in the world and a representation of it, most
10 See, for example, Batt (1991), Bowen (1987), Hanbury-Brown (1991), Hodgkin (1992) and Lovell (1991).
11 The best example of this is Guerlac (1988). However, it is also interesting to note that Guerlac wrote this 
history as a contemporary observer, and made extensive use of interview - perhaps the first such history to do 
so.
12 Susskind (1968).
13 Although Jeff Hughes’ work involves the same people at the Cavendish in the 1930’s, and Jon Agar also 
follows some of them as they moved into radio astronomy in the 1950’s and 1960’s, as does Edge & Mulkay 
(1976).
14 Gooding (1990a, b), Gooding (1992).
15 Pickering (1989), Pickering (1992a, b).
16 Collins (1985).
17 I am indebted to my supervisor for discussions that have clarified my methodological intentions.
7usually on a cathode ray screen. This problem is not unique to radar; the difficulty of linking 
“representation” to “object in the world” has characterised the scientific enterprise since the 
Seventeenth Century.
This process has very often worked both ways. It is often the case in science that the 
representation is used as evidence that the object exists, or that an effect is “real”.18 For 
example, when Newton19 was arguing for his theory of white light by passing it through a 
prism to display a spectral image (a representation), his opponents were unable to “see” the 
same effect and blamed the glass in his prisms (this also underlines the difficulty of 
replication, which I will deal with in the next section). However, in the case of radar the 
stability of the object was not in question, it was the representation of it that needed to be 
fixed as not being an artefact of the apparatus.20
The radar scientists and engineers had to ensure that they could link their representations 
to the objects they were trying to track. This involved them being able to communicate their 
private experience of that representation to their colleagues. They needed to persuade, and 
persuasion was not often a straightforward task initially, as I describe. I will highlight the 
structure of their experiments, showing that (to paraphrase Gooding) “observing anything 
but chaotic... behaviour depend[ed] on skilful manipulation..., and this [took] some time to 
acquire.”21
Observation using radar required several types of skill - it required the initial 
experimental and social skills of its inventors in designing it, building it, making it work and 
training others to use it. It then required other skills of its operators in order to turn it into 
an effective observational device. In the next section I will define the four types of skill that 
I have uncovered in operation with reference to other work on this area.
18 This is explored in Woolgar (1988).
19 See Schaffer (1989).
20 This is similar to the history of the use of x-rays to represent the internal structure of the body. See 
Passveer (1993).
21 Gooding (1990b), pl35.
81.2.2 Skill and Tacit Knowledge: Embodied and “Black-Boxed”
The second major theme that I wish to address is that of skill and tacit knowledge. This 
theme is concerned completely with science as practice: with what scientists do (their
experimental skill), and with what they make (knowledge, in the form both of artefact, or
apparatus, and effect, ie what the apparatus and the scientist produce together). As I 
explained in section 1.2, apart from a few earlier examples22 of interest in the practice of 
science, and what forms of knowledge practice could constitute, it is only relatively recently 
that there has been any work in this area. The majority of the recent interest has come from 
History of Science, and SSK.
One of the first people to challenge the view that scientific knowledge came only in the 
form of ideas or theories was Ryle. As he put it:
Theorists have been so preoccupied with the task of investigating the nature, the 
source and the credentials of theories that we adopt that they have for the most part
ignored the question what it is for someone to know how to perform tasks.23
He argued that there was no distinction between mind and body, but there was a distinction 
between “know-how” and “knowing that”.24 What Ryle identified was that some forms of 
knowledge could be embodied, or could be classified as skills. These skills were the abilities 
of people to engage with the world through their actions, and had the further characteristic 
that they could in some cases be unarticulable. Polanyi characterised it thus:
22 See, for example, Ryle (1949) and Polanyi (1959).
23 Ryle (1949), p28.
24 Ryle (1949), ch 1.
9[U]nformulated knowledge, such as we have of something we are in the act of doing, 
is another form of knowledge.25
Polanyi called this form of knowledge ‘Tacit Knowledge”. He was interested in tacit 
knowledge in the form of understanding, as “all human knowledge is... shaped and sustained 
by the inarticulate mental faculties which we share with the animals.” This knowledge is 
gained by experience, as “[the] body is always in use as the basic instrument of our 
intellectual and practical control over our surroundings.”
Someone who has studied the role of human skill in experiment is Harry Collins.26 There 
are several points which I wish to draw out of Collins’ work in order to employ them in my 
own framework. Collins has concentrated on the issue of replicating scientific apparatus, 
and used this to show that in order for replication of effects to take place, then a transfer of 
explicit instructions is not sufficient. In Collins’ case study, a second scientific team is tiying 
to build a TEA laser. Despite them concurring fully with the first team’s results, they are 
unable to get their apparatus to work until a member of the original team is able to bring 
with him his personal skilled knowledge of how to build TEA lasers. Collins shows how 
transfer of knowledge requires a social component. In this case, the scientist has embodied 
know-how, but this knowledge can be made explicit because it is of the form of knowledge 
that wasn’t required before the need to make explicit became necessary. This is one type of 
skill and tacit knowledge.
A further type of skilled tacit knowledge is embodied knowledge in the form of Ryle’s 
“know-how”: this type of skill could be thought of as manipulative skill. Gooding27 has 
shown how Faraday learned skill which became “embodied”, when he learned the 
manipulative skills required to produce the rotation effect. However, not only did Faraday 
learn how to interact with his apparatus to produce an effect, but he also was able to
25 Polanyi (1959), pl2.
26 See Collins (1985).
27 Gooding (1990a).
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produce apparatus in which the manipulative skill was removed, he had ‘‘black-boxed” those 
manipulative skills into an artefact which had “embedded” tacit knowledge. Gooding 
concentrates on the role of the world in prompting lines of investigation by examining the 
“fine structure of experiment”. There is a continuous process of learning by doing, such that 
theory and experiment are combined through human agency. The skill of manipulating 
experimental apparatus in order to see their effects sets up an interactive process such that 
what the experimenter thinks about what he is doing is shaped by the experience of doing, 
and also conversely in that the next steps are shaped by what the experimenter thinks when 
whilst doing. In this way, theory and experiment shape and modify each other.
When examining my work I will be looking for four things:
(i) Instance? of embodied “know-how”, in the form of skilled interaction with apparatus 
in order to produce new effects, and also to interpret effects.
(ii) Instances of embedded “know-how”, in the form of artefacts which have taken non­
explicit tacit knowledge and removed the necessity for an operator who has this knowledge, 
or skill.
(iii) Instances of embodied “know-how” that is made explicit after something fails to 
produce an effect, as in, for example, when apparatus is new and the skills are being learned, 
or when the apparatus is being replicated.
(iv) Instances where communication of knowledge takes place, either by transmission of 
embedded knowledge, or by embodied knowledge.
1.2.3 Communication
This final point brings me to the third theme, that of communication. Communication is 
a social process, and allows the transmission of knowledge. However, knowledge
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transmission can take place in several different ways, and I will highlight some of the ways 
which it takes place and which I feel are of importance. For there to be an exchange of 
scientific knowledge, then there has to be some form of shared culture in order for that 
transmission to occur. For example, written or diagrammatical information can only be 
understood if the recipient is familiar with the language or the diagrammatical notation in 
which it is written or drawn. Furthermore, there has to be a shared scientific culture in order 
to facilitate the transmission of scientific knowledge.
I will be looking at communication on three levels, on the immediate personal level 
between people in a group, between groups within a country, and between different 
countries. The level of the research team provides examples of shared scientific culture, that 
show how at the lowest level, scientific knowledge is transmitted by personal contact. The 
individuals will be able to demonstrate their findings by teaching their peers how to see 
effects, and to produce them for themselves. Group members may also be able to provide 
assistance in the form of new ideas, or through their own particular skills. Such skills may 
be of the form of techniques necessary to manufacture particular items of apparatus, or they 
may be in terms of knowing how to produce the optimal set-up of a collection of apparatus 
through accumulated experimental skill: years of working in similar situations.
Transmission between groups is something covered by Collins2®, and Mackenzie & 
Spinardi.29 Collins has argued (as I mentioned above), that replication of new scientific 
equipment and techniques cannot take place with just the transmission of algorithmic 
knowledge; it also requires the transfer of embodied knowledge in the form of skilled 
experimenters. They are able to provide tacit knowledge in the form of embodied skill in 
how to use the apparatus to get the required result, and they are able to make explicit 
knowledge that had hitherto been implicit because they had not required it. Mackenzie & 
Spinardi have modified this argument to say that replication of new scientific equipment and
28 Collins (1985).
29 Mackenzie & Spinardi (1994).
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techniques can take place without the concomitant transfer of personnel with tacit 
knowledge, but that the replicators will most likely take as much time to make the 
replication as the original experimenter, despite having the knowledge of the outcome (as the 
original experimenters didn’t). This is because they too had to learn how to use the 
apparatus; they had to build up their own tacit knowledge of how to operate the equipment, 
of how to engage with it physically to produce the correct effect.
I will be examining the case of the communication of knowledge between groups 
through the transfer of embedded knowledge in the form of equipment. In particular, I wish 
to see what the Germans found “transparent” about the British radar set they captured. In 
other words, were they able to replicate the set, and if they did replicate, did they fully 
understand its working? Were they able to deduce what they could learn about the new 
British apparatus, techniques and results from studying only the apparatus? Could they use 
this knowledge, if they gained any? This complements the work that I have already 
mentioned, by using Gooding’s ideas of the tacit knowledge embedded in apparatus. This 
knowledge is “black-boxed” by engaging the world through experiment to the point where 
the original manipulative skill of the experimenter is no longer needed. Only interpretative 
skill is required to use it effectively, rather than manipulative skill
1.2.4 The Direction of Knowledge Transfer
This is a minor theme which I will make no more than a brief mention of. The main 
direction of knowledge transfer that I investigate is from Britain to Germany. This is rather 
a narrow view of the intelligence war fought between the two countries. Information flowed 
both ways, and both sides sought out as much as they could. They accomplished this in 
many ways; spies, equipment capture and radio frequency-monitoring were the most 
common.
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The allies had the upper hand in terms of espionage by the fact that they did not occupy 
large tracts of land where they had to operate their secret equipment that had populations 
hostile to them, and ready to pass on information to the enemy. This was very much the 
case with Germany. Both sides regularly monitored the radio traffic (including radar) of the 
other side not only for information, but to see what frequencies were being used. Injudicious 
use of airborne radar could also be a give-away to the position or timing of operations. In 
particular, the Germans quickly employed a listening device for H2 S, called Naxos. I will 
draw attention to instances of knowledge transfer in both directions, as opposed to the main 
centimetre radar theme.
1.3 Resources
The resources and methods chosen by me to accomplish my aims include some that are 
traditionally associated with the historian, and some that aren’t. The first sources of 
information on the topic that I used were books, and journals. Information contained in such 
a manner falls under several different types. Much of the published work on radar falls 
under the class of participant information of one sort or another. The journal material is 
much more limited. The second source available to me was archive material. This includes 
the reports and diagrams produced at the time, and in some cases laboratory note-books too, 
and constitutes the major primary source.
Primary information can also come from interviews with participants, a method not used 
as much by the historian as by the sociologist. This is due largely to the obvious necessity of 
participants being alive in order to conduct interviews with them. In this case, the events are 
still sufficiently recent for there to be some participants still alive. This method of research 
was interesting in that it offered possibilities for corroboration that are not usually available. 
I found that three out of my four interviewees had already written up their experiences in the
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form of memoir or histories. The interview allowed me to clarify some areas of ambiguity, 
and ask for their impressions on events. The fourth interviewee discussed his laboratory 
notebook and impressions with me. In addition, one of the interviewees took me around key 
sites in the development of the first British microwave radar. As nothing remains of the huts 
where the experiments took place, he was able to show me the exact locations of buildings, 
and the places where some of the experiments occurred and the landmarks used for 
calibration of equipment.
In all these cases of interview my experience has been very similar to that of Frederic L. 
Holmes, who used interviews of Hans Krebs in later life in conjunction with Krebs own 
notes and papers from the time he was doing his major work. Krebs’ later thoughts are very 
different to those when he was doing his early work; his early uncertainty is replaced by a 
later conviction about how things appeared.30 This process goes on between the original 
source material and my interview material, and I make mention of it where it occurs. As 
Gooding points out, this allows us a window into the process of reconstruction that a 
scientist uses, not only when first performing the work but also in later life.
I examine a related theme in Appendix A, that of the difference in account afforded by 
the difference in perspective of participants according to their level of competence and their 
social position. In particular, I compare the account of one of the scientists, Lovell, who 
later achieved high status in his field of radio astronomy, with one of his technicians, Batt. 
Batt was not a research scientist like Lovell; he was a trained technician. He had some skills 
which Lovell did not, and vice versa. His different social standing in terms of his position in 
the heirarchy of the laboratory meant he saw events in a different way to Lovell. This 
difference in perspective has become visible when one compares the two accounts. The two 




1.4 Outline of Thesis
The main body of work divides into two sections. The first section is concerned with 
British developments. The second section examines the German developments, draws 
together the findings from the previous section and that section, offers an analysis of the 
material, and presents some answers to the questions outlined above in the light of the 
analysis.
Within the first section, there are four chapters. Chapter two looks at the development 
of radar in Britain before the centimetre revolution. It explores the technical and political 
background that gave the conditions for this development, and the subsequent directions 
taken that lead to the realisation that centimetre waves were desirable. It shows how initial 
AI success was achieved using small highly skilled +eams, and how these teams came to be 
broken up and marginalised. It points out what these radar-building skills were, and how 
they would subsequently be useful. I also make mention of some of the other outcomes that 
could have occurred without the particular chain of events that lead to the decision to press 
ahead with centimetre research. This is interesting in the light of the Germans’ decision not 
to go down this particular road.
Chapter three presents the development of centimetre components in Britain, with some 
collaboration from France and America. It looks at the state of knowledge that existed 
about the subject before any research was undertaken with the specific development of radar 
in mind. It examines where and when the significant advances in component design were 
made, especially the cavity magnetron, and again shows how small, highly-skilled teams 
operated in concert with each other to produce semi-manufactured components that were 
absorbed into the fledgling radar programme. These first two chapters rely mainly on 
secondary material. The next chapters are based more on primary material.
The fourth chapter explores the different ways in which the problem of centimetre radar 
was tackled, by GEC (General Electric Company) and by AMRE (Air Ministry Research
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Establishment), initially separately but later in unison. GEC developed a 25cm system which 
was working shortly before AMRE were able to produce anything on 10cm with the cavity 
magnetron. It shows how the researchers suffered problems of replication, experimental 
skill and team-work in constructing the first operational centimetre AI.
The fifth chapter follows the development of the H2 S blind-bombing and navigation 
system. It looks at the political pressures for such a system, the realisation that one was 
possible, and the difficulties experienced in producing anything workable and worthwhile. It 
also notes the difficulties experienced by the Americans in replicating British results despite 
readily available information. The bounds of the chapter extend to the system that was used 
operationally and captured by the Germans, in February 1943.
Similarly, the second section, which is concerned with German developments, contains 
three chapters. Chapter six explores the development of German radar prior to the 
discovery of the British centimetre set. It follows the aims of the German researchers and 
designers, and looks at the reasons why research into the centimetre waveband was largely 
ignored.
The seventh chapter looks at how the Germans came to grips with their discovery. What 
difficulties there were for them in teasing out the secrets of the knowledge embedded in the 
set, and how these were overcome. How did they reorganise their research, and what 
impact did this discovery have? Were the Germans able to replicate British/American 
centimetric knowledge successfully? Did they achieve this more speedily knowing that the 
outcome of such research was possible?
In the final chapter there are two aims in mind. The first is to compare developments in 
Britain and Germany, before and after H2 S. What lead British research to take a different 
direction to German? How well did the Germans ’’catch up”? The second aim is to examine 
the implications of this story for the understanding of technological innovation and 
proliferation, and the way knowledge is created and disseminated. Lastly, I offer some
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conclusions from the work, and gives some pointers to future research that may be 
undertaken either from this work, or using its findings.
British microwave radar research followed patterns that will be recognisable to anyone 
familiar with Collins’ and Gooding’s work. The successful, speedy research especially in 
Britain was conducted in atmospheres of co-operation between individuals and teams, with 
great ease of communication between these individuals and teams. The personnel involved 
had similar backgrounds, and/or had acquired great practical skill in dealing with electronic 
components and apparatus. They also usually came form backgrounds that were 
unconventional in the terms of the field, such as physics, or even biochemistry. There was 
also much co-operation between the research teams, the military and the manufacturers. 
Where this broke down, or where persons or teams were isolated, progress was slow, and 
the “wheel was often reinvented”. Links provided the source for many instances of 
“serendipity”.
German research was much more fractured and suffering from the kind of bureaucratic 
interference that British research to some extent managed to throw off. The plus side was 
that their equipment was well engineered, robust and easy to service. Later on, despite 
efforts to reorganise when the extent of the Allied microwave revolution became clear, 
research was still split around institutions in physically different places. To what extent there 
was co-operation between these institutes is unclear. The Germans took roughly the same 
time to develop experimental centimetre sets of their own as their British counterparts, so it 
would seem possible that at best, fore-knowledge of the success of microwaves provided no 
advantage. In some cases it could be argued that given Germany’s particular situation in the 
later stages of the war centimetre research was a diversion as the resources employed into it 
would have been better used elsewhere.
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Chapter 2: Pre-Microwave Radar
2.1 Introduction
The main body of this thesis is concerned with how the British developed centimetre 
radar, and then how the Germans copied this discovery. However, before I go on to look at 
the British centimetre radar developments in chapters 3, 4 and 5, and the German 
developments in chapters 6 and 7, there is something that needs to be done first. That 
something is to tell how radar came about, and what the British had learned about how to 
construct it, develop it and use it before its perceived limitations meant that centimetre wave 
radar came to be required and developed
The date generally accepted by historians for the beginning of radar in Great Britain is 
February 26th 1935. On this day, in a van in a field near Weedon in Northamptonshire, 
"beats" (a form of fluctuating signal) were received from a Heyford bomber flying through 
the beam of the BBC Empire short-wave transmitter at Daventry. The significance of this 
event lay not in the effect produced, for such an effect had been seen, and noted, before, but 
in that this demonstration had been arranged for a purpose. That purpose was to persuade 
the Air Ministry, and more specifically Sir Hugh Dowding, head of Fighter Command that 
they should provide funding into researching a means of early warning, based on the 
reflection of radio-waves. As such it was successful.
Radar is a means of detection using radio waves. That it was developed at this time in 
particular, and at all depended on several factors: the recognition of the reflective and 
detective properties of radio waves, the recognition of the detectability of aeroplanes and 
other objects by such methods, and the need for such a method of detection.
Any attempt at the writing the history of a scientific or technological artefact must 
involve decisions about where to begin the account, what is included in it, and what is left 
out. Any start-point is in some senses an arbitraiy decision, for in the history of science the 
decision of what constitutes a key event is essentially a retrospective one.
This chapter will examine the genesis of radar, primarily in Britain, up to the 
development of the first airborne apparatus. This particular application was the main spur
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for the development of microwave radar in this country, so it will serve as a background 
chapter for those events, chronicled in Chapters 3, 4 & 5. However, the story is also an 
international one, so I will also mention episodes that occurred in other countries. Events 
relating specifically to the development of pre-microwave German radar will be covered in 
Chapter 6.
I will look at the radio background of radar, in terms of commercial industry and 
research into atmospheric composition, where many of the skills and techniques used in 
radar research were perfected. The political situation in Britain in the early 1930’s, in 
particular the fear of air attack form a resurgent Nazi Germany provided the impetus for 
using science to investigate the possibility of air defence against bombers. Sir Henry Tizard, 
Rector of Imperial College, scientist and former test-pilot, headed a government committee 
tasked with finding a solution to this problem. This committee was instrumental in setting 
up the research establishment, first at Orford Ness, and later at Bawdsey Manor, that would 
become known during the war as AMRE and then TRE.
Research begun in 1935 led by 1936 to the development of a system that enabled 
aircraft detection to accuracies of around 5 miles. Experience garnered with this system by 
regular exercises in conjunction with RAF fighter squadrons led to the development of a co­
ordinated fighter-control network, using information provided by radar stations located in a 
gradually extending chain around the coastline. This type of radar became known as Chain 
Home.
When Tizard was satisfied with progress toward the problem of daylight detection, he 
started to press in 1936 for an airborne system that could detect aircraft at night. His 
reasoning was that, if daylight raids could be detected easily, then the bombers would be 
forced to operate in overcast or night-time conditions. Therefore some other method of 
detection more accurate than Chain Home would be required. He set up a small team under 
the leadership of Dr E.G.Bowen to look at this problem.
Over the next three years Bowen’s team went a long way towards developing skills, 
techniques and apparatus peculiar to airborne operation, where the difficult and cramped 
conditions caused difficulties in addition to the normal experimental problems encountered in 
a warm, stable, spacious laboratory. Events of 1939-40 described here, and in Chapters 3
2 0
and 4 effectively sidelined Bowen, and the many skills he and his team built up were nearly 
lost. Fortunately they were able to pass many of these on to the new recruits such as Lovell 
and Hodgkin, but later in the war their experience was missed. I wish to examine the nature 
of Bowen’s team and their investigations in relation to the questions posed in the 
introduction, and to show how his was a highly skilled, close-knit team that very similar to 
those which characterised the centimetre teams of the war. Their expertise was under­
utilised due to political tensions within the establishment. Nevertheless, they managed to 
develop a crude form of Airborne Interception (AI) radar by the outbreak of war, along with 
a ship and submarine system ASV (Anti Surface Vessel). It was Bowen who was one of the 
main protagonists behind beginning centimetre research when he realised that his own 
remarkable 1.5m AI would still have operational defects that would limit its range to the 
height of the aircraft above ground.
2.2 Political and Technical Background
2.2.1 The Beginning
Radar is a means of detection using radio-waves. The background to the development 
of radar can be considered to consist of four parts. Firstly, the recognition of the reflective 
properties of radio-waves. Secondly, the development of components and technologies 
adaptable to radar purposes. Thirdly, investigations into methods of detection of aircraft and 
other objects. Lastly, the impetus to recognise, push for and develop radio-wave detection 
methods into working systems. I shall give an account of each part.
Maxwell’s mathematical theory of electro-magnetic waves predicted the existence of 
undiscovered waves whose properties would be similar to those of light. These properties 
were that the waves would have a velocity equal to that of light, and that they would be 
"reflected from conducting surfaces and refracted by dielectrics according to the classical 
laws of geometrical objects".1
1 Guerlac (1988), p33.
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Such waves were first produced by Heinrich Hertz in experiments conducted during 
1887-88. Once he had succeeded in generating and detecting radio waves, he began a series 
of experiments that showed that these new waves behaved in the same manner as light. 
Hertz's first apparatus used a spark gap transmitter that produced waves of 10m in length. 
Subsequently he managed to generate waves as small as 66cm. H»« experiments confirmed 
that the waves had light-like properties, such as reflection, refraction, polarisation, shadow- 
casting and diffraction.
In the following decade other researchers demonstrated the optical properties of what 
are now termed microwaves, or electromagnetic waves of lengths of around 10cm to 
millimetres. For example, the Russian Peter Lebedev, using 6mm waves, showed double 
refraction in a crystal. This had not been possible with the longer waves of Hertz's 
equipment.
It was not long before people realised the possibilities of the "Hertzian Waves" for 
"wireless" telegraphy. Marconi's initial experiments in 1896 were made using lm waves 
with a parabolic reflector behind both the transmitter and the receiver. However, the 
technology of the day meant that it was only possible to generate longer waves of sufficient 
power for communication purposes, and this led to the virtual abandonment of short-wave 
work around the turn of the century.
2.2.2 Radio Technology
The expanding field of radio, or wireless, led to the taking of a number of steps along 
the road to the development of radar. These steps included several devices that, with 
hindsight, could be viewed as radar apparatus. Radio, and, to a lesser degree, television, 
were the providers of the basic components of radar. In this section I shall outline the 
development of the components for radar, and the ways in which some of the techniques 
used were invented and developed.
The main requirement for a radar set, when the possibilities of the technique were 
eventually realised, was for a valve that could produce very short radio waves at very high
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had the embodied knowledge of an unarticulable kind, of working with radio equipment. 
This is the kind of experimental skill that can be “black-boxed”, but also assists the 
experimenter when they are working in terms of helping them to make decisions about how 
to progress. When the war finally came, these persons were among those recruited into 
radar research.3
The utilisation of long waves for radio communication at the beginning of the Twentieth 
Century was largely due. to fact that at this time it was only possible to generate the high 
transmitter power needed for broadcasting at these longer lengths. Due to the almost 
exclusive utilisation of wavelengths of the order of hundreds of metres, the optical-type 
effects that were more readily observed with very short waves passed out of the everyday 
experience of scientists and engineers. Despite this lack of exposure to very short waves, 
which might lead one to expect a lack of interest in experimenting with them, their reflective 
properties were first used in a detection device in the first decade of the century.
Several historians4 have identified the anti-collision device of Christian Hulsmeyer, 
patented in 1904, as the earliest example of a radar. However, as it was not a pulsed device, 
others do not classify it so, despite other similarities. Hulsmeyer was a young engineer who 
originally trained as a teacher. He had used his training as an opportunity to repeat Hertz's 
experiments, as he was interested in Physics. He became involved in the idea of an obstacle 
detector for ships after witnessing the grief of a mother whose son had been drowned in a 
collision at sea. This prompted him to search for a means of avoiding such collisions and 
unnecessary deaths.
For its time, Hiilsmeyer's apparatus was remarkably advanced, and contained several 
innovations that would later become standard in radar sets. Principal of these was the use of 
a method of shielding the receiver from the transmitter. This also discriminated between the 
signal received from its own transmitter, and that from another transmitter. The apparatus 
operated on a wavelength of 40-50cm, and had a range of about 5km. The transmitter and 
receiver both had directional aerials bearing a strong resemblance to those devised by 
Professor Yagi in the late 1920's (such "Yagi arrays” are nowadays seen on many roofs in
3 Guerlac (1988), pp36-40.
4 See, for example, Swords (1986) pp43-5, Pritchard (1989) chi and Guerlac (1988) p41.
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distance further than the direct (ground) wave would travel. They assumed that the 
reflection occurred from a layer of charged ions. Despite this early interest, little 
experimental work was done on investigating the phenomenon until the early 1920's. The 
success of amateurs in using short-wave transmissions for long distance communication, and 
the unusual associated effects, revived interest in it.
In 1924 the so-called "skip distance" (see Fig 2.1) was discovered by amateurs using 
100m transmissions. This was a distinct gap in the distance away from the transmitter where 
transmitted waves could be received, arising from the different distances travelled from the 
ground (direct) and sky (reflected) waves. Discovery of this phenomenon opened up 
investigations into the properties of the layer that was believed to cause this reflection. In 
Britain Appleton and Barnett were the first to work on this area, using a frequency-change 
method similar to that later employed by the Russian Geodesy team. In December 1924 and 
January 1925 they calculated the height of the "Kennelly/Heaviside Layer". This work was 
also taken up in America by two researchers called Breit and Tuve, who were the first to 
employ a pulse technique making these measurements. They calculated the height of the 
layer to be between 50 and 130 miles. They thought that their initial results may be due to 
the Blue Ridge Mountains, which were also at about that distance from their transmitting 
and receiving apparatus. This is interesting in the context of later work on radar, when the 
experimenters were still trying to map what they “saw” with their apparatus to an object in 
the outside world. This is a perennial problem in science, and one that has occurred in many 
other instances as I have described in the Introduction. I make further mention of the 
problem in a radar context in chapters 2 and 4.10
Subsequent to its publication, Breit and Tuve’s pulse method was adopted widely, and 
the British team abandoned their continuous-wave/frequency-change method. The interest 
that this work generated led to the amassing of a large body of research aimed at exploring 
the upper atmosphere using radio methods. Subsequent work during the late 1920's and 
early 1930's refined the techniques to get shorter and clearer pulses, and introduced the 
cathode-ray oscilloscope as an indicator. Amongst those working on this area in Britain was 
Robert Watson-Watt, who was responsible for coining the word "Ionosphere" to describe
10 Guerlac (1988), pp50-3.
Figure 2.1: Sky wave, ground wave and sKip-distance. This diagram shows the 
area where no signals can be received (skip distance), because the range is too 
great for a direct wave from the transmitter (ground wave), and too short for the 
reflected wave from the ionosphere (sky wave).
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the various reflecting layers in the upper atmosphere.11 It was his familiarity with pulsed 
radio distance-measuring techniques that led to Watson-Watt suggesting this method for the 
location of aircraft when he was asked about the problem in 1935.
Lastly it is worth mentioning that the effects of aircraft interfering with radio beams 
were published twice during the early 1930’s. Prior to these two instances of publication, in 
January 1931, W.A.S.Butement and P.E.Poilard of the (British) Signals Experimental 
Establishment submitted a proposal to the War Office. After the War Office rejected it, 
Butement and Pollard also submitted it to the Admiralty, who also rejected it. The Air 
Ministry were ironically not approached, for after two rejections Butement and Pollard were 
not inclined to seek a third. The Air Ministry had the greatest need for such a system, and if 
they had heard of Butement and Pollard’s work it might have given them three years' start. 
Their system was, in Clarke's words, "the world's first rudimentary radar proposal."12 They 
proposed the detection of ships from ship or shore using a transmitted radio pulse on a 
wavelength of around 50cm. They suggested using a rotatable beam, with directed antennae 
to ensure the beam was narrow. Before their work was halted due to the rejections they 
managed to perform some basic experiments that obtained reflections from stationary 
objects, which indicated some promise for the idea.
In December of 1931, Post Office engineers at their Research Station at Dollis Hill in 
London were experimenting with a short-wave communications system. They noted some 
unusual effects whenever aircraft flew through the beam. These interesting results were 
written up in a report dated 3/6/32. They explained that the aircraft set up a pattern of 
"beats" interference (much the same as that later used in the so-called "Daventry 
Experiment"), and they even attempted to correlate the frequency of the beats with the 
aircraft's speed. Independently, in January of 1933 workers at the Bell Telephone 
Laboratories in the United States published more detailed observations of the same effect 
that noted that it occurred even when aircraft were out of sight.13
In this section I have indicated how the technology and skills that came to be used in 
radar arose. The apparatus and components were high-power, short wave valves for pulse
11 Guerlac (1988), p52; Watson-Watt (1957), p92.
12 Clarke (1965), p i 14.
13 Watson-Watt (1957), p94.
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operation, and CRT displays. The skills were those necessary to build and operate 
transmitters and receivers utilising these components. These skills and equipment came from 
a mixture of scientific and commercial interest, aided in some cases by military pressure. 
However, reflection of radio waves by objects remained solely an interesting and sometimes 
irritating phenomenon until 1934. This attitude changed due to concern about how to detect 
bombing aircraft, and the belief that a new method of detection could be found by using 
science and scientists to investigate the problem. The political pressure that led to scientific 
interest in this phenomenon being revived and actively pursued, will be recounted in section 
2.2.4.
2.2.3 Other Detection Methods
Just as there were several different types of object which scientists and the Military were 
keen to detect, there were also several different methods tried for detecting them before the 
pulsed radio-wave technique was almost universally adopted. These other methods fall 
broadly into three types: utilisation of sound, infra-red, and ignition-noise.
Sound locators were developed as aircraft detectors during the First World War and 
were also used during the 1920's and 30's. The first locators were little more than large ear 
trumpets; later ones were much bigger. The major problem with sound location was the 
relatively slow speed of sound (approximately 700 mph; radio waves travel at the same 
speed as light: 186 000 mph) in relation to the speed of the aircraft (2-300 mph at this time). 
The problem was that because the speed of the aircraft noise travelled only 3 times as fast as 
the source of that noise, by the time the noise arrived at the listener, the aircraft had already 
moved a considerable distance nearer. The faster the aircraft, the greater the distance it had 
moved and the less time afforded by warning apparatus. By the early 1930s aircraft speeds 
were such that the utility of sound locators was negligible.
Nevertheless, a programme for building large, concrete sound locators around the South 
East coast of England commenced in 1933. A large concrete sound-mirror was built on the 
edge of Romney Marsh in Kent pointing in the direction of Paris, as France was the
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European nation with the largest bomber force at that time and therefore perceived by the 
British as their biggest threat. This, incredibly, was despite the recent seizure of power in 
Germany by Hitler. As Watson-Watt later put it, "Reinforced concrete is rudely uncompliant 
to the winds of diplomacy".14 Furthermore, this mirror was next to useless. It would pick 
up nothing unless the aircraft was almost directly in line with the focal axis of the mirror, and 
even then any sound could be easily masked by other noises, such as motor boats, cars, or 
the wind. However, "this unpromising work went on because there was apparently no other 
hope".15 Even after the eventual development of the coastal radar chain, sound locators 
continued to be used inland by the Royal Observer Corps, as there was no other method in 
place for detecting aircraft once they had crossed the coastline (the radar chain only pointed 
outwards from the coast).
Another method tried as a means of detecting aircraft relied on emissions from them. 
The ignition systems of petrol engines generate electromagnetic radiation. This occurs 
because of the high-voltage spark that is used to ignite the air-petrol mixture. During the 
late 1920's the French considered using this effect as the basis of a means of detection, until 
they realised that efficient screening of the emissions could eliminate their usefulness.16
Investigations into the military usage of infra-red radiation (another detectable emission) 
began during the First World War. The first experiments were conducted into detecting 
people, ships and vehicles, and met with a reasonable degree of success. Infra-red detection 
of aircraft was limited by the sensitivity of the available receivers, and by the inability of 
infra-red to penetrate through clouds (it is absorbed by water molecules). Nevertheless, 
during the late 1930s R.V. Jones, a young British graduate student, pursued the possibilities 
of this phenomenon as a means of detection, at the Clarendon Laboratory in Oxford. The 
Laboratory head, Professor Lindemann (later to become Churchill's scientific advisor), 
strongly supported this line of research, especially as a means of detecting aircraft from other 
aircraft at night. Lindemann was a noted “hawk” of the period, as I recount in the next 
section. Writing in 1972, Jones claimed that:
14 Watson-Watt (1957), p80.
15 Rowe (1948), p4.
16 Swords (1986), p48.
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On April 27th 1937 I made what appears to have been the first flight in which an 
aircraft was detected by another in flight by infra-red. The range was modest - only 500 
yards - but the limitation was not due to the detector but to the... transformer...17
Despite this interest, Lindemann was notoriously antagonistic toward radar. Eventually, this 
led to personal enmity between him and Sir Henry Tizard, the chair of the committee formed 
to investigate Air Defence. This committee eventually chose radio-wave detection as the 
best option for detecting aircraft using scientific methods. It is possible that infra-red 
detection could have been useful in the context of night-fighting, as a means of detecting 
other aircraft. However, by that stage (1936) Lindemann’s stock was so low that radar was 
the only option considered by Tizard’s committee (see section 2.1.4).
The potential of these other methods, with the possible exception of infra-red, was 
exhausted by the time anyone decided to investigate seriously the possibilities of scientific 
research into detecting aircraft. That is one of the main reasons why radar came to be 
accepted so wholeheartedly and so quickly as the best method of solving Britain’s air- 
defence problems. This was despite recognition (in some quarters) of the defects of the 
technique, such as its susceptibility to jamming.
2.2.4 Political Background
Edgerton has argued recently that Britain has long had an appreciation of the value of 
air-power, and its own vulnerability to it.18 The British State saw air power as a 
technological alternative to having to use large numbers of personnel, which the economy 
could not afford, stretched as it was with commitments to Imperial defence. Edgerton 
argues that Britain was not inadequately equipped when war broke out (as the popular myth 
would have it). Rather, the Air Ministry and senior members of the Government had an
17 Swords (1986), p51, quoted from Jones, RV. (1972) "Some turning-points in infra-red history", The 
Radio and Electronic Engineer 42 ppl 17-126.
18 See Edgerton (1991) for an aeroplane-orientated radical reinterpretation of Britain's role as a 
technological and military power.
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appreciation of the possibilities of the aeroplane throughout the 1930’s. By appreciating, and 
even exaggerating the threat that air power posed to an industrial society the State 
recognised the need to prepare for air defence. It was in the light of such appreciation that 
Stanley Baldwin made his remark on 10 November 1932, that "The bomber will always get 
through".
Britain was the only country to emerge from the end of the First World War with an 
independent Air Force. Shortly before the end of that war the newly formed Royal Air 
Force19 founded a strategic bombing force in order to attack German industrial targets. 
During the late 1920's and 1930's the Royal Air Force was often used for policing duties on 
the Empire's frontiers, especially in Iraq20, where the potential of using aircraft to exercise 
military (and political) power in a cheap and effective fashion was first recognised. As such, 
Britain was unique amongst World powers in putting such official faith in aircraft, and in 
perceiving the threat from them.21
By 1934 Hitler was in power in Germany, and it became increasingly obvious that he 
was rebuilding the German Air Force. This was contrary to the terms of the Versailles 
Treaty, the peace accord from the First World War which forbade Germany to have any Air 
Force whatsoever.22 There was an increasing realisation amongst politicians and the military 
that the British Isles were becoming ever more vulnerable to air attack. The speed of 
bombers relative to fighters was increasing, making them more difficult to shoot down (even 
if they could be found). The nature of the geography of the British Isles meant that this 
threat was keenly felt. Enemy aircraft could only be spotted within close proximity to the 
coast. Therefore, with nowhere more than 70 miles from the coast, and most targets less 
than this, defending fighters would not have enough time to take off and climb to meet
19 The Royal Air Force was formed by amalgamating the Army’s Royal Flying Corps and the Navy’s Royal 
Naval Air Service. It was done despite heavy opposition by the two older services, and for some years after 
the end of the war lived in danger of being returned to its former masters.
20 The commander of one of the squadrons engaged in these activities was Arthur Harris, who became a 
strong advocate of area strategic bombing and Head of Bomber Command during the second half of the 
Second World War.
21 Edgerton (1991) ppl6-21. This view is also confirmed by Gunston (1986), pp32-3.
22 The Germans had for some time been training pilots in places such as the Soviet Union, also ostracised 
during the 1920’s. There was also a proliferation of gliding schools where many Germans learned to fly, no 
doubt in preparation for the day when Germany was allowed or decided to have an Air Force again.
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raiders after they had been reported crossing the coastline, leaving the whole country 
vulnerable.23
Further anxiety was caused by the Summer Air Exercises of 1934. A series of night 
"attacks" were conducted against London and Coventry. RAF bombers were sent to probe 
the air defences of these targets. In the first attack the Air Ministry building was deemed 
successfully "destroyed". More than half the "attacking" aircraft reached their target. It 
looked as though Baldwin's prediction about the bomber always getting through was 
tellingly accurate. At this time the main method of early warning against air-attack was a 
large concrete mirror (the sound locator mentioned in the previous section) designed to pick 
up the sound of approaching aircraft. It was starkly clear that this method was inadequate 
for the demands of locating the rapidly improving bombers of that time.
In 1924 the Air Ministry had appointed H.E.Wimperis as its first Director of Scientific 
Research, after Henry Tizard (of whom more will be said later) refused the post. Wimperis 
graduated in mechanical engineering before the First World War, during which he joined the 
Royal Naval Air Service. He helped to set up a research laboratory at Imperial College in 
1917 and remained there after the war until appointed to the Air Ministry. At the same time 
as Wimperis’ appointment, A.P.Rowe, a civil servant who was a physicist by training, was 
appointed as his Personal Assistant.24
It was in the atmosphere of resignation towards the threat of air defence that was 
current in September 1934 that Rowe, on his own initiative, undertook a review of Air 
Ministry files relating to air defence; he found 53. This was by no means encouraging, as 
"there were at that time several times 53 thousand files in Air Ministry on other topics; and 
many of the 53 [he found] contained mere brief letters or one-page memoranda."25 Faced 
with such a dearth of thinking on this topic, writing in 1948 Rowe summarised the situation 
facing him thus:
It was clear that the Air Staff had given conscientious thought and effort to the design 
of fighter aircraft, to methods of using them without early warning and to balloon defences.
23 Clarke (1965) ppl05-6.
24 Swords (1986) p84; Clarke (1965) p66,69.
25 Gunston (1976) p37.
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It was also clear however that little or no effort had been made to call on science to find a 
way out. I therefore wrote a memorandum summarising the unhappy position and 
proposing that the Director of Scientific Research [Wimperis] should tell the Secretary of 
State for Air [Lord Londonderry] of the dangers ahead. The memorandum said that unless 
science evolved some new method of aiding air defence, we were likely to lose the next war 
if it started within ten years. Unfortunately, I was not clever enough to think of a new 
method.26
Wimperis and Rowe were not the only ones being galvanised into action by the 
perceived threat of air bombardment. Within the Royal Air Force, a sub-committee of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was formed under the then chief of British Air 
Defence, Air Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham. In addition, from within Parliament 
Winston Churchill (at this time enjoying one of his periods in the political wilderness) 
agitated for something to be done to rectify the complete lack of provision for air defence 
against bombers. Churchill relied heavily on the head of the Clarendon Laboratory in 
Oxford, Professor Lindemann, for scientific advice. With Churchill out of favour, 
Lindemann’s influence was low, a situation that later changed greatly with the fortunes of his 
patron.
Following the advice of Rowe’s memo, in October 1934 Wimperis contacted Professor 
A. V.Hill of University College, London. Hill was a physiologist by profession, but he had 
worked on armament research during the First World War. Wimperis wished to discuss the 
possibility of using electromagnetic radiation to disable or kill people on board aircraft. The 
so-called “death-ray” was a popular contemporary idea and Wimperis decided to find out 
whether it belonged firmly within the boundaries of science fiction. Proposals for such a 
device would arrive regularly on his desk, usually accompanied with polite requests for large 
amounts of money with which to commence or continue further work. The two met on 15th 
October to discuss the problem of air defence, and Wimperis left the meeting intending to 
put a proposition to the Air Council.
The next step occurred on 12th November when Wimperis finally sent his proposition to 
Lord Londonderry. The document suggested that a committee be formed to study the
26 Rowe (1948) p4.
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problem of Air Defence from a scientific perspective. He proposed that the committee 
consist of himself, Hill, Professor P.M.S.Blackett (a physicist who had served in the Navy) 
and Henry Tizard, rector of Imperial College, Chairman of the Air Ministry's Aeronautical 
Research Committee, and a former test-pilot. Rowe would act as secretary. All these men 
were also personal friends of Wimperis. Furthermore, the make-up of the committee fitted it 
to perform equally well within the interleaved but distinct worlds of academia, government 
and the armed forces.
Tizard was formally asked to chair the committee on 12th December. Its terms of 
reference were to be "to consider how far recent advances in scientific and technical 
knowledge can be used to strengthen the present methods of defence against hostile 
aircraft."27 Tizard then wrote to the other members of the committee to ascertain their 
views, and arranged a meeting for 28th January 1935. The committee was named the 
Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence (CSSAD), and was referred to 
informally as the Tizard Committee.
However, in early January and prior to this first meeting Wimperis contacted another 
friend, Robert Watson-Watt, who worked at the Radio Research Board at Slough, in order 
to question him too about the possibilities (if they existed) of the "death-ray". Watson-Watt 
put the proposals to one of his junior researchers, A.F.Wilkins, who concluded that radio­
waves could not be generated at sufficient power or wavelength to have any appreciable 
affect on the structure of an aircraft or its occupants. However, as Watson-Watt pointed out 
at the conclusion of his report:
[A]ttention is being turned to the still difficult but less unpromising problem of radio­
detection as opposed to radio-destruction, and numerical considerations on the method of 
detection by reflected radio waves will be submitted if required.28
27 Clarke (1965), p i 12.
28 Watson-Watt (1957), p83. At this time Robert Alexander Watson Watt was just plain Mr Watt; after 
being knighted in 1942 he changed his surname to Watson-Watt. The quote also gives an example of his 
rather flamboyant and wordy prose-style.
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Wimperis passed on the findings of this report to the first meeting of the CSSAD. The 
committee followed up by requesting further details, as Watson-Watt suggested. Watson- 
Watt set a further problem to Wilkins, based on the amount of energy an aircraft would re- 
radiate if it was assumed to behave like a 25m horizontal dipole. The results of his 
calculations were submitted to the committee in a letter dated 14th February. In it were 
contained not only the calculations that showed that detection was a distinct possibility, but 
also a clearly articulated vision of how detection could be incorporated into a defence 
system. This was a very important document as it shaped British thinking about radar for 
the next few years and culminated in the Chain Home early warning radar. Gunston’s 
analysis gives some idea of the effect of Watson-Watt's report:
In this document - as important to British history as Magna Carta - [Watson-Watt] 
described not just the basic underlying principles of radar, but also the way a complete 
British defence system should be constructed, approximately how it should perform, and 
how the complete system - with communications to plotting centres and to fighter pilots, 
Identification] F[riend] or F[oe] and even enemy anti-radar countermeasures - would 
eventually function. Not the least thing about it was its air of total authority. Watson- 
Watt, in precise and official language, was describing techniques and often even existing 
hardware that he and his colleagues had devised, built and used. This was no 'mad 
inventor* with a harebrained and unexplainable secret, but a mature engineer with a 
proposal that was wholly valid, wholly explainable and capable of swift verification. By no 
means least, it was enormously encouraging; Watson-Watt himself promised The amount 
of reflected energy you will get back is amazingly big'. How the whole thing seemed to an 
Air Staff previously barren and desolate of ideas can be imagined.29
Whilst perhaps over-exercising the benefit of hindsight, it does show that the important thing 
about Watson-Watt's report was that it considered all the implications of such a method of 
detection. Such thought for radar strategy was a part of British thinking right from the 
beginning, a situation different from Germany and all the other countries engaged in radar 
research.
29 Gunston (1976), p39.
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These positive findings were discussed at the second meeting of the Tizard committee 
was held on February 21st. Wimperis had by this date already suggested to Air Marshall Sir 
Hugh Dowding30, the Air Member for Research and Development, that £10,000 be spent 
immediately on investigating the possibilities of Watson-Watt and Wilkin’s paper. Dowding, 
in keeping with his reputation for_eaution, insisted that they carry out preliminary tests, 
which Wimperis duly arranged. Watson-Watt’s initial idea was to use his own ionospheric 
research transmitter at Slough, but Wilkins considered that it would be impossible to modify 
in the time available. He recalled that the BBC transmitter at Slough worked on a 
wavelength of 49.8m, almost exactly right to give maximum re-radiation from the 25m 
aircraft wingspan.
They set up their experiment on the 25th February, and carried it out on the morning of 
the 26th. From a technical perspective the demonstration was merely to show that aircraft 
reflected sufficient amounts of radio energy to make this method a possibility for detecting 
aircraft. Wilkin's calculations showed that it was possible, but as Watson-Watt said in the 
report: "It turns out so favourably that I am still nervous as to whether we have got a power 
of ten wrong, although even that would not be fatal."31 He also pointed out to Dowding the 
uncertain nature of such an experiment, but qualified these uncertainties in his favour, as he 
related in 1957:
[T]his is a game which I cannot and will not play unless I am allowed to write my own 
rules. They are quite simple. If I score, I have won. If I don't score, 'it don't mean a 
thing'! If we don't get the indications we expect, it will not be because we are wrong in our 
theory or seriously wrong in our rough figuring. It will be because we have 'lashed up' a 
rough equipment, made up of parts meant for other purposes, set up a miserable strand of 
wire as an aerial, picked an unsuitable site, mis-estimated the strength of the Daventry 
beam, misinstructed the pilot, who can't be allowed to know why he is patrolling a dull and
30 Dowding's nickname was "Stuffy" - a reference to his abrupt manner. This way of dealing with others 
made him no friends in high places, and later led him to be treated shabbily. He was due to retire in 1939, 
but his appointment was extended for a year, a period which as it happened covered the Fall of France and 
Battle of Britain. He is widely viewed as having conducted the battle in the summer and early Autumn of 
1940 brilliantly, by husbanding scarce resources of men and aircraft Yet within a few weeks of the high 
point of the fighting in September he was asked to clear his desk without so much as a thank you.
31 Watson-Watt (1957), p83.
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vacant beat, or have done one of a hundred things that should be avoided in a crucial 
demonstration.. .32
Watson-Watt made explicit here many things that would normally go unremarked when 
reconstructing an experiment for publication. Such difficulties were the sort of thing that 
Watson-Watt could, some 22 years later, elaborate upon. At the time of the experiment they 
were factors that lay in the domain of tacit knowledge, as defined by Polanyi and refined by 
Collins.33 As the experiment worked in this case, they did not have to go through a process 
of learning why their equipment failed, how to make it work, and how to modify it, which 
they did later with other apparatus. This is the learning process whereby scientists interact 
with their equipment to gain the embodied skill of how to make it work. Gooding relates 
how Faraday went through a similar learning process whilst working on the phenomena of 
electricity and magnetism in 1822.34 The quote also illustrates the fundamentally uncertain 
nature of any experiment, even when the techniques and equipment are already well known, 
and the phenomena had been produced before (although not to their knowledge).
Despite the possibility of difficulties, the demonstration was successful in its aim, which 
was to persuade Dowding and the Air Ministry to allocate money to the project. On the 
strength of what they saw, they recommended the allocation of £12,300 for the first year, 
excluding the cost of aircraft flying time. It is interesting to note how much time and effort 
had to be spent on the demonstration, considering such an effect had already been observed 
several times by others. However, in these instances it was merely an annoyance to the 
experimenter, and so its utility to the military was not perceived. But, as Gunston put it in 
1976:
When one reflects on the situation the mind boggles as to how it could have come 
about. The need for a method of unfailingly detecting, locating, and tracking enemy 
aircraft had been clear and obvious from 1915 onwards. There surely appeared to be only a 
very limited range of possible methods, each derived from heat, light, sound, magnetism or
32 Watson-Watt (1957), pl09. This is Watson-Watt's reconstructed recollection of a conversation he had 
with Dowding.
33 See Polanyi (1958), Collins (1985), Ch3.
34 See Gooding (1990), Ch 6.
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electricity (accepting further that heat, light, magnetism and electricity are all 
manifestations of one of the most fundamental phenomena in the universe, the 
electromagnetic wave). Any bright schoolboy asked to think about the matter would have 
gone to see eminent physicists, radio and acoustic engineers, and the matter would have 
snowballed as each worker named others prominent in the same field Within 24 hours our 
schoolboy would have heard of Hertz, and of the shoal of subsequent workers who had 
demonstrated the reflective properties of radio waves and patented Telemobiloscopes. He 
would hardly have been able to avoid discovering that as lately as 1932 four engineers 
researching VHF (very high frequency) radio for the Post Office had included in their large 
published report how cross they had been at interference from aircraft, describing the 
measured aircraft ranges and the way the beat-interference varied with aircraft speed In 
1933 Bell Telephone Labs in the United States published even more extensive 
observations. Yet here was Rowe [in 1934] still unaware of any of these things.35
It is, of course, easy to look back with hindsight, as Gunston has done, and imply that 
such things were there for the finding if one were only to look in the right place. Yet in 
1934 the solution was far from obvious. There were several different avenues that were 
tried before reflection of radio was settled upon. I will show later in this chapter that, even 
though this method had considerable political and scientific support (from, amongst others, 
the Tizard Committee, Watson-Watt, and the research establishment dedicated to 
investigating related phenomena that was formed at their instigation) it was still a far from 
accepted technique within all circles of power and influence even as late as 1939.
2.3 Chain Home
After the Air Ministry approved funds for the investigation, Watson-Watt organised the 
commencement of research at his laboratory, the Radio Research Station at Slough. 
Simultaneously he began to search for a suitable place in which to carry on this secret work 
in greater privacy than was afforded at the Station. He assigned Wilkins and Bainbridge- 
Bell, another ionospheric worker, to the design of a receiver. After advertising for further
35 Gunston (1976), pp38-9.
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workers, he employed Dr E.G.Bowen to join them. Bowen was already working at Slough, 
having taken his PhD in London under Appleton (the pioneering ionospheric worker).
Orfordness, on the Suffolk coast, was the location selected by Tizard to house the 
pioneer radar group. It was an old airfield located on a remote spit of land accessible only 
by boat, so that it was virtually an island. The airfield, built during the First World War, was 
originally used as an armaments research station, and therefore had suitable buildings to 
house the team. Watson-Watt and Wimperis went out to look at the Station in early March, 
and reported its suitability to the Tizard Committee. It was sufficiently isolated for them to 
conduct sensitive work away from general view. Initially the group were short of the 
necessary funds to buy equipment, so they began building the transmitter and receiver using 
spares from the ionospheric equipment at Slough. The group were to move out there as 
soon as an electricity cable was laid from the mainland.36
The cover story thought up for Orfordness was that it was an ionospheric research 
station To support this story Watson-Watt suggested continuing research on 50m. He 
believed that better results would probably be achieved by working at wavelengths of 7m, 
but that their 50m work should be continued for the time being. Components and 
techniques were already well developed at this wavelength, and this would enable them to 
gain valuable experience in tracking aircraft before having to get to grips with the new 
shorter wavelengths.37 By basing their initial research on tried and tested techniques and 
equipment, the group were saving themselves a long period of getting to acquiring the skills 
necessary to build and operate new equipment as well as learning how to use it in a novel 
way. The difficulty of getting newly constructed equipment to work even when the way it 
should respond was already established would have been very time-consuming, and time was 
something the researchers felt they didn’t have. In this case there would be plenty of 
problems to come in operating equipment with new goals in mind: those of learning to “see” 
aircraft with it.
36 Orfordness was frequently referred to as "The Island" by those who worked there. Guerlac (1988), p i 31.
37 Guerlac (1988), pl34. From an interview with Watson-Watt.
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2.3.1 Orfordness
On May 13th 1935 the small group of Bainbridge-Bell, Wilkins, Bowen and J.E.Airey 
(the group’s technician) moved from Slough to their new location. Rowe described the 
"Island" as "One of the loveliest places on earth... I env[ied] the first radar workers who had 
a fascinating job to do among pink thrift and yellow shingle and the cries of the terns."38 
Bowen was not so enamoured of his first view of it: "We were greeted by hail and sleet and 
a howling East-coast gale... and it was some time before the impression that we had arrived 
in an Arctic waste faded away."39
They brought two ten-ton trucks full of equipment, and had to transfer them and their 
loads across the estuary over the next few days. The antenna was erected between two 75 
foot wooden towers, and linked to a broad-band receiver built by Wilkins and Bainbridge- 
Bell. It fed into a cathode-ray oscilloscope indicator, that could give a range-scale of up to 
fifty miles.
The transmitter was built by Bowen, and was "an unknown quantity [that] had never 
previously been put together, not even for a test run at Slough."40 Their first major problem 
was generating sufficiently high-powered waves for their transmitter, and they had to 
"acquire" the necessary components from various sources. The valves were from the Navy 
Signal School41, who advised Bowen not to run them beyond their specified ratings. In the 
interests of rapid progress this was not strictly adhered to. Bowen also recalled to Guerlac 
that he made a capacitor for his apparatus by fitting together two metal cans, one outside the 
other. This ability to construct equipment out of the most unlikely sources was to be a 
characteristic of British radar research (see also chapter 4). The ethos which operated in the 
British Government research centres was one of “get it working and worry about how it will 
be engineered later.” This approach had both benefits and disadvantages; equipment could
38 Rowe (1948), pl3.
39 Bowen (1987), p ll.
40 Bowen (1987), pl2.
41 Bowen (1987), Guerlac (1988, from interviews with Bowen) and Callick (1990) all give these valves as 
being type NT46, a silica-envelope valve. Foley (1991), in his history of the silica valve, gives them as type 
NT41. In any case, the Air Ministry Radar Group were reliant on the Navy's Signal School for high-power 
transmitter valves during the late 1930's, the development of these being fully covered in Foley (1991).
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be made to work very quickly, but on the other hand when in operational service it often 
proved likely to be unreliable (H2 S was a prime example of this, see chapter 5). Companies 
such as GEC and EMI were more thorough in their approach to designing new apparatus, 
but the down side of this was that they were often also less innovative.
This first equipment utilised familiar techniques and equipment, but its performance had 
to be significantly improved above that required for ionospheric work. Guerlac42 
summarises the targets that Watson-Watt's team were aiming for:
Old Watson-Watt
Peak Power 2kW lOOkW
Frequency 6MHz (50m) less than 6MHz
Receiver Bandwidth . 10kHz 50kHz
Pulse repetition rate - 50/sec
Pulse length 100-200msec 10msec
In order to ensure a return at the ranges required, the gain of the equipment (power out 
to power received) need to be of the order of 1019. The receiver was about as sensitive as it 
could be, so most of the gain had was wrung out of improvements in the performance of the 
transmitter. This involved Bowen running the valves at (short duration) pulse powers well 
above those that were used in continuous operation. Fortunately the valves stood up to this 
rough treatment, and on May 31st they received echoes from the ionosphere. This was a 
useful way for them to calibrate their equipment, by using a well-known phenomenon. 
These, and later results were published in a paper in 1937.
Just a month later, the CSSAD (Tizard Committee) came to Orfordness to review the 
progress made so far. Just before they arrived, the team had followed a Singapore aircraft 
out and back for 15 miles. However, according to Bowen:
Watson-Watt, in his optimistic fashion, had arranged for a Vickers Valentia to fly 
short legs between Martlesham and Orfordness during the Committee's visit. No clearly
42 Guerlac (1988), pl36.
42
recognisable signals were received from the Valentia. Many years later Watson Watt was 
inclined to say that he saw aircraft echoes on that occasion but I am afraid that this was not 
the case; or at least, if he saw such signals, no one else did What the Tizard Committee 
did see was a spectacular display of ionospheric echoes at 60 miles and beyond, but no 
aircraft echoes. They appeared well satisfied with this.43
Bowen’s description acknowledges the early difficulties of deciding what exactly the 
trace on the screen corresponded to. The team were familiar with the type of echo received 
from the ionosphere, as they had all come from doing this work. They were also certain of 
the existence of the aircraft, but at this stage tying down what was the aircraft and what was 
something else (such as an ionospheric echo) was a difficult process. Watson-Watt did 
mention the difficulties with this particular demonstration in his autobiographical account, 
although did not admit them in such a forthright way as Bowen did in his:
When, however, we sent a Valencia out to be tracked before their very eyes, we got 
only intermittent glimpses between 8 and 18 miles - later comparison with the aircraft log 
indicated that these were right within half a mile - but we failed to "see" him at all on his 
homeward trip.44
On the 17th June, after the committee returned home, the experimenters got much 
clearer indications that they could track aircraft after getting an echo at a range of 17 miles. 
It was a Scapa flying boat from the Felixstowe base, and when it returned Watson-Watt 
phoned up the commander to get it to do another trip, which was again observed. They 
were now in the position of tying down a “blip” on the screen to an aeroplane; in other 
words they had achieved a calibration and agreed that the signal related to something else, 
the passage of an aeroplane.45 They had now acquired the necessary manipulative and 
interpretative skills to relate the trace on their screen to a recognisable object, as I discussed 
in the Introduction. From this point onwards they were able to utilise aircraft from the
43 Bowen (1987), pl5.
44 Watson-Watt (1957), pl27.
45 See for example Passveer (1993), on the problems associated with learning to “see” x-ray pictures as a 
similar problem.
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nearby Martlesham Heath base for calibration and testing flights, and with a ready supply of 
controllable targets the progress they made was extraordinarily rapid (see over for an 
illustration of what a display looked like).46
2.3.2 Difficulties: Personalities and Politics
From the way I have written the chronological order of events it would seem that the 
progress of the team towards achieving their aim was relatively smooth. They had clearly 
defined goals, political and financial support, and a team of skilled men familiar with both the 
techniques and the equipment they were using. This was not always the case, and very often 
there were difficulties to be dealt with that stretched beyond the business of deciding which 
particular “spikes” on the CRT came from aircraft and which didn’t.
The radar team on the Island, for the year it spent at Orfordness, was always small in 
number. It never exceeded a total of six. It was important that the team all shared the same 
degree of belief in the successful outcome of what they were doing, yet according to Bowen, 
Bainbridge-Bell had doubts about the viability of the project from the beginning, and was 
eventually moved back to Slough:
He was undoubtedly the most talented circuit designer at Slough [but] at the time of 
the move to Orfordness [he] became... cynical... and was very pessimistic about the success 
of the venture. He saw difficulties which simply did not exist... [H]e was quite certain that 
the increase in transmitter power would lead to unacceptable overload of the receiver...
Almost as his price for joining the project, he... insisted on a very expensive... cable being 
laid between the transmitting and receiving huts... In the end, [this] problem simply did 
not arise.47
Bowen was making judgement from a position 50 years removed from events. He was able 
to pass judgement on what could be classed as “difficulties that simply did not exist” because
46 Bowen (1987), pl5.
47 Bowen (1987), pl4.
Figure 2.2: The type of indications used to display the presence of aircraft This 
method was the preferred method until the all-round Plan Position Indicator was 
invented. Also known as A-Scope display.
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he was aware of what the successful outcome was. Bainbridge-Bell was legitimately casting 
doubt on whether anything would be achieved, doubt that was probably the expression of a 
more cautious personality and a realisation that science is never straightforward. At the time 
his opinion was as justified as Bowen’s but their superiors wanted a positive attitude form 
their staff and Bainbridge-Bell was removed.
In the political arena too, not everyone was completely convinced of the efficacy of 
placing so much faith in the embryonic radar chain. All the members of the Tizard 
Committee (the CSS AD) were totally committed to radar, and their visit to Orfordness 
confirmed in their eyes the necessity for pressing on with the programme with as much haste 
as possible. However, at the meeting of the CSSAD following their visit an extra person 
was present. This interloper was Professor Lindemann. Tizard and Lindemann had been 
very friendly in their younger days, but events of the 1930’s and 40’s led to a lasting enmity. 
Lindemann was very strong minded and not afraid to voice his opinions. This made him a 
controversial figure, and most mentions of him by authors who were involved in events 
indicate that he engendered in those he dealt with a strong personal bias either for or against 
him. His involvement with the CSSAD was no exception.
The story of the happenings between Tizard and Lindemann make an interesting adjunct 
to the main theme. The full story has been chronicled by C.P.Snow, in his study of the 
workings of the scientific community, Science and Government,48 Lindemann, as I noted 
earlier, was Churchill’s scientific advisor and linked to right-wing “hawkish” thinking at the 
height of the appeasement policy. At the time of the 1934 Air Exercises, Lindemann wrote 
to The Times calling for a scientific investigation of methods of air defence against bombers 
other than simply by reprisal bombing. This was thought to be the only “defence” against 
bombing, and operated by the same logic as the later nuclear MAD (mutually Assured 
Destruction) “balance of terror” argument. Lindemann continued lobbying Parliament for 
something to be done through 1934 by using his association with Churchill. Importantly, he 
pressed for a committee independent of any department, such as the Air Ministry. When he 
was eventually told of the CSSAD in early 1935, and invited to join, he delayed doing so due 
to his belief that an Air Ministry-linked committee would be bound to be ineffective, and so
48 Snow (1961).
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not worth his while. Not least behind Lindemann's motives were his politics: the government 
of the day was led by a Socialist, and he was a staunch Conservative.
Lindemann’s strategy led him to agitate for a sub-committee of the Committee for 
Imperial Defence to be formed. He wanted it to contain a few scientists and service-men, 
and be chaired by a person of Cabinet rank or equivalent, in order to assure the necessary 
political "clout” to prevent what he perceived as Civil Service inertia from obstructing their 
decisions. This committee, chaired by Lord Swinton, was eventually formed in April 1935 
and reported to a higher strata of government than the CSSAD. However, Tizard was also 
made a member of this new committee, and saw a high probability of conflict arising where 
the responsibilities of the two committees overlapped.
Following the change of premiership between MacDonald and Baldwin on 7th June, 
Churchill was invited onto Swinton's committee. He made Lindemann's inclusion on the 
Tizard Committee a condition of acceptance. This was the reason why Lindemann attended 
the tenth meeting of the CSSAD on July 25 th.
Clarke49, Tizard’s biographer, identifies two main areas where the two men differed. 
Firstly they had differing opinions on the technical solution to the air defence problem. 
Tizard and the CSSAD believed that the bomber threat could be met by directing sufficient 
aircraft onto incoming raids, via an integrated radar warning system. Lindemann believed 
(rightly, as it turned out50) that radar stood a great possibility of being jammed and hence 
rendered ineffective. Therefore fighter aircraft would not be able to meet the bombing 
threat. He believed instead that the correct approach was to sow fields of aerial mines 
attached to parachutes. Tizard was against this for two reasons. Firstly, he believed that 
Lindemann’s idea for aerial mines was completely impractical. Secondly, "radar had grown 
up under [his] own loving eyes, and it was natural enough that [he] should tend to deal with 
such criticisms more leniently than did Lindemann."51 Lindemann was rightly critical of
49 Clarke (1965), ppl25-7
50 During the Second World War both sides conducted experiments into jamming radar by blocking 
transmissions and by the dropping of aluminium foil “tuned strips” to blot out responses. This latter was 
codenamed "Window" in the UK, and "Duppel" in Germany. Each side was initially amazed to learn that 
the other possessed radar, and neither side utilised effective jamming until much later in the war. This was 
largely due to an earlier reluctance to provoke the enemy into retaliatory jamming.
51 Clarke (1965), pl33.
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radar, but the perceived impracticability of his alternative solution did not do him any 
favours in winning his argument.
The other major difference between the two, according to Clarke, was their approach to 
getting things done. Lindemann believed that the ends justified the means, and would use 
whatever means he had at his disposal. He often made enemies in the process. By contrast, 
Tizard's style was much less confrontational. Matters between the two came to a head a 
year later when the whole CSSAD resigned in protest at Lindemann's continued presence. It 
was reformed without him. Lindemann finally gained the upper hand in 1940 when Churchill 
became Prime-Minister, and appointed him as his Scientific Advisor. Lindemann made sure 
Tizard was effectively sidelined, but by then the radar chain was in position and about to 
prove its worth in the Battle of Britain.
A further example of the reactions that Lindemann provoked can be see from these 
quotes from Bowen, writing in 1987. The discussion in the first quote took place during the 
June visit to Orfordness of the CSSAD:
I heard mention of Professor Lindemann, the controversial Professor of Physics at 
Oxford University. At that time both Oxford and Cambridge University were represented 
by members in [sic] Parliament. Professor A V Hill, already on the Tizard Committee, was 
the member for Cambridge. Lindemann had just put his name forward as a Conservative 
candidate for the Oxford Seat, but his candidature was turned down by the Party. It may be 
hindsight, but I seem to remember a distinct feeling of satisfaction being expressed at the 
time about this set-back for Lindemann. Had we but known, there were to be ominous 
developments later.52
[I]n January 1935... [t]here were... any number of suggestions about air defence 
ranging from those which were barely possible to others which were slightly eccentric to 
still more which were totally irrational or else downright fraudulent People like Professor 
Lindemann of Oxford University, for example, advocated wires trailing from aircraft or 
drifting balloons. The kindest thing one can say about most of these schemes is that in 
spite of much discussion and many expensive trials, they never lead to a workable method 
of defence.53
52 Bowen (1987), pl5.
53 Bowen (1987), p4.
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Despite the occasional visit such as those described above, the researchers at Orfordness 
remained largely unaware of the arguments and intrigues in the corridors and committee 
rooms of Whitehall. During the remainder of 1935 work progressed steadily on fulfilling the 
requirements of Watson-Watt's memorandum. The main goals were developing facilities for 
measuring range, bearing and height. With the co-operation of pilots and aircraft from the 
nearby Martlesham Heath airfield, they improved the performance of their transmitter by 
using calibration flights, to the point where in December 1935 they could follow aircraft to a 
range of 80 miles. In July 1935 they first noticed that a formation of three aircraft produced 
a fluctuating CRT trace; in other words the spot “wobbled”. This effect became extremely 
useful as it allowed skilled54 operators to estimate the size of formations, allowing effective 
allocation of aircraft resources to meet incoming raids. The problem of height-finding was 
solved by Wilkins, who used a method he had devised for measuring the angle of incoming 
transatlantic signals.
The type of direction finding facility was finally decided upon around September, when 
a crossed-dipole method was tried and found successful. A previous suggestion to use two 
receivers and work out bearing from triangulation was rejected as being too complicated for 
the operator. During this period they reduced the wavelength of the transmitter from the 
original 50m (inherited from ionospheric research) to 26m, due to interference they received 
from 50m signals from transmitters on the Continent. This was again reduced to 13m due to 
interference from domestic 24m transmissions.55
2.3.3 Bawdsey
On 9th September 1935 Watson-Watt submitted a progress report to the Swinton 
Committee (the Sub-Committee of the Committee for Imperial Defence) summarising the 
state of research at Orfordness. Part of this document was a summary of discussions he had
54 By this, I mean operators with the necessary interpretative skills. In other words, they would be operators 
who could interpret the images on the screen - a skill in itself - but one different from having a more 
interactive skill of being able to modify the equipment to produce the required effect as well as interpret it.
55 Swords (1986), ppl86-95.
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held on the nature of the warning system that would need to be introduced in conjunction 
with the radars for them to be effective. They recommended building a chain of 20 stations 
around the South and East Coasts. The Swinton Committee accepted these 
recommendations, and voted further funds for the setting up of this chain and the expansion 
of the research establishment dedicated to radar.
Towards the end of 1935 Watson-Watt realised that the limited facilities at the 
Orfordness site were no longer suitable for housing the establishment, as it grew in size. The 
prototype early-warning station required the building of a 240 foot mast. This was in close 
proximity to an airfield where it was a hazard to flying. Also, the staff numbers were rising, 
and laboratory space was running out. Watson-Watt and Rowe went to search for larger 
premises, and settled upon Bawdsey Manor, a large country house located 15 miles further 
down the coast than Orfordness. The house was owned by Sir Cuthbert Quilter, and had 
been built by his family in the latter part of the previous century in a mixture of Indian styles. 
The Air Ministry arranged a compulsory purchase and the team moved there in May 1936. 
Bawdsey was almost unique in East Anglia in being sited on a raised piece of ground, some 
80 feet above sea-level. This fact meant that an extra 80 foot of height could be gained for 
the radar towers without any extra building. The manor house and associated outbuildings 
provided accommodation for the experimenters, and adequate laboratory space.
In the Summer of 1936 Watson-Watt resigned his position at Slough and formally took 
over as Superintendent of the Bawdsey Research Station. He recruited many staff from the 
Universities and Technical Institutes, and at first the atmosphere was more that of a 
University than of a Civil Service Establishment. Hours were not regular, work continuing 
late into the night whilst croquet and cricket were played during the day.56
Despite the urgency of the project things did not always progress quickly due to a 
significant culture clash between those who hailed from educational establishments and those 
whose background was in the Civil Service. Ex-University men, used to popping down to 
stores or even going out to purchase their own equipment, found it difficult to get to grips 
with an Air Ministry stores procedure that seemed to operate at a pace more akin to that of a 
snail than a top-secret, highly urgent military project. No component could be ordered
56 Robinson (1983), p27.
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without forms in triplicate, for example. Another major point was that, contrary to what one 
might expect from an establishment using radio techniques and components, very few of the 
staff were radio engineers. As Robert Hanbury-Brown writing in 1991 pointed out:
What was... remarkable about our group... was that there was not a single experienced 
radio engineer. In the receiver group our boss had some knowledge of radio, but I wouldn't 
have described him as a radio engineer, while Donald Preist and myself were both straight 
out of college. Admittedly I had attended a formal course in electrical engineering and my 
head was full of the mathematical theory of things like filters and antennas, but that was of 
limited use... what we needed was practical experience. Fortunately both Donald and I had 
been keen radio amateurs and had built our own equipment; without that experience we 
would have been lost.57
This tendency to employ people in radar research who were not radio specialists is a 
recurring theme in this history. The team who developed centimetre components, and then 
centimetre radar, were very much in the same mould. It may at first glance appear strange, 
but usually the non-specialists had skills that could be useful, or were radio amateurs. 
Certainly Hanbury-Brown was well equipped in other areas for his work; as he informs us he 
had long been used to tinkering with radio components and so had a feel for using them. It 
was, post-hoc at least, a definite policy to employ such skilled non-specialists. The heads of 
the various teams and establishments felt that people who were not steeped in the culture of 
what could or could not be done, were much more likely to follow unusual and original 
paths. They would, therefore, be quicker to gain solutions to the pressing radar problems 
than those who were part of the established radio industry. Watson-Watt deliberately 
employed non-radio engineers in order to "improve speed and originality"58.
Some historians59 have argued that this simply caused delays at later stages of the 
process of manufacture. I am to inclined agree. When one reads of the German equipment
57 Hanbury-Brown (1991), ppl2-3. Hanbury-Brown was in the unusual position of having gained a degree 
by the age of 19. This was because, having had to leave public school when his step-father absconded "in a 
cloud of debt", he continued his education at Brighton Technical College. Whilst beginning his PhD at 
Imperial College he was "head-hunted" for the radar project by Tizard.
58 Guerlac (1988), pl44.
59 See for example, Susskind (1968), pl02.
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captured periodically by the British there was always great praise for the quality of its 
manufacture.60 German equipment was developed by commercial firms, and not in 
Government establishments. On the one hand this led to the superb build-quality mentioned. 
On the other hand, the Germans often lacked a clear idea of the purpose for the radar 
equipment they designed (see chapters 6 and 7). British solutions were often innovative, but 
being rushed into operational use often had poor serviceability. The first operational use of 
H2S which was rushed into service, as chronicled in Chapter 5, is a case in point. Attempts 
were made to rectify this problem during the war by the introduction of what became known 
as "Operational Research", a process that was refined by Sir John Cockcroft, a member of 
the Cavendish Laboratory and a colleague of many members of the centimetre radar 
development team.61
The Swinton Committee decided upon the locations of the first seven (later reduced to 
five) radar stations in the coastal chain at a meeting in the September of the previous year 
(1935), and issued instructions to commence their construction. They originally intended 
that these stations be ready in time for the 1936 Annual Air Exercises, in September. 
Unfortunately construction did not proceed to schedule, and only the prototype research 
station at Bawdsey (which was, however, to become part of the chain in any case) was ready 
to participate in the exercise.
Despite these setbacks, the Air Exercises took place over three days and involved 
around a hundred aircraft. Half the aircraft were bombers detailed to "attack" Bawdsey by 
approaching from 100 miles out to sea. The other half were fighters that were to be directed 
onto the raids by operators using the radar at Bawdsey. The Commander-in-Chief of Fighter 
Command, Sir Hugh Dowding, who had recently been promoted to this position from that of 
Air Member for Research and Development, was invited to observe the exercise 62
It was vitally important for the continuation of funding for the project that this 
demonstration was successful, as it had already been delayed several times due to the
60 Nissen (1989).
61Operational Research was a phrase first coined by Rowe in 1938. It was applied to the work done by a 
team investigating how to improve the process of filtering the information received at the control centre from 
the stations. It was later extended to the whole process of investigating how new devices fitted in to their 
jftace of operation. For a full history, see Air Publication 3368 (1963).
62 Bowen (1987), p24.
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construction of the other stations being behind schedule. Unfortunately, the first day of the 
Exercise was a disaster. No signals were received from incoming aircraft in time to make 
interceptions, and Dowding "sat in the receiver room and saw nothing until his ears told him 
that the raiding aircraft were passing overhead.”63
At the time of this exercise Bowen was no longer connected directly with the early 
warning radar; he was now in charge of building an airborne radar (see section 2.4). He had 
already built a miniature receiver, and a ground-based transmitter in one of the towers at 
Bawdsey Manor and on the day of the exercise was able to view aircraft echoes to a range of 
50 miles using this much more experimental and less powerful equipment. At lunchtime on 
the first day he was informed of the problems with the main equipment, which were that the 
demonstrators had only managed to obtain a range of 10-15 miles from the main transmitter, 
and that as a consequence no interceptions were made.
Bowen described what he could see on his own equipment to Watson-Watt, who 
immediately arranged to show Dowding. This improved matters somewhat, in that at least 
something somewhere was visible. However, that afternoon the main transmitter, which was 
after all the reason for the demonstration, could not be made to work. That evening a post­
mortem was held, and Bowen's description of the discussions is interesting:
A very confused picture emerged from the subsequent discussion. Some put the blame 
on the new transmitter on the 240 foot tower on the hill, but there were others who 
defended it. The issue should have been clear cut, but there was a complicating factor.
Wilkins had recently replaced the open wire feeders on the receiver towers with coaxial 
cable and there had not been sufficient time for proper tests to be made.64
In this particular experiment, there was not a replication of the original apparatus as some of 
the equipment had been modified. Several of the variables in what was previously a working 
system were changed, and as a consequence the system no longer worked. The 
experimenters were certain about what the outcome of their experiment should be, but they 
could not make that correct outcome happen. They needed to replace different pieces of the
63 Bowen (1987), p24.
64 Bowen (1987), p25.
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apparatus to establish which one was the “culprit”.65 What was required was someone with 
the requisite knowledge to recognise what elements of the equipment were crucial to 
operation and shouldn’t be replaced. Bowen was that person, as he had helped to construct 
the apparatus, and had the embodied skill (or “know-how”, following Ryle) of both the 
articulable and unarticulable kind necessary to effect modifications.
Upon investigation, Bowen found that there was virtually no signal being transmitted 
from the aerial tower. He was dispatched to Orfordness to resurrect the transmitter used 
previously before the new one at Bawdsey was constructed. This one was fully understood 
by the operators who knew how to get it to produce the correct result, and was far more 
suitable for demonstration purposes. Bowen worked overnight to repair this transmitter, 
which gave a satisfactory performance the next day and mollified Dowding.
Hanbury-Brown was also working at Bawdsey that day, but contrary to the earlier 
comments in his autobiography, he put the blame for the mistakes they made on them not 
having enough experienced engineers:
The almost complete failure of the radar to perform on the first day was a good 
example of the need for more engineering know-how [my italics]. The man whom Watson- 
Watt had put in charge of the transmitter, although very bright, was a physicist with no 
experience of radio at all. He learned his radio engineering on the job, and by studying my 
copy of Short Wave Wireless Communication by Ladner and Stoner. I think we all began 
to fear for the future of that transmitter when, at tea one day, he turned to me and said 
'Hanbury, how can I break down the sharpness of resonance?* You don't have to know 
much about radio engineering to realise he was starting from scratch!66
There appears to be a difference of opinion here about whether it was better to have 
specialists or non-specialists working on radar. In this case, they were working on new 
applications of existing technology, so Hanbury-Brown was probably right to believe that 
people with more “engineering know-how” were required. Later, as I relate in chapters 3 
and 4, the new innovations were performed by people with experimental know-how in terms
65 Compare this with Collins' account of replicating a laser, where the original laser could not be 
successfully replicated by instruction alone. Collins (1985), Ch3.
66 Hanbuiy-Brown (1991), pl6.
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of building apparatus, but without radio-engineering training (and the associated 
preconceptions) about what was and wasn’t possible.
Despite the success of the Bawdsey transmitter in allowing operators to locate the 
position of incoming aircraft, positional information was no use on its own. For radar to 
fulfil its intended role of air defence, that information had to be used to direct fighters against 
bombers. This meant transmitting the positional information of incoming aircraft to Fighter 
Command Headquarters. Bainbridge-Bell devised a method of transmitting it so that it was 
displayed as a spot on a CRT map, indicating exactly the position of the aircraft. Designed 
to save the operator from having to work this information out herself67, it failed to work this 
way in practice:
[I]t drove us nearly mad and might well have wrecked the whole operation; the data 
supplied by the radar was dubious enough to start with, without the unknown errors which 
were introduced by this gadget when one of its many cords slipped We gave up using it on 
the second day of the Exercise and took to calling the results down the telephone.68
Earlier on, in July, Tizard pressed for an investigation into how the information 
provided by the radar stations would best be utilised. This lead to a series of experiments at 
Biggin Hill airfield, whereby fighters were sent up to intercept incoming aircraft. After a few 
weeks (the experiment began on August 4th) the controllers became competent at direction, 
even when the incoming aircraft changed their course during the interception. In practice, it 
was found that often the angles of courses to be transmitted could be estimated with 
sufficient precision to make an interception, negating the need for calculating the 
triangulation of vectors exactly and thus saving time. The operators became very skilled at 
using their new apparatus. The difficulty with this new style of fighter control was selling it 
to the pilots. Traditionally the role of the fighter pilot was to wander the sky at his own 
volition, and many of them did not take to the idea of being little more than pawns in a game 
of 3-dimensional aerial chess. With the new system, their individuality was subordinated to
67 Many radar operators in the Chain Home Stations were women, as they were found to have a better 
concentration-span than their male colleagues.
^Hanbury-Brown (1991), pl4.
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orders from older men on the ground, directing them by means of a mysterious, secret 
"magic eye". That radar was successfully brought into operation, in light of these possible 
obstacles, was no mean achievement.69
Just as these experiments in aircraft direction began to show promising results, Tizard 
was made aware of the disastrous Bawdsey experiments in mid-September by Dowding. In 
the light of the poor showing he wrote to Watson-Watt saying that due to political pressure 
he would soon be forced to recommend that the programme be curtailed, unless they could 
make improvements in time for a repeat test in April 1937. Experiments on interception 
continued during this period, and fortunately the next time they chose to demonstrate it to 
the ‘Top Brass” they conducted a much more convincing experiment. Construction of the 
individual stations in the Radar Chain continued over the next two years.
2.3.4 Operational Use
Between 1936 and 1939 the original solitary experimental Bawdsey transmitter and 
receiver station expanded into a full twenty-station early-warning chain. The first five 
stations were in place by the time of the Munich Crisis in 1938, and because of the perceived 
German threat were put onto 24-hour watch. These first five stations surrounded the 
Thames Estuary; as London was thought of as the main target for any attack, the five would 
stand in the way. The chain as originally intended extended all along the South and East 
Coasts. All the positional information from the stations was telephoned into a central filter- 
room, which was in turn connected to the fighter airfields so that they could be told to take 
off and intercept. Further experiments were conducted that exposed flaws in the integrated 
system, so that by the time war broke out in September 1939 it had been refined pretty 
thoroughly. Actual experience during the next year meant that the system worked 
effectively during the Battle of Britain, in conjunction with other innovations such as the
69 Clarice (1965), ppl50-3. Some pilots did choose to ignore the controllers, but on the whole most obeyed 
them when the system was put to the test in 1940.
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aircraft themselves,70 Identification Friend or Foe71 and the VHF radio-telephony links (the 
latter two arising directly from experience of using the integrated system). 72
The first five stations were still prototypes, and flaws discovered during the exercises in 
1938 were eradicated from the others.73 The serviceability rates of the first five were not as 
good as the others, which lends weight to Hanbury-Brown’s view that if more engineers had 
been involved earlier on, there would have been more reliable stations from the start.
A further problem that was encountered with the Chain Home (CH) stations, as they 
became known, was that it was very difficult to pick up aircraft at very low heights. This 
was due to the long wavelength and floodlighting principle that they worked on. To 
compensate for this a range of sets were developed from the prototype 1.5m airborne set to 
fill in the low-coverage gap. Known as Chain Home Low (CHL) it employed a rotating 
aerial, and was introduced in October 1939.74
2.4 The First Airborne Radar
In this section I shall describe the development of the first airborne radar. The 
happenings in this section are important for several reasons. Firstly the members of the 
airborne radar team gained much experience in developing radar devices to fit in aircraft. In 
particular, they were used to working inside aircraft in the air, and operating their equipment 
in the more difficult conditions found there as compared to the laboratory. Although the
70 The Hurricane and Spitfire were both designed in 1935 and entered service in 1939. They were the first 
monoplane fighters in service with the RAF and represented a generation leap in performance over the 
previous biplane fighters.
71 IFF was developed to allow recognition of friendly aircraft on the Chain radar screens. When illuminated 
by them, the IFF box carried by a friendly aircraft transmitted a pulse on a specific frequency that appeared 
as a characteristic spike on the trace of that aircraft. Not all British aircraft were fitted with it by the Battle 
of Britain, but it was later to become standard.
72 To enable efficient communication between pilots in the air and controllers on the ground, and for pilots 
to talk to each other in the air, VHF radio-telephones that were frequency modulated and hence much clearer 
than the old audio modulated sets were also developed in time for the Battle of Britain.
73 Technical details of the CH stations can be found in Swords (1986) Ch5, and Neale (1985).
74 Jones (1985), p417.
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head of the team, Bowen, was marginalised as far as the main protagonists were concerned 
by the time centimetres came along, he was still able to pass on some of his experience to his 
successors (see chapter 4). Secondly, the airborne team had many opportunities to provide 
solutions to how to actually design and build an airborne radar. I shall follow some of the 
processes that they went through when there were no fixed conventions about how to do 
things. By so doing I hope to make visible the way that science is creative in the way it 
works.
The airborne radar team, like the Chain Home team that preceded it, and many teams to 
follow (see chapters 3 and 4) was small, close knit, shared common work practices and 
beliefs, and had practical skill in working with electronic apparatus. I wish to examine the 
process of the transfer of embodied knowledge between individuals within a group given 
these conditions, and see how they fit with my analysis of these points in the Introduction.
2.4.1 The Need for Airborne Radar
The decision to attempt to build what seemed to be an impossible device was typical of 
the British approach to radar of the time. The reasoning behind the decision to try to 
develop an airborne set hinged on the early success of the radar team. It was thought that 
the new device would mean that the defending fighters would be able to successfully counter 
any attacking daylight bomber force. Facing heavy losses would lead, they reasoned, to the 
Germans switching their attacks to night-time. Although the CH stations and operators 
could place fighter aircraft to within 3 or 4 miles of incoming bombers, near enough for 
visual target-acquisition during daylight, visibility at night is only 500-1000 feet. Therefore 
pilots with no additional aids would not be able to spot attacking aircraft at night, even if 
placed in their general vicinity. It was thought that an aeroplane-mounted miniature radar 
set was required to make up for this deficiency.75
75 Later experience showed that a more accurate radar than chain home was required even for placing night- 
fighters in range for their own sets to receive signals. From this, Ground Control Interception (GCI) stations 
were developed, entering service in October 1940. Even with this innovation, which was based on CHL and 
included the first Plan Position Indicator display to aid the controller, the pilot and his radar operator had to
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My use of the conditional in the previous paragraph is deliberate, for who thought of the 
need for such a device is not exactly clear. It appears to have been either Watson-Watt, or 
Tizard. Guerlac merely said that "one of the members of the Tizard Committee pointed out 
the necessity for a small radar set that could be carried in an aircraft."76 Gunston was more 
specific: "While... [CH] went from strength to strength, Watson-Watt - many said Sir Henry 
Tizard thought of it - lost little time in beginning [airborne radar]."77 Rowe came down on 
the side of Watson-Watt: "Early in the history of radar development, Watson-Watt had 
forecast that radar sets would one day be installed in aircraft. This was indeed vision of the 
boldest kind."78 Watson-Watt (in 1957)concurred with this:
Bowen has recalled that it was on some date... late in 1935 that I first dared to 
propose... that we should compress a radar station into an item of aircraft equipment... The 
project was put by me, as the voice of the team, to the Tizard Committee in February 
1936.79
I not discovered anything which gives Tizard’s own views. However his biographer, Clarke, 
quotes Bowen as saying "Tizard was in fact the one who in 1936 first suggested that an 
attempt be made to make a radar set into an aircraft."80 Bowen says in his own book that 
"[Tizard] passed [his] thoughts on to Watson-Watt and Watson-Watt passed them on to us 
at Orfordness."81 What we see from all these accounts is another example of how memory 
is an imperfect recording device, and is prone to exaggerate the part played by an individual 
when they recollect what they participated in. However, when we are able to compare 
several accounts, as I have here, we can see that the issue cannot be settled by recourse to 
what the original actors recall or have written, so it is probably fairer to give equal credit for
learn how to effect interceptions using the new AI equipment. Some were far more successful than others, 
such as Rawnsley who was operator for “Cats-eyes” Cunningham, the most successful British night-fighter 
pilot See Rawnsley & Wright (1957) for descriptions of how the routines were painstakingly evolved over a 
period of several months of trial and error.
76 Guerlac (1988), pl45.
77 Gunston (1976), p41.
78 Rowe (1948), p39.
79 Watson-Watt (1957), pl42.
80 Clarke (1965), pl58.
81 Bowen (1987), p31.
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thinking of the idea to Tizard and Watson-Watt. This example does illustrate how it is 
important to take note of a variety of sources if at all possible for the sake of making sure 
that it isn’t one person’s recollections which get sole status as ‘The truth”, as usually there is 
some variation which gives the historian the scope to make an interpretative judgement 
about what happened.82 Leaving aside the issue of who first thought of it, the perceived 
need for some form of airborne radar came very early in the history of radar in Britain. This, 
as I indicate in Chapter 6, was something unique to this country and shows how technology 
is shaped by the cultural niches in which it is required to fit.83
2.4.2 Airborne Interception (AI)
Bowen was put in charge of this new project in early 1936, and initially he worked 
without assistance. The scale of the problem was enormous, and must have looked 
insurmountable. Tizard was asking Bowen to take many tons of equipment, including high 
towers, buildings, generators, etc., and compress this into an equipment weighing at most a 
few hundred pounds and occupying a minimum of space. One could almost compare it as 
going from ENIAC to a PC in one step. To get some idea of how the problem appeared, it 
is worth extensively quoting Bowen’s autobiography, where he clearly set out what the 
problems were:
No one was very optimistic about being able to make a miniature radar at that time.
The existing transmitter at Orfordness was a whole room full of equipment weighing many 
tons. The transmitting and receiving antennae were on masts 75 feet high, soon to be 
increased to huge structures 240 feet high. The receiver was a large rack of equipment 
bristling with valves, control knobs and indicators requiring the attention of a highly 
skilled operator... There were other formidable obstacles. To achieve a reasonable antenna 
size, the operating wavelength would have to be reduced to one or two metres. This was a
82 See, for example, Gooding’s (Gooding (1993»discussion of Holmes’ biography of Krebs, and Appendix 
A, for further discussion on the role of memory in shaping autobiographical accounts.
83 For discussion of how “perceptual filters shape strategic goals”, see Beyerchen (1994), and my discussion 
in chapter 6.
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time when the shortest wavelength for which components were available was five meters.
In addition, in order to achieve a minimum range of 1000 feet, the pulsewidth had to be 
reduced to near one microsecond, that is, to one millionth of a second. The reduction from 
200 microseconds to 20 microseconds which had already been achieved at Orfordness had 
not been difficult, but going down to 1 microsecond was strictly unknown territory.84
My first step was to draw up a list of the design criteria which should be aimed at in an 
airborne system. There was no such thing as an operational requirement and no precedents 
by which mundane considerations like size and weight could be evaluated... [T]here were 
as many opinions as to what a night-fighter would look like as there were people prepared 
to make a guess.85
By ‘\vhat a night-fighter would look like” Bowen is being literal; no-one had fixed how 
the actual aeroplane should be designed. One engine or two? A single crewman, two, or
three? Bowen clearly illustrates in these quotes what he had to consider in relation to the
task he had been set. It must have been a challenge for him, and it is also very useful for the 
historian because he sets out before us the process through which he had to go. There were 
no right or wrong ways to go about building an airborne radar, it was up to him, in 
conjunction with the few colleagues who soon joined him, to work out how to solve the 
problems using the skill and knowledge they had accumulated whilst working with the chain 
radars, and in their earlier laboratory work. Importantly, it is also very useful for the 
historian to try and uncover what other options were considered, whether these options were 
tried and if so what the outcome was that led them to change their minds. When the history 
of science or technology is written it is very easy to write it as a natural progression along 
lines that must have been obvious. This is not the case, and Bowen has illustrated it well. A 
similar view was related by Hanbury-Brown, who again summarised the problems well 
despite joining the small airborne group a year later in 1937:
In the development of things like... radar there is an early and interesting stage when
all the designers’ options are still open and the conventional pattern is not yet set. If, for
84 Bowen (1987), p31.
85 Bowen (1987), p32.
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example, you look at the history of radio you will find that before the invention of the 
thermionic valve, all sorts of unlikely devices were used to generate and detect radio 
waves... When the diode and triode were eventually invented the pattern was set... In 1937 
much the same was true of airborne radar, most of the questions of how to design the 
actual electronic components and all of the questions of how to make a radar operationally 
useful in a military aircraft were still wide open; there were many possible answers and 
that made the work exciting.86
Bowen was soon joined by other workers, and despite the rather awesome task ahead of 
them, the nature of the work was stimulating. During 1936 Bowen made progress in 
defining the criterion for his embryonic airborne set. He consulted aircraft engineers to find 
out the sort of constraints within which he had to work. The set would have to be not more 
than 200 pounds in weight, occupy no more than 8 square feet and consume no more than 
500 watts of power. Most of the available power on the aircraft was already used in running 
existing services such as the instruments and the radio. A group discussion on the effects of 
drag on performance ruled out wire aerials, so only short stub-antennae could be used, 
requiring a wavelength of around 1 metre. There were further considerations to take into 
account, such as making the set easy enough to be operated by either a pilot, or a dedicated 
operator, in a cramped, noisy, blacked-out cockpit.87
One of Bowen’s first major breakthroughs was the acquisition of a receiver from EMI, 
developed for their proposed television service. His earlier attempt to build a receiver on 
1.5m was abandoned due to the complete lack of any suitable high-power transmitter valve 
at this wavelength. The EMI receiver was very sensitive, and suitably small and light for 
installation in an aircraft.88 By the time this receiver was ready, the radar team had moved 
to Bawdsey, and Bowen’s airborne group was expanded to include three new members. One 
of these, Gerald Touch, had previously studied at the Clarendon laboratory for a PhD. The 
other two, Hibberd and Jefferson, were from the radio industry.
Experiments literally "got off the ground” when they installed the newly acquired EMI 
receiver in an aircraft. Bowen decided that the only way to begin was to leave the
86 Hanbuiy-Brown, (1991), p21.
87 Bowen (1987), p32.
88 Guerlac (1988), pl47.
61
transmitter on the ground. At this stage there was simply no way they could make a 
transmitter small and light enough for installation in an aircraft. Prior to this step the 
transmitter and receiver, both working on a wavelength of 6.7m, were first tested on the 
ground where ranges of 40-50 miles were achieved against aircraft.89
The aircraft used for testing was a Heyford bomber. This was one of the typically 
antiquated aircraft of the RAF of the period. It was a biplane bomber with open cockpits 
and a fixed undercarriage, but despite these defects it had one advantage very useful for 
radar in that it had engines that produced a relatively small amount of electrical "noise". The 
first flights took place in the Autumn of 1936, and produced very good results. At a flying 
height of 2-3000 feet, ranges of 8-12 miles were achieved. Bowen put these achievements in 
perspective by pointing out that such ranges were never exceeded, especially at such low 
heights, by any production airborne radar set throughout the duration of the war, including 
the centimetre ones.
After this trial and initial success using a ground based transmitter which had the 
advantage of not being constrained by weight and space, and allowed them to use much 
higher powers than would be available in an aircraft, they now had to make a decision on 
whether to carry on with this method. They called it RDF 1.5, which indicated that it was a 
"half-way-house" between the Chain radars (RDF 1), and full airborne radar (RDF 2). 
Bowen was strongly committed to this solution, despite its difficulties. The main problem 
was that the range measurement was not accurate unless the aircraft was directly between 
the target and the transmitter. Unfortunately for Bowen, Watson-Watt was against the idea, 
and despite continued pressure, it was dropped. Bowen believed that by so doing they lost 
the opportunity to gain valuable experience in the usage of airborne radar, in much the same 
way that the Biggin Hill exercises allowed the RAF to iron out their problems with fighter 
direction. Unfortunately for Bowen, it was also not the last time that he would be over­
ruled to the detriment of rapid progress, in his opinion.90
At around this time the team acquired some new valves from America, known as "door­
knobs" after their bulbous shape. They were ordered after their attempts to modify the
89 Bowen (1987), p35.
90 Bowen (1987), p37.
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existing British-made valves to work at low wavelengths and high powers were 
unsuccessful. The intention was to use them to push the wavelength of the transmitter down 
to around lm. Touch built a transmitter with these valves working on 6.7m in order to try it 
in the Heyford aircraft with the EMI receiver. Successful operation again came quickly 
when the complete assembly was tried in March 1937. The cranes at the harbour in 
Felixstowe showed up particularly well, being large metallic objects. After the rapid 
progression on the CH stations, they felt sure they could make similar progress with the 
airborne radar (or AI, for Airborne Interception, as it became known).
Despite at the outset having a clear idea of the applications of the airborne set (AI, and 
Anti-Surface Vessel [ASV]), there were still a large number of obstacles for them to 
overcome. Their eventual aim was to produce something that could be used by a specially 
trained operator. However, the operator would not necessarily have any knowledge of 
science or electronics, and would be working in cramped, cold, dark, noisy and shaky 
conditions, tiying to find an enemy aircraft whilst simultaneously trying to avoid getting shot 
down or having an accident himself. It was therefore vitally important to take all these 
conditions into consideration when deciding how best to design the display of the set. As 
Hanbury-Brown put it:
[0]ne had to imagine oneself in a night-fighter chasing some bomber in the dark, [or] 
skimming over the sea looking for enemy ships... What precisely should the radar do?
Where could it go in the aircraft and who would operate it? How should the data be 
displayed?91
Soon after the flights in the Heyford, Bowen’s group were offered their own aircraft. 
To borrow aircraft from the Experimental Establishment at Martlesham Heath was 
increasingly difficult, as they were already fully committed to their own programmes of 
testing and couldn’t fly at the whim of the men from Bawdsey. After some thought, they 
selected Avro Anson, and two were delivered in August 1937. This aircraft was a twin- 
engined monoplane with a large internal cabin suitable for carrying scientists and their
91 Hanbuiy-Brown (1991), p23.
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equipment. It was also sufficiently modem to offer a modicum of reality in terms of 
simulating the conditions of the end use of the radar, in a high-performance fighter aircraft. 
The two Ansons were specially modified so that their ignition systems were screened, to 
prevent interference with the received signal. The normal level of ignition noise was high 
enough to completely swamp the receiver, and therefore had to be eliminated^ This was a 
problem of many aircraft of the time. Later aircraft that were designed especially to carry 
radar had screened engines form the outset. Others converted to this task of carrying 
sensitive radar receivers had to have their engines modified in this way.
In the meantime Bowen and Hibberd worked on their transmitter, and Touch on the 
receiver. Their task was to try to get it to operate on a wavelength of around lm. It was 
successfully made to operate at 1.25m, but its performance fell markedly at wavelengths 
below this level. They calibrated the set on the ground using a water tower 3 miles distant 
as a target. Such calibration using large and obvious fixed points was a common means of 
verifying that the set was actually locating something “out there” as oppose to merely 
displaying “noise” (see also section 1.2.1). This equipment was first tried out in an aircraft 
on 17th August when Bowen recalls that they received echoes from ships at ranges of 2-3 
miles.92
During these first few months of operation, ship detection proved easier than aircraft 
detection due to the larger size and slower speed of ships. Following further ship 
observations during fleet exercises held in September, priority was gradually switched from 
AI to ASV. This decision was largely “political”, originally, of course, the whole rationale 
for airborne radar was to provide a means to combat bombers. However, when they 
discovered that one could also detect ships with the new apparatus the focus of the end-use 
shifted away from the more difficult AI project. Nevertheless, they still conducted their early 
ASV experiments with crude apparatus that often refused to work at all, and gave only 
range data. They still had no means of direction finding, and the transmitter was very 
underpowered.93
92 Bowen (1987), p41.
93 Guerlac (1988), pl48.
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This shift in emphasis continued for a year, but when they recommenced work on the AI 
programme in the summer of 1938 the development work done on ASV meant that the 
airborne apparatus available was much improved from the previous year. For example, 
whilst using the Heyford, power for the equipment came from an assortment of batteries. 
After switching to the Ansons, changed to a generator. Standardising Jhe power source was 
very important, for up until this time they had had to contend with different current and 
voltage ratings, and supplies that varied in rating whilst in use. This could affect the 
performance of the equipment severely, because it would perform in an unexpected fashion 
or not at all. The variation in power supply was one more unwanted factor that would have 
to be investigated when they were looking to fix a problem. Bowen decided that the 
solution was to run an alternator off the aircraft’s engine. He made a trip to electrical 
manufacturers Metro-Vickers and discussed his requirements with them, asking them to 
come up with a suitable design. Their design was adopted, and performed two extremely 
important roles for Bowen. Firstly, it standardised the power supply to iheir equipment, 
eliminating one more variable in their experimentation. This had the effect of embedding 
Bowen’s skill into a piece of apparatus. He learned when it was the variable supply that 
caused problems with his apparatus, but doing away with variable supply meant this 
knowledge was no longer required. Airborne radar was one step nearer a “black box”. 
Secondly, the design finalised by Bowen and Metro-Vickers was adopted as a universal 
standard airborne radar power-supply by all the allied forces. This meant that there was a 
much greater degree of interchangeability so that sets could be upgraded or replaced, as all 
subsequent equipment was designed to run off this power source.
During the remainder of the year the group made further tests and improvements to the 
running of the transmitter and the receiver. At this stage the radar set still only gave range 
information, on the standard A-Scope display (using a time-base trace that gave the range as 
a spike on a line, read off on a scale, see figure 2.2).
The team were still deciding on how to accomplish attaining the required information, 
and then how to display it. The type of display used in ASV had already finalised, but as 
"chasing another plane in the dark is very different to spotting a slow moving ship", so
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careful consideration had to be given about how to arrange the AI display.94 The CRT 
screens used in radar displays had controls to operate tuning, brightness and focus. In the 
chain stations it required the operator to make further manipulations of controls to give 
bearing and elevation; range being read off the scale on the screen. For an operator in an 
aircraft, they decided that if possible bearing and range information would need to be 
displayed directly in an easily readable fashion to the operator. As Bowen wrote:
[T]here was no prior experience to indicate just what an operator could and could not 
do in the back of an uncomfortable and extremely noisy aircraft.95
They eventually settled on the idea of using four receiving antennae; two mounted 
vertically and two horizontally. By separating the aerials in this way, the relative strength of 
the signal received in each aerial would indicate whether the target aircraft was above or 
below, to the left or to the right of the aircraft, bv comparing this signal strength from the 
left-right and up-down pairs. This arrangement gave an easy method of display using two 
screens (see over for illustration).
They settled on this arrangement after rejecting two others that were too complex. The 
overlapping beam system employed in this method was already used in the Lorenz Landing 
System, something that would be familiar to the group members and hence would probably 
mean that it would be considered.96 The methods that were rejected were the utilisation of 
the B-Scope (Range/Azimuth) display used in ASV instead of the twin screen method, and a 
method of phase comparison. The former was fine for ASV where height was not a 
consideration; the operators were searching for something on the 2-dimensional surface of 
the sea and a two dimensional display indicating how far ahead, and whether the target was
94 Hanbury-Brown (1991), p26.
95 Bowen (1987), p65.
96 The Lorentz Landing System was a method of lining up aircraft to an airfield runway. Overlapping 
beams were transmitted either side of a runway, such that "dots" were heard on one side and "dashes" on the 
other. These dots and dashes were synchronised, so that when the pilot was in line with the runway he heard 
a continuous tone. This system became widely used around the world in the 1930’s. A blind-bombing 
system based on this method was also used by the Germans in 1940. It was known as X-GerSt, and was 
successfully jammed by “bending the beams”, sending the aircraft to bomb empty fields. One notable failure 
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Figure 2.3 AI Marks I-IV display. The left hand screen shows that the target is 
to the right, and the right hand screen that it is above the aircraft In each case 
the distance of the trace from the origin gives the range. There would be a range 
scale marked on the screen. Note the "ground return", in the form of a large 
spike. Anything in the area between the origin and the ground return is visible; 
if it is further away than the height of the aircraft above ground it is not visible. 
From Bowen (1987), p66.
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to the left or right, was sufficient. The latter method involved finding direction by 
comparing the phase of the received signals; phase changing upon reflection from the object. 
However the method required sophisticated electronics, and Bowen didn't have the staff to 
spare on developing them.
The display devised was as simple as could be made from existing knowledge. It gave 
the operator all the information he needed quickly and simply. They originally intended to 
use just a screen and display the information in the form of a cross. However this idea was 
abandoned as they considered that the large ground-retum signal would create a messy area 
where the two traces overlapped, and make the display confusing.
Once they had decided on the display, their major task was to perform experiments to 
improve their apparatus. The next major hurdle for them was that of refining the transmitter 
to address the problem of the minimum range of the equipment. Bowen described what was 
they had to deal with:
It had always been recognised that the minimum range performance of an air-to-air 
radar would be crucial. At the time, the thought of firing blind at a target aircraft at night 
was simply out of the question. The Air Force made it an absolute requirement for a pilot 
to identify his target before opening fire. There would be just as many friendly aircraft in 
the air as there would be enemy aircraft and a high probability that a nightfighter would 
intercept a friendly aircraft... It was essential, therefore, that the minimum range should be 
small enough for the pilot to see and identify his target by eye before opening fire. In our 
discussions with the Air Ministry it was generally agreed that a minimum range of 1000 
feet was the figure to aim for. This figure was based on a series of night tests that had been 
made at Famborough several years before; they found that on moonlit nights a target 
aircraft could sometimes be seen up to 2000 feet away, but on really dark nights or on 
nights when the moon was obscured by cloud, a range of 1000 feet was required and that 
was the figure we aimed for.97
Between 1938 and 1939 work progressed on this problem, albeit often slowly. The 
technical aspect of making a short enough pulse was relatively easy to solve, but protecting
97 Bowen (1987), pp67-8. Night-fighting had long been an element of RAF thinking, even before the 
invention of AI radar, hence the trials to determine visual ranges at night.
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the receiver from the strong transmitted pulse was not. However, Touch eventually did 
solve this, and they conducted tests to see how short the minimum range of the receiver was 
by using the height of the aircraft above the sea. They would compare the indicated ground 
return to the altimeter height, and by this method managed to successfully operate the set at 
minimum ranges of between 100 and 500 feet, which was perfectly adequate according to 
the Air Ministiy 1000 feet criterion.98
Unfortunately for Bowen, the whole question of minimum range became open during 
1940 when production AI was being installed. Bowen believed that there was no problem 
with the work his team undertook:
[T]he minimum range question... was the cause of a misunderstanding later, when the 
airborne group was accused of having paid insufficient attention to this problem. Some of 
the production sets did not always meet the 1000 foot requirement, but this was a matter of 
adjustment, not of basic design."
I shall relate these difficulties in more detail in section 2.4.4.
During 1939 and 1940 the research set in the Anson was refined into firstly the Mark I 
apparatus installed over the Summer and Autumn of 1939 into Blenheims (aircraft that were 
in reality light bombers and totally unsuited to the task of night-fighting), and in October 
1940 the Mark IV AI which went into the much more suitable Beaufighter. The Mark I was 
extremely troublesome both in operation and serviceability, and also because it took the 
researchers away from research into the task of installation, when, as war approached, the 
RAF insisted that the new device needed to be rushed into service (without proper trials or 
finalised design). As Hanbury-Brown recalled:
These demonstrations of AI [to VIPs such as Dowding and Churchill] were successful, 
in fact far too successful for its own good because they resulted in a complicated piece of 
equipment being introduced to the RAF in a hurry without provision being made for its 
maintenance and training. Before we knew what was happening we were committed to 
fitting 30 Blenheims with AI in one month for service trials by a nightfighter squadron (25
98 Bowen (1987), p69.
99 Bowen (1987), p69.
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Squadron) at Northolt... In due course they were fitted but no further research on AI or 
ASV was possible for quite a long time.100
A further interesting use of AI, tried out in February 1939, was for navigation. I 
mentioned that calibration was made by flying over the sea and relating the height given to 
that shown by the altimeter. Altimeters were normally set to show sea-level whilst flying, 
and were sometimes readjusted to show the height of an airfield above sea-level as zero, 
when the aircraft was on landing approach. Over high ground Bowen realised that it was 
possible to use the AI to read the height of the aircraft above ground using the ground- 
retum, and compare it to the height above sea-level from the altimeter. Subtracting one 
from the other would give the height of the ground, and this could be compared to the 
contour heights on a map. Bowen made a flight navigating by comparing heights read off 
the AI to the contours on a map. This realisation that radar and map-making could be so 
joined was not utilised until much later, when it became the basis of H2 S (see chapter 5).
In addition to the technical deficiencies of the set, there were other problems to be faced 
before it could be used in action. It must be remembered that at this time many fewer people 
were familiar with items of technology at all, and that even the trained RAF fitters would not 
be used to the brand-new technology of the AI. Although operation was, after many flying 
hours, a simple procedure to skilled men like Hanbury-Brown, his expertise (both in 
operation and maintenance) had to be passed on to others:
Having got the AI sets into working order the first thing which I had to do was to 
teach the radio mechanics of 25 Squadron how to maintain and test them (not an easy 
thing to do without any instruction manuals or test gear). The next thing was to work out 
with the Squadron how best to use an AI set in the air, which we did by making 
inumerable mock interceptions with one or two of the pilots and ourselves as AI operators.
Having established a reasonable procedure, we then had to train all the pilots and 
radar operators to carry it out. We started on the ground by showing the men who had been 
chosen by the Squadron to be trained as radar operators how to work the set and how to tell 
the pilot the distance and direction of the target using the intercom.101
100 Hanbury-Brown (1991), p28.
101 Hanbury-Brown (1991), p36.
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It was only when these preliminary stages were carried out, and finally the techniques 
for operation were decided upon and being trained for, that the pilots, operators and the 
researchers involved with them were able to see how well their system worked. During the 
initial training period, interceptions were made in daylight and the pilot picked up his target 
visually, saying nothing whilst the operator used the AI apparatus to direct him onto the 
target. This was difficult enough in itself, and involved careful judgement of the closing 
speeds of the two aircraft and the ability to communicate directions clearly to the pilot. 
However, when air interception was tried out at night, it was discovered that it was 
practically impossible for ground operators to place the nightfighter behind the target and 
within range of the AI, as CH and CHL were not up to the task:
What everyone, including Fighter Command, had failed to foresee - until it was almost 
too late - was that AI by itself, with its limited range, was only half the solution of the 
problem of guiding the fighter onto the bomber in the dark; the other half of the problem 
was to build a new type of radar for ground control.102
Hanbury-Brown wrote up the results of his investigations, conducted at Northolt airfield 
during October and November 1939, and passed them onto Rowe at Dundee. He 
recommended a form of Ground Control using a sweeping narrow beam, with the display 
similarly using a rotating line to show indicating blips of target aircraft in relation to the 
centre, which was the location of the radar. This form of display, known as a Plan Position 
Indicator (PPI) is widely used today, but in 1939 it was a revolutionary idea.103 Rowe set 
wheels in motion and in October 1940 the GCI (Ground Control Interception) Station was 
introduced. This incorporated the rotating PPI, which facilitated the passing of accurate 
positional information between the ground controller and the night-fighter crew. The PPI 
was also later used in H2 S, as a rotating map display (see chapter 5). The techniques 
worked out using AI Mark I, and its replacement Mark IV, were also used with the 
centimetric AI, Mark VIII, introduced in 1942 (see chapter 4).
102 Hanbuiy-Brown (1991), p41.
103 Unfortunately Hanbuiy-Brown did not state how he came upon this idea.
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What is important to draw out of this is that new technology will have unforeseen 
effects, both counter-productive and beneficial. Despite having embedded their skill into the 
prototype AI, it still took someone skilled and familiar with its operation to teach others, by 
personal contact, how to maintain and operate it. It also shows that any new technology 
will fit into the cultural framework104, but at the same time alter the “rules of working”. 
These alterations in established procedures can also highlight areas that require further 
change for the new technology to be effective, in much the same way that, for example, the 
introduction of steam-engine technology altered approaches to engineering embankments, 
cuttings, viaducts and so forth. When the first steam locomotives were introduced they were 
unable to cope with the steep inclines that the colliery railways used. The “playing field” had 
to be levelled for them, by putting railway-lines on gentle slopes. This necessitated the 
building of spectacular civil-engineering projects, such as bridges, viaducts embankments 
and cuttings. This process was at work in the field of radar in 1939/40. The introduction of 
new equipment and practices necessitated a change in some of the old equipment and 
practices in order for the full potential of the new to be realised, it was only by actually 
using the equipment that the need for these changes became evident; they were not foreseen, 
and one could argue that they were not foreseeable.
2.4.3 Anti-Surface Vessel (ASV)
As I indicated in the previous section, one of the first things noticed by Bowen and team 
when they first took to the air in 1937 with their airborne apparatus, was that ships stood out 
clearly from the surface of the sea. During exercises in September of that year, Bowen was 
able to locate the North Sea Fleet in dense fog with the radar-equipped Anson when the 
other Coastal Command aircraft were grounded. He also used the equipment as an altimeter 
and coast-detector; the coast, too, standing out on their apparatus. Due to these successes 
emphasis was shifted from AI to ASV for most of 1938. During this period a lot was
104 The idea of technology being shaped by, and at the same time shaping, strategic goals in wartime is 
discussed in Beyerchen (1994), and in chapter 6. By cultural framework, I mean the general setting of 
accepted practice and apparatus being used at a particular time and place.
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learned about how to build and operate airborne equipment, as the targets used for the 
calibration were slower and larger objects than aircraft. After priority was switched back to 
AI, development of ASV continued in parallel to AI, using the same 1.5m equipment, and 
ASV Mark I was introduced into service at about the same time as AI Mark I.
Britain, being an island, depended heavily on shipping for supplies. When the war began 
in 1939, Bov/en was called on to see whether the ASV Mark I would be able to detect 
submarines. The Submarines of the period needed to surface regularly both to recharge their 
batteries, and to enable speedier travelling to and from bases to hunting-grounds (submerged 
speed was only 5 knots, using electric battery-powered engines; surface speed was 15 knots 
when diesel engines were used). In each case when surfaced, the ships were visible during 
daylight hours and therefore vulnerable to attack, which meant that both these operations 
were normally conducted at night. Hence if ASV could be employed, then submarines could 
be attacked at any time. The major question was whether a submarine conning tower would 
offer a large enough target for ASV. An exercise with an RN submarine was conducted 
during November 1939, and Bowen successfully located it when only the conning tower was 
above water.
ASV was used throughout the war, and a centimetre version based on H2 S was also 
introduced in 1943. It plays a relatively minor part in my account because the innovations 
that I am interested in were mainly related to developments in AI radar. However, the 
debate about allocation of resources into AI or ASV, and later H2S or ASV, depended upon 
the state of the Battle of the Atlantic (or the U-Boat war) at that time. The success in 
aircraft locating and destroying fluctuated during the war, and was dependent on more than 
just ASV, but figure 2.4 shows the impact that it and other devices had (see over). In 
general, rises in sinkings caused panic and prompted a “Something must be done” attitude 
from senior government members. As can be seen from the graph, ASV Mark I was 
particularly unsuccessful for reasons that were very similar to the failure of AI Mark I, as I 
described in the previous section. Bowen related that:
The failure of attacks during 1940 can be put down to many factors, but in simple 
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Figure 2.4: The effects of ASV. The ratio of Allied ships sunk to the number of 
German submarines lost, plotted at three monthly intervals for the duration of 
the war. From Bowen (1987), pl09.
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of Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm learned how best to use their new equipment.
Their problems were compounded by the poor serviceability of ASV Mark I, the lack of test 
equipment and the total absence of training facilities. It remains true to this day that any 
military service, when faced with the introduction of a new and exotic equipment, requires 
meticulous training and a long and protracted practice period before they can make the best 
use of it.105
An improved ASV, Mark II, was introduced in Autumn 1940. The primary effect of 
having a more serviceable machine was that crews operated longer hours and made more 
attacks on submarines, along with more sets being in service, and this forced submarines to 
be more wary, hampering the U-boats’ ship-hunting activities. Shipping losses fell initially, 
but when U-Boat commanders got more used to the tactics, they rose again.
The introduction of the “Leigh Light”, an aircraft-mounted searchlight, tipped the 
balance in favour of the allies again to the point where the U-boats were forced to change 
tactics, preferring to surface during daylight when aircraft could at least be spotted. 
However, in late 1942 the Germans finally introduced a warning receiver on 1.5m, a move 
that came about after Rommel’s forces captured106 an intact ASV-equipped Wellington in 
North Africa. Unfortunately for the Germans, the warning receiver came into service only 
shortly before the introduction of 10cm Mark III ASV. They had developed a warning 
receiver for 1.5m ASV Mark II, which was just being replaced by the new 10cm ASV. 
Naturally, they were unable to detect the 10cm ASV-equipped aircraft until they discovered 
the usage of it in February 1943, and developed a suitable warning receiver. This did not 
occur until the Battle of the Atlantic was effectively won.107 This final variant was adapted 
from H2 S, and was the product of a further political wrangle between Tizard, who favoured 
emphasis on the U-Boat problem, and Lindemann (by now Lord Cherwell) who leaned 
towards night-bombing aids. The details of this are in Chapter 5.
105 Bowen (1987), pl09.
106 This was another example of equipment capture by the Germans. It came only a couple of months before 
the capture of centimetre H2S, so had little time to make an impact (see chapter 6 for more discussion of 
German pre-centimetre airborne radar).
107 Bowen (1987) makes mention of the Germans being fooled by a captured operator into thinking infra-red 
emissions were the reason for their 1943 U-Boat losses, rather than 10cm ASV. By the time they realised 
this was the case (mid/late 1944), the war was effectively over.
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Between mid 1943 and the end of the war, the Germans never regained the initiative in 
the Atlantic, despite eventually developing a 10cm warning receiver after the discovery of 
this development (described in Chapter 7). I make mention of the ASV developments as 
background information; the events, whilst important to the course of the war, are not a 
major part of my thesis. _
2.4.4 The Problem of Minimum Range
When war broke out the whole Bawdsey establishment was evacuated from their 
Suffolk manor house up to Dundee University. The reason for this was the proximity of 
Bawdsey to Germany; it was feared that the Establishment would come under attack 
immediately. This move caused chaos on two fronts: firstly due to the physical problems of 
moving a whole research establishment lock stock and barrel, and secondly because the 
arrangements for the move were not properly made, so Dundee University were unprepared 
for receiving the radar men.
On arrival at Dundee in early September 1939, the airborne group were further isolated 
by being sent to Scone airport some twenty miles distant. Scone was a small grass field, 
with no facilities apart from a small hut, and was clearly totally unsuitable for building and 
testing airborne radar equipment. Unfortunately the remedy, when it came in November 
1939, was little better. The group were dispatched to St Athan, near Barry in South Wales. 
They had more space, but in unheated hangars during the middle of the worst winter for fifty 
years, and were also on an operational airfield which was bombed at one point. As Lovell 
pointed out:
The fallacy of our emergency move from Bawdsey and the aerodrome at Martlesham 
Heath was soon underlined a few weeks after our arrival at St Athan. A JU 88 [German 
bomber] appeared out of the murk and dropped a 1000 bomb on the main runway. The 
story of AI radar and Bowen’s group might well have been different had this bomb
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exploded, but it did not do so and proceeded to bounce along the runway like a tennis ball - 
the detonator was faulty.108
Now the airborne group were some 300 miles distant from the parent establishment, and 
were also reduced to the role of mechanics installing AI into 25 squadron Blenheims. 
During this period very little research work was actually done, and the airborne group also 
became personally isolated from the hub, especially Bowen. Lovell remarks that ‘Very few 
of us who arrived at St Athan in November 1939 ever did return to research at the parent 
AMRE establishment”, and it is not hard to see why (I cover Lovell’s personal account of 
conditions in chapter 4, along with more detail about why the move took place and who 
authorised it). The move was a disaster for AI development, and the main reason for this 
occurring was the so called “problem with minimum range” of AI.
Early in 1940 great dissatisfaction arose within the RAF with the then current AI, Mark 
III. This was because Al-equipped Blenheims were failing to shoot down anything at all. 
There were several reasons why this was happening, and it took a thorough investigation to 
work out why this was so. This was not before it had led to the alienation of Bowen from 
the rest of the establishment. It also illustrates how scientific results that are thought 
resolved (such as that AI can “see” other aircraft), can become contentious again. The 
argument made against AI by the RAF was that it didn’t work because the minimum range 
of the system (1000 feet) was too low. They insisted that only a change to the equipment’s 
design would help operators to “see” and shoot down enemy aircraft at night.
During air testing, the RAF had not found the new Mark III set satisfactory, and their 
complaints were summarised by Hodgkin as follows:
1) Massive ground echoes made it impossible to detect aeroplanes at a range greater 
than the height above ground. This had come up in an acute form because it had proved 
impossible to intercept the low-flying mine-laying aircraft which had been used extensively 
during the winter nights of 1939-40.
108 Lovell (1991), p21.
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In some ways it is strange that the RAF made mention of this, for they had long known that 
maximum range was a problem with 1.5m AI. This is why Bowen was so keen to go for 
10cm in the first place.
2) The direction-finding arrangement was somewhat unreliable and could not easily be 
tested on the ground. (The reliability of Mark IV AI was much better than that of Mark 
III.)
The main problem here was the arrangement of the aerials on the aircraft and the polarisation 
of the system, problems addressed and solved by Hanbury-Brown as I will describe shortly.
3) The display was difficult for a skilled observer and impossible for an unskilled one.
This problem was one that would not only bedevil AI, but was also a problem for other 
types of airborne radar like ASV and H2 S (see chapter 5). Interpreting what was on the 
screen of the display and relating it to an object “out there” was something that became, 
after practice, unproblematic for the scientists who devised the radar sets. However, their 
interpretative skills had to be taught to the RAF operators, many of whom were not familiar 
with electronic apparatus. Some learned these skills easily, some with difficulty, and some 
not at all.
4) The minimum range was too long and the maximum range was too short. The RAF 
wanted something less than 500 feet for minimum range and greater than five miles for 
maximum range...
5) The RAF wanted an equipment which could be installed in a Spitfire109and would be 
used by the pilot rather than by an observer. They favoured a ‘spot-indicator’ type of 
display on a single cathode ray tube.
6) Aircraft manufacturers did not like cluttering up the wings of high-performance 
aeroplanes with aerials of any kind.
109 This was a single-seat, single-engined fighter. In fact AI for single-seat aircraft was something never 
used during the war, although the technology to make such a device existed. The original limitations of the 
1.5m AI forced the adoption of the two-seat principle (pilot and radar-operator). Once this system was found 
to be successful, it became the operational norm.
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7) It would be easy to jam a wavelength of 1.5 metres.110
Most of the problems that Hodgkin gives were current in the minds of the AI team at the 
time. Bowen believed that some of them were just inherent problems of using 1.5m, and 
that they could all be solved by using 10cm (see chapter 4).
In early 1940 Hanbury-Brown was posted to the newly formed Fighter Interception 
Unit, that was formed to help solve the problem of why AI was proving so unpromising in 
service. He summed up the problems with AI neatly:
If our fighters were really going to shoot down enemy aircraft at night a great deal 
more experimental work would have to be done and new equipment, such as GCI radar, 
would have to be developed Of course many things were needed besides GCI, such as 
faster aircraft with better armament, better radio communications, a system of identifying 
friendly aircraft to the GCI, a more reliable model of AI and better test gear. As far as 
organisation was concerned there was an obvious need for better training of radar operators 
and mechanics.111
One of the first problems that Hanbury-Brown dealt with was that mentioned by 
Hodgkin in point two - that of unreliable direction-finding. The original AI Mark I was 
fitted to Blenheim aircraft with a long nose. The equipment was thoroughly tested using this 
aircraft. By the time Mark III was tested, the design of the Blenheim had been changed to 
one that had a much shorter nose. Pilots using the new set up (the short-nosed Blenheim 
and the new AI) complained about its performance. However, Hanbury-Brown identified 
that the main problem was one of serviceability. Quite simply, the sets kept going wrong 
because they were hurriedly made. There was also another problem that was not attributable 
to operators complaining abut the performance:
We spent hours and hours at 20 000 feet measuring everything that could be measured 
and much to my surprise, we did find a really serious fault We discovered that when the 
angle of elevation, or depression, of the target relative to the Blenheim was less than about
110 Hodgkin (1992), ppl45-6.
111 Hanbury-Brown (1991), p55.
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45 degrees its azimuth was shown correctly, but at angles greater than 45 degrees the 
display of the azimuth was not only wrong in magnitude but was sometimes wrong in 
sense. Above an elevation of about 60 degrees a target on the left of the fighter was 
actually shown as being on the right and vice versa!112
The RAF operators, being relatively unskilled in AI operation compared to Hanbury-Brown, 
knew that what they were getting was wrong, but they were unable to tell why. Hanbury- 
Brown, with his years of skill in operating AI radar, knew that he was able to “repeat the 
experiment” to get the “correct result”, so he also knew that in this case there must be 
something wrong with the apparatus and not with the operator (himself). He was aware that 
a lot of work had gone into improving the original AI Mark I to the stage of Mark III. He 
believed that the Mark III electronics should be more reliable than their Mark I predecessor, 
which meant that there were only a' few possibilities left as to where the problem lay. He set 
about testing the antenna set-up:
It didn’t take me long to find out what was the matter. The original installations of AI 
had been made in long-nose Blenheims and the performance of their azimuth antennas had 
been thoroughly tested at Martlesham and Northolt. But the later installations had been 
made in short-nose Blenheims and we had used the same antenna system. Although in 
routine tests at St Athan it had given satisfactory patterns in the horizontal plane, we had 
failed to notice that at high angles of elevation, or depression, there was a strong signal 
reflected from the cowling of the engine nearest to the antenna. On a short-nosed 
Blenheim this unwanted reflection seriously modified the directional patterns of the 
antennas and at very high elevations actually reversed the apparent azimuith of the 
target.113
After investigating the problem, Hanbury-Brown knew that it was the new arrangement of 
antennas that was unsatisfactoiy. They needed to be changed in order to get the Mark III AI 
working satisfactorily. He was able to discover this due to his possession of two types of 
skill. Firstly, he posessed interpretative skill from flying with the AI apparatus. He knew
112 Hanbury-Brown (1991), p58.
113 Hanbuiy-Brown (1991), p58.
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how to associate what he saw on the display with an aircraft being pursued. He could, 
therefore, identify when this relationship was not working properly (giving the correct 
result). Secondly, because he had a large degree of embodied skill that he had built up by 
actually designing, building and modifying the equipment through years of interaction with it 
and what it produced, he was able to identify the source of the trouble much quicker than 
anyone else. In this second case he pGsessed tacit knowledge (in the form of embodied skill) 
about what could be the source of the problem. As he was one of the men who had 
embedded his radar-building skill into the AI “black box”, he was also able to unpack this 
black box quicker than anyone else because of his tacit knowledge. Importantly, he was also 
able to make a step that solved the problem, as he describes:
After a few hasty and unsuccessful attempts to reposition the antennas, I took the bull 
by the horns and changed the polarisation from horizontal to vertical. This completely 
cured the trouble; we were now able to design remarkably neat antennas which could be 
mounted far away from the engines where the troublesome reflections from the engine 
cowlings would not reach them.114
The key phrase to note in this paragraph is “I took the bull by the horns”. This to me 
suggests that it was a possibility that Hanbury-Brown (or one of the other members of the 
airborne group) had already thought of as a possible next-step towards improving the 
apparatus. Again this is, I believe, an indicator that Hanbury-Brown posessed embodied 
knowledge about AI radar. The way he words it, it appears that changing the aerial 
polaristation was an obvious next step. However, such a step would probably be far from 
obvious to an electronics engineer unfamiliar with the behaviour of radio waves transmission 
and reception in airborne radars.
Unfortunately, at the same time as Hanbury-Brown was dealing with the directional 
problems, Bowen came under attack for what was suddenly perceived by the RAF to be a 
further problem with AI: the minimum range of the equipment. As I have quoted earlier, the 
RAF had many misgivings about using AI at all, due to the extremely poor results of the first
114 Hanbury-Brown (1991), p58.
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few months in service of the equipment, when very few enemy aircraft were located and 
none were actually shot down.
At the time that the argument arose, the main establishment was based in Dundee, but 
the airborne group were at St Athan in South Wales (as described in chapter 4). The 
physical distance alone was enough to open up a chasm between the airborne group and the 
main site, but the nature of their work (fitting AI, not doing research) exacerbated the 
problem. Not only was there the physical difficulty of communication between two distant 
points, but there was also a problem over personalities. This arose because Rowe appointed 
W.B.Lewis, a Cavendish physicist, to be his deputy ahead of many of the Bawdsey radar 
pioneers, one of whom was Bowen. As Lovell recalled:
[I]t is hard to understand why Rowe allowed one of his key groups to be destroyed in 
this way. An important factor was no doubt the serious acrimony that had developed 
openly between the Rowe - Lewis grouping and Bowen. The genesis of this was the arrival 
at Bawdsey of Lewis in the summer of 1939. At that stage Bowen and Wilkins [Watson- 
Watt’s former deputy] were the senior and pioneer members of the research group - Bowen 
on airborne radar and Wilkins on the development of the main ground installations.
However, Lewis impressed Rowe to such an extent that on the outbreak of war and the 
move to Dundee, Rowe "had risked offending my old colleagues by appointing Lewis as my 
deputy although he had been with us but a few months’. In fact, Rowe did not avoid this 
risk. Wilkins soon moved to Watson-Watt’s London Office and Bowen was forced into 
increasing isolation, first at Scone [Airport, near Dundee] and then St Athan.115
Rowe, who took over as superintendent from Watson-Watt in 1938, was a civil servant 
and a former bomb-ballistics researcher. He was not familiar with electronics, but Lewis 
was. This is presumably why Rowe recruited and promoted him: to act as an “expert” to 
back him up. However this action certainly infuriated Bowen, who did not think much of 
Lewis’ abilities with electronics and his (or Rowe’s) understanding of airborne radar (see
115 Lovell (1991), p21. See also in chapter 4, where I describe the relationship between Lewis, Rowe and 
Phillip Dee who took charge of the centimetre research group in May 1940.
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Chapter 4)116. Bowen was also irritated by Rowe’s lack of flexibility as a manager, and he 
was not alone in this respect.117
As I mentioned earlier, the criterion that Bowen, Hanbury-Brown and the rest of the 
group took as their benchmark for the minimum range performance of their AI was 1000 
feet. This target was met, as far as they were concerned, when they designed their system, 
as Bowen recalled:
[T]he minimum range question... was the cause of a misunderstanding..., when the 
airborne group was accused of paying insufficient attention to this problem. Some of the 
production sets did not always meet the 1000 foot minimum range requirement, but this 
was a matter of adjustment, not of basic design.118
So Bowen was stating that any flaws in the performance of the operational sets were caused 
by poor manufacture, not poor design. Hanbury-Brown noted that the production sets 
didn’t always meet the requirement either:
Our new version of AI (AI Mark III), like its predecessors, did not always meet this 
requirement; its minimum range might be anything between 800 and 1500 feet depending 
on how the receiver had been adjusted.119
Like Bowen, he also asserts that “in the airborne group we knew that this figure could be 
reduced to about 800 feet by a simple modification of the receiver... My own view... was 
that a minimum range of 1000 feet was adequate and I doubted whether night-fighter crews 
could make use of anything else.”120 Another point to note is that Hanbury-Brown was 
again alluding to the competence of him and the other members of his group in their ability
116 Lewis provoked varied reactions from the people who knew and worked with him, as the letters written 
to Lovell when he was writing Lewis’ obituary show (see W.B. Lewis papers). On the positive side, Lovell 
believes that it was Lewis’ intervention that saved 10cm AI during the summer of 1940 when there was 
considerable pressure to divert all resources into meeting the immediate threat of German invasion.
117 See Lovell (1991), Batt (1991), Atkinson (1990), Hanbury-Brown (1991) and Hodgkin (1992) for 
examples of Rowe’s particular eccentricities regarding the behaviour of his research staff.
118 Bowen (1987), p69.
119 Hanbury-Brown (1991), pp59-60.
120 Hanbury-Brown (1991), p60.
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to build working AI radars. This is further evidence that they were aware of their own 
embodied skills in this respect.
The RAF’s general dissatisfaction with the performance of AI was relayed to the main 
establishment at Dundee. Rowe consulted with the RAF’s Operational Research Section. 
It’s head, Harold Lamder, told them that the main difficulty with AI was that the minimum 
range of the set was unsatisfactory, and that it should be more like 600 feet than 1000. 
When Bowen was informed he was considerably irked, as according to him Lamder “knew 
nothing about the subject, had never been connected with airborne radar at Bawdsey and... 
never [took] a flight to see for himself.”121 He knew that Lamder did not possess the same 
amount of embodied knowledge that he had gained through four years’ work with AI radar, 
and believed Lamder was in no position to make these sort of decisions.
Lewis, Rowe’s deputy “decided to work on it for himself’122 without apparently 
consulting any of the airborne group. He had an idea for changing the pulse-shape to make 
it sharper and shorter, reasoning that this would then reduce the minimum range of the set. 
He gave the job to E.H. (Ted) Cooke-Yarborough, a “Very competent electronic 
engineer”123, and also to engineers at EMI. However (according to Bowen) EMI were “a 
very expert group, but were as inexperienced in airborne matters as [Lewis] was.”124 
Hanbury-Brown’s experience with the engine-cowling problem and aerial polarisation lends 
weight to this view.
Both Bowen and Hanbury-Brown believed that the problem of minimum range was one 
that was created by Lewis and Lamder, something that they as competent airborne radar 
researchers of several years’ standing had already assessed and passed over as in hand. As 
far as they were concerned, any problem of minimum range either didn’t exist, or was due to 
errors in manufacture, or to the set-up of the whole night-fighting organisation. Both men, 
as skilled engineers, had arguments to back up their position. Bowen believed that Lewis 
and Lamder didn’t understand how the receiver worked; they didn’t have the skill that he 
had through having built it:
121 Bowen, letter to Lovell 2/5/87. In W.B.Lewis papers.
122 Hanbury-Brown (1991), p60.
123 Hanbury-Brown (1991), p60.
124 Bowen, letter to Lovell 2/5/87. In W.B.Lewis papers.
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What both Lamder and Lewis failed to realise was the simple fact that in considering 
the minimum range performance of a radar set, there had never been a problem in getting 
the pulse width down. The whole problem was due to ringing in the receiver which in our 
case was within a few feet of the transmitter and was subjected to a tremendous kick when 
the transmitter fired. This was well known and well understood from the early thirties, 
when Wilkins and myself were familiar with the ionospheric work going on at Slough and 
King’s College. We carried this knowledge to Orfordness in 1935 and successfully 
introduced some of the precautions needed into the first air warning set. Neither Lamder 
nor Lewis were involved in this work and as I have said, they got the problem entirely 
wrong; if there was a problem it was due to ringing in the receiver and not due to the 
transmitter.125
In this passage Bowen also mentions the transportability of his embodied knowledge. 
He and Wilkins learned about ringing in the receiver at the Slough research station and were 
able to transport their embodied knowledge with them as they moved. It is possible that this 
knowledge could have been made explicit if required in the same way as the TEA-Laser 
building knowledge was made explicit in Collins’ study.126 But if Bowen and Wilkins were 
not around, they would have been unable to give this embodied information to their 
colleagues.
Bowen’s embodied skills in building airborne radar were no use to him in this debate, as 
he was well removed from the centre of what was happening by being in South Wales. The 
status of Lamder and Lewis, who were senior in the civil service heirarchy to Bowen and 
Hanbury-Brown enabled them to question the solutions to airborne radar problems made by 
Bowen. However, according to Bowen they didn’t have the necessary competences to ask 
the right questions about the lack of performance. Hanbury-Brown said the same things of 
Cooke-Y arborough:
125 Bowen, letter to Lovell 2/5/87. In W.B.Lewis papers.
126 See Collins (1985), ch3.
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[Lewis and Cooke-Yarborough] made the first test flight from Leuchars and found the 
results were inconclusive partly because of the difficulty of independently measuring the 
range at which the echo signal disappeared.
I found this mildly amusing as I had already discovered that it is no use trying to 
estimate the distance from one aircraft to another when you are in the air, it has to be 
measured: In the many mock interceptions which I made when demonstrating AI, 
everyone without exception, including experienced pilots, underestimated the distance 
between aircraft by a factor of at least two. To most people an aircraft 500 feet away looks 
dangerously close! At Martlesham we solved this problem by flying low over the sea and 
using the aircraft’s altimeter to calibrate the minimum range of the echo from the surface 
of the sea.127
On moving to Swanage (see Chapter 4), the transmitter designed by EMI “electronics 
wizards” Alan Blumleinl28 and E.L.C.White was air-tested along side Cooke-Yarborough’s 
own version of an improved transmitter. These tests showed that the EMI version gave a 
greater maximum range, both having a similar minimum range of around 500 feet. The EMI 
transmitter was incorporated into AI Mark IV along with Hanbury-Brown’s vertically 
polarised aerial system. This system was eventually installed into the much faster 
Beaufighter twin-engined night-fighter in Autumn 1940. When combined with GCI 
(introduced in October 1940) and with several pilots and radar operators who had virtually 
taught themselves how to make interceptions, the new system made a much greater impact.
The “problem of minimum range” was made into an artefact of the apparatus by Lewis 
and Lamder. They were both unfamiliar with AI, who had never flown with it and who 
hadn’t spent several years building it and experiencing it in operation. Bowen and Hanbury- 
Brown, both far more skilled than the other two were convinced that any failure of their 
apparatus in operation was due to factors other than their design. The upshot of this dispute 
was a fine version of AI, mark IV, but the downside was that the rift between Rowe and 
Bowen became irrevocably large. As Hanbury-Brown says: “In effect Tafiy [Bowen], who
127 Hanbury-Brown (1991), pp60-l.
128 Blumlein was part of EMI’s television team, and recognised as the finest electronics engineer of his 
generation. He later worked on H2S, and was tragically killed in June 1942 when the test aircraft he was 
flying in crashed.
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had been one of [radar’s] brightest stars was lost to AMRE”129. He became sidelined at 
Swanage and all his skill and experience was lost to the members of the centimetre group. 
This occurred when Tizard asked him join him on his trip to America in September 1940. 
Bowen’s responsibility was explaining the prototype cavity magnetron (a type of 10cm 
transmitter valve, see chapter 3 and 4) to American scientists and engineers.
I think the general point to draw from this is that it is impossible to know what kind of 
impact Bowen’s airborne radar skill would have made on future developments. Lovell 
speculated that Bowen may have been able to speed up development of H2 S in 1941/2 (see 
chapter 5). What one can say is that his skill appears to have been correct in defining the 
minimum range problem as an irrelevance to the problems of AI in general:
I once did an assessment of the minimum ranges actually recorded by Fighter 
Command pilots in combat reports in 1940 and 1941... in actual combat, the median 
minimum range to which enemy aircraft were tracked by AI and then seen by eye was 
between 1200 and 1500 feet.. When there was a moon or the target had been damaged or 
had defective flame compressors, the range at which the target was sighted was sometimes 
over 2500 feet. There were few reports, if any, below 1000 feet. These figures are 
remarkably close to the RAE results of five or ten years earlier. So much for Lamder’s 
claim about the defective minimum range of AI! His claim was doubly phoney. Not only 
was the original performance of AI well within the Fighter Command requirement, but as 
was demonstrated by the night battles, there was no need for anything else. The whole 
thing was a fabrication of Harold Lamder, and neither he nor W.B.Lewis knew the 
technicalities involved.130
That Bowen was ignored and sidelined was regrettable, and may have had as I indicated an 
adverse effect on radar. The minimum range issue shows that a researcher’s status within 
the heirarchy of an institution can confer the holder with the power to judge what is 
“correct” and what is not. This power can be wielded to overrule those who have built up a 
superior level of knowledge through their practical experience of apparatus. Lewis was 
deputy Superintendent of the radar establishment and Lamder was head of Operational
129 Hanbury-Brown (1991), p61.
130 Bowen, letter to Lovell 2/5/87. In W.B.Lewis papers.
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Research at Fighter Command. This status meant that they were deemed better able to 
decide the nature of a problem concerning radar than the people who had the practical 
hands-on skill of making the device.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have done four things. Firstly, I have given a brief history of radar 
development up to the final variant of conventional technology AI. Secondly, I have given 
an account of some of the major steps taken whilst building radar in the ground and air 
forms in Britain just before the second world war. Thirdly, I have tried to unpack the 
contentious nature of radar research, to show how not everything was clear cut and how 
many people remained to be convinced that the developments that seemed obvious to the 
pioneers actually did what they claimed to. Lastly, I have brought out the vulnerability of 
the enterprise to personality conflicts and changing location.
There are several things to draw out of these points. The embodied skill of the airborne 
pioneers in building their radars was considerable, and this skill had to be propagated out 
into the wider world in several ways if airborne radar was to be a success. Their embodied 
skill had to black-boxed, or embedded, into the production AI in order to make sure they 
performed as they should. This was the issue of actually building production equipment that 
performed as well as the laboratory sets. In the case of Marks I-III the pioneers 
acknowledge that production was not up to scratch, but that in the beginning there were:
[inadequate engineering standards in industry - the manufacturers were good people 
who improved fast, but when they started, they only knew the technology which went into 
domestic radio receivers.131
131 Bowen, letter to Lovell 2/5/87. In W.B.Lewis papers.
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The second skill which, even when adequate equipment was developed in the form of 
AI Mark IV, was the ability to “see” anything using the equipment, and to use that ability to 
shoot down enemy aircraft, for that was the measure of success for AI. It was only by a 
great deal of trial and error that all the conditions for performing this successfully were 
worked out:
Most of the successful night-fighter pilots of 1940 and 1941 were entirely self-taught.
This was not the fault of any one person, but was due to the fact that a piece of equipment 
was being introduced into service for the first time. By comparison, the introduction of 
centimetre wave equipment a few years later was a good deal easier because there were 
plenty of people in the RAF who knew the broad principles involved.132
Another thing to note is that with AI we see the emergence of the type of team that was 
to dominate British radar research. This was a small team of people with good practical and 
experimental skill, who worked closely together and were able to develop a good working 
relationship. Rapid results brought continued success, and a belief in the project. They built 
up a large amount of embodied and embedded knowledge of how to build and operate 
airborne radars; what skills were needed to “see” objects using the screens in the aircraft, 
and how to fix things if nothing could be seen. Hodgkin described how useful one of these 
walking repositories of radar-building knowledge was to him:
I... learnt more about radar and electrical engineering from [Hanbury-Brown] than 
from anybody else.133
Fortunately Bowen was around to point people in the right direction when most of the 
centimetre components and the early centimetre radars were being designed and built. He 
was lost to the centimetre team after that, in September 1940.
Finally, we have seen that this sort of team was sensitive to disruption in the form of 
personality clashes and also in geographical dispersal. There is a great difference between
132 Bowen, letter to Lovell 2/5/87. In W.B.Lewis papers.
133 Hodgkin (1992), p!42.
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being committed to an idea about how to do something and disagreeing about details of how 
to do it, and disagreeing about the fundamentals of how to do it. In this case, and later on 
with the centimetre research, the successful teams (in terms of quick problem solving) had 
very strong common bonds and worked together in small spaces. This appears to have 
provided the optimum conditions for sharing embodied knowledge in the form of practical 
skills and also in terms of ideas about how to progress. These ideas were usually generated 
by having an intimate knowledge of the apparatus. The ability to consult quickly with 
colleagues who shared this knowledge, or posessed greater knowledge, facilitated quick 
progress. Geographical and personal isolation inhibited this speed. In the next two chapters 
I will describe firstly how similar small, highly skilled teams developed components for 
centimetre radar, and then how they combined these components into a 10 centimetre AI 
which got rid of the problem of maximum range of AI. Before that, I shall briefly consider 
how things could have gone.
8 8
A Counterfactual Intermission
By late 1940 the Mark IV AI finally bore fruit and was used very successfully for the 
next two years until the introduction of centimetre AI. Similarly, the 1.5m ASV also served 
its purpose very well. The other major uses of centimetre radar were in bombing, and these 
applications grew out of the apparatus being developed for centimetre AI. Centimetre radar 
was considered a vital research direction to take, and the occurrences of this story are what I 
examine in this chapter. Before I undertake that task, I wish to consider briefly what other 
directions the story of radar development could have taken.
The main reason that the development of centimetre radar was undertaken was because 
of the problem of the maximum range of the 1.5m AI. Bowen believed very strongly that 
10cm radar was the only solution to this problem. However, in practice, 1.5m (Mark IV) AI 
was found to work perfectly adequately when used in conjunction with a proper fighter- 
control (GCI) and skilled pilots and radar operators. As events turned out, this information 
was only discovered well after the development of centimetre radar had commenced. 
However, if maximum effort had gone into AI during 1937/8 (rather than effort being 
diverted into ASV for a year), it is plausible that the problems of AI would have been solved 
a year earlier. This would have negated the pressure for centimetre AI, and quite probably 
stalled the research project.
Without a perceived need for AI the pressure for centimetre research would have 
removed. This is infact what happened to some extent in Germany. Centimetre research 
involved exploring a whole new field of physics. As I discuss in chapters 6 and 7, German 
metric radars performed the tasks envisaged for them very well. It was only when the 
Germans had a pressing need for improving the performance of their radar that they 
undertook centimetre research, however, they had also by this stage captured British 
centimetre radar, and felt obliged to catch up in this area.
It is interesting to speculate what would have happened had centimetre radar not been 
developed. Probably the most significant change would have been in terms of the Battle of 
the Atlantic, where people such as Rowe have argued that 10cm ASV made a crucial 
difference during early 1943. During this period the build-up to the invasion of Europe
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began, and many materials were transported across the Atlantic. Centimetre radar made 
little impact upon the state of the war as far as Britain was concerned up until this point.
Centimetre research was nearly stopped during the Battle of Britain, when many people 
thought that all available resources should be channelled into meeting the very real and 
urgent threat of a German invasion. As I relate in the next chapter, centimetre research was 
viewed by most people as being very “pie-in the sky”, and had few friends outside the small 
group of those committed to its development. I believe that given the state of 1.5m AI, 
there was going to be pressure from the radar researchers for centimetre research given the 
way the war went, but that the continuation of this research during the summer of 1940 was 
very touch and go. If this had been cancelled, it is unlikely that it would have been 
resurrected. Firstly, by October 1940 mark IV AI and GCI arrived. Secondly, all the rapid 
progress on centimetre research occurred between June and September 1940, and without 
this rapid progress there would have been little weight for the researchers to justify the 
resources that were poured into this area subsequently.
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Chapter 3: The Development of British Microwave Radar Components
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I introduced the reader to the concept of radar. I covered the 
precursors of radar, and explained the political developments of the 1930’s that led to 
Britain seeking a scientific solution to the problem of air defence against bombers. The 
Chain Home radar and the accompanying methods of directing fighter aircraft onto 
incoming raids were the response to this threat. Airborne radar followed out of the next 
worry, that of air attack by night. I explained how airborne radar was developed. I also 
concentrated on the nature of the problems facing the airborne team, and the 
characteristics that that team exhibited in dealing with these problems. Lastly, I 
considered some of the possible lines that radar development could have taken apart from 
going down the road of centimetre research.
This chapter follows the development of the key components that were used in 
building the first British microwave radar in August 1940. The importance of this radar 
to the thesis is that it was the basis of the experimental AI system out of which H2 S was 
developed. H2 S was the complete microwave system which the Germans captured and 
copied in 1943, and which I use to explore some of the issues of knowledge types and 
transfer that I raised in chapter 1. The story that I tell in this chapter is very similar to 
that told in the next. Both the development of microwave components, and then of a 
complete system, happened very rapidly. I wish to argue that this rapid development was 
due to three factors that were similar in each case.
The first factor is that the groups involved were very small, consisting of up to a 
dozen people, though sometimes only two or three individuals. Despite being small they 
were linked to other research groups, which allowed a transfer of intellectual and 
experiential resources. These linkages are the second factor. All the key developments 
were made by men who were linked in some way either to the Cavendish Laboratory of 
Cambridge University, or else to the General Electric Company (GEC). They were also 
all accomplished experimenters who had either had long experience of working in 
laboratories with complicated electronic or physical equipment, or else had had 
experience prior to their University or Research appointments that gave them practical
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skills in making and operating complicated apparatus. These skills which fall into the 
category of embodied skills, are the final factor.
The skills that they gained can be described as embodied tacit knowledge about how 
to operate and construct electronic apparatus. Their practical, embodied knowledge 
equipped them to refine their apparatus when they were experimenting. Sometimes, they 
were required to make this knowledge explicit when helping a colleague. Their working 
arrangements facilitated this process, as they were in small groups where problems could 
be readily discussed, and apparatus observed by others and demonstrated to others. This 
environment permitted a high degree of cross-fertilisation of ideas, as I will show.
One of the main things that I wish to show is that the advancement of their ideas 
about what they were doing, and what they would do next, came not solely from 
theoretical ideas (although the theoretical nature of their work was discussed). I will 
indicate how their physical experience of acting through experimentation shaped their 
thought processes and helped them to formulate their ideas about their work. This 
process is described by Gooding in relation to Faraday’s work with the rotation motor, 
when Faraday developed both his practical experimental competences and his ideas about 
theory in parallel}
3.2 The State of Microwave Technology Prior to the Outbreak of War
In this first section I shall look at what work existed on microwave theory and 
components that was potentially available to the AMRE 10cm radar team, and where this 
work came from. I say “potentially” quite intentionally, as some of the AMRE team 
members assert that they were unaware of what was available. For example, Lovell 
stated that:
Much later we learnt that the properties of paraboloids as aerial systems for the 
transmission and reception of very high frequency waves had been worked out in other 
countries but at that time, in 1940, we knew nothing of that work and proceeded to 
rediscover these properties for ourselves.2
1 Gooding (1990), ch 6.
2 Lovell (1991), p39.
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Indeed, parabolic reflectors were used in France in 1935-6 to make an obstacle detector 
for ships.3 I intend to show that prior to the War, any knowledge that existed in Britain 
about microwaves was passed on through personal contact, as with Oliphant and the 
Varians, or was learnt through experimentation based on the limited amount of published _ 
material available. I believe that given the desultory level of knowledge about 
microwaves that existed in this country, the speed of developments was due to the way 
that the few who did have experience interacted on a close personal level with those who 
didn’t.
3.2.1 Waveguide Research
Much work on the properties of very short radio-waves was done in the late 
nineteenth century (see in particular mention of Hertz’s experiments in the last chapter). 
The early electro-magnetic wave generators were spark-gaps; such generators produce 
short (centimetre) length waves. However, the power given by spark-gap generators 
was very low which meant they were only suitable for use in laboratories. The 
commercial exploitation of radio that took place following Marconi’s experiments used 
much longer waves. Interest, and research money, went into looking at the longer (tens 
to hundreds of metres) radio waves. Centimetre research remained low-key as there 
were few opportunities for using it outside the laboratory.
Very early theoretical work on the behaviour of electromagnetic waves in hollow 
tubes was conducted by Lord Rayleigh in 1897.4 In 1936, Rayleigh’s work was extended 
by W.L.Barrow of the MIT Electrical Engineering Department and G.C.Southworth of 
the Bell Telephone Laboratories, both in the USA. Barrow found that a suitably matched 
tube5 to the wavelength of the wave could produce transmission of a radio wave at a 
strength ten times that of free space. More work was done on investigating the 
properties of hollow tubes as microwave carriers, up until the foundation of the
3 Guerlac (1988), ch 2.
4 See Guerlac (1988), ch 2.
5 Barrow’s original waveguide was a one-foot diameter air-duct pipe. Similar inventiveness was shown 
by the British at AMRE, where their first waveguide was part of the plumbing for an Elsan chemical 
toilet. See Atkinson (1990).
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Radiation Laboratory at MIT following the Tizard Mission’s visit in 1940 (see Chapter 
4). The Radiation Laboratory was able to draw on a local body of expertise in this area 
when the Americans began research into microwave radar.
Southworth’s investigations began in 1931 when he started studying the properties of 
di-electric materials in cylinders. This led him eventually to work on the waveguide 
properties of hollow pipes (where the di-electric material is air). He generated the 
necessary wavelength by using a Barkhausen-Kurz valve, which was the usual choice of 
valve for generating centimetre wavelengths at this time). Importantly, he also 
discovered that by flaring the ends of the waveguide into a horn shape he could direct the 
emission into a beam. He does not appear to have envisaged many applications for his 
discoveries, as Guerlac reported:
Southworth was... cautious... in commenting on the possible applications of this 
new form of radio transmission. Its value appeared to be limited by the fact that the 
size of waveguide structure is proportional to the wavelength, and hence it was only 
suitable for the very highest frequencies. These frequencies [wavelengths] were only 
just being explored and as yet no suitable source of power was available on these 
frequencies: “The situation then is that the art at these extreme frequencies is not yet at 
the point which permits a satisfactory evaluation of practical use.”6
It should be noted that there was a small but significant amount of expertise in the US 
about waveguides. This expertise was put to good effect in the Radiation Laboratory. 
The Radiation Laboratory eventually co-operated with its UK counterpart, AMRE 
(renamed TRE in 1942), but large-scale co-operation did not begin until after then US 
entered the War in December 1941. Southworth’s work was not used by the scientists at 
AMRE. As Lovell illustrated, they proceeded to do much of their empirical investigation 
into waveguides for themselves when they commenced research into this area in May 
1940 (see chapter 4). Therefore Southworth’s work had little influence on the initial 
British investigations into microwave radar.
6 Guerlac (1988), p204. Quote taken from Southworth, G.C. (1936) “Hyperfrequency wave guides - 
General considerations and experimental results.” in Bell Syst. Tech. J. 15, pp284-309.
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3.2.2 The Klystron
One of the important features of microwaves that made them interesting for research 
was how they behaved in a resonant cavity; which is what, in effect, a waveguide is. The 
behaviour of resonant cavities in connection with their use in electronic valves was first 
investigated by William Hansen of Stanford University in California7. He was looking for 
a low-cost way to design a high-energy valve for x-ray research, which he was doing 
under the tutelage of David Webster. When Hansen was an undergraduate student at 
Stanford his potential was recognised by the staff and he was “groomed” to become a 
member of the faculty. He then went off and did his graduate work at MIT in x-ray 
crystallography. Ginzton, a contemporary of Hansen’s, described his abilities as a 
researcher:
At graduate school, his childhood training with tools ana mechanics blossomed 
and he became an excellent machinist. Later these mechanical skills became important 
in the klystron project as he was able to identify Russ[ell Variants more practical 
ideas and to help Sig[urd Varian] design equipment.8
Prior to the Second World War it was far more common for scientists to build their own 
experimental apparatus. This meant that they often learned practical skills, such as those 
that Ginzton listed above. Hansen would have got a feeling for the physical possibilities 
of the materials that he worked with, both in terms of constructing apparatus and in 
terms of the physics he performed with it. This physical knowledge would have helped 
him to refine his colleague’s ideas into practical lines of experiment.
Hansen’s ideas for using resonant cavities came from work he did as a graduate 
student on examining oscillations within a sphere. Hansen discussed his ideas for using 
resonant cavities with Russell Varian, who was another student of Webster’s.9 The 
trouble with Hansen’s ideas for generating high-energy x-rays were the limitations of the 
contemporary technology. Building a device with sufficient power would mean him 
constructing equipment of 15 feet in diameter. Hansen put a proposal before the Head of
7 The reasons that Stanford came to be the scene of this research are explored more fully in Norbert & 
Seidel (1994).
8 Ginzton (1977), p717.
9 Norbert & Seidel (1994), p206.
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Faculty, but as funds were tight and such a large piece of apparatus would eat up a not 
insignificant proportion of the available research budget for the department, he was told 
to go away and make a mathematical analysis of how his device would behave. Ginzton 
added:
As surprising as it may seem now, the idea of a microwave cavity resonator was 
not yet known and Hansen was exploring the utility of the idea both intuitively and by 
complex mathematical analysis employing boundary value approaches.10
His time was not wasted, though, because this work gave him sufficient ammunition to 
persuade his colleagues that the project was viable. He constructed a working model in 
February 1936, but:
...while simple enough in theory, and prototype, in practice it was another matter 
entirely. Over the next year Hansen built his “Big Rhumbatron” as he called it, but 
major problems with the triodes, cooling system, and blocking condensers limited 
efficiency.11
Hansen’s mathematical investigations were useful to him in helping to formulate ideas as 
to how to build his device and also, of course, in persuading those in control of the 
purse-strings to give him the money to build it. He used mathematical models in 
conjunction with his own experience in order to design the equipment that he built. 
However, his theoretical work was no substitute for practice. He had to perform 
experiments with apparatus, and go through the trial-and-error stages of building up 
“know-how”. It was only through engaging with his apparatus that he was able to learn 
how to make it work.
Hansen’s impetus for developing the rhumbatron was as an electron accelerator for 
x-ray experiments. However, the impetus for the development of the resonant cavity 
principle that resulted in the klystron, which was also Hansen’s idea, came from a 
different direction. Whilst Hansen was working on the rhumbatron, his erstwhile 
colleague Russell Varian moved to the Farnsworth Television Laboratory, and then on to
10 Ginzton (1977), p717.
11 Norbert & Seidel (1994), p207.
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his own laboratory. Russell’s brother Sigurd was an airline pilot with Pan Am, and the 
two often discussed ways of becoming rich through having an idea for an invention. 
Sigurd’s idea was for a means of detecting aircraft through cloud12. Russell believed 
that any such device would need to operate on centimetric wavelengths, and that 
Hansen’s rhumbatron may well be the source of such high-energy, high-frequency power. 
He discussed the possibilities with Hansen, and when Sigurd took leave of absence from 
Pan Am the three set about the problem in Spring 1937.13
Hansen was concerned about the performance of the triodes in his rhumbatron, and 
looked for a different valve that might alleviate some of those problems. He discussed 
the problems with the Varian brothers and recorded these discussions in his laboratory 
notebooks. A combination of discussion, diagram-drawing, experience with the 
rhumbatron and consideration of the problem led Hansen to devise the “bunching 
principle”. He imagined speeding up and slowing down the electrons travelling across 
the evacuated space in the valve so that, rather than travelling in a uniform stream, they 
travelled in groups (rather like firing distinct bursts from a machine gun). This bunching 
would be at a frequency that could be controlled, and would be of the right order to 
produce microwaves. These ideas led top them constructing a valve that incorporated 
the bunching principle, and putting it to the test.
Their first tests gave very encouraging results, with the new valve (which they 
named the klystron) giving off 13 cm radiation at sufficient power to be detected around 
the room. These initial results were enthusiastically greeted and gave grounds for 
considerable optimism, as Russell’s wife wrote: “This, of course, means that the victory 
is practically won and it is just a case of time before they get the other little items 
straightened out. Dr Webster was so thrilled that he invited the physics department and 
myself over to his house for beers”.14 However Mrs Varian’s optimism was ill-founded, 
as:
[I]t required four years of further development before the klystron became a 
production-line item. The next four years proved to be a trying time for the Stanford
12 This was at the time of the Japanese invasion of China, and of the Spanish Civil War when the effect 
of airpower was first realised
13 Guerlac (1988), pl96.
14 Winnie Varian to Allie and Weonah, August 31,1937, Varian Papers, University Archives, Stanford 
University, quoted in Norbert & Seidel (1994), p209.
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team, while Stanford patented the klystron immediately, they entered into a 
development contract with the Sperry Gyroscope company without realising the 
implications of development. The tension between industrial proprietaiy rights and 
academics’ propensity to open publication strained relations between the two groups.15
Hansen had devised a useful principle, but a lot of work had to be done before this 
principle could be incorporated into a production valve. Hansen and his team had to 
spend time experimenting in order to learn how to make their klystron work as they 
wished it. When they had done this, and had developed the requisite tacit knowledge, 
their embodied skill could be embedded into an engineered valve. However, the 
difficulty which they had in reaching this stage meant that the production valve took four 
years of development.
This recalcitrance is important to note, as the klystron is of major interest to the story 
of British microwave radar development as I describe in the next chapter. The other 
important point is that Oliphant16, who headed the Birmingham team that developed the 
cavity magnetron, went to Stanford to see the klystron:
Now Oliphant, who had been informed at the close of 1938, by Sir Henry Tizard 
and Professor J.D.Cockcroft, about radar progress and its problems, had visited 
Stanford University, among other places in the U.S.A., in January 1939 and had 
acquired much information on the recent klystron work of the Varian brothers.17
When the British attempts to build a working klystron are related in the next chapter, 
it will be seen that they also had quite considerable difficulties in getting it to work. This 
was at a time when the klystron had been in existence for three years. These difficulties 
were also experienced despite Oliphant having had personal contact with the originators 
of the valve. Oliphant certainly had personal contact with Hansen and the Varians, and 
was shown their klystron. This is something that was related by Burcham & Shearman:
15 Norbert & Seidel (1994), p209.
16 Oliphant was originally an Australian, but he came to Britain in 1927 to work at the Cavendish 
laboratory. In 1937 he moved to take up the Poynting chair of Physics at Birmingham. He transformed 
what had been up until then a relatively small and quiet department, orienting it towards nuclear 
research and getting the Nuffield Laboratory built. Oliphant (1990), Burcham & Shearman (1990).
17 Bums (1988b), p269.
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[H]igh powers (though not yet at short wavelengths) were... needed in linear and 
cyclic accelerators for nuclear physics and early in 1939 Oliphant visited the United 
States to see Ernest Lawrence, the cyclotron physicist, in California and to learn about 
the new klystron generator of power at very short wavelengths which had been 
developed by the Varian brothers (1939) at Stanford. He brought back with him the 
technical information necessary for the construction of one of these at the Birmingham 
laboratory.18
When Oliphant visited Stanford, the klystron was not stable. By this I mean that Hansen 
and the Varians had not yet acquired the skill to operate their klystron - they could not 
produce the required effect every time. By his visited he acquired the algorithmic 
information required for building a klystron, and he presumably had Hansen’s embodied 
tacit knowledge about klystron operation made explicit to him by his personal contact. 
However, as Hansen did not possess the experimental skill to make it work every time 
(because he had still to learn how to do this) Oliphant would have the same trouble as 
Hansen, even if he had had complete knowledge transfer about the klystron. This was 
why the British had trouble with their own klystron in 1940.
3.3 The Origins of British Interest in Microwaves
Microwave radar was developed in Britain primarily as a response to the perceived 
shortcomings of AI marks I - IV. Bowen, and others, had identified the main problem as 
being a limited maximum range (the so-called “minimum range problem” was solved by 
the Mark IV variant). Because these versions of AI used 1.5m waves, the set “floodlit” 
rather than producing a narrow beam, and the maximum range of the set was limited by 
the aircraft’s height above ground. The ground would always produce a large return on 
the screen that would swamp any signal within the theoretical maximum range of the 
system, but further away than the ground (see chapter 2). The Air Ministry team that 
constructed the first microwave radar were able to draw on a base of experience, 
particularly in the form of manufacturing expertise and skill, gathered from several years’ 
interest in the potential of microwaves by both the Military and industry. It was the
18 Burcham & Shearman (1990), p8.
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eventual coalescing of this interest into a unity of purpose, that of developing high-power 
sources for centimetric waves, that I believe enabled the remarkable rapidity with which 
this project bore fruit in the shape of the cavity magnetron.
More specifically, I will argue that the development of the cavity magnetron was the 
due to the combination of four lines of research and experience, namely:
(i) Hansen’s resonator principle from the klystron;
(ii) Randall & Boot’s experience of valve manufacture and their knowledge of the 
resonator principle, coupled with their innovative combination of this new principle with 
the magnetron valve-geometry;
(iii) Gutton’s work on split-anode magnetron improvement; and
(iv) the refinements made by Megaw to unite these three strands into the pre-production, 
engineered El 189 cavity magnetron.
In each case the experimenters had considerable “hands-on” practical experience and 
background knowledge of their field, but they combined this knowledge with an ability to 
push their work into uncharted areas where their only guidance was their “intuition”. I 
would argue that this was due to their good understanding of the physical possibilities of 
apparatus from their considerable practical skills. These skills gave them a “feel” for 
what was possible. They had unarticulable “know-how” about how to get an experiment 
to work, similar to Hansen and his klystron.19
The British Government’s research establishment’s interest in centimetres began 
when the Co-ordination of Valve Development (CVD) Committee placed a contract for 
the development of high-power centimetric valves with Birmingham, Oxford and Bristol 
Universities in Autumn 1939. This was shortly after the outbreak of the Second World 
War, but interest in developing high-power centimetre valves had been developing over 
the previous two years. To explain where and why this interest originated, it is necessary 
to retrace a few steps to bring together several threads.
CVD was formed in early 1939 in an attempt to formalise an already existing 
arrangement between the three Military Services and their various commercial valve
19 See also, for example, how Morpurgo and team proceeded to investigate the existence of Quarks by 
using a charged oil-drop experiment. Gooding (1990), chapter 8.
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suppliers. The committee was supposed to cut through the secrecy surrounding radar 
development, which was hampering co-operation and standardisation between these 
organisations and producing a duplication of effort not deemed to be in the national 
interest. The Air Ministry’s needs were being met by the work done by its establishment 
at Bawdsey, which had accrued four years’ worth of experience in radar development. 
Bawdsey already had dealings with suppliers for components, which I have covered in 
the previous chapter. The Admiralty relied on its own Signal School for valve 
development (also mentioned in chapter 2; the Signal School supplied the valves for the 
original radar experiments), but:
Although Admiralty and Signal School were aware of the work at Bawdsey from 
the beginning, it was considered that the design and construction of ship-borne 
installations was sufficiently different from land-based or aircraft equipment to justify 
an independent approach to their development20
One interpretation of this state of affairs could be simply the Senior Service wishing to 
preserve its “empire” intact. Both the Navy and the Army had fought to suppress the 
retention of the RAF as a separate service after the First World War, so this is a 
possibility. Nevertheless, the Navy’s Signal School too was a repository of considerable 
skill in valve design and manufacture.21
The Admiralty developed its own 7m wavelength ship-borne radar designed to detect 
aircraft, Type 79, which entered service in October 1938. Naval research was 
independent to that of the other two Services, and there were only informal contacts 
between researchers in the different camps. It is not known how much they shared with 
each other.22 The valves for this equipment were made by engineers in the Signal 
School, and the group developing these valves was led by J.F.Coales. The group did 
some calculations in early 1938 that led them to believe that a wavelength of 50cm would 
be most suited to surface-vessel detection. The Admiralty also had a contract with GEC 
for the development of very short wave valves for communication purposes. Part of this 
contract was for a propagation study, done by E.C.S.Megaw, who would later play an
20 Callick (1990), p2.
21 Further details can be found in Foley (1991).
22 Co-operation between the services was negligible in Germany, as I describe in chapters 6 and 7.
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important part in refining the newly developed cavity magnetron. It was while Coales 
was involved in discussion with GEC that the decision to form the CVD Committee 
came about. Coales was unable to discuss the usage (radar) to which the valves would 
be put with the GEC staff, as none of them had the security clearance necessary to know 
about this top-secret application. Coales mentioned the problem to C.S.Wright, the 
Admiralty’s Director of Scientific Research (DSR). Wright gave approval for certain 
individuals at GEC to be informed about radar, and the arrangement was formalised in 
the form of the CVD Committee a few weeks later. This committee then met at regular 
intervals thereafter, with Watson-Watt coming to the second meeting on 14th February 
1939.23
The establishment of CVD is very important for several reasons. Its primary purpose 
was to co-ordinate valve development and manufacture between the Services’ research 
establishments and the several manufacturers (though primarily GEC) engaged in 
producing valves for them. As such it provided a level of co-operation between all the 
various parties interested in radar that didn’t exist in any other country at this time, and in 
the case of Germany, ever. For the purposes of my interpretation of events, I believe it 
allowed the easy transmission of knowledge about techniques, processes and equipment 
at the opening phase of the development of high-power centimetric valves. In terms of 
skill and practice, it provided the forum that enabled people with a problem to become 
aware of someone with perhaps the necessary skills to help solve it. CVD was very 
important because it was the means by which personnel could be introduced to each 
other to allow the transfer of valve- and radar-building skill in the form of ideas and 
practical competences.
3.3.1 The Split-Anode Magnetron: GEC’s and SFR’s Contributions
The split-anode magnetron was invented by A.W.Hull24 of the American GEC in 
1921. It was a glass-envelope valve that consisted of a cylindrical anode surrounding a 
central cathode, with a magnetic field applied along the axis of the cathode/anode
23 Callick (1990), pp2-3. Details of what passed at the CVD meetings can be found here.
24 See Hull (1921a, b).
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combination. Because of its geometry, the valve oscillated in a mode that produced 
waves much shorter than those of standard triode-type valves. In the 1920s and 1930s 
the valve was refined25 by researchers in various electrical companies. During the 1920’s 
several researchers in different countries conducted experiments with the valve, but its 
power was low and it remained at best a laboratory oddity. At the beginning of the 
1930’s interest was revived in centimetric waves in Europe, the U.S. and Japan when it 
was realised they would be suitable for directional communications purposes.
In the 1930’s the largest manufacturer of valves in Britain was GEC, which had a 
research laboratory in Wembley. From 1932 a small group at this laboratory under 
E.C.S.Megaw were attracted by the commercial opportunities that they thought were 
possible with very short waves. They began propagation studies on wavelengths below 
60 cm at this time. This work included investigating the properties of the split-anode 
magnetron. In 1933 Megaw published a paper detailing his investigations into the 
phenomenon of tcback-propagation”, whereby electrons returned to the cathode causing 
further heating and emission. He also mentioned that back-propagation may be useful in 
producing very short wavelengths 26
The Philips company of Holland was also interested in magnetrons, and one of their 
engineers, K.Posthumus, did some experimentation during 1934-5. Splitting the 
magnetron anode into two segments had been investigated in 1924, by Habann. 
Posthumus took the idea one step further, using four segment anodes, and found that 
increasing the number of anode segments gave a corresponding decrease in the magnetic 
field strength and the accelerating voltage required for a given power output. He 
explained these improvements in efficiency in terms of a theory of a rotating electron 
cloud, and his paper influenced Randall and Boot’s thinking in 1939.
Megaw studied Posthumus’ work closely and conducted some further experiments. 
One aspect that followed on from Posthumus’ paper was the potential of back- 
bombardment, and Megaw concluded that “secondary emission could provide a major 
fraction of the operating current”.27
One of the other major workers on the split-anode magnetron was Dr Henri Gutton 
of the French company SFR. He was the head of a team who built an obstacle-detector
25 For details, see Guerlac (1988), ppl87-92, and Swords (1986), pp259-263.
26 Callick (1990), p59.
27 Callick (1990), p60.
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for ships using a wavelength of 16cm. It was fitted to the liner Normandie in summer 
1935, but bad weather and damaged valves prevented him from making any tests and the 
equipment was abandoned. Gutton used Barkhausen-Kurtz valves for this work, that 
operated on a wavelength of 16cm, and his first obstacle detector wasn’t pulsed but 
utilised the continuous wave method. Whilst considering the problems of his detector 
after the failed Normandie trials, he decided to change to pulse operation and use split- 
anode magnetron valves. He conducted experiments in 1936 and 1937 and read of 
Posthumus’ work, and in 1937 patented an 8-segment28 valve which gave 10 watts of 
power on 16cm. Gutton was visited in 1939 by Megaw to discuss the work he had done 
on magnetrons, which I will cover in the next section.29 Importantly, this was an 
opportunity for these two engineers with magnetron-building skill to exchange ideas and 
techniques about how to improve the valves, something that Megaw would put to use 
with great effect when he refined the cavity magnetron.
3.3.2 The Cavity Magnetron: Development at Birmingham and GEC
As these events took place in various parts of Europe, the network that formed the 
British Scientific Establishment, civil, government and military, set in motion the train of 
events that led to the engineered cavity magnetron. This network was one that had 
grown over a number of years since the formation of the CSSAD in 1935. As the 
number of radar workers increased, so new people were let into the radar secret. It 
started off with the members of this committee, and gradually expanded to include men 
like Watson-Watt, Cockcroft, Rutherford and the like. British science was a lot smaller 
than it now is, as there were far fewer laboratories. However, there were some linkages 
between personnel that were far more important than others.
The Cavendish Laboratory and the Athenaeum Club in London had been two 
important nodes in the network of Establishment linkages at the highest levels of British 
science for the previous two decades. Many members of the British scientific elite, some 
of whom were members of the committees engaged in deciding the future of British air
28 This refinement gave shorter wavelengths with the same valve geometry.
29 Molyneux-Berry (1988).
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defence, were members of the Athenaeum, and many of these had at some period trained 
or worked at Cambridge University’s Cavendish Laboratory for Physics. The 
connections between the Cavendish and the Bawdsey radar research establishment were 
widened during the Spring and Summer of 1938, and again in the summer of 1939 when, 
because of the impending war, many University scientists were shown the hitherto secret 
Chain Home stations and introduced to radar.
In the Spring of 1938 Sir Henry Tizard lunched at the Athenaeum with Cockcroft of 
the Cavendish to explain the nature of the secret radar work going on at Bawdsey, 
together with some of the problems the people there were experiencing. Tizard realised 
that if war broke out, there would have to be a large expansion of research and 
development into radar applications, so he set about making contacts with personnel that 
he thought would be useful to recruit or help recruit others. Tizard already had links into 
the world of University science firstly through knowing the other members of the 
CSSAD (the ‘Tizard Committee”), and secondly through being the Rector of Imperial 
College.
Tizard and Cockcroft’s meeting sent ripples across the pool of British University 
science. In the Autumn of 1938 Bragg, head of the Cavendish and superior to 
Cockcroft, wrote to Sir Frank Smith, head of the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research (DSIR) asking for the “important leaders of research in many Universities” to 
be informed of radar problems. This action would create a wider network of people who 
knew about and could contribute to radar research. He forwarded a copy of his letter to 
Tizard, who wrote back to Bragg saying that:
You say in your letter ‘sometimes a problem can be put to outside people which is 
of such a general kind that no secret is given away by formulating it.’ This is just 
what I am proposing to do if I come up to Cambridge to have an informal talk with the 
senior people there. What I thought of doing was to state as clearly as I can what the 
main problems are, without necessarily disclosing all the ways in which they are being 
attacked. It can do no harm to get people thinking on the right lines.30
Bragg’s contact with Tizard led to the drawing up of a list of people who were deemed 
by them to be suitable for initiation into the radar secret. This list included men at most
30 Letter, Tizard to Bragg, quoted in Clarke (1965), ppl71-2.
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of the major University physics departments of the time, namely those of Oxford, 
Cambridge, London, Bristol, Manchester and Birmingham. Importantly many of the 
senior members of these various laboratories had either spent time working at the 
Cavendish, or had been students there. They were at least familiar with each other 
through this link, if not always on the level of personal friendship. This knowledge 
greatly eased co-operation in some ways, although occasionally it could also lead to 
friction (as in the case of Lewis and Dee, as I relate in the next chapter). Inclusion on the 
list was by personal recommendation of people whom Tizard and Cockcroft trusted. 
Inevitably this meant that they relied on their friends in departments at other Universities. 
It also meant that non-physicists were included (as in the case of Alan Hodgkin, as I 
discuss in the next chapter).
Over the summer of 1939, the scientists that were on the lists drawn up by Tizard 
were taken round Chain Home stations and told of the advances that had occurred in 
detecting aircraft through using radiowaves, and also of the problems still being faced, 
namely those in AI. It was in this way that Oliphant was introduced to radar during the 
Summer of 1939, as he recalled in 1990:
Tizard was undoubtedly the main influence which induced us to abandon, 
temporarily, the work going on in Birmingham on nuclear energy, in order to devote 
ourselves to microwave radar. Our experience at the ‘chain’ station, where we were 
introduced to the mysteries of RDF, and discussion with Cockcroft, Bowen and Rowe, 
convinced us of the advantages which might be expected from the development of 
generators and detectors of radio frequencies far higher than those then in use. It was 
Tizard who persuaded me that a contribution in the field could be of immediate value 
in the war with Germany, and I have no doubt that it was Tizard who persuaded 
Charles Wright to propose to me a practical way in which we could work on these 
problems under Admiralty auspices.31
In the Autumn of 1939, CVD placed contracts with Birmingham, Oxford and Bristol 
for the development of these valves, and Signal School remained an interested party in 
what went on. Oliphant remembered receiving notification in the form of sealed written 
orders:
31 Letter, Oliphant to Clarke, quoted in Clarke (1965), p203.
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Immediately after the outbreak of war, I was surprised to receive an envelope, 
inside which was another, marked TOP SECRET in red letters. It was from the 
Admiralty, asking that I get together a small team to try and develop a generator of 
radio waves of wavelength about 10 centimetres. The University agreed that I should 
undertake secret war-work without demanding to know what it was, and arrangements 
were made- .vith the Admiralty to meet any expenditures involved. Jim Sayers, who 
had worked with Appleton [who worked on ionospheric detection in the 1920s - see 
chapter 2 - and was also a member of the Cavendish], was allotted to us; Randall, who 
had been working in the Lab on phosphorescence, became part of the team, as did 
Nimmo, a New Zealander. A research student, Boot, joined Randall, and Titterton, 
who had taken his PhD and had been teaching, returned to the Lab to provide pulsed 
power supplies. We knew of the development of the klystron, at Stanford, which 
produced small outputs in the desired frequency range, so Sayers undertook to try to 
push far greater electron currents through the coupled resonators, to develop higher 
output power.32
This quote indicates that Oliphant was in the possession of an important piece of 
knowledge - that it was possible to generate high-frequency waves with a klystron, albeit 
at low powers, even if he didn’t know how just yet.
Oliphant’s team were all physicists who had no direct experience of radio 
engineering, apart from Sayers who had worked on ionospheric research at the 
Cavendish . It is interesting that Boot was described as “a research student who had 
already shown great aptitude in making things work”33. So, despite not having any direct 
experience of radio engineering, these men had acquired practical skill in working with 
electronic components and of the physical ideas behind them. Bums wrote that:
Oliphant felt that this ignorance was an advantage and not a handicap, for it 
meant that his staff would not be inhibited by prior learning and experience about 
what could and could not be done: they would be able to work from first principles.34
According to Shearman & Land, Randall “was a former colleague of E.C.S.Megaw at 
the Research laboratories of the GEC”35 This contradicts the assertion that they would
32 Oliphant (1990), pp7-8.
33 Shearman & Land (1985).
34 Bums (1988b), p269.
35 Shearman & Land (1985).
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not be inhibited by prior experience, but lends weight to the idea that experience and 
contact are essential components of “serendipity”. Randall’s prior career of working 
with electronic valves at GEC would have given him the sort of acquired tacit knowledge 
of what could and couldn’t be done in the realm of valves that would be useful to him in 
working on this problem.
Oliphant divided his team up to look at various aspects of the centimetre problem. 
They decided to start with the hitherto accepted methods of generating centimetre 
waves: the klystron and the Barkhausen-Kurtz valve. Oliphant and Sayers looked at the 
possibilities of improving the klystron, Moon and Nimmo at how it could be used to 
either generate or receive36 radio waves in a radar system, Titterton undertook building a 
50cm system using GEC’s “micropup” valves, already used in 1.5m AI, and Randall and 
Boot were given the Barkhausen-Kurtz oscillator to look at.
Randall’s view of this in 1946 was that:
At first Boot and myself spent a few weeks studying the Barkhausen-Kurz tube as 
a detector device; the greater number of workers in the laboratory, however, were 
concerned with the klystron, both as an oscillator and as an amplifier, and we were 
naturally interested in the whole field37
The klystron was the subject of discussion in departmental colloquia earlier that year 
when the Varians’ papers were published, which is where Randall and Boot were 
introduced to the idea of resonant cavities. However their allotted task of investigating 
the Barkhausen-Kurtz valve was proving “unpromising”, and Randall and Boot became 
“disenchanted with this task”.38 As they indicated, they started to put their minds to the 
problem of a high-power transmitting valve. They added that:
[A]t the risk of incurring some unpopularity from our fellow workers, we 
concentrated our thoughts on how we could combine the advantages of the klystron 
with the more favourable geometry of the magnetron.39
36 The klystron would eventually became used for this purpose in centimetre AI in the form of the reflex 
klystron, or “soft-Sutton” valve..
37 Randall (1946), p248.
38Boot & Randall (1976), p724.
39Boot & Randall (1976), p724.
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Randall and Boot were unconvinced by the klystron. One of the main problems with 
operating it was getting the electron beam focused enough. They were also only 
operating it continuously (not pulsing it), and they ‘‘believed that its pulsed peak power 
output would not greatly exceed its CW power.”40 This sort of belief about how 
relatively novel equipment will or won’t operate is characteristic of how skilled 
experimenters are able to direct their thoughts and future experimental directions into 
fruitful areas. It comes from having experience of working with apparatus; of having a 
‘Teel” for the possible. Gooding has analysed this procedure in relation to Morpurgo’s 
Quark experimentation in the 1960’s. Morpurgo’s team conducted a number of 
preliminary experiments to get experience of working with their apparatus. They 
developed their apparatus by using “available precedents”, which led them to choose an 
oil-drop apparatus similar to Milikan’s. However, their preliminary experimentation with 
this apparatus ‘ “destabilised” the model which embodied the team’s understanding of 
possible instruments.”41 This is the same process that Randall and Boot underwent with 
their attitude to using the klystron. Preliminary experimentation with it led them to reject 
it as unsuitable.
In November 1939 they came up with the idea that led to the construction of their 
first cavity magnetron. The circumstances can be judged in hindsight as extremely 
fortuitous now it is known that their idea was a resounding success, but of course at the 
time they had no idea that their thoughts would led so quickly to a solution of their 
problem.
In their 1985 article, Shearman and Land introduced some parts of the thinking that 
led to Randall and Boot’s cavity magnetron idea. Shortly before war broke out Randall 
went on holiday with his family to Aberystwyth. Whilst there he bought an English 
translation of Hertz’s Electric Waves, which contained a description of how Hertz 
detected radio waves using a wire loop receiver. This idea of a loop of wire would 
influence him in the design of a suitable cavity. Furthermore:
40 The two were introduced to the principles of radar operation at Ventnor Chain Station during the 
summer of 1939. Whilst there, they were able, as were all the physicists, to study the circuit diagrams of 
the equipment, and even to suggest modifications “which of course always made its performance worse.” 
Boot & Randall (1976), p724.
41 Gooding (1992), p83.
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An element in their thinking may have been the seminal suggestion to Oliphant 
on a visit to the Admiralty Station at Haslemere that the combination of the split- 
anode magnetron with resonators after the pattern of the klystron described by the 
Varian brothers may be a way forward to shorter wavelength operation. Randall was a 
former colleague of E.C.S.Megaw at the Research Laboratories of the GEC and was 
aware of the limitations of the pre-war magnetrons of two and four anode construction 
and external Lecher wire resonators.42
This passage tells us of the level of knowledge about split-anode magnetron valves that 
Randall posessed. This knowledge would help him and Boot, I believe, to make their 
next step.
Randall and Boot were equipped well for their next leap of thought. They 
understood about conventional magnetrons, they also understood something of the new 
field of resonant cavities, and they were disillusioned with the research they were 
following on the Barkhausen-Kurtz valve. They had studied papers by the Varians on 
their klystron work, and had seen papers on conventional glass-envelope magnetrons, but 
“[fjortunately [they] did not have the time to survey all the published papers on 
magnetrons or [they] would have become completely confused by the multiplicity of 
theories of operation.”43 They were also fortunate, as they have said, in being part of a 
dynamic laboratory well equipped with a workshop and skilled technicians. The Varians’ 
paper had also given them some insights into how to construct cavity resonators to the 
best effect, namely that:
On any given mode [of oscillation] the frequency is largely, if not entirely, 
dependent on the dimensions of the resonator. When such resonators are constructed 
of copper, three important features are evident:- (i) low h.f. losses; (ii) wave-length 
stability; (iii) potential capability of large heat dissipation.44
Their thoughts now turned as to how to combine the geometry of the magnetron, 
which has a central cathode surrounded by a cylindrical anode (the magnetic field is 
applied along the axis of the anode/cathode combination), with some sort of resonator. 
Unfortunately the resonator types associated with the klystron, cubes and spheres, did
42 Shearman & Land (1985).
43 Boot & Randall (1976), p724.
44 Randall (1946), p248.
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not suit the shape of the magnetron. Randall’s rereading of Hertz came into effect here, 
as:
The only other types of short-wave resonator circuit with which we were familiar 
were Hertz’s original loop-wire resonator and a short-circuited quarter-wave line.45
[B]ut this was not a cavity. A cylindrical extension of Hertz’s wire loop became a 
cylinder with a slot along a generator and it occurred to us that a number of these 
would fit around the slotted anode of the magnetron we were trying to invent Also, it 
would be veiy simple to build in the laboratory workshop. Only drilling, turning and 
slotting would be needed It also occurred to us that a series of 1/4 wave radial slots 
would also serve as resonators as they were 3-dimensional versions of a lecher line.46
(See over for illustration). The remaining matter for them to fix was how big they should 
make the dimensions of the resonating cylinders. In a book published in 1902, 
H.M.Macdonald calculated that the resonant wavelength of Hertz’s loop was covered by 
the formula \=7.94d, where d  was the diameter of the loop. As Randall and Boot were 
trying to produce 10cm radiation, they fixed d  at 12mm. The depth of the anode block 
was restricted by the dimensions of the laboratory’s electromagnet to 4cm.
In December 1939 Randall & Boot’s resonator anode design was machined in the 
laboratory workshop, the technician being Tom Gardiner. They had heard of the oxide 
cathodes developed by Henri Gutton in France47 through Randall’s connection with 
Megaw at GEC (see previous section), but they decided against using one as they 
thought it would introduce an extra complication, and unknown quantity, into their set­
up. Instead they used the standard, and better-understood, tungsten cathode. The whole 
valve was continuously evacuated with the glass to metal seals being made with sealing 
wax. Cooling was supplied by water to the copper endplates, which had holes drilled in 
them to allow easy replacement of the cathode should it bum out. This happened 
frequently (See over for illustration of Anode Block).
There is a difference between constructing a new apparatus or equipment and 
actually making it work. By analysing Pickering’s account of Morpurgo’s hunt for the
45 Randall (1946), p249.
46 Boot & Randall (1976), pp724-5.
47 At least this is what Randall said Callick (1990), p62, said “Gutton’s results with the oxide cathode 
were not known to British workers because of the ban on communications imposed by French security 
following the outbreak of war.”
Figure 3.1 The genesis of the anode block. Randall and Boot's thoughts 
manipulated a hertzian loop into a cylinder with a slot. This cylinder was then 
joined onto another cylinder, along with five others, to form the anode block of 
the cavity magnetron. From Bowen (1987), pl47.
Figure 3.2 The anode block and the prototype cavity magnetron. The cavity 
magnetron (right) was Randall and Boot’s experimental prototype. From 
Randall (1946b), p306.
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Quark, Gooding shows how Morpurgo and his team had to modify their concepts and 
models in order to get a working device. I have already mentioned how their preliminary 
experimentation led them to reject the Milikan oil-drop apparatus. For example, they 
now decided to use a magnetic levitation method, but when they tried it they found their 
apparatus would not fit between the poles of the largest electromagnet they had 
available. “They [then] use[d] classical field theory to redesign the magnet poles.” 
Therefore it was only through actually trying to get the apparatus to work that the 
discovered this problem. This was the same problem that Randall and Boot faced with 
their apparatus, and many other experimenters have faced.48
Thus there was a gap of some two months between the construction of the valve and 
the first time it produced oscillations. This is fully commensurate with the idea that they 
had to build up their skill in interacting with the new valve and the associated set-up. In 
the 1946 paper Randall was quite coy about this, saying simply that “[f]or various 
reasons the first trials were delayed”.49 For an explanation we have to look further 
forward in time and distance from events to Randall & Boot’s 1976 review of their work, 
where they said that:
Although the initial tests were to be CW for simplicity, a suitable power supply 
posed great difficulty because all the high voltage rectifiers were in use for the klystron 
experiments so it was necessary to make two continuously pumped thermionic diode 
rectifiers. The complete set up... now contained three mercury diffusion pumps [the 
third being for the cavity magnetron itself].50
Their first experimental set up was a remarkable achievement, and a testament to 
both the practical skill of the laboratory technicians and Boot, who built it.51 However, 
as I have noted above it is rare for innovative equipment to work first time, or to work as 
expected, and we have confirmation of both of these phenomena in Randall and Boot’s 
descriptions of their apparatus:
48 Gooding (1992), p85.
49 Randall (1946), p249.
50 Boot & Randall (1976), p725.
51 Boot’s prowess was acknowledged by Sayers: “the superb experimental ability of Harry Boot”, and 
Moon: “Bom and educated in Birmingham with no silver spoon in his mouth but with an engineer’s 
instinct in his brain and (I suspect) a lathe in his father’s garage... There is no need to enlarge upon 
Hany’s famous skill.” Sayers (1990), pl2; Moon (1990), pl4.
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Powerful oscillations were obtained on the morning when all this equipment 
worked simultaneously [my italics] and that was 21 February 1940.
and...
There was also the day when no power could be obtained until it was found out
52[my italics] that the output coupling loop had burned itself out.
When all the equipment did finally work together, on February 21st, there was great 
excitement in the laboratory. The output lead gave off* great power, which was initially 
evident from what they observed when they turned the on apparatus:
The amount of power produced was, for the time, capable of quite spectacular 
effects. It was uncomfortably hot to hold the hand near the output lead of the 
magnetron and a small arc sprayed off into the surrounding air53. An attempt to 
estimate the power output was made by the very crude method of burning out 
successively larger 6V filament lamps and it was found that the low pressure neon- 
lighting tubes, (about lm long by 37mm diameter) could be lit to a brilliancy 
corresponding to a power consumption of 400w, [circa 6A, 70V at 50Hz]. That the 
output had proved rather more than we had anticipated originally, is shown in 
laboratory notebooks of attempts to prove that the wavelength was not centimetric, but 
metric. The wavelength was measured however the next day by means of a pair of 
Lecher wires about 3m long, and it was shown to be 9.8cm.54
It is interesting to note the important point that Randall and Boot initially disbelieved 
their own results. They had succeeded in creating something that produced an effect 
wildly different from what they expected, or what anyone believed possible.
After a few more days of experimentation, their remarkable results were 
communicated to Charles Wright at CVD on 27th February, who discussed them with 
others including W.B.Lewis, Deputy Superintendent of AMRE. At the CVD meeting of
52 Boot & Randall (1976), p725.
53 Compare this to Batt’s description of the klystron at Worth Matravers later that year (chapter 4).
54 Quoted from Randall, J.A. and Boot, H. AH. (1945) The development o f the multi-resonator 
magnetron at the University o f Birmingham, (1939-1945), in Bums (1988b).
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5th April 1940 Lewis initiated a discussion on the advances made at Birmingham and 
arrangements were made for Megaw of GEC to visit Birmingham in order to begin 
producing a fully engineered production valve. Megaw went to Birmingham on April 
10th. The arrangement between CVD, GEC and Birmingham was formalised by 
correspondence between Oliphant and Sir Clifford Paterson of GEC. It was agreed by 
them that GEC would make sealed-off versions and help Birmingham with techniques 
and materials. S.M.Duke, a GEC technician, was seconded to the Birmingham 
laboratory in June.55
Megaw was GEC’s expert on magnetron construction, and as I mentioned in the 
previous section, he made a private visit to SFR (France) in June 1939, where he was 
shown the newly developed oxide-coated cathode employed by them in a four segment 
split-anode magnetron. In early May 1940 Megaw was visited by a member of SFR, Dr 
Maurice Ponte, who brought improved versions of the earlier valve that Megaw saw the 
previous year. When Megaw went to Birmingham he suggested that they use an oxide- 
coated cathode to improve the pulsed peak-power output. He also informed them of the 
revolutionary gold-sealing technique developed by D.A.Boyland for GEC, whose use in 
the cavity magnetron was suggested by Le Rossignol56. This technique was suitable for 
sealing copper to copper, which the cavity magnetron case and endplates were made 
from, and involved using gold wire heated to 500°C under pressure. It also resulted in 
neater seals than using a brazing method (which the Germans used in their copy of the 
magnetron - see chapter 7).
The first valve design produced by Megaw, designated the El 188, had a tungsten 
cathode. This meant that it was suitable only for CW operation because the cathode 
could not cope with the higher powers used in pulsed operation. A CW high-power 
centimetre valve was what the Admiralty required for their communications project, so 
Megaw completed the design. A benefit of this design was that its dimensions made it 
suitable for use between the poles of the standard 501b electromagnet, much lighter than 
the one Randall and Boot employed, and therefore more conducive to airborne operation 
(see illustration overleaf).
55 Callick (1990), p62.
56 Le Rossignol and Duke had worked together on high-power transmission valves at GEC before Duke 
was transferred to Birmingham. Bums (1988b), p277.
Figure 3.3: Megaw’s El 188 prc-productiou cavity magnetron. From Megaw 
(1946), p980.
Figure 3.4: Megaw’s El 189 pre-production cavity magnetron. Compare to 
figures 3.2 and 3.3. From Lovell (1991), p40.
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As I relate in the next chapter, at this time GEC were working on an Air Ministry 
contract for a 25cm AI system. They were using “micropup” valves (as used in 1.5m AI, 
see previous chapter), but had also tasked their valve team with designing a split-anode 
magnetron with four segments for use in their AI. According to Megaw:
[T]he chief interest in the copper-block structure, so far as the commitments of the 
GEC Laboratories were concerned, was as a basis for high power c.w. designs for 
communication on rather shorter wavelengths. But with increasing pressure on the 
need for 10-cm A.I. it was considered whether a design using this technique could 
provide a lighter and more powerful pulse source than the dull-emitter resonant 
segment magnetron which was already in development, with good prospects of 
producing as much peak power as the Birmingham valve. Both of these, as they stood, 
involved electromagnets which were inconveniently large for airborne use, one on 
account of the large gap and the other on account of the high field-strength 
requirement.57
GEC’s priorities were different from those of AMRE and Birmingham. They had their 
Air Ministry contract for a 25cm AI system and were not seeking to use 10cm for this 
particular application. They only saw the cavity magnetron as being a good prospect for 
communication usage, and not for radar. As the El 188 stood, it was not suitable for use 
in an aeroplane. Furthermore, GEC did not see the cavity magnetron as being the key to 
success in very short wave AI. They believed their own valve would be as good. 
However, after AMRE and Birmingham brought pressure to bear on GEC, Megaw 
began to see how he could improve his valve.
Megaw’s El 188 design suffered from two flaws that had to be eliminated if it was to 
be used for airborne developments. Firstly that it was water-cooled, which was 
impractical for installation in an aeroplane. Secondly it required a very large and, 
importantly, heavy magnet, though at least this was an improvement on the huge 
electromagnet used in the Birmingham laboratory. This, again, was far from ideal for 
aeroplane usage where equipment weight was a primary consideration. Thus Megaw set 
to work designing another valve:
57 Megaw (1946), p980.
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It was decided to attempt such a design, though it had to be based on several 
unproved assumptions. These were:-
(1) That the type of oscillation in the copper-block magnetron was the same as in the 
Gutton-Berline multi-segment valves. The main point here was that it had been 
c-sncluded from [Megaw’s] interpretation of the mode of operation of the latter, at the 
time of the visit to Paris in 1939, that the cathode diameter should have no critical 
effect on their behaviour and that therefore - contrary to the general belief about other 
magnetrons - large diameter cathodes could be used
This was important in that it allowed Megaw to use a much higher cathode current, 
which gave higher output powers - high power-output was after all the object of the 
exercise. Megaw also admits that he was basing his design on “unproved assumptions”, 
but that he had concluded that the new valve design was not significantly different from 
Gutton’s valves which he had seen the previous year. This was an important intuitive 
step and again illustrates how previous experience is a major factor in rapid scientific 
advancement. He continued, listing the other unproved assumptions:
(2) That efficient operation of valves of this type was possible with space-charge- 
limited anode current, so that increased cathode emission would make possible 
increased pulse output. At this time (April 1940) there was still no decisive 
information on this point.
(3) That the mode of oscillation of the copper-block resonant system was such that the 
wavelength was substantially independent of the axial length.
The final assumption was important if he was to make a reduction in the depth of the 
valve. Making the valve “slimmer” would reduce the gap needed between the poles of 
the magnet supplying its field, and hence allow the magnet to be physically smaller, and 
therefore lighter (important in airborne equipment), in producing the same field-strength. 
The strength of the magnetic field along the cathode determined the efficiency, and the 
power output of the valve. This was understood by Megaw from his previous experience 
of split-anode magnetrons. He also intuitively used a wider cathode (assumption 2), 
which he believed would also increase output power and on which there was “no decisive 
information at [that] point”. Again, Megaw was intuitively introducing a modification
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which he believed would improve the valve, without undertaking any experimental work 
to back his beliefs. He was soon able to check whether his intuitive beliefs were correct.
Just after Megaw’s first design was completed he received an example of the 
improved French magnetron with the oxide cathode. This modification was the major 
factor in the improved power output of the French valve. The valve, known as the M. 16, 
was extensively tested by Megaw to evaluate the beneficial properties of its large 
cathode. His major discovery about the new design was that once the oscillations began, 
the anode current could be reduced, and “secondary emission” (of electrons, which came 
free without cathode heating), led to a much greater efficiency in the valve’s 
performance. Megaw then designed a second cavity magnetron, the El 189 (see previous 
page for illustration). This was much slimmer than the El 188, and incorporated fins for 
air cooling. Two samples were constructed. One had a spiral tungsten cathode (No 1), 
and the other a large oxide cathode (No 2). After construction, both valves were tested 
to determine their performances, and found to give lkW of power. Within two weeks 
(mid-July), he had raised this to lOkW at 9.8cm which was a huge increase in available 
power from the previous design.58
No 1 was sent to the GEC AI group, and in the third week of July 1940 No 2 was 
sent to AMRE at Worth Matravers. Further samples were constructed, No 4 going to 
Birmingham on 24th July, and in August an eight-cavity design was completed. Sample 
No 12 with eight cavities went to the US with the Tizard mission (see next chapter). 
This was the source of some confusion, through a mistake. The drawings that Bowen 
had with him showed the original six cavities, but when the valve was x-rayed by the 
Americans it showed eight. It took a good deal of persuasion, and contact back to GEC 
to convince the Americans they weren’t being misled by British “generosity”!59
3.4 Conclusion
The cavity magnetron proved to be a success, as I relate in the next two chapters. 
This was due to a very fortuitous combination of ideas and experience, made possible by
58 Megaw (1946), p982.
59 Callick (1990), p64.
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a lucky series of contacts. I believe that it was only due to these personal contacts 
between individuals with specific skills that the engineered cavity magnetron was 
produced. Much has been made of the achievement of Randall and Boot, and it is 
certainly true that their idea for combining resonant cavities with the geometry of the 
existing spit-anode magnetron valve was a major breakthrough in the search for a source 
of high-power centimetre waves. However, as it stood the Randall/Boot cavity- 
magnetron was neither more nor less capable of delivering the desired amount of power 
than the conventional glass magnetrons being developed at GEC and SFR. What really 
made the magnetron into a suitable transmitting valve for radar was the work done by 
Megaw. He was the key, combining the insight that Randall and Boot put into anode 
design, with the work done by the French in cathode design, together with much 
accumulated experience in engineering valves for many different purposes (See overleaf 
for diagram).
The cavity magnetron came to be used in the centimetre version of AI that was 
developed by Air Ministry personnel during the summer of 1940. I have shown that its 
development came about through the ideas and skills of small groups of people who were 
connected with each other. These same conditions were pertinent to the development of 
metric AI described in chapter 2, and as I will show in the next chapter, to the 
development of centimetre AI.
It was Hansen and the Varians who developed the resonant principle with their 
klystron. Oliphant brought experience with this valve and the ideas associated with it to 
Birmingham, where they were transmitted to Randall and Boot. Randall had previously 
worked with Megaw at GEC. In the interim Megaw became familiar with split-anode 
magnetron design, and obtained experience with oxide cathodes from Gutton at SFR. he 
was also familiar with new sealing and manufacturing techniques being developed at 
GEC. Megaw made a visit to see the Birmingham cavity magnetron, and was able to 
combine this with his experience of split-anode magnetron design, and Gutton’s oxide- 
coated cathode, to design the El 189 pre-production cavity magnetron that was so useful 
to the 10cm radar team (see next chapter).
The major factor that made El 189 so useful was its stability, in two senses. Firstly, it 
had embedded in it the embodied practical skill of several people: Randall and Boot, 
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Figure 3.5: The background to magnetron development. I show here how people, 
places and artefacts were linked in time and space in the magnetron development 
story. Time is on the Y-axis.
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manufactured easily. The performance that the cavity magnetron was able to give could 
then be easily replicated, both in terms of the consecutive performances of one particular 
valve, and that it was possible to copy (or replicate) the valve so that each one could be 
made to perform as it should by persons who did not have the designers’ embodied skill. 
This was the second form of stability, which placed it in marked contrast to the unstable 
klystron which didn’t perform the same way each time.
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Chapter 4: British Centimetre AI Radar
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I told how interest in centimetre waves arose, and I described 
how its various components were developed. In this chapter I will do two things. I will 
document the story of how the experiments with centimetre radar progressed using those 
components. I will also draw conclusions about philosophical aspects of that work based 
upon the analytical framework I developed in the first chapter.
Interest in using centimetre waves for radar had a chequered history until some 
months into the Second World War. Late in 1939, despite official indifference towards 
earlier enthusiasm on the part of people like E.G.Bowen at Bawdsey, came a pressure to 
commence centimetre-wave radar experiments. Air Ministry interest culminated in a 
contract with GEC for a system on 25cm (although this was based on using conventional 
components), and Bowen acted as a co-ordinator between AMRE and GEC.
Despite research instigated outside of AMRE by CVD, work on centimetres only 
began at there in March 1940. It was at this time that Bowen and his 1.5m AI came 
under pressure to due to the problem of minimum range (see chapter 2). Centimetre 
research was started by Herbert Skinner, slightly before the AMRE moved to the Dorset 
Coast at Worth Matravers in May. During the spring and early summer an intense period 
of activity produced results in both AMRE and GEC. AMRE chose to use the newly 
developed cavity magnetron as a source for high-power 10cm waves, and GEC 
continued their work on their 25cm system (despite GEC’s laboratories refining the 
cavity magnetron - see previous chapter). Late summer saw differences between the two 
groups come into the open, and culminated in a short period where both competed for 
the upper hand as to who would be allowed to continue the research as senior partner. 
This dispute centred around whether to go with AMRE’s innovative, but still relatively 
unproved, 10cm work, or GEC’s more conventionally based and engineered 25cm 
system.
The debate was settled in AMRE’s favour, and further research was continued there 
during late 1940 and 1941. GEC now acted in a supporting and secondary role. In 
March 1941 AMRE researchers commenced airborne experiments with the new set.
1 2 0
They learned a great deal, solving most of their problems by the early summer of that 
year. The final airborne problem, that of common transmit-receive, wasn’t solved until 
the summer of 1941 when the “soft-Sutton” klystron was introduced. This valve stopped 
the powerful transmitter pulse entering the receiver, and burning out the delicate 
componentc-it contained.
At the same time, centimetre components were becoming better understood and 
engineered. Work on airborne radar applications bifurcated in late December 1941 when 
the H2 S ground-mapping radar project was started (see chapter 5). This work relied on 
the understanding and expertise built up with 10cm AI experiments during the previous 
18 months. AI finally entered service in a production engineered form in late 1942, 
nearly three years after the invention of the cavity magnetron.
This radar development work was undertaken by small teams of physicists. I will 
show that there were factors that aided their success and some that abetted it. Firstly, 
how were the teams organised? What was their location, the nature of their internal and 
external contacts? Their ambience? Both the GEC and AMRE teams were small, close 
knit and composed of people who had spent considerable periods either working 
together, or in the same laboratory with the same colleagues. They shared common 
work practices, and were able to relate easily in tackling their problems. I will examine 
how these conditions influenced the transfer of embodied and embedded knowledge 
within and between the laboratories interested in centimetre radar.
Secondly, these common work practices and a large measure of acquired practical 
skill, together with an unconventional approach made possible by using physicists and 
other scientists rather than radio engineers (who had been “indoctrinated” into ideas of 
what could and couldn’t work by their training), led to rapid success. I will highlight 
examples of this phenomena, identifying which practices fall into the category of 
complete embodied “know-how” (as in unarticulable) and which could be articulated 
when transfer of these skills was required. I will also assess how these fit in with 
Gooding’s claims1 about the fine-structure of experiment, where the practice of the 
experimenter leads to the acquisition of embodied knowledge about how to produce 
phenomena.
1 See chapter 1, and Gooding (1990).
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Thirdly, periods of internecine or external rivalry (and associated non co-operation), 
and periods of dispersion of group members, led to slow progress. I will assess this with 
reference to the ideas I introduced in chapter 1 about the communication of knowledge. 
Non-co-operation is a social inhibitor of the transfer of knowledge, that produce a debate 
about the veracity of results or effects in the same way that th^-failure to replicate results 
can. Whenever there is disagreement about results or an effect, the apparatus and 
techniques of the original experimenter are questioned.2 In conclusion, I will show that 
the nature of the teams played a very important part in what they achieved.
I will be drawing out aspects of the story that show what practical skills the 
participants had, and how they learned how to improve their working relationship with 
their apparatus by actually doing experiments. This follows the what Gooding has 
written about how both Faraday and Morpurgo and his team refined their apparatus and 
techniques through repeated experimental trial.3 As we would expect, there are examples 
of the non-transportability of technical know-how between groups, and also an instance 
of failure to replicate within a group.
Even during high-pressure war-time conditions it still took a considerable amount of 
time to produce a finished, stable artefact: a production AI radar. It is important to note 
that many aspects of the research were not straightforward; there were numerous 
instances of things not going according to plan, of unexpected difficulties and moments 
of rapid progress when the experimenter’s ability to get to grips with the world through 
their apparatus led them to make advances without necessarily having a full theoretical 
understanding of what they were doing. This, in particular, supports ideas put forward 
by Gooding in Experiment and the Making o f Meaning that interaction with the world 
through experiment has a reciprocal relationship with individual and group understanding 
of the world. In this early stage of centimetre radar development, I wish to show that the 
production of “good” results, ie building centimetre AI radar that did what it was 
supposed to do in aircraft, relied on experimental skill. This skill was in three forms: 
embodied unarticulable knowledge, embodied articulable knowledge and embedded 
knowledge (see chapter 1). I will identify what stage the apparatus was at with reference 
to these three forms of knowledge before it was adapted for use as a ground-mapping
2 See Collins (1985), ch 4.
3 See Gooding (1992).
124
Official ambivalence to researching centimetre waves meant that when war broke out 
in September, the focus for centimetre research was located away from AMRE (as it was 
renamed), at Birmingham University and at GEC. Furthermore, at the outbreak of war 
the whole Establishment was evacuated from Bawdsey which was thought far too prone 
to aerial attack (being very obvious from the air because of its 350 feet high CH towers). 
As described in chapter 2, the Bawdsey establishment was packed and moved in two 
days. Watson-Watt had made arrangements for AMRE to move to Dundee University, 
with Bowen’s Airborne Group going to Scone airport some 20 miles away. Whilst the 
chaos caused by the move for the main radar group at Dundee was bad enough, the 
Airborne group had things far worse. They had minimal access to facilities and 
apparatus. For example, obtaining scientific literature was next to impossible and 
communication with staff at the main Establishment was greatly impeded, as Bowen 
described:
When he arrived at Dundee, Rowe was greeted by an incredulous Vice-Chancellor 
who seemed to have forgotten Watson-Watt’s visit; he has simply not been informed of 
any subsequent plans. Being an accommodating soul, he offered the new arrivals two 
rooms, each 20 feet square, which was all the space he could spare for the several 
people who were either en route to Dundee or already there. I do not want to elaborate 
on how the problem was finally solved and will leave those responsible to explain what 
transpired as best they can. There had been a monumental blunder, from which the 
AMRE, as it was now called, took a year or more to recover.11
This state of affairs was the product of the hasty evacuation and general panic of the 
first few days of hostilities, when people expected to be bombed straight away. When 
the situation settled down there was a further move at the beginning of November, when 
the Airborne Group was again uprooted and went to St Athan in South Wales (as I 
explain shortly). However, the rest of the Establishment remained in Dundee, until the 
two groups were reunited in Worth Matravers in May 1940.
One of the main consequences of the split between the Airborne Group and the Main 
Establishment was that research into centimetre AI, which was primarily Bowen’s idea, 
ground virtually to a halt. The group became little more than advisory staff to the RAF
11 Bowen (1987), p87.
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“double-doorknob” valves.7 It did not prove particularly successful, as the range 
obtainable on non-moving, large, ground objects was only three-quarters of a mile. As 
Bowen’s team were already getting much greater success with their 1.5m system they 
abandoned further experimentation on the shorter wavelength.
This is to be expected as the general ambience at the Bawdsey research establishment 
at this time was not in favour of centimetre wavelengths. Bowen reports that “anyone 
talking about centimetres was thought of as some sort of crank.”8 There were still 
problems with the 13m Chain Home radars, and the. 1.5m AI was also barely off the 
laboratory bench. Therefore it is hardly surprising that centimetre wave research was 
viewed as a pipe-dream. Nevertheless, the seeds were sown in Bowen’s mind that very 
short wavelengths could prove useful.
The first part of 1939 saw the advent of the CVD (see previous chapter), and with it 
came a greater spirit of co-operation between the Services and their respective Research 
Establishments. Watson-Watt went to the second CVD meeting on February 14th, and 
Sir Charles Wright (DCD Admiralty) visited Bawdsey. The Admiralty, according to 
Bowen, had “expressed [the] greatest enthusiasm for changing to centimetre waves”9 
(see above), and Bowen and Wright were able to discuss their respective problems 
during the Spring and Summer. When Bowen explained the problem of minimum range 
caused in airborne radar by the usage of 1.5m wavelength, Wright agreed that the 
greatest need for centimetre wavelength transmitter valves was by Bawdsey’s AI team. 
Bowen calculated that given a beam width of 10 degrees (thought necessary for sufficient 
resolution to view a target aircraft and eliminate ground returns), and an aperture (aerial 
width) of about lm (the diameter of the nose of a fighter aircraft) then a wavelength of 
approximately 10 centimetres would be ideal (see overleaf for diagram). Wright believed 
that a similar wavelength would be most suited to gun-laying radar for the Navy.10
7 American companies had pressed ahead with designing miniature valves in the 1930s. The smaller 
physical dimension of the valves related directly to the wavelength that the valves produced, but making 
smaller valves required learning new manufacturing techniques, and concomitant investment in training 
and plant. As British companies were still feeling the effects of the Depression, this investment was not 
forthcoming. The lack of British expertise in manufacturing these valves led to a severe shortage when 
war broke out See Barnett (1986).
8 Bowen (1987), pl43.
9 Bowen (1987), pl43.
10 Bowen (1987), pl43.
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team hastily installing 1.5m AI into Blenheim aircraft to act as crude night-fighters.12 
This situation was intolerable, and was probably due to animosity between Bowen, and 
Rowe and Lewis (Rowe’s deputy) which arose from the “minimum-range problem” 
described in chapter 2. Lewis’ appointment in the Summer of 1939 “risked offending 
[Rowe’s] old colleagues”, namely Bowen and Wilkins, who was Bowen’s equivalent on 
ground radar. Bowen had no great respect for Rowe, whom he thought of as being 
officious and ignorant of electronics matters. In correspondence with Lovell he wrote:
[F]rom his first appearance at Bawdsey, Rowe was the man who was out of his 
element and overwhelmed with problems he could not cope with. This was largely due 
to his complete ignorance of electronic matters and how to conduct electronic 
research... [T]he appointment of Lewis did nothing to improve the situation. I found 
Lewis arrogant, and totally unable to discuss a problem rationally if he found himself 
out of his depth, which was often the case in those early days... In my experience, he 
always behaved as if he was all-knowing; this may have fooled some of the new­
comers but it completely alienated the pioneers.13
This period marked the beginning of Bowen’s isolation from the centre of AMRE. 
Apart from the internal politics, it was also irritating to those researchers on the team to 
be treated in such a way. Such internal strife, as well as causing a level of animosity that 
strong enough to be remarked upon by persons not directly involved, had a retarding 
effect on developmental work. Bowen posessed a great deal of embodied knowledge 
about radar, especially airborne radar. If he was in the laboratory, other researchers 
could go directly to him for advice about how to proceed, or get him to show them how 
to do something, or ask him to help design apparatus. His physical absence meant that 
they lost an important resource.
Bernard Lovell, a young researcher at Manchester University working for Patrick 
Blackett (Tizard Committee member and former Cavendish Laboratory researcher) was 
one of several scientists who visited Chain Home stations during the summer of 1939. 
Lovell was one of those earmarked for radar research should war break out, and he was 
duly called up. He was amongst those who went to Dundee with the evacuated
12 It was whilst using these aircraft, designed as bombers, as night-fighters during the Summer of 1940 
that many of the lessons of how to actually use AI to make night-time interceptions were learned. See 
chapter 2.
13 Bowen to Lovell, 15/5/87, in W.B.Lewis Papers.
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Establishment, arriving on September 29th. His initial instructions were that he should 
commence work on short wavelength experiments. Together with another Manchester 
colleague, Peter Ingleby, Lovell set to work on building a transmitter that worked on 
shorter wavelengths than the 15m apparatus used. However, within a few days they 
were ordered to assist with the fitting of 1.5m AI into Blenheims. There then began a 
period of oscillation between occasional scraps of research, and working as glorified 
fitters. The situation was not conducive to progress as Lovell described:
Working in the small group with this type of conflict seven days a week (all leave 
and rest days had been cancelled) soon eroded the enthusiasm and hope.
Furthermore, Lovell began to realise that military work was not as straightforward as his 
University research had been, as he went on to recount:
I had been allowed to join in a test flight of the AI and that quickly made me 
realise that making an equipment work in the air was quite a different matter from 
operating on the ground Hitherto in my few years of University research I had 
donned a lab coat and dealt with an apparatus in the warmth and quiet of a laboratory.
Now the lab coat was replaced by a bulky flying suit, a parachute harness and a 
parachute that also served as a seat The spacious laboratory was replaced by the 
cramped and cold interior of a Blenheim night fighter. The noise made normal 
conversation impossible and the vibration was so great I could not imagine how any 
electronic equipment could survive even on its anti-vibration mountings.14
This state of affairs continued for a while, and at the beginning of November the 
group was moved to St Athan in South Wales (whilst the main establishment remained in 
Dundee). Facilities here were, if anything, worse than in Dundee, and there was the 
added disadvantage of being 400 miles away from their colleagues as opposed to just 20.
Increasingly frustrated by his utilisation as little more than a maintenance fitter, 
Lovell again contacted his old boss, Blackett:
After only a few weeks at St Athan I wrote to Blackett (17 December) explaining 
what was happening - but without this hindsight [with respect to the Bowen/Rowe
14 Lovell (1991), pl7.
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friction] as to the probable cause - arguing that the work we were doing could be 
carried out far more efficiently and appropriately by the engineers from the firms who 
were then manufacturing the airborne AI equipment.15
Blackett had already visited St Athan on 14th December with Tizard and Watson-Watt, 
and they were concerned with the situation. Blackett returned on 17th January, but in 
the meantime Ingleby and Beattie were killed when the aircraft in which they were flying 
crashed near Bridgend on 7th January. This set back their research, and brought a harsh 
note of reality to the group. On 26th February Lovell noted that he was studying a paper 
from GEC on electromagnetic horns, and that there were discussions as to whether the 
team should move to GEC where progress was being made on 50cm.16
Blackett’s January visit brought a ray of hope into the atmosphere of gloom, as he 
had news that part of Bowen’s group was to form a re-created centimetre research team. 
This ‘part’ was to be Lovell, who, following the deaths of.Inglesby and Beattie had 
A.H.Chapman (Blackett’s technician) as his sole team member at that time. On 26th 
February Lovell was joined by Alan Hodgkin, a physiologist by training from Cambridge, 
whose transfer was arranged by Blackett. On being called up under the plan to bring 
scientists into military research, Hodgkin’s initial posting was to Famborough, where he 
worked on the effects of altitude on pilots. Assigning a physiologist to work on radar 
may at first seem very odd, except that Hodgkin’s pre-war research was primarily on 
conduction in nerve fibres, which had led him to become familiar with constructing and 
operating electronic equipment such as oscilloscopes. It was whilst he was at 
Famborough that he met Blackett, and his posting was arranged.17
When Hodgkin arrived at St Athan, six months had elapsed between the outbreak of 
War and the recommencement at AMRE of any kind of investigation into wavelengths 
shorter than the 1.5m used in AI, ASV and CHL (although GEC were investigating this 
area independently to AMRE). This period of delay was not caused by experimental 
problems. It was caused by factors outside the laboratory, and indicates how such 
factors are an important part of the progression of centimetre radar research. I believe 
that these conditions of confusion were symptomatic of the change in certainties
15 Lovell (1991), p21.
16 van der Hulst/Lovell Correspondence, paper by Lovell.
17 Hodgkin (1992), pl41.
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occasioned by the Wartime environment. This confusion is a factor which impedes 
scientific progress, as it leads to the closure of channels of information such as the 
unavailability of persons or books and journals. It is one of the factors which 
differentiates how scientific research operates in wartime, and how it operates in peace. I 
will look at some of what I believe to be the benefits of the wartime environment, such as 
greater speed in allocation of resources, later in this chapter and also in chapter 5.
4.2.1 Commencement of Centimetre Research at St Athan
When Hodgkin arrived, he, Lovell and Chapman recommenced research into using 
shorter wavelengths. It was by no means clear that their task was in any way useful, as 
Hodgkin recalled:
At an early stage Eddie Bowen, who I found an inspiring person, told me that I 
should give Lovell any help that he needed and explained broadly what he wanted me 
to do. In a letter to my mother dated 28 February 1940 I wrote, ‘I don’t yet know 
exactly what my final job will be. At present I am helping Lovell with a problem 
which looks as if it’s going to be insoluble so perhaps helping is not quite the right 
word’18
They had to start somewhere, so they began by investigating the possibilities of different 
sorts of antennas:
At last we were allowed to begin a little research. The two of us with Chapman’s 
help made a large horn-type antenna and on 5 March we took it outside the hangar 
and fed it with a 50 centimetre oscillator.19
This is one of the rare instances where Lovell acknowledges the role of his assistant, 
Chapman. Technicians play an important part in the life of a laboratory; they have skills 
that complement and augment those of the scientists, but their contribution is usually 
omitted from scientific accounts. However, their different perspective provides the
18 Hodgkin (1992), pl42.
19 Lovell (1991), p25.
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historian with another useful impression of what goes on in the laboratory. This is 
discussed further in a paper I have written (see Appendix A).20 Despite the usual 
practice, Chapman’s help is also mentioned by Hodgkin:
[Fowen] suggested that I should read up about ways of generating narrow beams - 
horns, paraboloids and so on, and, if possible, of swinging the resulting beam 
electrically... I decided to use 50 cm, which was then a reasonably understood 
wavelength. Lovell’s assistant Chapman, from Blackett’s Laboratory, helped me to 
build an oscillator at this wavelength which we used for a month or two.21
As they were interested in using short wavelengths the two men went to visit GEC, 
where they were shown the company’s ‘micropup’ valve, which was capable of 
generating several kilowatts at 50cm. The micropup was the basis of GEC’s 25cm 
system (see next section), and aroused considerable interest in Lovell and Hodgkin:
Alan Hodgkin and I were fascinated by this new development and for the first 
time the practical possibility of an AI on a wavelength of 50 centimetres with a narrow 
beam to avoid the ground returns began to emerge. We returned to St Athan and our 
veiy large horn. Even if it were possible to fit such a very large device in a 
nightfighter some means had to be found, other than moving the horn, of swinging the 
narrow beam. At least facing a seemingly insuperable research problem with a fellow 
spirit was a refreshing change from the preceding months of drudgery with the AI and 
ASV equipment.22
It is interesting to read what Hodgkin has to say about the same experiments:
Following Bowen’s advice, I tested out the beam-swinging method at 50cm using 
three large wave guides. The physicists at Dundee, whom I was soon to meet at 
Swanage, felt that my tests were a great waste of time since the result could be 
calculated with certainty on the back of an envelope. However, the tests made us 
organise turntables and other equipment for measuring polar diagrams and it taught 
me something about electromagnetic radiation. It should also be said that the reason
20 In general, a scientist makes things explicit about the process of science that a technician, who has not 
had the same background and training, would not and vice-versa. See for example Shapin (1989).
21 Hodgkin (1992), pl50.
22 Lovell (1991), p25.
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Bowen wanted everything tested was that the 90° side lobes from a reflector or array 
giving a narrow beam are nearly always larger than those calculated from simple wave 
theory. This is important in Air Interception because the echo from an aeroplane at 
the same range as your own altitude is liable to be swamped by an enormous ground 
return.23
Hodgkin and Lovell were trying to measure the shape of the beam coming from their 
horn. They did this by producing a “map” of the signal, by measuring its strength in 
various orientations relative to the aperture of the horn. This information was plotted 
onto a “polar-diagram”, which showed how the signal strength varied with respect to the 
angle from the aperture (see overleaf for diagram). The diagram was a two-dimensional 
slice through the output pattern of the antenna. This does not necessarily mean that the 
diagram was the same in all orientations. What is important was that any signal coming 
from the side lobe, unless it was weaker than a signal from the main lobe, would not only 
obscure the main lobe signal, but also, crucially, be indistinguishable from it. In the case 
of a ground return, this would almost certainly be stronger than that returned from an 
aircraft, which is why it was important that such side lobes be measured so they could be 
suppressed. That such side lobes did not behave as theory predicted is exactly the sort of 
tacit knowledge that experienced men like Bowen could offer to the newcomers. This 
quote also illustrates that discrepancies between theory and what was understood by the 
practitioners did exist, and were having to be re-addressed regularly.
The polar-diagram was an important graphical aid towards understanding how 
different types of aerial actually worked. It was a tool that the experimenters could use 
to help them improve their aerials in order to get the shape of signal that they believed 
would work the best. Graphical representations are often an important tool in allowing 
an experimenter to “make sense” of his discovery.24
In March 1940 moves were made by the senior management to reunite the whole of 
AMRE in one location. This information gradually filtered down to Lovell, who heard 
rumours that the team would be moved back to Dundee, or to GEC, or to the Aircraft 
Experimental Establishment at Famborough. Finally it was revealed that they would go 
to Dorset. It was also at this time that Rowe, still at the main establishment in Dundee,
23 Hodgkin (1992), ppl51-2.
24 See for example, Gooding’s analysis of Faraday’s magnetic curves. Gooding (1990a), ch 4.
^ L f  *
S.VU S ^ r k
C tU s J  0
Figure 4.2: A typical aerial polar diagram. The side lobes are the “blobs” that 
extend out sideways from the main beam. This is a graphical representation of 
how the signal strength from, or received by, the aerial varies compared to the 
angle to the aerial in a particular plane.
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re-opened investigations into centimetre waves there. He asked Skinner (a Cambridge 
graduate who had previously lectured Lovell at Bristol) to commence research into this 
area. Skinner was joined by James Atkinson, who had trained at the Cavendish but had 
joined Bawdsey on graduation in 1939. When war broke out Atkinson was assigned to 
modifying the Chain Horn? stations, and when this was completed in March 1940 he was 
attached to Skinner. As he recalled:
I immediately reported to the leader of the Centimetre Team - none other than 
Herbert Skinner, who with his dry and economic sense of humour, informed me that I 
had doubled the size of the team!
Herbert had been well briefed - 1 think by W.B.Lewis - on the need for narrow- 
beam equipment in fighter aircraft to allow them to operate at low altitudes. Although 
we had no aerial, transmitter or receiver at this stage I was despatched to Stores to 
order two 6 ft aluminium paraboloids manufactured to ±1 cm. He was aware of the 
high-power klystron being developed at Birmingham University, but had no idea when 
or if we might obtain i t25
It is clear that immediately prior to the move to Worth Matravers the Centimetre 
Research Team at AMRE was in a very poor state. It consisted of Skinner and Atkinson 
in Dundee, who had done no practical work at all, and Lovell, Hodgkin and Chapman at 
St Athan who had done some basic practical work on horn antennas. Those personnel 
who had experience of airborne radar, namely Bowen and his team, were either sidelined 
or used as mechanics and fitters to install 1.5m AI and ASV, tasks not connected with 
centimetre research.
In contrast, GEC were at this time developing their own version of AI. It operated 
on 25cm and used conventional valve designs. Yet in just a few months, this would be 
superseded by a 10cm system from AMRE. That this happened was due to the cavity 
magnetron, whose remarkable development was described in the last chapter. This was 
despite considerable pressure from within both GEC and AMRE to persevere with 
something less revolutionary (and, in their eyes, more likely to be successful) than 10cm. 
In the next section I shall describe the work at GEC.
25 Atkinson (1990), p25.
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4.3 GEC’s 25cm System
In the previous chapter I explained how it was largely the Admiralty that initiated the 
work on 10cm transmission valves through the CVD. Bowen was the only person from 
AMRE with an interest in producing smaller wavelengths to improve his Airborne 
Interception system. His discussions with Sir Charles Smith of the Admiralty, who was 
also chairman of CVD, were a contributory factor to the Admiralty’s decision to initiate 
this research. It may seem odd that the push for something perceived to being mostly of 
benefit to the Air Force came from the Admiralty. However, by this time (October 1939) 
the Air Ministry too were considering the problem of how to generate centimetre 
wavelengths at high powers and how they could be used.26
That this interest had sprung up was due largely to the way CVD facilitated the 
transfer of information about new developments between the different potential 
interested parties. GEC had a valve, the micropup, which could operate on wavelengths 
of 50cm at a power of several kilowatts. Through CVD Tizard became aware of the 
valve’s potential, and arranged to visit GEC to see the progress being made there. 
According to Sir Clifford Paterson’s Diary (Paterson was at this time the head of GEC):
Had visit from Sir Henry Tizard who wanted to satisfy himself that all resources of 
industry were being focused on radio and RDF. He is sure that ‘this is the radio war’ 
and radio will win or lose it. He came feeling that some of the Air Ministry problems 
would go quicker if the centre of responsibility for development were in industrial 
rather than in Service establishment [sic] as at present. I partially supported him. He 
inspected our facilities and looked over our valve and CRT work. He is seeing me 
again after he has seen Watson Watt.27
Through Paterson’s membership of the CVD, GEC were in very close contact with 
developments at the Service establishments, and at Bawdsey in particular. Through his 
membership of CVD Bowen was also a regular visitor to GEC’s Wembley research 
establishment. Tizard mentioned his own Wembley visit to Watson Watt, who in return 
mentioned this to Paterson on November 29th:
26 Bowen (1987), pl45.
27 Clayton & Algar (Eds. 1991), p i 1.
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Lunched with Watson Watt. He referred to Tizard’s visit to us and now wants us 
to take on research and development for AI - breaking away if possible from orthodoxy 
- if we can get expectation of better results therefrom. He will visit us here in a few 
days to discuss and finalise an arrangement. We shall need to incorporate some 
service people in our group.28
This quote is significant for several reasons. Firstly it supports what I quoted from 
Lovell’s 1991 memoirs, in the previous section. This was in relation to how work at St 
Athan was getting nowhere, and rumours were circulating of a move to GEC. Secondly, 
there is another reference to the idea that it would take a tcbreak... from orthodoxy” to 
solve the problem of centimetre AI. This is a very important theme, as it introduces a 
tension between the idea of using expertise to solve engineering problems, and the idea 
that expertise in an area can cloud the ability to make intuitive leaps. Paterson was not 
the only person with such views. In the previous chapter I quoted Oliphant’s view, that 
physicists would be better able to produce solutions than engineers. Later in this chapter 
I indicate Batt’s initial view that by being a radio engineer he was a misfit in terms of 
what he viewed as orthodox radio-engineering practice.
Paterson met again with Watson-Watt on December 11th to discuss the AI contract. 
They arranged a further meeting for 22nd December, which Bowen was also to attend. 
Before this meeting, on December 15th Paterson saw Appleton who was also a member 
of the CSS AD. His record of these meetings sheds further light onto why centimetre 
research was not working at AMRE during this period:
Lunched with Appleton to see how matters stood in regard to his support of our 
proposed AI work. He is chairman of an RDF sub-committee of Tizard’s main 
committee and is determined to foster the ‘farming out’ of service problems whenever 
possible. Furthermore he is concerned at the ineffectiveness of the Service 
establishments. I said I thought their morale had been undermined since Rowe and 
the Bawdsey group had been dispersed. They now were no longer an organism.29
28 Clayton & Algar (Eds. 1991), pl5.
29 Clayton & Algar (Eds. 1991), pl9.
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In this quote we see another allusion as to how people viewed the proper way to run 
a research team at that time - it had to be an “organism”. That is, it had to enable the 
interaction of its members so that they could produce solutions to the problems facing 
them much more quickly than when the group was dispersed. Of course, at this time the 
AI workers at St Athan were not engaging in any research primarily because they were 
being used to fit existing types of AI instead.
As previously arranged, on December 22nd Paterson met with Watson-Watt, Bowen, 
Touch and Hanbury Brown to discuss how GEC would approach the problem of 
developing a short-wave AI under the terms of their Air Ministry contract. At this 
meeting they decided to bring in GEC’s Television Team to undertake the project. Sir 
Robert Clayton, who was a member of the Television Team, described himself and them 
as:
[0]ne of the many groups which reinvented radar when they observed the 
fluttering of television signals when they were reflected from an aircraft as well as 
being received directly.30
When assigned to producing an AI on a wavelength of 25cm, the team was allocated 
new tasks in pursuit of this goal. In the light of Paterson and Appleton’s comments about 
how teams were better suited towards problem solving, the Television Team was ideal 
for its new role. The team was led by Dr D.C.Epsley, who, according to Clayton, was a 
“very good inventor”.31 Epsley’s deputy was G.W.Edwards, who was in charge of 
testing the newly invented systems, and of their flight-trials. Under Edwards were three 
men: Dr B.J.O’Kane; Robert Clayton, who worked on aerials; and E.C.Cherry, who 
worked on receivers. They were assisted by D.O.Walter and L.H.B.Knox who drew and 
constructed units that they designed. There were also other laboratory assistants that 
they could use. Sir Robert also recalled that the team related very informally, discussing 
problems together over breaks (in much the same manner as in University research), and 
were planning to develop their radar in around less than a year (in comparison, by the 
1960 s a new system took some ten years from drawing board to production).32 Clayton
30 Clayton (1984), p383.
31 Interview between author and Sir Robert Clayton, 10/9/92.
32 Intuview between author and Sir Robert Clayton, 10/9/92.
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and his colleagues fitted the emerging pattern of the typical radar team very well. Their 
group was relatively small and close-knit, contained men who were confirmed 
experimentalists with several years skill in both building and running apparatus, who 
were amply provided with assistance from experienced technicians. These points are 
worth bearing in mind when we examine what they achieved, the time in which they 
achieved it, and this group’s similarity to others that came after it in AMRE.
Work based initially around 25cm and the micropup valves that were already being 
used for 1.5m AI commenced early in the new year. Methods of reception for 25cm 
were discussed with Bowen and Watson Watt in a general meeting on November 16th. 
Paterson clearly appreciated the difficulties that Bowen was having at this time, as this 
comment from his diary shows:
Bowen is a fine chap and I think that our usual collaboration policy will pull 
things right with the rest of his group.33
Paterson also mentioned a discussion with Rowe about re-housing the St Athan team at 
Wembley in his diary:
Had from Rowe [a] private letter re St Athan staff working with Bowen and 
possibility of our housing some of them here where research is possible under better 
conditions.34
Given the events described above, the fact that Rowe was discussing the problem could 
mean one of two things: either he was genuinely concerned over the centimetre team, or 
he was trying to isolate Bowen even further.
On January 31st 1940 Paterson noted in his diaiy that:
Epsley tells me that we may have to go down to 5cm for the AI work - anyway the 
velocity modulation work has to be hastened as in case we may have to both generate and 
amplify at these wavelengths.35
33 Clayton & Algar (Eds. 1991), p23.
34 Clayton & Algar (Eds. 1991), p23.
35 Clayton & Algar (Eds. 1991), p23.
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Between New Year and the end of January the Television Group studied the available 
literature on existing microwave components. This study led Epsley to conclude that it 
would be necessary to go down to 5cm eventually. However, according to Clayton, 
Epsley was still keen to continue working towards the 25cm system even when the 10cm 
magnetron developments became known. He remained convinced of the viability of the 
system, perhaps because he felt it more apposite to persevere with relatively better- 
understood technology than microwaves. By contrast the others at GEC had already 
become convinced that the cavity magnetron offered greater possibilities for success.
On March 14th Bowen attended a meeting at GEC’s Wembley site. At the meeting 
he pressed GEC to concentrate on 10cm, and not 25cm as per the guideline from the Air 
Ministry’s DCD. He saw the 25cm work as merely a stepping stone to the lower 
wavelengths that he was convinced were the only solution to the AI problem. He also 
related, privately, to Paterson that he thought that GEC’s efforts with 25cm were along 
the right lines and that the work would be valuable in any case. By this time Epsley’s 
group had worked hard to produce a “lash-up” which was shown to the visitors from 
AMRE.36 Careful consideration was given to the scanning arrangements and, not 
surprisingly given, their background, the team decided on a television-type (up and 
down, and along) pattern. This is a good example about how scientists will often solve a 
problem using methods with which they were already familiar. By contrast, when 
Hodgkin at AMRE designed a scanner arrangement, he chose to use a spiral scanning 
pattern. Hodgkin was a physiologist. Epsley was also thinking about how they could 
switch the transmitted and received signals through a single aerial.37 This was a very 
important problem, that would remain unsolved until well into 1941.
Over the next few months, before news of the cavity magnetron (which was well 
under way by April 1940) reached the 25cm AI team at Wembley, the team was occupied 
with investigations into crystal mixers, work into couplings and switches for waveguides, 
and in further work on improving the operation of their 25cm system. 2kW of pulsed 
power at this wavelength was extracted from millimicropup valves in April.38
However, the work at GEC changed radically later that summer when AMRE’s 
successful 10cm experiments using the cavity magnetron were made known to them. It
36 Clayton & Algar (Eds. 1991), p31.
37 Clayton (1984), p385.
38 Clayton (1984), p385.
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was initially the source of some tension between the two groups. This was later resolved 
and a good relationship built up, but there was the potential for a block on information 
exchange between two of the important groups of centimetre radar scientists. This is 
what Clayton had to say about the subject writing in 1984:
The Government supervision of the [25cm] project was initially in the hands of 
E.G.Bowen... [who] had developed the airborne interception radar which worked at a 
wavelength of about 1.5m and which had been further developed and manufactured by 
EMI at Hayes; liaison meetings were set up between the Wembley and Hayes teams for 
exchange of information and expertise... [At the same time a]n airborne radar team 
was established at TRE under Dee... It would appear that the Wembley team was not 
made aware of this, nor were the TRE team informed for some time of the activity at 
Wembley. The result was that parallel activities grew up which were to be a source of 
friction over a substantial period. In spite of this there were considerable contributions 
from both sides.39
This paragraph establishes two interesting points. The first is that contact between 
organisations for the purpose of the transmission of expertise was viewed as important 
by the scientists actually doing the work. They realised that contact with other groups 
was important for them to learn new ways of doing things that would help their own 
work, and that they could do this best by face-to-face contact and through laboratory 
visits. They would also pass on their own expertise. This is an example of co-operation 
between rival firms who would normally jealously guard any knowledge that would give 
them a competitive edge, and is a distinct reminder of the very different situation that 
pervaded in wartime. This level of co-operation between firms was never seen in 
Germany, for example. The second, is that a lack of co-operation could prove to be 
detrimental to rapid progress, as it opposed the flow of ideas and expertise that facilitate 
this. Perhaps the best illustration of a beneficial exchange of information between distinct 
groups is the case of the cavity magnetron, as related in the previous chapter.
The existence of two teams committed to solving the same problem but in different 
ways led to animosity and non-co-operation until a hierarchical relationship was 
established between them. This dispute between GEC and AMRE over who had custody 
of the AI project was eventually resolved by the status of the group leaders rather than
39 Clayton (1984), p385.
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by an appeal to the benefits of each system, as I relate in section 4.5.40 When it was 
resolved, the two groups no longer competed without communicating with each other, 
but shared their expertise.
GEC’s 25cm radar team shared certain characteristics with AMRE’s 10cm radar 
team. They were j» small, closely-knit group who had worked together for a few years, 
they were all very experienced in working with electronics, in the field of television. 
They were able to put this experience to good use as it related very closely to their new 
task. Their major difference to the AMRE team was that they were pushing relatively 
well-understood technology to its limits, rather than working with a completely new 
field. In the next two sections I will cover the development of AMRE’s 10cm radar.
4.4 Worth Matravers: the First 10cm Radar
In this section I will do two things. Firstly, I relate the development of 10cm radar in 
chronological fashion. This allows me to describe the possibilities that faced the 
researchers as they went along, together with the directions in which they went. 
Secondly, I wish to show that the 10cm radar that they constructed was an unstable 
entity which required certain conditions in order to make it work as required. In 
particular, I want to examine the processes of acquisition of embodied radar-building and 
using skill by the researchers, and of embedding that skill within their apparatus. This 
second process was not complete by the time airborne experiments commenced in March 
1941, and was not even fully complete when H2 S experiments began in 1942. Due to the 
chronological description of events I will indicate instances that support the view that 
10cm radar was not fully stable by 1941 as they occur. Following the problems that the 
researchers had is important to this thesis, because I want to show that building 10cm 
radar was a difficult exercise that involved a lot of work learning how to build and use it 
on the part of the experimenters. This period of hard work and difficulty should be borne
40 This process confirms Collins' ideas about social status and the resolution of disputes. He argues that 
it is the status of the antagonists within their community which determines whether they win a dispute 
about knowledge claims, rather than any appeal to the results given by the apparatus. See Collins 
(1985), ch 4.
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in mind when I go on to examine the German centimetre research programme in chapter 
7.
The dire situation in centimetre research described in section 4.2 created the 
necessary impetus for centralising AMRE at one location. The location chosen was 
Worth Matravers on the Dorset Coast near Swanage (see overleaf for picture). The site 
was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, it was much closer to London than Dundee and 
would enhance communication between the institution, the Military and Civil authorities, 
and the manufacturers. Secondly, the location was thought to be safe from air attack. In 
early 1940 this was, of course, true; the English Channel came between two allies, France 
and Britain. However, after the fall of France in June 1940, Luftwaffe forward air-bases 
were suddenly very close, and AMRE faced the real possibility of air attack. The 
Germans believed that the British wouldn’t be so stupid as to place a top secret 
establishment in such a vulnerable position, for the site remained unscathed, despite being 
marked by a very obvious 350 foot high CH mast.41 Indeed the Germans only attacked 
the whole CH system once during the Battle of Britain 42 They were very successful and 
put several stations temporarily out of operation, and effectively “blinding” the British air 
defence. This had the consequence of forcing the RAF to mount standing patrols of 
fighters for the day that the system was out of operation 43 However, the stations were 
quickly repaired and were never attacked again.
Work on readying the site began in late March, and by April several AMRE 
researchers, including Lovell, were informed that this was to be their final destination. 
The group that was assembled there didn’t all arrive together, but most people had come 
by the second week in May. Skinner and Atkinson arrived early, as Lovell noted in his 
diary on May 10th:
Spent the afternoon with Skinner and Atkinson planning a 10cm [split-anode] 
magnetron drive and a scrounging visit to Bristol.44
41 Pritchard (1989).
42 Wood & Dempster (1961).
43 Radar was originally designed to prevent the RAF having to mount standing patrols. With radar, 
fighters could be sent to where they were needed, allowing the pilots to rest, and then putting them 
directly in the way of incoming raids. This allowed successful defence with limited resources, as the 
Battle of Britain showed See Wood & Dempster (1961).
44 van der Hulst/Lovell Correspondence, Lovell (unpubl.) 10/5/40.
Figure 4.3: AMRE Worth Matravers, Dorset, 1940. The picture shows ‘A’ and 
‘B’ sites, ‘B’ Site being the main complex. *C’ Site was a couple of huts in a field 
about a quarter of a mile along the road extending to the right (south). From 
Batt (1991).
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Hodgkin arrived “in early May”, but was aggrieved to hear that the airborne team 
was to be headed by John Pringle, and that Bowen was to be removed (this was in 
conjunction with the minimum range problem, see chapter 2.).45 Philip Dee arrived at 
Worth Matravers on May 11th, along with several others from his Cavendish research 
group, including W.E.Bur^h«m, Sam Curran, and Devons. Devons, Dee and Burcham 
had lectured Atkinson at the Cavendish two years previously.46 They came from an 
establishment in Exeter, working on an anti-aircraft system that involved firing rockets 
on wires. This was the system that Lindemann had argued for whilst opposing radar in 
1936 (see chapter 2).
On May 14th Reg Batt arrived. He was one of a dozen or so people who were 
recruited to be technicians in the new establishment. Previously he had worked for the 
Post Office Engineering Department, and answered a low-key advertisement in the Times 
requesting people for an undisclosed government task. On arrival he was finally told of 
the role of AMRE. This was explained as designing devices to locate enemy aircraft and 
ships using radio waves, something that seemed in the realm of science fiction to the 
young man.47 Batt was described by Atkinson as being “there to show us how properly 
to wire up anything electrical.”48 Batt’s descriptions provide a useful counterpoint to 
those of the scientists, as they are from a completely different perspective - that of a 
technician. They often have the effect of rendering strange to the reader what to the 
scientists seemed at most problematic (see also Lovell and Chapman’s relationship, 
section 4.2.1). Yet despite his different grade and background Batt was accepted 
smoothly into the team, as his account of his introduction to Skinner and Atkinson 
written in 1991, shows:
They greeted me with genuine warmth which somewhat took me aback, used as I 
was to a hierarchical institution such as the Post Office, where a junior grade would be 
expected to know his place. It seemed I had now entered the more democratic 
ambience of university researchers.49
45 Hodgkin (1992), pl55.
46 Atkinson (1990), p25.
47 Batt (1991), ppl5-6.
48 Atkinson (1990), p25.
49 Batt (1991), pl8.
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In this quote Batt alludes to the special relationship that operated between technicians 
and their scientist colleagues, a relationship not always readily recognised by the 
scientists, but one that is still very important. I discuss it further in Appendix A.
4.4.1 The Klystron Experiments: the “Bodge-Up” from the Bog
The centimetre team were allocated a hut and facilities on C-Site, which was some 
distance away from the main A-Site. They had a simple wooden hut, very basic with 
“only one stool and a filing cabinet. There were no facilities”, apart from an Elsan 
chemical toilet which was cannibalised by Atkinson to use as a waveguide for klystron 
experiments. As well as his improvisational abilities, one of Atkinson’s other gifts was 
his understanding of the RAF stores system that enabled him to procure items easily 
when others were frustrated by bureaucracy.
Hodgkin described their hut:
It now seems extraordinary that all this high-powered work went on in a small 
isolated hut, reached by a muddy track, with no gas, and only makeshift water and 
electricity supplies.50
Ward and Robinson were allocated the task of designing circuits.51 Not everyone 
was treated so efficiently, and Hodgkin was initially unsure of what he was supposed to 
be doing, “except that [he] should design a scanning system for a 10 centimetre Air 
Interception set.” As his skills were not initially required, he took to spending a lot of 
time at Christchurch, where he “learnt a good deal about testing radar equipment in a 
military aircraft” 52 There were great difficulties with this, not least the variability of the 
power supply frequency, and the destructive effect of unpressurized, bumpy aircraft on 
delicate glass components. These were hazards that Lovell had already noted the 
previous year. Hodgkin returned to permanent residence in Hut 40, ‘C’ Site, at the end 
of June.
50 Hodgkin (1992), pl61.
51 Dee (unpubl.) 15/5/40, in Lovell (1945, unpubl.), in John Rylands University Library, Manchester.
52 Hodgkin (1992), pp 157-8. He learnt about airborne radar from Hanbury-Brown, who was probably 
the most experienced person in the country in terms of actually flying with radar equipment.
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When he arrived in May, Batt was informed of the various activities going on by the 
deputy superintendent, Lewis. The 10cm work sounded the most interesting, and Batt 
volunteered for it. He was allocated as an assistant to A.G.Ward, who was to work on 
the receiver. Ward explained to him the work that was being undertaken by the 
centimetre team. This was Batt’s reaction to it:
What kind of madhouse had I elected to join? Here was I, having recently 
acquired formal radio-engineering qualifications, encountering alien concepts such as 
transit time and resonant cavities - a far cry from broadcast communications.53
10 centimetre work was of a completely different nature to that usually done in radio 
engineering. It is, therefore, understandable that only physicists, who were free from the 
engineer’s beliefs of what was and wasn’t possible, were employed to do the research 
(see also my comments in section 3.3.2). In a 1990 paper, Batt put it thus:
Facetiously it occurred to me that the powers that be had found themselves 
lumbered with a bunch of academics who knew nothing about radio, and so had 
decided to let them loose on this project which respectable radio engineers considered 
impossible.
I was the odd man out. I had come form the Post Office, was the most junior of 
the group, but the only one with formal radio engineering qualifications. Yet within 
hours of my arrival at TRE (then AMRE) I could see that with centimetres, the less 
one knew about radio the better.54
He explained, as he got to grips with new concepts such as electron transit-time, the 
reason why it all seemed so strange:
To some one like myself accustomed to working at Broadcast frequencies, it was 
like being told that our motor cars were useless because they could not keep up with a 
bullet in full flight.55
53 Batt (1991), pl8.
54 Batt (1990), p33.
55 Batt (1991), pl8.
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To underline this point, in a 1990 booklet Burcham described the reaction of the rest of 
the other AMRE members not engaged in centimetre research:
The group was regarded with amused tolerance by the rest of the Establishment 
and was allocated a remote hut on a near cliff-top field in which to conduct their 
university-type experiments for which only the very far-sighted could see any 
predictable useful outcome.56
Burcham’s comments highlight the reasons that the centimetre researchers were so 
different from the other AMRE workers. They were not civil servants, and they were not 
rcdio engineers. Nor were they working on refining existing apparatus and techniques. 
They were University scientists entering a new field of research. I believe that the 
characteristics that set them apart also facilitated the rapidity of their work, as I will show 
ir this section and the next.
Another perspective on the events comes from Philip Dee, who kept a diary during 
this period. The entries written about the time of his arrival at Worth Matravers give us 
his view point about his colleagues, the experiments they did, and his battles with 
officialdom. In particular he wrote things about his colleagues which, although highly 
subjective, offer further insight into why centimetre research had been so badly ignored 
prior to May 1940. He described Rowe as ‘Very self-important and conceited”. Bowen, 
oi the other hand, was “in great disgrace over [the] scandal involving the minimum range 
[of 1.5m AI]”57. He was also very worried that things had been so bad at St Athan, as 
this had got the centimetre group off to a very bad start. His concern probably originated 
fiom speaking to Lovell whom he described as “effervescent” and “full of rage” at 
AMRE’s chaos. This chaos, and the personalities of Rowe and Lewis combined to 
worry Dee as he related:
AMRE is apparently run along the lines in which separate groups working in 
different places work upon transmitter, receiver, display etc. This might be reasonable 
for established techniques but is obviously quite impracticable for a new field such as 
centimetres is likely to prove.58
*Burcham & Shearman (1990), p20.
57 It is difficult to judge who was right in this particular case. See chapter 2, section 2.4.4.
58 Dee (unpubl.) 15/5/40.
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Dee clearly had firm ideas about how the group should be run, and saw the importance of 
interaction along the lines of what occurred in his experience, at University Laboratories 
(and in particular, the Cavendish Laboratory). Dee had been a supervisor there, to 
Burcham, Curran and Devons. In the summer of 1939 these three were working on 
nuclear reactions using H-T equipment. Even though they had acquired some experience 
with electronics, most of this type of work was done by Lewis. According to Burcham, 
this was the main reason why Lewis was appointed to AMRE. He remembered that 
Lewis disappeared during 1939, and he was told that Lewis would be required for 
government work during the 1939 Summer Long Vacation.59 Writing in 1990, Atkinson 
described Burcham as “quiet and restrained, possibly as a result of previous years spent 
working with Dee at the Cavendish, but he could be relied upon to get Dee going again 
should there be a lull - or to warn us what to expect next.”60
Skinner and Dee set about trying to persuade Rowe and Lewis, who were 
“uninterested in AT’ against their “Pre-war Civil-Service mentality” to “centre all the 
work in one place”61. Dee had also to discover how he was going to fit into the 
hierarchy at AMRE, such as there was at that time. When Dee was at the Cavendish 
Laboratory he had been superior to Lewis (who was now Deputy Superintendent). He 
now found himself to be below Lewis in the chain of command. This reversal in their 
relationship had the effect of subverting the formal structures of power at AMRE as they 
applied to the centimetre group. Consequently, they often acted outside the regulations 
of the establishment, but in the belief that they were circumventing restrictions to rapid 
progress. This behaviour was tolerated grudgingly if it produced results.
The relationship between Dee, Skinner and the leaders of AMRE was recalled by 
Burcham, who wrote that Dee and Skinner were officially group leaders under Lewis. 
Bowen saw Lewis as an active hindrance towards progress, but Burcham believed that 
Lewis pushed for the centimetre work to be continued during the Battle of Britain and 
threat of invasion (as did Lovell, and also Atkinson). If this was the case, then he had a 
positive effect towards ensuring the continuation of the project, at a time when many
59 Burcham interview, 15/2/93.
60 Atkinson (1990), p25.
61 Dee (unpubl.), 15/5/40.
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other people not directly connected with it thought that the researchers would be better 
employed on more pressing problems.
Skinner, who came from Bristol University, had a similar level of experience and 
status to Dee. At the beginning it wasn’t clear whether he or Dee was in charge of the 
centimetre work, although each had their own area of responsibility. Dee was the one 
who made arrangements, and offered leadership. He was a tidy, meticulous person, who 
was well organised and “loved an argument”.62 People went to him for guidance. 
Skinner was more of a ‘Virtuoso”, who dipped into various projects, including using the 
split-anode glass envelope magnetron to provide a power source for the aerials. He also 
acquired low-power klystrons from Sutton at Bristol to be used as local oscillators in the 
receiver, and was “rather quiet and self-contained, and in any discussion you had to 
decide whether the grunts he emitted were in favour or not of the views being expressed 
- and in age he was the senior member of the party.”63 He built crystal detectors with a 
considerable degree of skill, carefully fitting the crystal onto the cats-whisker wire, and 
tapping it carefully with his pipe.64 He had the process worked out by July (see overleaf 
for illustration):
Skinner made v. nice glass sealed crystal, the great advance being his discovery 
that Si [silica] can be brazed to rod. This enables glass seals to be made without 
disturbing crystal mounting.65
This process was also described by Batt, who, as a technician, appreciated Skinner’s 
practical abilities:
[Building crystal detectors was] a task taken on by Skinner... who had not only the 
vision of what was required but the practical abilities, including glass-blowing skill, to 
make [them].66
These two quotes illustrate two points. Firstly, Skinner was highly skilled in a variety of 
practical arts, that enabled him to construct the apparatus and components necessary for
62 Atkinson (1990), p25.
63 Atkinson (1990), p25.
64 Burcham interview, 15/2/93.
65 Burcham (unpubl.), 16/7/40.
66 Batt (1991), p47.
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his experiments. Secondly, both quotes show that Skinner’s practical ability was a part 
of the discovery process for him. His ideas about how to proceed were shaped by his 
understanding of how to make equipment. Although Skinner was probably the most 
skilled practical experimenter in the group, his abilities were by no means unique. All the 
other members of the team had similar experiences and skills, if to a lesser degree, which 
actually shaped the direction in which they went. They constructed their apparatus and 
developed their knowledge of how to use it through their physical interaction with it and 
embodied understanding of it.
Dee was made aware by Rowe of AMRE’s relationship with GEC, and of the work 
that GEC were at that time undertaking on shorter wave AI. He understood that GEC 
had had a contract for AI since January, but only on 25cm and with a horn antenna. 
Epsley at GEC was thinking of using 4 horns in order to obtain directional information. 
Dee noted in his diary that AMRE were more in favour of 8-10cms, but that at this time 
GEC were pessimistic as to whether there would be ever be enough power for it to work 
effectively. When Dee wrote this, the animosity between GEC and AMRE was not yet 
developed. It also illustrates that there was communication between the two groups, 
which could be of benefit to each.
There was another group interested in centimetres, of course, at Birmingham 
University. Dee was also informed by Rowe of some of the work going on there:
Oliphant is said to have developed a klystron giving a kW at 8cm and Randall 
also in Birmingham has a magnetron on the same wavelength. There are no 
transmitting valves at all in AMRE on such wavelengths and Skinner and I have 
decided that I should go to Cambridge, and try to get a klystron made in the Cavendish 
to Oliphant’s design as quickly as possible.67
Other sources (such as Lovell (1991)) suggest that the magnetron was a complete 
surprise to the centimetre team when it arrived in July, but perhaps Dee, being more 
senior, was informed earlier. The quote also illustrates the Cavendish Laboratory links at 
work.
Another ex-Cavendish member of the group was Burcham, who recalled in interview 
that the group got together over 15th to 18th May 1940. He shed some light on the
67 Dee (unpubl.) 15/5/40.
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working practices used at the Cavendish that were also adopted at AMRE due to the 
high proportion of former laboratory members there. At the Cavendish they worked 
independently, on separate projects, but regularly interacted with each other to discuss 
their day to day problems. This way of working continued at Worth Matravers, where 
the lay-out of their hut mimicked laboratory conditions in allowing **sy communication 
between the researchers. It was a long hut with a bench down each side. There was an 
office at the end shared by Dee and Skinner, who were not very compatible as Skinner’s 
untidiness infuriated Dee. Further evidence of the way people in close confines can 
interact was given by Dee’s comment on July 5th that Skinner’s general untidiness was a 
problem for Robinson, whose group he and Dee belonged to. Burcham however makes 
note of Dee and Skinner being incompatible, so maybe this was how Dee vented his 
irritation with Skinner - by blaming it on someone else. The degree of freedom of 
communication allowed within the team is surprising in the light of their secret military 
work, but Burcham believed that it contributed greatly to their rapid success. The whole 
group were extremely close-knit. Regular interaction was of great importance. They 
kept little paperwork, apart from technical references, and generally wrote very little 
down. This is confirmed by Dee when he makes note of writing a report to Rowe, as I 
show in a later quote.68
Over the next few weeks after their arrival in mid-May, Dee set about initiating work 
on 10cm. On 21st May he went to Cambridge to see Bragg (the head of the Cavendish 
Laboratory) about getting a klystron built there. On 22nd he went to Birmingham to see 
their klystron and also, according to him, the cavity magnetron. On 23 rd he went back 
to Cambridge to check on their progress with the klystron. On the same day Lovell 
“started active attempts to get a 10cm [split-anode] magnetron going in the field.”69 
Meanwhile Dee was confirming how he fitted into the structure, and recorded that on 
27th he had a meeting with Rowe to determine where and under whom he should work.
By the end of May conditions appear to have improved in Dee’s view, as on 30th he 
“moved into Hodgkin’s aerial hut and Burcham and [he] put together some HT gear for 
the klystron.” The next day “Burcham and [he] had a fine day putting up pumps, getting 
3-phase off the mains and running the high vacuum backwards. Quite like old times.”70
68 Burcham interview 15/2/93.
69 van der Hulst/Lovell Correspondence, Lovell (unpubl.) 23/5/40.
70 Dee (unpubl.) 31/5/40.
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As Dee and Burcham had worked together in the Cavendish, they would have established 
a rapport that allowed close co-operation. This is an example of how they sought to 
recreate the working environment that they felt suited them, and that they believed 
increased the speed with which they tackled their problems.
Whilst Dee and Burcham worked towards setting up their klystron, Lovell noted on 
29th July that his split-anode magnetron was showing signs of working, and that Dee 
was building a klystron inside the hut. Lovell’s magnetron was “going on 1 lcms” on 
30th, which was a big step towards him being able to commence his aerial experiments.71
Early in June Dee went to a meeting at GEC, Wembley, to discuss their AI system. 
He described them as being “attached to 25cm”, and as regarding AMRE as simply “a 
place that supplies aeroplanes for them (GEC) to use for their own gear”. On his return 
he informed Lewis that this was “an inversion of the proper state of affairs”. He told 
Paterson that in his belief, GEC and AMRE should work together and be a joint team. In 
the same entry he also made mention of the way he was fitting into the establishment, and 
his views of Lewis and of what he was supposed to be doing:
Lewis... seems to be a little hedgy perhaps for fear that Skinner and I are showing 
signs of absorbing too much work and perhaps becoming too powerful.72
Lewis, of course, had only the previous year been Dee’s junior. This quote shows that 
even with a pressing external threat, and working in wartime, social relations within the 
group could have an effect on that group’s performance. This is reinforced by Dee’s 
note that he also pressed Lewis to say what he was supposed to be responsible for. He 
and Skinner, being the senior men in the centimetre group and with no official 
demarcation between their activities and spheres of influence, were starting to tread on 
each other’s toes. Skinner was deemed by Lewis to be in charge of basic research, and 
Dee was responsible for putting the system into an aeroplane. However, Dee couldn’t 
see this happening for at least six months, and Pringle had been given that job anyway. 
As he lamented:
71 van der Hulst/Lovell Correspondence, Lovell paper.
72 Dee (unpubl.) 5/6/40.
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[A]s far as I can see all that 1 am really supposed to do is ask Pringle to get it 
[installation of centimetre AI] done. This should not take six months.73
Despite all the muddle and confusion in setting up the new establishment, something 
was being achieved at AMRE during this period. Whilst Dee and Burcham were 
working on completing the klystron set-up:
Lovell has got a low power 10cm glass envelope magnetron working in a ‘field’ 
coffin for the polar diagram measurements... much to Lovell’s annoyance eveiyone 
twiddles the knobs on every possible occasion, this being the first working apparatus.74
This description gives the reader an impression of a cosy, familiar laboratory where 
everyone is interested in everyone else’s work, something that Dee believed to be very 
important for the new field that they were entering (as illustrated in an earlier quote). 
The impression of chaotic endeavour is reinforced in a letter by Dee from 1982:
I think that you will never appreciate how unorganized [sic] and chaotic the whole 
set up was. We went our separate ways but seemed to coalesce when there was a 
common agreement - or enemy!75
Often at this stage the “enemy” was GEC, not the Germans. As GEC’s 25cm system 
took shape and was shown to influential people within the Air Ministry, and the prospect 
of invasion grew greater, AMRE’s 10cm project came under threat of cancellation.
Lovell’s own notes confirmed that he was able to make polar diagram measurements 
of the horns fed by the magnetron on 5th June.76 The previous day he had made no 
measurements because “Atkinson was messing about with pulsing and Skinner with 
crystals.”77 Skinner and Ward were working on the receiver, using a klystron from the 
Clarendon Laboratory at Oxford University as a local oscillator. This became known as 
the Sutton tube after its inventor, Dr R.W. Sutton.78
73 Dee (unpubl.) 5/6/40.
74 Dee (unpubl.) 5/6/40.
75 van der Hulst/Lovell Correspondence, letter Dee to vdH, quoted in letter vdH to Lovell, 7/2/82.
76 van der Hulst/Lovell Correspondence, Lovell paper.
77 van der Hulst/Lovell Correspondence, Lovell (unpubl.) 4/6/40.
78 Hodgkin (1992), pl61.
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My account emphasises the level of practical way in which the centimetre researchers 
learned their skills, and built their apparatus. Because of the need to work quickly the 
majority of the learning that was done by the researchers was passed on directly through 
close co-operation within the laboratory hut. However, some of the other aspects of 
University life used to share information within a group were utilised at AMRE. Dee 
noted that on June 10th he went to a lecture given by Bowen, the second such lecture in 
fact, on 1.5m AI and features he believed would be required by centimetre AI. He 
described Bowen, who he clearly impressed him, as a “terribly competent man”. It is 
also possible to infer from this quote and his hostility towards Rowe and Lewis, that he 
was also unimpressed that Bowen, a man with clear experience to offer, was being 
excluded from playing a full role in their work.
In the entry for the 10th June he also mentioned their continued attempts to conjure 
up something from the klystron. A large part of the delay in their experiments was that 
they had to wait for a water supply for cooling to be rigged up. Either due to the level of 
confusion in the new establishment, or because of the slowness of official channels in a 
Government establishment, nothing was done for several days after their request was 
made. In the end they went to Cambridge and “stole” the necessary equipment. Despite 
their attempt to speed up the process by using this unorthodox method of acquiring 
equipment, rigging it up took seven men ten days. In disgust, Dee wrote that “the whole 
thing could have been done by Lincoln at the Cavendish in an hour.”79 Whilst not stating 
so explicitly, it would appear that this is a reference to his Laboratory assistant. Such 
references from scientists are rare (although this was written in his diary, not a source 
that was intended for publication) and it hints at the intimate relationship, confidence and 
understanding that the scientists had with their technicians. It also indicates that part of 
the reason for the friction at AMRE between the University scientists such as Dee, and 
the civil servants such as Rowe, was their completely different methods of working. 
These frictions were exacerbated by the unusual circumstances of high pressure to 
achieve results quickly caused by the War situation. This pressure caused the peacetime 
structures and methods used at AMRE to be put under severe strain.
Ward and Batt moved into the hut during mid June, joining up with Skinner, Dee, 
Burcham, Lovell and Chapman, who had moved in slightly earlier. Batt was amazed to
79 Dee (unpubl.) 10/6/40.
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see the klystron equipment, which was “reminiscent of those early Frankenstein films.”80 
Batt wrote that the AMRE klystron was built from drawings furnished for Dee by 
Oliphant, who then had the valve constructed in Cambridge. In some respects one could 
say that this confirms Collins’ hypothesis81 that replication cannot be achieved solely by 
the possession by the replicator of algorithmic knowledge (such as diagrams). However, 
as the klystron was still not a stable entity at its source (Stanford), there is no way to tell 
whether the subsequent transmissions of knowledge to Oliphant and then to Dee 
furnished each with the necessary experience to replicate the original work. If the 
original experimenters had not learned to make the klystron work as they wished every 
time, then it is to be expected that the replicators would have the same difficulties.
On 12th June Lovell started working on parabolas instead of the horns, and noted the 
results in his laboratory book:
[Mjoved the dipole across the mouth of the sectional parabola and found that it 
shifted the beam 8° per 5cm... not enough power to see what the side lobes were like... 
this makes me regard the aerial problems as 75% solved.82
When the valve blew the next day (13th) he phoned up Megaw (at GEC) to see whether 
another could be found. Thus despite the developing antagonism between GEC and 
AMRE, there was still evidence of some beneficial co-operation between the two 
organisations. However, Megaw was not part of the 25cm team at GEC.
June 13th was the day when they finally produced power from their klystron set-up. 
Up until now the klystron had been incredibly difficult to operate. As Batt put it:
It seemed that the although theory was simple enough, for the klystron to build up 
its powerful oscillation every facet of its construction, assembly and adjustment had to 
be just right. Here was the bane of many a scientist - an entity possessing an infinite 
number of variables.83
80 Batt (1991), p40.
81 Collins (1985), ch 3.
82 van der Hulst/Lovell Correspondence, Lovell (unpubl.) 12/6/40.
83 Batt (1991), p41.
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Batt’s quote provides good evidence to back up Gooding’s assertions84 that theoretical 
knowledge is not sufficient to conduct experiments. The experimenter has also to have 
practical experimental skill: “every facet of its construction, assembly and adjustment had 
to be just right.” In other words, the experimenters had to have spent time working with 
their equipment, absorbing practical, unarticulated “know-how”, in order to get it to 
work.
Burcham also noted that the klystron first oscillated on June 13th.85 One of the main 
problems with it was that the filament often burnt out and had to be replaced, which 
meant dismantling the valve as he described in his notebook:
Whenever I am out of the lab and Skinner has to do this he forgets to turn off the 
water before pulling off the cooling pipes with the result that I am standing all day in 
about 1/2” depth of water, and the water on the bench is about equally deep but has its 
surface relieved somewhat by floating cig-ends, tea leaves, banana skins, etc.
However, we have managed to get quite a lot of power out of it and light a Pea lamp 
nearly a foot away.86
The klystron remained difficult to use even until the cavity magnetron arrived in July, 
which was the main reason why the cavity magnetron was so quickly employed. 
Burcham noted, as late as July 15th, that he had:
Tried pulsing of klystron again. Got it going, but it then suddenly stopped & 
would not work for sometime. Finally got it again by heating cathode v. hot.87
This quote shows the learning process that Burcham was going through with the 
klystron. He was still not in the position where he fully understood it, but he had by now 
developed ideas about how to fix it when it went wrong or refused to operate. In other 
words, he had already learned enough about klystron operation to know what type of 
remedies might work in getting it going again. But the klystron was clearly far from 
unproblematic, so we can conclude that at this stage the embodied knowledge of the 
experimenters in operating it was not embedded into it.
84 Gooding (1990), ch4.
85 Burcham (unpubl.), 13/6/40.
86 Dee (unpubl.), 13/6/40.
87 Burcham (unpubl.), 15/7/40.
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Throughout June work continued in the hut, where a routine was developing. Dee 
gave a very different impression of life in the laboratory in his diary notes, than would 
normally be found in experimental descriptions published in scientific textbooks or 
papers. The impression of a lively laboratory is reinforced by this excerpt:
Lovell is now measuring polar diagrams on 10cm in the field outside the hut. His 
mirrors [parabolic aerials] provide excellent targets for competition between Atkinson 
and myself of the throwing of large lumps of mud which collect outside the hut.88
One can only imagine that this must have irked Lovell considerably!
Lovell was not on his own in performing his experiments. He was being assisted by 
Chapman, the technician who had been brought from Manchester. Batt pointed out how 
well Lovell and Chapman complemented each other:
In Chapman, Lovell had a most valuable asset. A university laboratory assistant 
was truly a jack of all trades, and master of them alL He combined the abilities of an 
instrument-maker, a tool-maker, a glass-blower, and an expert in vacuum technique.
In addition he would have a working knowledge of electronics, optics and thermo­
dynamics. To a university laboratory a good assistant would be as valuable as a master 
chef to a maitre d’hotel.
Chapman was all of these things but above all he was by temperament calm and 
unflappable and in no way intimidated by Lovell's hyperactive zeal. Hence they made 
an effective and extremely productive team.89
Batt, as a technician, would be expected to be more aware of the assistance that such 
people give in the laboratory. In practically every other account given by a scientist, the 
technician is almost invisible: rarely, if ever alluded to. Here we can see precisely how 
much of a contribution they could make. This is not to say that scientists did not also 
have these skills for some of them did, notably Skinner. But there was definitely a 
partnership and division of labour occurring (see also Appendix A for further discussion 
of this process).
88 Dee (unpubl.), 14/6/40.
89 Batt (1991), p43.
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On his return to Worth Hodgkin was allocated the task of designing a scanner for the 
system:
Someone, probably Dee, suggested that 1 get a prototype scanner going, first on 
the ground and then in an air-to-air test to take place by Christmas [1940]. This was a 
tall order, as we then had no way of transmitting and receiving on the same aerial.
Nor did we know the answer to much simpler questions such as how to make a 
satisfactory rotating joint in a concentric cable or wave-guide carrying electromagnetic 
waves at centimetre wavelength.90
In this paragraph Hodgkin uncovered the problems that were facing every member of 
the team in one way or another: that they were working to a very tight schedule, and 
very often did not know whether they would be able to meet it. However this pressure 
forced them to take risks which, surprisingly, often paid off. In mid July Hodgkin met 
A. W. Whitaker from Nash & Thompson, who gave him a lot of advice on how to build 
his scanner. This advice was to prove invaluable to Hodgkin, whose successful design 
relied heavily on the knowledge he gained from Whitaker. This is a good example of the 
transmission of articulable embodied knowledge by personal communication.
Dee’s privileged knowledge of the new cavity magnetron increased, when he learned 
on 20th June, from a letter from Paterson to Rowe about GEC and AMRE co-operation, 
that the new magnetron now gave 2 kW. The others were unaware of this, but Dee now 
viewed their klystron work as a chance to learn about centimetric wavelengths and their 
behaviour:
With the klystrons we are learning the elements of aerials and transmission lines, 
much to the amusement of a fat old man called Bartlett... he knows all about the 
subject but regards it as quite pointless to let us into the secrets. Tried every... way to 
get some answers from him but gathered that I shall not be ready to understand 
anything for another 2 or 3 years since the subject is so complex.91
Despite Dee’s sarcasm, one can see the gulf that existed between the majority of the 
AMRE staff and the strange group at C-Site who persisted in their odd experiments that
90 Hodgkin (1992), ppl61-2.
91 Dee (unpubl.), 20/6/40.
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were likely to lead nowhere. Support for this view of the existence of a gulf comes from 
Hodgkin, who commented in 1992 that “[a] curious feature of the build-up was that 
Dee’s team was largely composed of physicists and we had hardly any mechanical or 
electrical engineers.”92 I noted previously that this meant the researchers did not have 
any preconceptions about what was or not possible. Certainly when we see what Batt 
wrote earlier about centimetric research seeming very strange to a radio engineer, this 
appears to be the case.
On 26th June Rowe finally confirmed Dee’s status as being in charge of installing 
“AIS” (centimetric, S-Band, AI) into an aeroplane. Dee complained again that this was 
highly unlikely to occur for a further six months. Further discussions with Rowe on July 
12th resulted in Dee being told he was actually in charge of all centimetre research. This 
elevated Dee to a position superior to Skinner. It went some way to removing the 
friction in their relationship, as the two had hitherto been treated as having equal 
seniority by the more junior members of the team. Later on the two went in to different 
spheres, with Dee in charge of Applications, and Skinner in charge of basic research on 
9cm and 3 cm.93
The AMRE group’s relative lack of success up until the end of June was in contrast 
to Birmingham University, who had worked with the klystron since the previous 
October, they had also, of course, developed the cavity magnetron. Their klystron 
equipment and transmitter was brought down on July 3rd by Oliphant and Sayers and 
their group, and demonstrated to the AMRE staff, as Dee noted. Burcham, however, 
thought it was on July 2nd. He informed me in interview that it was far more refined 
than the AMRE klystron, but still worked using a pump. As far as I am aware this was 
the first ever working 10cm system (see overleaf for illustration) - but there is no mention 
of it anywhere apart from in Burcham & Shearman’s 1990 description. I suspect that this 
is due to the subsequent success of the cavity-magnetron powered set produced by 
AMRE.94
When compared to the Birmingham team’s success, AMRE’s klystron equipment 
was still going nowhere. Atkinson wrote that:
92 Hodgkin (1992), pl70.
93 Hodgkin (1992), pl70.
94 Burcham interview, 15/2/93.
Figure 4.5 Birmingham University’s trailer-mounted Klystron se t From 
Burcham & Shearman (1990), pl2.
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The project [was] in difficulties. With our relatively massive equipment, any 
number of variac transformers, Avometers and oscilloscopes, the idea that even if we 
were able to get echoes at a reasonable range, we would be able to fit it into a fighter 
aircraft seemed most unlikely, not only to visiting Service personnel, but also amongst 
many of our own colleagues working on other projects95
This quote indicates that as time progressed, confidence in the AMRE team’s ability to 
produce a centimetre AI was decreasing. In order for them to survive, they had to 
produce demonstrable results that were as good as or in excess of those being produced 
at GEC and at Birmingham.
Dee was unhappy with the co-ordination of effort on the development of centimetric 
equipment. On July 9th he had a meeting with EMI, who had been contracted by the 
Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) to work on valves, aerials and receivers:
Presumably Warmsley at MAP is the only co-ordinator between the firms and 
AMRE and he never touches a piece of apparatus, just tries to direct the work from an
96office desk in London.
Despite being aimed at bureaucratic interference and incompetence, this is a revealing 
comment as it further underlines the implicit belief by Dee that the scientists had to get to 
grips, literally, with their equipment in order to fully appreciate what they were doing and 
would be able to do. Dee’s concern about the situation at Standard Telephones and 
Cables, which was worse than at EMI, also illustrates further implicit belief in the need 
for close co-operation between all the various parties concerned with development, when 
he described them as “obviously need[ing] intimate contact with the other centres of such 
work.”97 Again, on 13th July 1940, he was very disparaging about a bureaucrat: “DCD 
[Sir George Lee] is here for a meeting on AIS [10cm AI]. He is a hopeless old man with 
no knowledge of any of us.” Dee firmly believed that there were very great problems in 
this area, as a 1981 letter shows:
95 Atkinson (1990), p26.
96 Dee (unpubl.) 9/7/40.
97 Dee (unpubl.) 10/7/40.
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The brutal fact was that in early 1940 people at MAP were thinking they could 
develop a 10cm AI by sending secret, limited information out in different directions - 
to firms, to RAE, to TRE etc., etc. The apparent idea was that all this information 
would come together at MAP and an equipment evolve. It was just ludicrous and 
neither Skinner nor I would take part in such a game. Instead we went ahead to make 
an equipment, pulling in firms as required.98
Dee and Skinner’s resistance to this policy of what they saw as excessive secrecy shows 
that they believed that close co-operation was essential for rapid progress. They realised 
that it was important for the people actually building and experimenting with the 
equipment, and those who would manufacture it, to be closely involved at all stages of 
the process. However, at first they had to pursue this policy against the inclination of the 
organisations with which they worked. It was a measure of their status that they were 
allowed to work in this fashion. The policy of openness was eventually enshrined in 
Rowe’s weekly “Sunday Soviet” meetings (see next chapter for an explanation). It is 
also interesting to note that the process that they describe as being so detrimental, the 
“sending [out of] secret, limited information... in different directions”, was exactly the 
process used in German radar research, as I relate in chapters 6 and 7.
One of the effects of the centimetre team’s policy of autonomy, was that the 
researchers were expected to take responsibility for the equipment they were building, as 
Hodgkin related:
In 1940 when I was still a junior scientific officer earning £300 per annum I was 
encouraged to write and sign letters to firms on technical matters, and Dee’s authority 
was required only if some point of major policy were involved.99
As the system was also subject to a weekly review, this stopped over-enthusiastic young 
researchers from going too far, as Lovell did in the winter of 1940. He ordered several 
thousand square feet of perspex in order to construct a covered “greenhouse” within 
which to perform aerial experiments without being expose to the elements. He reasoned 
that Air Ministry procedures were such that ordering a large amount of material was as
98 van der Hulst/Lovell Correspondence, letter Dese to vdH, quoted in a letter vdH to Lovell, 7/2/82.
"  Hodgkin (1992), p!71.
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easy as a small amount. When this misdemeanour was discovered, Lovell was 
reprimanded for overstepping the mark.
The result of Sir George Lee’s visit on 13th July was that the relationships within the 
10cm team were unofficially formalised. Burcham recorded this relationship in his 
notebook: _
I worked with Atkinson on pulsing the klystron, with moderate but not especially 
great success. A family tree has now been drawn up for 10cm work on the following 
lines (unofficial):
Dee
(T) (R) (Aerials &
Presentation)
Skinner etc. Ward etc. Lovell etc.
DCD is coming tomorrow to give some decision about the priority of AI.100
Burcham’s mention of further klystron problems shows that the visit of Oliphant and the 
Birmingham klystron system had not at this point led to any improvement. This lends 
weight to the possibility that the klystron was not even fully understood by the 
Birmingham team if they were unable to assist the AMRE team to make theirs work.
Now that he was (unofficially, at least) in charge of the 10cm project, Dee’s 
frustration against the perceived bureaucratic forces ranged against him began to mount. 
Being in charge of the project led him to be exposed to higher levels of authority than he 
had experienced previously, as described in the following passage in his diary:
There has been a lot of talk about the impracticability of centimetres due to 
specular reflection. All the defeatists quote this as a reason for not driving for 
centimetres. Even at high level meetings in London between people who have never 
seen a centimetre valve these objections are being aired. Some people believe that this 
is likely to make the pick up very uncertain.
100 Burcham (unpubl.) 12/7/40, from Burcham/Lovell Correspondence Dec. 1990.
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This is an extremely significant quote. The main reason that the Germans failed to 
pursue centimetre waves was on the basis of experiments conducted in 1939101 which led 
them to believe that the reflections from aircraft illuminated with centimetre radiation 
would be too weak to detect. Their experiments led them to construct a theoretical 
explanation that confirmed this view, and once established, this view informed all further 
experimental work until the arrival of the British H2 S. Even after the discovery of the 
ground-mapping radar, they failed to believe that centimetre waves could be used in AI 
until the recovery of a British Mark VIII centimetre AI.
The distance of the officials from the experiments at AMRE led to a conflict between 
their theoretical beliefs about centimetres, and Dee’s beliefs informed by his experience 
with working with them. The AMRE team’s practical knowledge of what they could 
actually do led them to challenge the view that centimetre waves were useless. It would 
have been quite possible that the “official” view would have been the one that pertained, 
as happened in Germany where authority carried a lot of weight. However, rather than 
just accept these ‘Tacts”, the AMRE group decided to investigate for themselves as the 
remainder of the quote from Dee’s diary illustrates:
We are therefore doing a rough polar-diagram of a Lysander with 50 watts of 
8cm C.W. and 6’ mirrors, as was pretty obvious the aircraft had a pretty peaky polar 
diagram but at all aspects there seems to be a fair return. Hope this will allay the 
boneheads at the top. Had to write this result formally on a file for the Chief 
Superintendent [Rowe] to read!102
Dee recorded the results of the experiments in his diary in a very interesting fashion, 
away from standard scientific convention. Using the split-anode magnetron that Lovell 
had for testing parabolas, they mapped the reflection pattern from a Lysander aircraft. 
The “peaky” pattern refers to there being more energy reflected at certain angles than 
others, for example the side offered a bigger reflective surface than the front. However, 
“there seems to be a fair return” is not the sort of language one would expect in a report 
or paper. This indicates the still uncertain nature of their beliefs about centimetre 
radiation at this stage. Furthermore, that he should make special mention of having to
101 See chapter 6 for more details.
102 Dee (unpubl.) 15/7/40.
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write up results formally indicates that it would not have been a usual practice. This was 
also confirmed by Burcham, who in interview said, amongst other things, that it was “an 
effort to write anything”. He also said that there were no progress reports in general; 
brief notes were written down for personal use, as aides-memoire and to develop ideas in 
a graphical form (figure 4.6, from Burcham’s notebook, also illustrates this). Equipment 
got improved through trial and error, as they conducted experiments.103 Their mode of 
working was one of close, informal co-operation in a highly practical environment. 
Modifications and understanding about centimetre waves became embodied into the 
researchers as they performed their experiments.
By mid July, 2 months after the arrival of the team members, the structure of the 
group was finally beginning to emerge. At the same time the cavity magnetron arrived at 
Worth Matravers. The arrival of this valve altered the speed of progress significantly. 
They had hitherto managed only to perform some useful experiments to increase their 
understanding of the behaviour of waveguides, parabolas and other centimetre 
components. Their failure to stabilise the performance of the klystron so that it gave 
them a regular supply of high-power, frequency-stable centimetre waves had significantly 
retarded their development of a complete system. They could not set about combining 
the components into a complete, demonstrable system if they were not able to operate 
one of the key components consistently and to order.
4.4.2 The Magnetron Arrives - The Initial Success on 10cm
On 20th July 1940 Dee noted that they received the GEC magnetron (referring to the 
El 189 sample), and that he and Atkinson fixed up a modulator to drive it. Burcham 
noted that “magnetron imminent” on July 18th, and on July 21st he mentioned using it. 
However, he recorded it as coming on Friday 19th July, and that it was brought down by 
Atkinson.104 Batt wrote that on 19th July Atkinson cleared bench space for “a new and 
exciting toy”.105
103 Burcham interview 15/2/93.
104 Burcham (unpubl.), 18-21/7/40.
105 Batt (1991), p50.
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The magnetron had an immediate effect on the 10cm group. All the work done at 
GEC by Megaw had made it into a device that was far simpler to operate than the 
klystron, which was still prone to stop without warning. Megaw’s embodied skill had 
been embedded into the cavity magnetron, which did not now require the same level of 
skill to operate as when it had been in Randall and Boot’s laboratory. By contrast, the 
klystron was not fully understood, the AMRE scientists did not have the embodied skill 
to operate it, and they could not therefore embed their skill into an apparatus that could 
be replicated and then operated by people lacking the embodied skill of the original 
researchers). With the new device, the AMRE researchers neither had to learn to 
produce the effect106 as did Randall and Boot, or replicate107 the device (as this had been 
done by Megaw). They only had to “switch it on.”
The small, neat, compact magnetron, <4the size and shape of a pill box”, was fixed up 
in a wooden cradle between the poles of a permanent horseshoe magnet. Cooling air was 
supplied by a large blower. The high-voltage supply for the klystron was used for the 
magnetron. Batt described what happened when the set up was completed:
With the precious magnetron in position and connected up, Jimmy [Atkinson] 
began to wind up the high-voltage supply. One thousand, two thousand ... nine 
thousand, ten ... Suddenly a neon lamp being held against the output stub of the 
magnetron started to glow: the magnetron was oscillating, producing power - 10 
centimetre power! It was all so simple, unbelievably simple. We didn’t audibly cheer 
but nevertheless that was the feeling we all shared.108
They now had a power supply that was stable. It was one less thing that they had to 
learn how to operate.
On 2nd August Burcham noted in his diary that “[t]he magnetron is now ready to be 
put outside for reflection experiments. I am supposed to be in charge of this although 
whether Atkinson will let me be, I don’t really know.”109 In the two weeks prior to this,
106 Compare to Gooding’s account of how Faraday learned to operate the rotation motor by trial and 
error experimentation - see Gooding (1990), ch 6.
107 Megaw was able to replicate the cavity magnetron as he had learned how to build and operate it in the 
first place. Part of his learning process had involved him making a trip to Birmingham to meet Randall 
and Boot. This follows the replication process, whereby personal interaction is required, as laid down by 
Collins (1985), ch 3.
108 Batt (1991), p51.
109 Burcham (unpubl.), 2/8/40.
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Lovell had moved on to measuring the transparency of perspex to radiowaves, as Dee 
recorded on 22nd July. Lovell himself recorded that he had got:
Very good results with the 3’ paraboloid. Side lobes too small to measure with the 
available power and marvellous beam shifting +/-25° with a shift of lOcms and the 
diagram not gone too badly to pieces.110
After these satisfactory results Lovell was now starting to think of using a beam- 
shifting method rather than a movable antenna. On 29th July Dee recorded discussions 
with Gossling and Paterson from GEC concerning the division of effort to produce a 
working 10cm AI. This issue was now coming to a head, but would not be resolved for 
another month.
In Dee’s diary the month of August opens with “First cm echoes in trailer at Worth”. 
This was the month when the team made rapid progress after receiving their magnetron. 
However, Dee still felt impeded by the system. On August 8th Sir Frank Smith (Head of 
CVD) visited and was shown “one of the few things well organised”. As I have already 
mentioned, the fact that GEC were making rapid progress forced AMRE to consider 
how they too could produce a demonstration of an apparatus. For them to demonstrate 
something successfully, it had to be at the point where they were able to operate it as and 
when they required. In other words it could not be something like the klystron that was 
not understood and was prone to “misbehaving.”
Smith asked Dee what was required for AIS:
I [Dee] said that all that was necessary was for me to have 10 minutes with 
someone who had the power to tidy up the appalling muddle and lack of direction of 
the work.111
As Smith was that person, Dee went on to impress upon him the need for further co­
ordination of the whole effort between AMRE, the Services and the manufacturers. He 
saw AMRE as the research centre, the hub that connected the RAF who used the device 
and the manufacturers who made the equipment that AMRE developed.
van der Hulst/Lovell Correspondence, Lovell (unpubl.) 22/7/40.
111 Dee (unpubl.), 8/8/40.
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Despite Dee’s difficulties with administration, things were starting improve with the 
magnetron equipment in early August. They were now at the point where all the various 
components were ready to be put together into one apparatus in order to start 
conducting tests. The transmitter and receiver were attached to different, independently 
mounted paraboloids, and according to Lovell on August 8th and 9th they managed to 
receive clear echoes from a coastguard hut some 500m distant.112 However Burcham, in 
his notebook, recorded this as happening on 10th. He also made note of a difficulty:
Running magnetron and looking for reflections. Able to get coastguard hut easily 
and well but difficult to direct large paraboloid onto a plane. Didn’t get it in fact.113
Burcham’s note show that on August 10th they were still not in the position of being able 
to correlate a signal on their display as coming from an echo from an aeroplane. Such a 
calibration was very important for them. Over the previous five years, radar researchers 
had used demonstrations of receiving aircraft echoes as a means to reassure their military 
superiors that they were spending their money on a worthwhile project. The AMRE 
teams, facing the challenge of GEC’s 25cm system, were now also in the position of 
having to produce a demonstrable apparatus in order to continue their research.
The episode that follows is very important, as it illustrates several key historical 
points. Firstly, it shows how Lovell, Burcham and Batt calibrated their equipment so 
that they were able to demonstrate its capabilities with confidence to visiting dignitaries. 
Secondly, it shows how Lovell, Batt and Burcham differ in their recollections of what 
happened, despite consulting their own written records of the events. Their 
interpretations of what happened vary according to their participatory role in the events. 
Thirdly, it shows how the misunderstandings and hostility between GEC and AMRE 
created their own different perspectives on the personalities involved in the events, and 
highlights the potential for a lack of co-operation that could have had far-reaching 
effects. I discuss how hostility and suspicion between rival firms and organisations in 
Germany impeded their research programmes in chapters 6 and 7.
112 Lovell (1991), p41.
113 Burcham (unpubl.), 10/8/40.
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On 12th August Dee was away from Dorset visiting GEC, who he thought “fear[ed] 
losing control [of the centimetre AI project].” Skinner and Atkinson accompanied Dee 
to GEC. Paterson, head of GEC at the time, had this to say of the meeting:
“What a day! Lewis, Dee, Skinner, Bartlett, Atkinson, Ward from Swanage to 
talk AI and means of co-operation. Except for Lewis there was no articulate idea on the 
subject from their end They appear to me to be a group of individualists with little 
experience in team work- except Lewis. Pressed them to have fortnightly meetings with us 
to review branches of work and detailed programme. Dee was non-committal. I though it 
best to put our proposals in writing in a letter to Rowe. I don’t believe they have yet got 
the idea of sharing responsibility with us.”114
From Paterson’s perspective it was Dee and AMRE who were in the wrong, and being 
disruptive. GEC had their 25cm system and felt that they should have their achievements 
recognised. This was not the view of people at AMRE, as confirmed by Burcham who 
wrote on 13/8/40 that “Dee & Skinner [were] back very depressed from GEC. There is 
obstructionism there.”115 AMRE needed to be able to demonstrate their achievements if 
they were to head off the threat of GEC.
In a relatively quiet atmosphere Lovell, Burcham and Batt fixed up their equipment 
to conduct more trials. In correspondence with Burcham, Lovell quoted from his own 
diary to confirm with him the correct sequence of events:
Mon. August 12th: Skinner, Dee and Atkinson away so got the double paraboloid 
swiveller out of the workshops and with Burcham fixed up cables and by 6 p.m. we 
were tiying to get reflections from aircraft. It was really rather exciting and we 
definitely picked him up.
Tue. August 13th: Dee quite incoherent after meeting with GEC yesterday. News of 
our echoes would have been good for GEC one imagines. We had quite a successful 
day picking up a plane in the morning and a tin sheet and a bicycle on the hill, which 
was amazing considering it should be right in the ground returns. Watson-Watt and 
Rowe down in the afternoon and suitably impressed. We got a Blenheim over for 
Watts at 7 p.m. but unfortunately got nothing. Must have been because it was going 
tail and front on and not across.116
114 Paterson, 12/8/40, in Clayton & Algar (1991).
115 Burcham (unpubl.) 13/8/40.
116 Burcham/Lovell Correspondence, Lovell to Burcham 26/2/90..
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Lovell’s comment that “we definitely picked him up” is ambiguous - does it refer to Batt 
or the aeroplane? In his book of 1991, Lovell decided that they “saw” the aeroplane 
first, on August 12th. However, in his 1991 book Batt believed that they were unable to 
see the aerophre on August 12th, and he had to make his bicycle ride in order for them 
to pick anything up:
[I]t was early afternoon and a spirit of depression was abroad since once again our 
efforts had come to nought What was needed was a moving target that could be 
called up to order.117
Batt here has highlighted what the main problem was - according to him they were 
unable to see anything at all with their equipment and required him to cycle with a tin 
sheet strapped to his bike in order to provide a slow-moving, easy to see target. This 
would provide ideal calibration for them. He wrote that Lovell said he had received 
echoes of Batt “up to saturation” after Batt performed his cycle ride.118
According to Batt, the next day, after he had made his callibratory cycle-ride that:
Four very dejected physicists arrived back from their meeting at Wembley It 
transpired that GEC had won a moral victory. Whilst Dee and Skinner had little in 
the way of positive results to report, GEC had taken them up on to the roof of the 
Wembley building where there 25 centimetre system was set up in a hut. Here they 
were shown an impressive array of echoes from the surrounding topography.119
Batt’s quote shows how important it was for AMRE to be able to demonstrate their 
10cm as GEC had done. Demonstration provided an effective tool for using in settling 
the dispute over who should have control of the AI project. However, the previous 
day’s events were to be very useful. Batt then recalled that Lovell mentioned to them 
that he had clearly seen Batt on his bike the previous day. On 13th, he had to repeat the 
demonstration by getting on his bike and cycling off so that Lovell could demonstrate the 
echoes received from Batt. He wrote that he also had to repeat this for several visitors
117 Batt (1991), p54.
118 Batt (1991), p54.
119 Batt (1991), p55.
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including men from GEC. He gave the reason why it was him that was used as being 
because he was a stable, easily “seen” entity when they only had the cumbersome 
independent paraboloid mounts.
Lovell, of course, described Batt as a “junior assistant”, someone who was not as 
important, in his eyes, as a scientist. He also recorded in his diary that the twin 
paraboloid mount came on August 12th, which is in contradiction to Batt’s recollection. 
This date for the arrival of the twin-mount is supported by the entry in Burcham’s 
notebook for the 12th:
Aft[emoon] - Lovell’s double paraboloid arrived, mounted on stand. Set it up, 
made rough connections everywhere and looked for echoes with Ward’s crystal mixer 
receiver. Found coastguard hut alright though there is a big ground return & echoes 
are very wide. Had a plane over and thought we saw it, but couldn’t be sure, seemed 
to keep jumping in & out. Easily picked up Batt cycling around with a sheet of tin.
This is distinct from ground very clearly.120
Burcham’s quote, I believe, explains the discrepancy between Batt and Lovell’s accounts. 
Batt, as the cyclist, over-emphasised his role to the point of excluding them seeing the 
aircraft at all. This was not the case; they possibly saw an aircraft. Lovell, however, 
privileged the aircraft as the thing “seen” first. Burcham noted that Batt was far easier to 
see than the aeroplane, which they could not be sure they had seen. Lovell, after fifty 
years, favoured the interpretation that he had definitely seen and aeroplane; Batt, that it 
was him that was seen. Looking at their original notes opens up the ambiguity that 
existed at the time.121
What we can also see from all three men’s quotes is that the business of learning to 
“see” with the apparatus was not straightforward. They had to move from observing 
something fixed (the coastguard hut), to something slow-moving and easy to direct 
(Batt), to something far less controllable (an aeroplane) and harder to “see”. Lovell was 
positive about seeing aeroplanes, but Burcham “couldn’t be sure”. Batt thought they 
couldn’t see them at all. Despite knowing that they could “see” some things, like the hut
120 Burcham (unpubl.), 12/8/40.
121 See Gooding (1993) for further discussion of how scientists re-interpret their original notes at a later 
date to give the impression that they had a much clearer idea of what they were doing than is apparent 
from the early notes.
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and Batt, even these may have been artefacts of the equipment. Burcham was challenged 
on this matter the next day:
Osborne says that we were looking at back kicks yesterday and that the real 
picture is [see picture from Burcham’s notebook, overleaf]. The back kicks are due to 
the receiver saturating. Output stage has to be modified122
“Seeing” with their equipment, especially their preferred target (aeroplanes) was a 
difficult business to start with. However, as I have mentioned, they had to have some 
results in order to keep their project going, because of the threat from both GEC and 
from more sceptical members of their own establishment. This is where Batt came in as 
useful: as he was an easily-directed demonstration aid. The necessity of having a good 
demonstration is confirmed by Atkinson, who wrote that:
[Rowe] could not understand the abundant enthusiasm shown by Dee and Skinner 
and their complete assurance of success. You must remember that France had just 
fallen and I think Rowe was under some pressure to concentrate efforts on projects 
likely to assist against more immediate air attacks - and there woe continual rumours 
of possible invasion.
My impression that the future health of 10cm work was not 100% was confirmed 
when I ran into John Mercer, whom I had known well at Bawdsey and who worked 
directly as personal assistant to Rowe. Amongst his duties was the arranging of high- 
level visits and he told me of a forthcoming visit and said that we had better make 
certain our echo demonstration worked well. He also bet me £1 - a lot of money in 
those days - that 10cm would never be used operationally during the war.
My personal opinion is that the quiet but very strong and definite influence of Ben 
Lewis was a major factor in the group’s being given more resources, now that 
satisfactory echoes had been demonstrated A second factor was the support of Air- 
Vice Marshall Joubert of Fighter Command Joubert came... for a demonstration 
following one of Rowe’s famous Sunday meetings: the demonstration went well much
123to our relief.
122 Burcham (unpubl.) 13/8/40.
123 Atkinson (1990), pp26-7. Contrast his view of Lewis to those expressed by Bowen in chapter 2.
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Figure 4.6 Burcham’s laboratory notebook, 13/8/40. A diagram of possible valve 
kickback.
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The men engaged in the work believed in the project, and they needed to be able to 
persuade senior government and Forces officials that they were worth supporting, 
according to Atkinson, this was done by Lewis.124 Now that they were able to say with 
certainty that they could see huts and persons, they were able to increase their ability to 
see aircraft over the next few weeks. Their observation of reflections from a Battle 
aircraft was noted in Dee’s diary on August 22nd. This was the day that Epsley and 
Marris from GEC came to Worth Matravers to view the 10cm system. It was crucial 
that they made a good impression with a proper demonstration, and Lovell recorded in 
his diary that:
[Epsley and MarrisJ very much sobered down by Hodgkin’s presentation 
apparatus. Then in the afternoon we managed to follow a Battle for 2 miles tail on 
which was magnificent.125
This demonstration provided AMRE with enough ammunition to take control of the 
centimetre AI project. At the subsequent CVD meeting Dee related their success, and 
GEC were ordered to cancel their 25cm work and to now support AMRE’s efforts.
The final major component for AMRE’s apparatus to be completed was the reflecting 
klystron, designed by Sutton of the Admiralty valve workshop at Bristol. It arrived at 
the end of August. Ward and Batt had struggled to operate the 20cm local oscillator 
they were using for their receiver experiments, and Sutton’s valve was “sheer magic” by 
comparison. Like the magnetron, it behaved in a much more stable fashion than its 
predecessor.126
At the end of the month (August 26th 1940) Dee fell ill. He was visited by Lovell, 
Skinner and Atkinson who sought his support for moving the centimetre group to the 
stables at Leeson House, a nearby Preparatory School that had been requisitioned to 
provide further accommodation for AMRE. However, both Lovell and Burcham note 
the move as having already occurred, on August 25th.127 On 20th Dee noted that he had
124 It is interesting to compare Atkinson’s positive portrayal of Lewis to the negative one put forward by 
Bowen in chapter 2.
125 Lovell (1991), p45.
126 Batt (1991), p61.
127 Burcham (unpubl.), 25/8/40; Lovell (1991), p42.
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officially been given control of the centimetre work. This was as a result of his 
complaint to DCD (Sir George Lee) on August 8th.128
Leeson House was a much better location for experimentation than C-Site. It was, at 
least, a permanent building that could be supplied with the necessary services for their 
work, such as electricity and water. Moreover, the hilltop site at Worth Matravers was 
subject to regular air-raid warnings (this was at the height of the Battle of Britain), and 
Rowe felt that the school, a few miles from the main site, would be less obvious and less 
prone to attack.129
4.5 Winter 1940/Spring 1941
In September Bowen, Cockcroft and Tizard went to the USA with the cavity 
magnetron and other items to show to the Americans in exchange for their secrets.130 At 
the same time, the centimetre group moved over to Leeson house. The move to Leeson 
led to a rapid expansion of the centimetre team. Areas of responsibility became more 
delineated. Dee was put in charge of applications, and Skinner of basic research. Within 
Dee’s group people specialised on different areas. People straight out of University were 
recruited directly to the team.
In early September a meeting was held between GEC and AMRE at Leeson House. 
After the August 22nd demonstration of their 10cm system, AMRE now had the upper 
hand.131 Dee wrote that they ccMade short shrift of their 25cm proposals...”. A
128 Lovell (1991), p46.
129 Batt (1991), p70.
130 The “Tizard Mission” was an amazing move on the part of the British Government, effected at a time 
of great Peril for Britain. Sir Henry Tizard travelled to America with a team of several experts (Bowen 
being the radar expert) and several top-secret and highly important British inventions, which the British 
offered to the Americans in exchange for similar knowledge of American secrets. Chief amongst these 
was the prototype cavity magnetron, which Bowen was tasked with explaining. Once there he liaised 
with American scientists to set up the Radiation Laboratory at MIT, and institution dedicated to 
microwave radar research. For details see Bowen (1987) and Clarke (1965).
131 Certainly this issue, although buried for the duration of the war, had a marked effect on the way 
AMRE and GEC viewed each other. After the war, Lovell wrote to MAP at their request about GEC’s 
claims in relation to AI. Dated 3/9/45,1 reproduce it in full:
“On Monday 12th August the experimental equipment which we had gradually assembled in a trailer at 
‘C’ site at Worth made it’s first attempt to obtain reflections from a Battle aircraft These were thought 
to be successful-bit were not conclusive until the next day, August 13 th, when among other things the 
phenomena was demonstrated to Rowe and Watson-Watt (This was also the day of the famous ‘boy on
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programme for a 10cm system using a scanning parabola was devised. Hodgkin wrote 
that “Dee’s team [now] worked closely with the GEC”.132
However, despite what Hodgkin recalled, the battle over which group had priority 
was only recently resolved. Initially, co-operation, which eventually became extremely 
close, was difficult:
Relations between Epsley’s [25cm GEC All group and the AMRE physicists were 
at first somewhat uneasy... Epsley felt that the jump from 1.5m to 25cm was quite big 
enough and was inclined to favour 25 rather than 10cm. On the other hand, Dee and 
Skinner considered that airborne radar would only really become effective at 10 or 
3cm and that it was essential to capitalise on Randall’s magnetron.
I would argue, that this situation was to be expected. It would seem only natural that 
each group would become attached to the fruit of its own labours. However, in the rest 
of the quote, Hodgkin concluded differently:
The controversy was partly an argument between engineers, who were very much 
aware of the difficulties of putting a new idea into practice, and the physicists who 
believed that any technical difficulty could be overcome provided the basis of the 
invention was theoretically sound. In this respect my training was helpful since both 
sides felt that a biologist was too ignorant to be committed one way or the other.133
a bicycle’ experiment). By August 22nd the Battle was being followed out to a range of 2 miles tail-on 
and was demonstrated to Epsley and other members of the G.E.C. on that day. By September 3rd we 
were getting 5 miles on a Blenheim, so you see that all the significant early experiments were, in fact, 
carried out on ‘C’ site at Worth [not at Leeson House]...
“As for the equipment, this was... entirely hand-made. It used two 3 ’ paraboloids with home-made 
dipoles and parasitic reflectors, one for the transmitter and one for the receiver (common T/R came very 
much later), and was pointed manually at the aircraft through a crude sight The transmitter used one of 
the very first G.E.C.-made magnetrons giving only about 2 or 3 kW peak. The modulator again used 
one of the early G.E.C. hard valves (I have forgotten the type-number, but it was one that always gave 
trouble, and after two more years was scrapped in favour of the spark-gap modulator in H2S). The 
crystal mixer was made by Skinner, and the receiver by Ward, using a Pye Intermediate] Frequency] 
strip. The display equipment and ordinary C.R.T. with range time-base was also made locally.
“... G.E.C... at that time... were concentrating very largely on 25cms. This was the cause of considerable 
argument and friction between TRE and GEC and it was not until there was a definite understanding 
that the GEC work was subsidiary to our technical direction that they gave up most of their attempts to 
initiate 25cms as a first airborne centimetric AI. This was achieved at a meeting at TRE on September 
3rd when they were shown the Blenheim up to 5 miles on the trailer equipment. This, combined with 
the TRE block for lOcms, largely stopped their efforts on 25cms. They did, of course, continue their 
work on 25cms and several months later we heard it was being used in an experiment at ADRDE.”
132 Hodgkin (1992), pl73.
133 Hodgkin (1992), ppl73-4.
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The AMRE group may well have believed that their ideas were theoretically sound, but 
their success was based on their practice. They had learned how to use their 10cm 
equipment successfully by actually performing experiments with it, and modifying it in 
the light of these experiments. They did not have a solid theoretical appreciation of what 
they had done. What they did have, was embodied knowledge about how to build 10cm 
radar acquired through their experimentation. Some of this could be made explicit, and 
some could be embedded, but these were further processes that they had to undertake if 
and when required.
However, GEC were also correct in that very often equipment was rushed into 
service before all the bugs had been ironed out. This was rectified by the setting up of 
the Post Design Service, a team of people from AMRE (later TRE) who went out to help 
the services learn about, install, and maintain the equipment whilst it was in its initial 
phases, and help train operators and mechanics in how to use and maintain it.
During Autumn 1940 the group settled into the stables. Work continued on 
improving the components, which were installed in a trailer located on the lawn of the 
house. Progress continued, and Burcham noted a reflection from an Anson was seen at 6 
1/2 miles on September 19th.134
During October work was begun to develop a Naval system following a visit by the 
Admiralty. On October 21st, Dee noted that the 10cm AI work was subordinated to GL, 
and that there was further disruption to the 10cm AI programme following demands for 
advances on centimetre ASV for ships. The main problem with 10cm AI was that of 
single-aerial working, for the powerful pulse had to be transmitted from the same antenna 
as was use for receiving the very weak return signal. Therefore care had to be taken to 
ensure that the delicate electronic components used for receiving were protected from 
the strong transmitted pulse:
AI is, of course, much more difficult than the other problems in that a single 
mirror must be used both for transmission and reception and the present methods of 
protecting the crystal seem to be inadequate. This is certainly the key problem from 
the AI standpoint.135
134 Burcham (unpubl.), 19/9/40.
135 Dee (unpubl.), 28/10/40.
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On November 6th Dee had discussions with Nash & Thompson about the scanning 
“mirror” designed by Hodgkin. He was under the impression that it would shake itself 
apart. The next day he noted that they had received a Sutton tube, which was to be used 
for dual working. He also noted that he was now in control of 10cm AI specifically, as 
Skinner and Atkinson had been diverted to other projects. November 13th saw him 
viewing Nash & Thompson’s spiral scanner. On 14th Dee recorded that he intended to 
persuade GEC to build a helical-scanner in case the spiral model didn’t work.
There was a general meeting on centimetre work chaired by Rowe on November 
26th. Dee argued for an expansion of basic centimetre research as 10cm AI was being 
completely ignored in order to concentrate work on the Naval and GL projects. It was 
only the visit of Joubert, head of Fighter Command, in December, that restored priority 
to AI.136
However, all was not well with these projects at this time. In an unpublished note 
from 1940 we are treated to a remarkable admission of the unpredictability at this stage 
of the equipment with which they were working:
Robinson... is furious as the Atkinson trailer results cannot even be repeated in his 
trailer. As Atkinson points out every magnetron and local oscillator, ever, have 
different characteristics and there is a tremendous amount of basic work which is 
necessary before even a repeatable experimental equipment can be specified This is 
very upsetting from the AI standpoint since of course airborne operation of equipment 
is more difficult and I fear we must be a long way from having proved if it is not even 
practicable to make a second equipment in AMRE with all the scientific effort 
available. Lewis is even working Robinson’s trailer to show how it can be done but 
Robinson is saying that he will no stay more than a day or two before giving up as a 
bad job.137
This paragraph gets to the heart of two issues that I am exploring in this thesis. Firstly, 
centimetre radar was not a stable, understood entity at the end of 1940, despite six 
months of experimentation and experience with it. Secondly, even when one had been 
successfully tested, replicating the results on another apparatus was not automatic and 
required, in Dee’s words “a tremendous amount of basic work”. This is confirmed by
136 Lovell (1991), p55.
137 Dee (unpubl.), 29/11/40.
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Hodgkin, who describes the third trailer that was equipped in order to set up a project to 
do gunlaying:
The third trailer was equipped a little later in order to demonstrate the potential of 
10cm radar for controlling anti-aircraft guns... [T]he gun-laying application looked 
easier than centimetre AI - no serious weight or size restrictions, no absolute necessity 
to transmit and receive on the same aerial - and so on. But of course the project had 
its own massive difficulties and work in that trailer went on for many months instead 
of a few weeks as had been hoped for originally.138
What these quotes illustrate, is that at the end of 1940 and in to 1941, construction of a 
centimetre radar was only partially realised. Lovell, Batt, Atkinson, and most of the 
other participants give the impression in their biographical accounts that the 1940 work 
produced a successful radar. However, when one examines original accounts written at 
the time, a different picture emerges. The team had had some success in managing to 
produce convincing demonstrations fo r others. They had also learned to produce results 
with their equipment. However, they were not in the position of fully understanding their 
apparatus, and being able to replicate the equipment and the results. The participants 
have reconstructed the uncertain, contingent nature of their apparatus and results of this 
period, into something far more stable than it actually was at the time.139 It required 
nearly a year’s further work before 10cm AI was stable enough to replicate. During this 
period the researchers increased the level of their embodied skill in operating and building 
the equipment. They were able to take this skill and embed it into the production 
apparatus that was produced in mid to late 1942.
4.5.1 AI experiments
Late in the year the experiments commenced on mounting the set into an aeroplane. 
On December 16th Dee recorded that the spiral scanner designed by Hodgkin was fitted 
to a Blenheim aircraft. Joubert (head of Fighter Command) complained of the lack of
138 Hodgkin (1992), ppl69-70.
139 For an account of the reconstructive processes that scientists use to make their apparatus and results 
stable, see Gooding (1990), chi.
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effort going into 10cm AI on 22nd December, and this was when the project really got 
underway again..
Dee went to de Haviland’s on December 30th. They had just had their private 
venture wooden aircraft, the Mosquito, approved, and one of the uses for it was going to 
be as a night-fighter. He also noted problems with the single-working aerial, that mixer 
crystals were being burned out through leakage from the transmitter into the receiver. 
During January and February 1941 experiments were carried out with the two trailer 
systems, and one was chosen from these trials, as Dee recorded.
In March 1941 Dee wrote:
[CJiystals slowly die... Main remaining worries - better crystal protection or 
abandonment of crystal for Vjelocity] M[odulated] mixer. Schedule of units drawn up 
with GEC to permit a crash programme - but many shaky points still.140
The first 10cm AI flight in the Blenheim occurred on 9th March 1941. The fuses in 
the system blew, but there was a very unexpected result from flying the system in the air. 
The display screen also showed a very clear horizon line, which allowed use of the 
system as an artificial horizon. This could be very useful at night as it instantly gave the 
pilots an indication of their attitude in relation to the ground. The next day Dee felt able 
to report that whilst flying with the system they “Saw Battle [aircraft] at 2 1/2 miles for 
[height] of 2 miles, ie OK.” Because of their experience of the ground system, by this 
time they were much more able to clearly link echoes with known physical objects.
In April they were informed by Birmingham that a 50% efficiency of the magnetron 
(ie power in to power out) was possible by using a higher magnetic field strength. A new 
mixer was still required as the old crystal one still gave trouble. On the 2nd April Dee 
noted that GEC were to make 6 AIS units.141
A new mixer was installed in May, and in June Dee wrote “Common 
T[ransmit]/R[ecieve] at last.”142 This was the problem of transmitting and receiving 
through the same aerial without damaging the delicate receiver components by leaking 
the powerful transmitted pulse into the receiver. During this month he also wrote a
140 Dee (unpubl.), Feta/March 1941.
141 Dee (unpubl.), 2/4/41.
142 Dee (unpubl.), June 1941.
175
report on the state of 10cm AI. This document was to become the basis of the 
AMRE/TRE Post Design Service, whereby Establishment personnel were formed into a 
unit which helped the Services adopt the new devices they designed. This service was 
especially useful with H2S.
At the end of June, the Oxford valve laboratory proposed the use of the Sutton 
reflex-klystron valve as a spark-gap in AIS. This was adopted.143 On 20th July it was 
decided that four aircraft would be fitted with experimental sets, and there would be 
eight spares. In October the first strapped magnetron arrived. Work had also started on 
3cm. The strapped magnetrons were much more stable and the GEC crystals were far 
less prone to burning out.
Late in 1941 work on centimetre radar was much more advanced and better 
understood than the previous year. Flight trials were being conducted, and there were 
links between AMRE and companies such as GEC, Nash & Thompson, and EMI. 15 
months on from the initial experiments, centimetre radar was far better understood, and 
there was a small but growing team of men skilled in its building and operation.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have described the work that went into building the first centimetre 
radar. I have told what the reasons for and against investigating this area were, and the 
applications that were envisaged by developing centimetre systems. I have also 
highlighted the aspects of this story that support my analysis in chapter 1. 10cm radar 
was developed through the experimental skill of the researchers. It was a practical 
achievement, rather than a theoretical one. By experimenting with 10cm radar, the 
researchers acquired embodied knowledge about how to successfully build suitable 
equipment. This was acquired by trial and error experimentation, and the process was 
not complete even 18 months after the original experiments.
I hope I have made clear that what they actually had to do was not at all as 
straightforward for the people doing the research as it might appear to them, and us, 
afterwards. There were considerable external pressures from, amongst others, Dee’s
143 Dee (unpubl.), end June 1941.
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“boneheads” (the officials at the Air Ministry), for it to be dropped if nothing in the way 
of results were forthcoming. Therefore, it was very important that the researchers had 
some means of demonstrating that they had made some progress towards their aim. 
They did this by producing a ground-based system that could be used to demonstrate that 
they were able to receive echoes from external objects such as huts, men on bicycles and 
aeroplanes.
I also hope that I have shown that the development of radar was very similar to the 
accounts I have given of the first airborne radar (in chapter 2), and the components used 
in centimetre radar (in chapter 3). It was exploratory, practically oriented work that 
depended to a large part for its success on the interactions between the team members 
and their equipment, and the team members with each other. Continued experimentation 
led to a greater degree of success in learning how to use centimetre radar firstly on the 
ground, and later in the air.
In the next chapter I describe the development of the ffeS ground mapping radar. 
Work commenced in December 1941, and it was built using the components and 
experience gained in building AI. Some of the work was done in parallel. However, as I 
will show, despite the settled and stable nature of the majority of centimetre components 
by this time, H2 S was still a very difficult piece of apparatus to make work. Its eventual 
success depended to some measure on a redefinition of what that success meant in order 
for it to be accepted.
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Chapter 5: H2S Navigation Radar
5.1 Introduction
In the previous three chapters I have explained how microwave radar was developed- 
in Britain. In particular I have concentrated on the aspects of development that were 
related to the embodiment of practical experimental skill of the people doing the work, 
and the embedding of that skill into the apparatus they designed that allowed it to be 
operated by others not equipped with this embodied skill. In this chapter I shall trace the 
political and technical events that led to the development of the H2S radar, and analyse 
these events in relation to the types of skill I outlined in chapter 1, and above. H2S was 
a ground-mapping radar fitted into the four-engined aircraft of Bomber-Command. It 
was used primarily for navigation and target-recognition, and was introduced into service 
in 1943.
I shall begin by describing the political and military climate in 1941. It was this that 
led to an investigation into the whole nature of the British bombing campaign against 
Germany. This investigation was instigated by F.AXindemann, scientific advisor to the 
Prime-Minister, Churchill. During the summer of this year Churchill was involved in a 
struggle in the Cabinet over the allocation of resources to the War Effort. This struggle 
was over the need to address the threat that German U-boats posed to British supply 
routes, and the feeling that the British should be doing something to carry the war to 
Germany at a time when Britain was everywhere on the defensive.
At AMRE, now renamed TRE (Telecommunications Research Establishment; an 
attempt to disguise the nature of their work), staff were developing two bombing aids, 
GEE (for Grid System) and OBOE (Overlay Bombing Over Europe). Work continued 
on these two projects under their respective inventors, RJ.Dippy and AH.Reeves, 
despite at best indifference and at worst hostility to their efforts. When the results of 
Lindemann’s investigation became known, resources were made available for these two 
devices. They were installed into bombing aircraft and used as part of a new strategy in
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Finally I want to show that the inability of the researchers to build a set that 
functioned to the requirement of the Air Ministry and the government led to changes in 
the definition of that requirement, and also to other changes. In other words, instead of 
modifying the apparatus to perform according to the project specifications, the 
specifications were modified to fit with what had been achieved with the apparatus. H2 S 
was supposed to draw a map-like picture of the ground that would enable a navigator to 
fly in conditions of no visibility without recourse to dead-reckoning methods. Often this 
was done by comparison with maps. However, in practice it was found that the H2S 
picture did not correspond to the map images, and so the maps were changed to fit the 
H2S picture. This raises the interesting point that representations, as maps are, do not 
always represent in quite the way that they are thought to.
5.2 Political Background
After the fall of France and the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940, Germany 
began a programme of night-bombing of British cities. The Germans were well able to 
undertake this task because they had developed a number of radio-based aids to 
navigation and target-finding at night (see chapter 6). One of the consequences of this 
action was that the Cabinet were more prepared to give a sympathetic hearing to the 
Bomber Command staff* pushing for more resources to be allocated to a bomber 
offensive against German industrial targets. Despite the primarily defensive stance of 
British thinking at this time, strategic bombing as an offensive weapon was not a new 
idea (see chapter 2). The discussions culminated in a directive from the Vice Chief of Air 
Staff (VC AS) to the C-in-C of Bomber Command, dated 15th January 1941, urging for, 
amongst other things, the destruction of German synthetic oil production.1
Before the RAF made any progress towards meeting this directive there was a 
further change in policy regarding the type of sorties to be undertaken by Bomber
1 Webster and Frankland (1961) vol 4, ppl32-33. Much later on, in October 1944, synthetic oil production 
was again targeted By this time bombing accuracy was greatly improved, and the proposition more 
realistically attainable.
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Command. This arose from a directive of Churchill's made in March 1941, giving 
priority to the Battle of the Atlantic. Shipping losses were rising alarmingly due to the 
German U-Boat campaign (see figure 2.4), and the bombers were now diverted from 
industrial targets to mine-laying in German, and German-occupied, ports, and to 
dockyard bombing. _
In Chapter 2 I mentioned the part Lindemann played in agitating for a solution to 
the British air defence problem. As the war progressed and disaster followed upon 
disaster for British forces, he became convinced that the only means of bringing about 
victory was through bombing German cities. He was also extremely sceptical of the 
rather optimistic claims that returning bomber-crews made regarding the success of their 
missions.2 Being Churchill's Scientific Advisor, he brought his fears up and Churchill 
authorised him to undertake a survey into the accuracy of British bombing. This was 
conducted by taking photographs of where the bombs dropped from British aircraft in 
several raids over July 1941 had fallen.
The results were not impressive. The survey was undertaken by D.M.Butt of the 
War Cabinet Secretariat, who found that only one crew in five bombed within 5 miles of 
the target. The number of crews who dropped their bombs within even half a mile of the 
aiming point was about 5%. As the VCAS had again changed his directive on July 9th 
back to attacking German cities, it was clear that the RAF had to significantly improve 
their accuracy to justify even the present level of expenditure on their bombing 
campaign, let alone expand it to the levels required in Lindemann’s plans.
5.2.1 TRE Involvement
Churchill minuted the Chief of the Air Staff on the strength of Butt's conclusions, 
with the statement that the report "seems to require your most urgent attention."3 The 
most important result of this discussion was that it prompted a Sunday Soviet meeting at
2 See Snow (1961) and Clark (1965) for details.
3 Churchill (1951) vol 4, p250.
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TRE, on 26th October 1941, chaired by Rowe, to discuss the problem of bombing 
accuracy and navigation to and from the target.
According to Rowe4 one of the main reasons why there was no requirement for the 
development of radio aids to navigation and bombing was that there was no appreciation 
of the way bombing operations would have to be carried out prior to the war. Unlike 
Fighter Command, which had had several years benefit of reasonably realistic 
interception exercises, Bomber Command entered 1939 still firmly convinced that 
Bombers would be able to operate in daylight and navigate by dead reckoning. Even had 
the realisation been made that this would not be the case, the difficulties associated with 
locating and accurately bombing well-defended, blacked-out targets many miles away 
would have been difficult to simulate. Bowen also commented, in private 
communication to Lovell, that “Dippy was driven to paranoia about the treatment he 
received on GEE and was still going on about it twenty years later.”5
At this time there were already two devices under development for Bomber 
Command by TRE. They were called GEE and OBOE. GEE's inventor, R. J.Dippy, had 
already spent several years working on his idea without any official encouragement. 
Through Dippy’s perseverance in October 1941 it had reached the production stage. 
The idea behind GEE was simple: three widely-spaced transmitter stations transmitted 
pulses and a device in the aircraft measured the time difference between each out station 
and the centre station. Measuring the time difference between the central station and 
one of the outside stations would locate the aircraft on a hyperbolic curve. By 
comparing the time difference between the centre station and two outside stations, the 
aircraft could be precisely located as it lay on the intersection of the two hyperbolae. As 
an aid to speed up navigation, special GEE maps were produced with hyperbolae marked 
onto them, corresponding to fixed distances from the transmitting stations (see overleaf 
for diagram).6
Unfortunately, in 1941 GEE still suffered from two problems that prevented it from 
being brought into operational use. The first is described by Rowe:
4 Rowe (1948), ppl06-8.
5 Bowen to Lovell, 15/5/87, W.B.Lewis Papers.
6 For a technical description of GEE, see Dippy (1946).
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Figure 5.1: GEE. Two stations, x and y transmit a coded signal The navigator 
in the aircraft measures the distance from each station and places them on a 
parabola. Employing a similar technique, he locates them on another parabola 
from stations y and z. The intersection of the two parabolas is their position.
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[T]here was a grave stumbling-block to the immediate use of GEE [as] there were 
not enough sets. It is commonly supposed that in the 1914-18 war our immediate use 
of the first few available tanks enabled the enemy to prepare for their use on a larger 
scale and to start their manufacture for use against us, thus robbing us of much of their 
value. The timing of the use of a new weapon in relation id ihe quantity available is 
particularly important for radio devices because most of them , in time, can be 
countered by jamming. Bitter arguments on the timing of the use of a new device were 
not infrequent until the war was nearing its end... Certainly it was right, in the 
summer of 1941, to await the production of several hundred GEE sets before using the 
device over enemy territory.7
The other problem with GEE was that, due to the curvature of the Earth, its range 
extended only to some 300 miles. This was enough to target the Ruhr, in the West of 
Germany, but not enough to target towns further East, such as Berlin, which was 800 
miles away. However, GEE offered improvements to long-range navigation as at least 
pilots would be 300 miles further towards their target before having to rely on dead- 
reckoning.8
The other device, OBOE, was much more accurate than GEE, but its use was even 
more limited. Because of these limitations it was never really encouraged, and only 
proved its usefulness by the time it was operational. Rowe described it as "the joker in 
the pack of TRE devices"9. OBOE worked by guiding an aircraft on a circular path 
which passed directly over the target. A second transmitter transmitted a signal in a 
circle whose circumference intersected the path of the aircraft’s circle at the release point 
- thus ensuing very accurate release (within 120 yards of the target). The main problem
7 Rowe (1948), pi 10. This was probably the reason that Dippy suffered “paranoia” over GEE (see footnote 4 
above).
8 Saward (1959), p61. Dead-reckoning required a complicated series of calculations based on the position of 
the aircraft relative to its starting point. This involved calculating its track in relation to its motion in three 
dimensions, this motion being dependent on variables such as wind speed, height, evasive action taken, fuel 
and bomb-load etc. If visual fixes were unobtainable navigation became a very hit-and-miss affair, and 
unless navigators were highly skilled the target could be missed by tens of miles quite easily. Wind speed in 
particular was always a difficulty because accurate forecasting relied on the ability to measure it on the way 
to the target at the time of the raid, something that could not be readily accomplished in wartime.
9 Rowe (1948), pi 12.
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was that only one aircraft could be controlled every 10 minutes, and that its range was 
again only enough to reach the Ruhr. When OBOE was eventually introduced into 
service in December 1942, it was used to mark targets with considerable success, but 
could not be used by individual aircraft (see overleaf for diagram).10
5.2.2 The "Sunday Soviet” of 26/10/41
When, in August 1941, Lindemann was made aware of the contents of Butt’s 
bombing-accuracy report, he immediately agitated for something to be done. 
Lindemann, along with others such as Harris, had long believed in the necessity of having 
a large bomber force. He believed that strategic bombing of cities, thereby destroying 
factories, homes and workers' morale, was the only way to defeat Germany. The other 
major effect this would have on German civilians, that of killing them in large numbers, 
was not openly mentioned. Even if strategic bombing did not bring about direct defeat, 
Lindemann believed it was an essential prelude to victory. However, in 1941 Bomber 
Command was both too small and its methods were too inaccurate to execute such a 
task.11
The current head of Bomber Command argued that Butt's report was too 
pessimistic, but Lindemann insisted to Churchill that even if it was an exaggerated 
picture, things were still bad enough to warrant serious attention. Surprisingly, TRE too 
were unaware of how bad things were. Rowe thought that everyone (excluding those of 
Cabinet rank) were deliberately kept in the dark, probably because if the information 
were made public, it would have been nigh-on impossible to send bomber crews out 
night after night if their missions were shown to be largely pointless.12
Prompted by Lindemann, Churchill minuted the Chief of the Air Staff of the report’s 
findings on September 3rd 1941. Now that the Prime Minister was aware of the
10 Saward (1959), ppl08-14. For a technical description, see Jones, F.E. (1946). Jones was Reeves’ assistant 
at TRE.
11 Saward (1984), pll2.
12 Rowe (1948), pi 15.
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Figure 5.2: OBOE. The first transmitter station x transmits a signal in an arc, 
such that nearer to the station produces a “dots” tone in a receiver, and further 
away produces a “dashes” tone. The signal is calibrated so that when the aircraft 
flies on a particular arc, a continuous tone is hear (dots + dashes). This arc 
passes in such a way that when transmitter y transmits a signal at a 
predetermined point, the bombs are released to fall on target z.
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situation in Bomber Command, Lindemann engineered the appointment of Sir Robert 
Renwick to co-ordinate the production of radio aids for bomber aircraft. Renwick was 
also in charge of the production of four-engined bombers at MAP, so the two 
appointments tied in well.
Rowe called a Sunday Soviet meeting at TRE for 26th October 1941. Precisely 
how it came to be called is not clear, but it was probably pressure from both Lindemann 
and Renwick13 that prompted Rowe to arrange the meeting. Rowe wrote that the 
purpose of the meeting was to discuss ways "to help Bomber Command bomb unseen 
targets.”14
Lindemann was very keen that all of Germany should be within reach of Bomber 
Command, so GEE and OBOE were ruled out of bounds for this particular discussion. 
No minutes were taken of these discussions, so the exact details of what was discussed 
are not known. Writing in 1948, Rowe reported that they:
...discussed the possibility of self-sufficient equipment [that] might enable electric 
power lines to be followed or which might detect towns by virtue of the magnetic field 
associated with the electrical installations... I recall that we went to our homes without 
an idea.15
Lovell, who was later to be in charge of the project, was not present at this meeting. As 
he recalled in 1991:
[I]t was customary for Rowe to summon only the senior scientists who had 
interests related to the subject under discussion. In any event the most significant TRE 
person present on that day was Dee whose diary entry reads only: 'Big v c c e  
meeting/Soviet at TRE on how to locate targets'.16
13 Lovell (1991), p87.
14 Rowe (1948), pi 17.
15 Rowe (1948), pi 16.
16 Lovell (1991), p87.
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That the meeting ended without any ideas is puzzling - as Lovell pointed out: "Although 
the ground return echoes on the metre wave AI systems had been a serious trouble for air 
interception, their potentiality for navigation had been recognised before the war by 
Bowen and his group."17
Bowen and Hanbury-Brown made several flights in early 1939, where they were 
able to navigate by measuring the height above ground using a 1.5m AI set, and then 
compare the readings to the contours on a map.18 Tizard recorded in his diary in early 
1939 that “Bowen and all concerned are very keen on using a form of RDF 2 [AI] as an 
aid to navigation.”19 That these developments were not generally known about by staff 
at TRE was probably due to the absence of Bowen, as "[he] was in the USA and the 
core of the original metre-wave airborne group was dispersed."20 Bowen was not in a 
position to pass on his experience due to his physical absence from TRE.
However, Rowe would probably have been informed by Bowen of the results of his 
and Hanbury-Brown’s test flight. It is odd that Rowe did not mention this at the 
meeting, except that there is evidence for much personal animosity between Rowe and 
Bowen (see chapter 2). What impact this may have had on Rowe's recollection of 
projects is unclear, but it is possible that it may have coloured his judgement of Bowen’s 
results. Lovell recalled in 1991 that Bowen:
...in the winter of 1939... continued his experiments on town identification with 
metre wave equipment in an Anson, but lack of encouragement and the troubles with 
the 1 1/2 metre AI caused these experiments to be abandoned.21
It is highly likely that as Bowen and Rowe’s dispute grew, Rowe ignored anything that 
Bowen did. The residue of this antipathy may well have led him to omit to mention 
Bowen’s results at the meeting on October 26th, 1941. Within the context of the
17 Lovell (1991), p88. See also Chapter 2.
18 Hanbury-Brown (1991), p31.
19 API 136, p21. From Tizard diary, 17/2/39.
20 Lovell (1991), p89.
21 Lovell (1991), p89.
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meeting, the deadlock was broken a few days later, so it did not in the end have a great 
significance.
This episode illustrates that having persons with embodied skill and knowledge 
available to be questioned or consulted was veiy important. I have catalogued some of 
the instances where experience did play a large part in helping a project move forward, in 
chapters 2, 3 and 4. In this case, there was a large possibility that no-one would have 
come up with a solution involving terrain-following. As it happened, this was not the 
outcome - but there may have been other instances where Bowen’s expertise could have 
helped, that have not come to light. The availability of experienced researchers, with 
their associated embodied knowledge, was an important resource for the centimetre 
team.
5.3 The Development of H2 S
5.3.1 The First Town-Detection Experiments
Despite the apparent negative outcome of the meeting on October 26th, just a few 
days later work commenced on a promising project. There are no records of the 
meetings at this time, but Lovell has uncovered some evidence of what happened in his 
research for Echoes o f War.
At this time, the Blenheim (N° V6000) aircraft being used for centimetre AI trials 
was fitted with GEC’s helical scanning system. This system was not producing results as 
good as those obtained with Hodgkin’s spiral scanner system. In correspondence with 
Dr Bernard O’Kane22 whilst writing his book, Lovell uncovered information revealing 
that Dee probably did have prior knowledge of the topic of the Sunday meeting.
22 At this time O'Kane, a member of the GEC research team, was attached to TRE to assist 
with the helical scanner trials. Lovell (1991), p94. This is a good illustration of how 
researchers with embodied skills are used to assist those learning how to use new equipment. 
O’Kane came from GEC, the source of the apparatus.
187
to O’Kane’s diary, on Friday 24th October (i.e. two days before the Sunday Soviet 
meeting of 26th October):
PID [Dee] came over and stopped our flying as the other 10cm people wanted to 
fly and he gave them priority. Actually he had a suggestion which he wanted to 
discuss with us so there were extenuating circumstances. The suggestion involves a 
break in the AISH [helical scanning AI] programme for a week or so ..23
Certainly Dee would have been aware of the progress of the centimetre ASV 
system, which had been undergoing trials since March 1941. This system was based on 
the AI set also under development (see chapter 4). Experiments with centimetre ASV 
showed them that it was possible to detect a submarine conning-tower, and that 
coastlines were also very prominent. Indeed, the detection of coastlines was also a major 
feature of the 1.5m ASV; similarly, as has been mentioned, the whole centimetre AI 
programme was begun because of the limitations of the 1.5m system caused by ground 
returns.
All through 1941 the centimetre teams conducted tests from trailers at Leeson 
House. One of the methods that they used to calibrate their equipment was to fire a 
pulse at, and receive echoes from, the town of Swanage (Leeson House stands at the top 
of a slope, which leads down to Swanage some 5 miles distant). Furthermore, Lovell 
was aware of the way the reflections from Batt on his bicycle (see previous chapter) 
stood out from the ground as early as August 1940, and made careful note of the 
surprise that this was. It must have indicated to him that centimetre waves behaved in a 
particular way in relation to objects and the ground. Perhaps the last word on the 
meeting of 26th should come from O'Kane’s diary, quoted in Lovell’s 1991 book:
Why nothing was said... is a mystery, perhaps Dee feared that the test might be 
forbidden as an unjustifiable delay in the AI programme. Alternatively he might have 
wished to have some evidence of a possible solution before raising any hopes.24
23 Lovell (1991), p92.
24 Lovell (1991), p93.
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Nevertheless, the next day O'Kane and his assistant, Hensby, obtained permission 
from GEC to interrupt the AI test programme, and the AI scanner was modified at the 
TRE workshops on the 28th to rotate at a fixed angle of depression, rather than rotate 
and move in the vertical plane to produce the necessary AI coverage.
At this point it is useful to take stock of what knowledge was available to the team 
about to begin experimenting with town location by centimetre radar. By October 1941 
there was a considerable number of people engaged on research in this area. Whilst the 
behaviour of centimetre waves and the components associated with them was not yet 
fully understood in all its aspects, there did exist a body of practical expertise in building, 
testing and flying centimetric equipment. This indicated that knowledge of airborne 
centimetre radar had not yet become embedded. Researchers with embodied knowledge 
were still required in order to build and use the equipment. This meant it was not in the 
position of being turned into production equipment.
Many of the ideas that would be used in H2S were already in the domain of common 
knowledge to the team. Firstly, the possibilities of using centimetre waves to distinguish 
objects from background clutter was evident from the ASV trials. Secondly, they all had 
expertise in building and flying with centimetre systems, although to different degrees 
and with different areas of specific expertise. Nevertheless, they were no longer novices 
in this respect. In October, the first strapped25 cavity-magnetrons arrived at TRE, 
making the stability, and therefore the ease of operation of the sets, much better. 
Thirdly, the concept of using a rotating scanner and plan-position indicator was already 
established through its operation in GCI, and also in ASV. What was required was the 
insight to put them together. Dee appears to have supplied this, prompted by the 
problems of Bomber Command.
On Saturday November 1st 1941 O'Kane and Hensby made a flight with the 
modified AI system over Southampton and, as Lovell says, "the radar echoes from the
25 Strapping involved soldering wires to the anode block, to connect different cavities together. This 
stopped the frequency of the magnetron oscillating in secondary (harmonic) modes, and altering the 
wavelength of the output.
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town were clearly distinguishable from the ground scatter”.26 Several more flights were 
made over Salisbury Plain and the Bristol Channel, and this time photographs were taken 
of the image on the CRT, a range/azimuth (B-Scope) model (see overleaf for pictures).
The prints were taken to Dee, who immediately showed them to Rowe. Rowe was 
very excited and thought that this was "the turning point of the war".27 The results were 
communicated to Lindemann who immediately pushed for resources to be put into this 
new system. It is interesting to note the very crude nature of the images that these 
photos represented. Despite Rowe’s excitement, there was obviously a lot of work to be 
done before these crude “splodges” could be made into a navigation aid which required a 
high degree of accuracy.
Rowe’s and Lindemann’s reactions were to prove the prologue to the whole story of 
the development and first operational use of what was to become H2 S. Their excitement 
at the possibilities belay the difficult task of actually making it work. Often throughout 
the development of H2 S, the politicians would assume that problems were virtually 
solved when this was far from the case. What the images being obtained from the 
display in the Blenheim V6000 actually represented was not clear cut. Many different 
objects stood out, and:
[t]he crucial question was whether radar responses obtained in separate flights 
were definitely associated with specific ground objects.28
This problem was one that would continue to be associated with the H2 S trials until 
the following October, a year away. It is another instance of one of the general themes I 
set out in chapter 1, that of learning to “see.” In October 1941, building a device to 
transmit and receive centimetre waves was, as I have said, unproblematic. What was 
very problematic was the whole question of the image produced on the screen, and 
whether that image could be tied to objects on the ground to the extent that a person
26 Lovell (1991), p93.
27 Rowe (1948), p i 17.
28 Lovell (1991), p94.
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Figure 5.3: The modified-AI town-finding photographs. These photos of the 
indicator in Blenheim V6000 were taken on 1/11/41, and purport to show 
Avonmouth and Warminster. From Lovell (1991), p93.
190
interpreting those images could relate them to a map, and so navigate "blind”. As 
Saward explained, writing in 1956:
Th[e] picture was not expected to be a replica of either a map or of the detailed 
landscape which the eye normally sees. Rather it would be a series of spots of light of 
varying degrees of brightness which had to be understood, but which would be 
comparable to the map picture and could be correctly interpreted... The representation 
in all cases would correspond to the general shape of the objects seen. In particular, 
the contrast between land and water would be of a high order because land gives an 
appreciable echo whereas water gives back very little signal.29
Saward captured the essence of the problem of producing a useful aid. In the rest of the 
chapter I will show how the researchers had to change their definitions of what was an 
acceptable representation in order to meet the targets set for them by the politicians and 
the RAF.
Lindemann was extremely enthusiastic about the preliminary results obtained at TRE 
and his agitation in government circles based on these results produced immediate 
results. He persuaded the Secretary of State for Air to call a meeting to discuss a policy 
for developing the new device. This meeting was held on 23rd December 1941, and 
brought together several persons representing all those with any interest in the 
development and usage of H2 S. Important amongst these were Lindemann (who was 
now raised to the peerage as Lord Cherwell), Dee from TRE, and various staff members 
of departments and services directly connected with producing or using a new electronic 
device.30
At this meeting, Lindemann raised the issue of whether to develop a device powered 
by the klystron valve. The DGIS (Director General, Intelligence Service) pointed out 
that the magnetron was virtually indestructible, that it wasn't known to the enemy, and if 
captured would assist them in obtaining AI equipment that could be used to counter a 
Bomber offensive. I believe that the DGIS’ assessment was only partially correct, as I
29 Saward (1959), p80. This was written 10 years after the war, at this time the appearance of different 
geographical features on the screen was unknown.
30 A copy of the minutes of this meeting are contained in AVIA 15/1609, paper IB.
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discuss in chapter 7. As a counter to this argument, Lindemann announced that a 
klystron equipped set should give a range of 15-20 miles, which would be satisfactory. 
This was done without any reference TRE staff, who were also present, as to what they 
thought about what was or wasn’t possible. The TRE staff were very experienced with 
using the klystron, and knew what they could achieve with it through their accumulated 
knowledge. This sort of behaviour by Lindemann caused a lot of friction with TRE 
personnel amongst others.
This sort of "interference" by Lindemann is often reported by TRE personnel when 
they write of wartime events. Lindemann had a talent for making enemies. Certainly 
Dee appears to have been annoyed by this remark, as he is minuted as saying that "there 
was no adequate evidence for this figure, so a magnetron would be needed. Also, 
klystrons are not yet available." It likely that previous experience with the 
temperementality of klystrons (see chapter 4) influenced Dee not to recommend that they 
be used in this way.
Discussion then continued on the availability or not of the klystron valve, until 
Lindemann suggested that H2 S should at first be used simply as a "built-up area" finder, 
rather than a navigational device. Dee managed to get the committee to agree that as the 
device was still very experimental, detailed decisions about how best to use the it should 
be left until a later date. After the meeting, the Secretary of State for Air to issued a 
directive that tests be undertaken at TRE to ascertain the limitations of the technique, 
and these tests were performed by O'Kane and Hensby in early 1942. Lovell was given 
overall charge of the H2 S3 1  project at TRE, on January 6th 1942.
The H2S story is very much one of how politicians and scientists interacted. 
O'Kane’s view of how things were at the time is significant, because he believed that they 
were very far from producing anything useful:
31 The name HjS has several origins, depending on who one reads. It is assumed either to have come from 
the formula for hydrogen sulphide, Lindemann purported to having said that the idea "stinks for not having 
been thought of earlier", or from a contraction of Home Sweet Home. At any rate, it replaced the initial 
codename BN (Blind Navigation), which, correctly, was discarded as being too obvious (Batt recalls that he 
guessed the meaning of the codename to be Bomber Navigation, which was not far short of the truth).
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In retrospect, matters must have been pretty desperate for a few range-azimuth 
pictures [figure 5.3] to have sold the system. It needed the eye of faith to interpret 
them and apart from my friend John Dickie of Bomber Command the first "outsider" 
to do so was Don Bennett [Officer I/C the Pathfinder Force, who were the first to use 
HjS operationally] when he came on the scene... We had, I think, one piece of luck.
The CRT we w-’™ using was not very good and not only "bloomed" on large inputs but 
was also astigmatic. The result was therefore not a small bright spot but a large bright 
"sausage". I recall the first PPI being not nearly so easy to interpret.32
As a result, the researchers had what appeared to be very distinct town-like blobs on 
their screen. This meant that the test flights seemed to show that there was a lot of 
promise for the system, and that it was possible to produce a map-like screen for 
navigating purposes. Their faith was unjustified because certain "erroneous'' 
assumptions were made on the basis of these results, as Lovell wrote in 1945:
During the course of these flights the anxieties about flying the magnetron over 
enemy territory were already prominent and in view of the ranges on towns [35 miles] 
given by the equipment in Blenheim V6000 an optimistic assumption was made that 
the lower-powered klystrons could be used. To test this assumption O’Kane and 
Hensby made a flight ‘with the overall sensitivity reduced to correspond with that 
obtainable with a klystron. The results showed that range reduction was not sufficient 
to impair the usefulness of the apparatus' - a conclusion that was soon destined to 
cause trouble.33
There are several important things note about these tests. The adapted AI apparatus 
under test was using a form of scanner and presentation that would not be used in the 
final version - namely range/azimuth as opposed to PPI, with rotating scanner. 
Furthermore, the Blenheim could only fly to 10,000 feet, whereas the operating height of 
the new aircraft for which H2 S was intended was at least 20,000 feet. They were trying 
to draw conclusions by extrapolation from results gained in conditions very different to
32 O'Kane /Lovell Correspondence, O'Kane to Lovell 5/2/93.
33 Lovell (1991), p95. Quotation from TRE Report N°12/106, in Lovell's TRE Record.
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those that were intended for the new device. They believed that altitude would not be a 
problem, and as I will show this was not to be the case.
Another of Lindemann's ideas regarding H2 S was his belief that a simplified scanner 
would allow the device to be pressed into service much quicker. His idea was to 
dispense with the rotating scanner and use a split aerial for location, similar to that used 
in AI Mark IV (see chapter 2). The report that was made by O'Kane and Hensby 
specified that using a fixed split aerial system would be "unlikely to provide successful 
bombing of a specified target", and that "if the use of a klystron were essential the 
efficiency of the split aerial system would be severely impaired as the range obtainable 
even with the magnetron is already near the operational minimum."
The researchers at TRE did not have any hard experimental data that they could use 
to back up their beliefs. What they did have, though, was considerable “know-how” 
about using centimetre devices, and I believe that this embodied experience led them to 
make assumptions about was and what was not possible. They had all been members of 
the team who had tried, and failed, to build a successful klystron-powered AI radar 
eighteen months previously. This experience gave them their “know-how” about 
klystrons and centimetre airborne radar. They certainly had more experience than 
Lindemann, and they knew it. Therefore, they were not prepared to accept his 
interference. Eventually Burcham was given the task of persuading Lindemann that his 
ideas were not wanted at TRE. He did this by taking him up on a demonstration flight. 
It was easy for them to arrange a demonstration where the system did not work very 
well, because that was how it always behaved. This demonstration succeeded, which 
was fortunate as the H2S team were already heavily committed to the scanner system.
5.3.2 The Scanner
Immediately after his appointment on January 6th 1942, Lovell began procurement 
for the design and building of the scanner for the system. As I pointed out in the 
previous section, the team were already thinking of how best to construct such a system
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immediately after the first experiments were conducted in November 1941. The team's 
knowledge of radar-building in both embodied and embedded forms was, as we have 
seen in chapter 4, comprehensive. After nearly eighteen months of experiment and trial, 
most of the practical problems of how to build centimetre AI sets into aeroplanes had 
been solved (see previous chapter). They had the “know-how” to build airborne radar. 
This is not to say that all the components were fully understood in terms of theory, as a 
technical report published as late as October 1942 states:
It should be borne on mind that the theory of these magnetrons is incompletely understood, and 
the mechanism described here is only intended to be a plausible picture of their mode of 
operation.34
However, the important thing is that although neither the magnetron nor the klystron 
were well understood theoretically, in practice the magnetron was far easier to use. 
The team already had magnetron-using “know-how”, and the device was stable-enough 
for them to believe that they were better off using it rather than the klystron.
Just after Christmas 1941, Dee, O'Kane and Hensby went to inspect three new types 
of aircraft just coming into service with Bomber Command, the Halifax, Lancaster and 
Stirling. They decided that the Halifax offered more potential for locating a scanner in 
different parts of the aeroplane. This would allow more variation for the purposes of 
experimenting with the best place to locate the scanner, and chose this type for trials.
At the outset, Lovell and his new team were trying to reproduce the results that they 
had already obtained with the AI equipment and scanner with range/azimuth presentation 
in the Blenheim V6000. Replication, as I have already mentioned in previous chapters, is 
problematic for scientists. When it doesn’t succeed, the replicating scientists have to tiy 
and get the original builders to make explicit the tacit knowledge they have about their 
apparatus’ construction in order to see what, in their opinion, needs altering or adjusting. 
It is made even more problematic whenever parts of the original apparatus are changed 
and modified in the replicated equipment, as the original builder does not have embodied,
34 AVTA26/329.
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recoverable tacit knowledge about these variations.35 However, the team were now 
attempting to do exactly this by using a new scanner and method of presentation, a PPI. 
As Lovell stated:
It seemed obvious to us that, for operational purposes, all-round-looking was 
essential and that the presentation should be on a plan position indicator (PPI) with 
the timebase rotating in synchronism with the scanner so that the navigator was 
effectively presented with a 'map' of the area over which the aircraft was flying.36
That this decision had already been made, was one of the reasons why TRE were so keen 
to 'kill' Lindemann's idea for using a split aerial system similar to that used in metric AI, 
with a simple range/azimuth presentation. Lovell and his team had a better “feel” for 
what they thought would be most usable in practice, because they had radar building 
know-how that Lindemann did not.
The rotating scanner in V6000 limited coverage to +/- 60 degrees due to being 
mounted in the nose of the aircraft (this was perfectly adequate for the forward-looking 
AI). Also, the beam given by the full parabolic-sectional 28" scanner dish had a beam 
width of about 15 degrees. Both these figures were unsuitable for the new type of 
presentation envisaged by Lovell. They needed to alter the shape of the beam in order to 
comply with the requirements of providing a signal for a PPI type of presentation. 
According to Lovell’s 1991 recollection, the reasoning of the team went thus: the width 
of the beam needed to be as narrow as possible, to give the greatest possible definition 
on the sweep. The range of the beam needed to be broad, to give as great a range as 
possible on the sweep. Lastly, the strength of the returned signal should be dependent 
only on the nature of the target and the aircraft's height, and not on the range of the 
target. However, designing a scanner that would produce a beam to meet these 
requirements would not be straightforward because:
35 See Collins (1985), ch 3.
36 Lovell (1991), p99.
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[TJhe Vertical polar diagram' was to be the cause of endless trouble and it was to 
be many a long day before we ceased to worry about this refinement.37
Many of the units for the new device were already stable entities that had embedded 
radar-building skill in them (centimetric AI units), but there were still decisions that they 
had to make concerning the units and components that could have unforeseen effects on 
the experimental results produced. On January 4th 1942 Lovell went to visit Handley- 
Page, the manufacturers of the Halifax aircraft selected for trials. The immediate 
reaction of the designer, Handley-Page, was not favourable. Lovell’s proposal was to 
mount the scanner to the rear underside of the fuselage, instead of a gun-turret, which 
Handley-Page felt would significantly impair the aircraft's performance. Lovell's 
response was to tell him that it was far better that fewer bombs be carried if they were 
actually placed on their target, a view in keeping with the atmosphere in the Cabinet.
Action was certainly swift, for on 6th January Rowe wrote to the Director of 
Communications Development (DCD), Renwick, requesting that he place contracts with 
Metropolitan-Vickers for the development and construction of two electrical scanning 
assemblies, with Nash & Thompson for two hydraulic scanning assemblies, and with 
Handley-Page for two perspex cupolas. Rowe stated that he would "endeavour to 
supply complete specifications of the[se] items... a.s.a.p."38 The first cupola-equipped 
Halifax arrived at the TRE airfield on 28th March 1942.
5.4 Political Pressures
This first aircraft dedicated to the H2S project arrived three months after the go- 
ahead was given. Although a long period, given the complex nature of the project, and 
the time at which it was undertaken, this time-scale was actually quite a remarkable 
achievement. It was due to the intense political pressure that Churchill put behind the 
project, at the behest of Lindemann. H2S differed from previous projects both in this
37 Lovell (1991), plOO.
38 AVIA15/1609, 2A.
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respect, and also in the way that it was developed. Significantly, a major manufacturer, 
EMI, was involved from the beginning . This was not the case with many other TRE 
projects with the exception perhaps of GEC and centimetre AI. Also, the level of liaison 
between TRE and Bomber Command, and the Air Force in general, was increasing 
significantly compared to that over the introduction of earlier devices. The introduction 
of new methods such as Operational Research, where service personnel evaluated proto­
type equipment, came into the forefront of military thinking at this time. This led to 
experienced aircrew being involved in the development of new devices from their 
inception. It had the positive effect of giving a significant input into thoughts about the 
actual usage of the device. There were considerable difficulties with getting less 
technically-adept people to use the prototypes of 1.5m AI (see chapter 2), and this 
experience changed the attitudes of the researchers. Political pressure was certainly 
useful in that it enabled Lovell’s team to get speedy access to resources. Unfortunately, 
no amount of political will could enable them to speed up the progress of their research. 
On the contrary, it often meant that they were unable to undertake the level of 
investigation that they would have liked which in the long run led them to the 
lengthening of timescales as they rectified problems not properly solved earlier.
The background to this pressure arose from Lindemann's enthusiasm for using a 
strategy of area bombing, if its accuracy could be increased. Early in 1942 he sent a 
memorandum to Churchill in which he stated that Bomber Command could "de-house" 
(a euphemistic term covering the policy of area bombing) the majority of German 
workers in the largest German cities, if the devices under development lived up to their 
expectations.
There is no doubt that there was backing for H2S from the highest level. Through 
his association with Churchill, Lindemann was able to exert considerable influence to 
prioritise the H2S project above. Lindemann’s influence, and the associated pressure 
produced an ambivalent attitude towards him from those with whom he was associated. 
On the one hand, the pressure was difficult to cope with, but on the other it enabled 
obstructions to be dealt with speedily. For example, when Lovell described in 1991 his
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visit to Handley-Page in 1942, he attributed the reason the Halifax was allocated and 
modified so quickly to Lindemann’s influence:
This was the first of many occasions on which no action would have been taken 
had not the Prime Minister been urged by [Lindemann] to give the highest priority to 
H2 S. [Lindemann] promised us there would be no delay and there was none.39
Similarly, in conversation with me Lovell described how this priority was exercised in 
practice through the man in charge of Communications in both the Air Ministry and the 
Ministry of Aircraft Production, Sir Robert Renwick:
[Renwick] was given overriding priority, and he would phone me every day. If 
there was any problem, he would get his winger [sic] to do it, and if he couldn't he 
would just pick up the phone and speak to the Prime-minister. It was just like that.
The priority was colossal.40
Renwick made an impression on others apart from Lovell. Wing Commander 
Dudley Saward was appointed to a post at Bomber Command Headquarters in 
December 1941, as head of a newly created RDF (radar) department. Initially appointed 
to deal with the introduction of GEE, he soon became involved with H2 S, and through 
that, with Renwick. He often had cause to deal direct with him, and in doing so use 
Renwick's influence to get jobs done. As he described him in 1959, Renwick was "A 
marvellous man... the best invention that's ever been installed at Whitehall."41
Unfortunately there was a downside to the H2 S programme from all this official 
interest. Lindemann was pressuring for the operational use of H2 S by July 1942, a date 
far too soon considering that AI, under development for two years, still wasn’t in 
service.. According to Rowe, there was "a danger that H2 S would suffer from too much 
limelight and too much haste."42 The problem was that Lindemann preferred to see any
39 Lovell (1991), plOO.
40 Interview between Lovell and the author, 1/12/92.
41 Saward (1959), p74.
42 Rowe (1948), pi 17.
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equipment used as soon as possible, never mind how good it was. The team at TRE 
believed differently. They felt they needed time to conduct experiments and try out the 
techniques to enable all the necessary experience to be gathered. This would do two 
things. Firstly, they would embed all their radar-building skill into the equipment, which 
would a llo w  it to be manufactured easily. Secondly, by doing this, the device would be 
reliable, stable, and simple enough to use to enable a relatively unskilled, non-scientist 
operator to use it. This was very important, as they learned with 1.5m AI and as I 
discuss in chapter 2. Lovell wrote in 1991 that in April 1942:
I did not know of the acute political pressures that had recently developed and 
which were to inhibit the appropriate research investigation of how to obtain a 
satisfactory H2 S picture in a high-flying bomber aircraft.43
This view is confirmed in interview, where Lovell said that "there was just no time to do 
experiments, particularly on the scanner problem." What was important was that Lovell 
and his team had to go out and actually do experiments; they couldn’t wave a wand and 
make the system work without going through the stages of learning by doing that 
characterised all the other research they’d done on centimetre applications, and they 
were well aware of this. However, it was a different matter explaining this to people of 
Lindemann’s and Churchill’s rank.
On the more positive side, the formation of Bomber Command's RDF unit under 
Saward had a beneficial aspect. It meant that right from the beginning representatives of 
the user had an influence in the design of the new device. In the past the scientific 
researchers had more or less presented a device to the RAF and expected them to get on 
with it. Hanbury-Brown experienced considerable difficulties doing this (see chapter 2) 
with 1.5m AI. The new approach was to prove important in the flight-trials stage.
The important thing to draw from the way in which this particular device evolved, 
there were pressures operating quite explicitly from "beyond the laboratory". This 
situation often pertains, as recent work exploding the myth of “pure” science shows,44
43 Lovell (1991), plOl.
44 See, for example, Gooding’s discussion of Morpurgo’s quark experiments. Gooding (1992).
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but in wartime the pressure to bring about closure is much greater. We have seen that 
this pressure led to decisions being taken as to when a device was "fixed", or well 
enough understood to be put into operation45, at a time in advance of that thought 
apposite by the people involved in creating it.
5.5 Airborne Trials
5.5.1 The Magnetron/Klystron Dispute - Round 1
At the Secretary of State’s meeting on 23 rd December 1941 the issue of whether to 
include the magnetron in plans for H2 S development was first raised. The committee 
were worried that the magnetron would prove hard to destroy, or would be captured by 
accident if a self-destruct device failed. This particular issue is important to this thesis, 
as I am trying to establish whether the Germans could have learned anything about 
British centimetre radar from only acquiring a captured magnetron. Collins would argue 
that this would not be the case, as radar-building knowledge could only be transferred 
through skilled people 46 In his view, the British would only have to worry if the 
Germans captured one of their scientists. There is some evidence that this was already 
accepted wisdom in the rush by the Americans to recruit German scientists at the end of 
the War. However, as I show in chapter 7, this is not my view.
When the decision was made about whether to use the magnetron, it had already 
had been the heart of several types of radar for over a year. One of these radars (the 
Type 271 Naval set) was already in service by the end of 1941. The others were the 
airborne AI and ASV, and the ground-based GL3 and GCI sets.
45 The scientists’ view that they were always being pressurised by officials contrasts nicely to Don Bennett’s 
view of how scientists behaved: “[Scientists] tend to have preconceived ideas and they then set out to prove 
these ideas regardless of whether they were right or wrong. There is no doubt that when a scientist is 
determined to prove something, it is very difficult to prevent him.” Bennett (1955), pl92. Here Bennett 
made explicit the frustration of the lay-person who doesn’t have the appeal to authority that a scientist has 
when defending their position.
46 Collins (1985).
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Using magnetrons in the radars mentioned above was not at odds with this 
philosophy because of the use to which they were put. The AI and ASV sets would 
either be used in home airspace, or over the sea, so an aircraft loss would not result in 
capture of a magnetron, which had proved remarkably difficult to destroy. Explosive 
devices usually destroyed more of the aircraft than the magnetron. The copper anode 
block was difficult to hide, and British experts unfamiliar with it were able to reproduce 
it when presented with the fragments.
The Type 271 was only used at sea, which meant that the chances would be that any 
magnetron would sink if the vessel it was in was abandoned or hit. The GL and GCI 
systems were used only within the UK. However, H2S was essentially an offensive 
system: usage would entail flights over enemy territory and the consequent risk of an 
aircraft being shot down and the capture of any secret equipment it carried. The 
committee realised this immediately, so they discussed the possibilities of using a 
klystron as transmitter valve instead. They considered this valve to be already within the 
general public domain, as details of it had already been published (see chapter 3) 47
In 1942 the Germans had shown no sign of possessing centimetre radar. British 
monitoring of enemy transmissions revealed no signals on these wavelengths, because of 
this, some people were cautious to the point of querying the usage of centimetre 
transmissions at all, as they believed that it would alert the Germans to the possibilities 
inherent in this area. However, more influential people (such as Tizard) believed that it 
was better to use the advantage whilst they possessed it, as the Germans may well have 
been close to success with their own systems and about to use them against the Allies.48
By the beginning of 1942, the TRE personnel were all convinced that using the 
magnetron was the only option for making the system a reality. In 1948 Rowe had this 
to say on the issue of magnetron capture:
47 The Germans did indeed have full knowledge of the klystron valve, but were mistrustful of it - perhaps not 
surprisingly given British experience with it as a transmitter valve..
48 This attitude was absent in the case of Window, the anti-radar jamming method Both sides discovered 
that it was possible to blot out radar by dropping strips of foil cut to an appropriate length, a fraction of the 
radar's wavelengths. Although both sides possessed this knowledge by early 1941, the British were the first 
to use it in 1943. Its use had been delayed until then by both sides for fear of provoking the other side into 
crippling retaliation. Both sides had grown very reliant on their radar devices. However, by 1943 pressure 
to use a method that could help reduce extremely heavy bomber-losses was irresistible.
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[W]e urged the use of the magnetron, arguing that it would take two years from the date of 
capture to use H2 S against us on a useful scale.49
It is quite probable that Rowe’s recollection of his earlier views owes a great deal to 
hindsight, as this was almost exactly the amount of time it took the Germans to build 
prototype centimetre airborne radars, as oppose to reconstruct them, as I relate in 
chapter 7.
The lack of a decision as to whether to use a magnetron or a klystron at the 
December 23rd meeting had several effects. The official policy, according to Lovell, at 
this time was to use a klystron as transmitter. To this end, EMI (who were already main 
contractors for the centimetre AI) were asked to produce fifty H2 S sets. Representatives 
from EMI met with the Secretary of State for Air on January 13th 1942. At this meeting 
they discussed the difficulties of H2 S manufacture. After the klystron/magnetron 
situation was described to Schoenberg, the head of EMI, he ventured that it would take 
3-6 months to develop a klystron to give enough power plus another 4-6 months to tool 
up for volume manufacture, even if lower priority were given to AI which was already 
using up all of EMI’s production capacity. They decided to develop magnetron and 
klystron equipments simultaneously; TRE would develop the magnetron equipment and 
EMI the klystron. Schoenberg asked permission to see Dee's equipment at TRE. This 
was significant for two reasons. Firstly, that someone as high up as Schoenberg would 
have to get this sort of permission highlighted the secrecy surrounding the project. 
Secondly, a face to face meeting would allow Dee to give Schoenberg some insight into 
the sort of tacit knowledge he would need to acquire for his firm. This would 
undoubtedly make their job of manufacturing easier, and Dee already believed in this sort 
of co-operation as I related in the previous chapter.50
Unfortunately, klystrons and magnetrons were not interchangeable, as the skilled 
experimenters knew. Any change in one part of the apparatus would mean a series of
49 Rowe (1948), pi 18.
50 AVIA15/1609,14A
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“knock-on” changes throughout. The difficulties that this situation produced were 
related by Lovell:
[I]f it had only been a matter of re-designing the AI mark VII units using the 
magnetron or developing the additional electronic and control units required for the 
specific H2 S application, the task of manufacturing 50 complete units would not have 
been a difficult matter for a firm with the great experience of EMI. However... this 
was not the case. The official directive to ourselves and EMI was that the klystron 
should be used as the transmitter, and - quite apart from the problem of producing a 
klystron with adequate pulsed power - this naturally reacted throughout the entire 
electronic system.51
The problems that this was likely to cause were noted in other quarters too. The 
meeting of the H2 S committee on January 13th initiated further results, as a memo of 
16th January from Rowe to the DCD at MAP reveals. Rowe had already had 
discussions with Alan Blumlein, EMI’s chief circuit designer, about obtaining assistance 
with H2 S. Rowe wrote that there was no specific TRE apparatus, so it would be 
difficult for EMI to build a prototype. However, he suggested that EMI could construct 
some units, as these would approximate to what was needed. They would also speed up 
production as EMI would then have experience of building the units, and a design 
already in place. Rowe related to Blumlein that a comparison of a klystron (9Pk2) from 
Bristol, tested in a system on the ground, with the results from the low power air tests 
indicated that the 9Pk2 would work. The Signal School at Bristol could supply 
experimental klystrons, so EMI would construct klystron units, and TRE the magnetron 
units. He therefore recommended that DCD should place a contract with EMI to 
produce TRE-designed airborne trials units. However, he noted the need for research on 
designing a modulator to drive the 9Pk2 klystron.52
One of the major decisions that the team had to make about the equipment was what 
shape of scanner would produce the ideal polar diagram for H2 S. There were two issues
51 Lovell (1991), pl07.
52 AVLA15/1609, I6X.
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here: firstly, what was the sort of polar diagram required, and secondly, when that was 
worked out, how to produce it from a suitably shaped scanner. The difficulty that they 
had, was that they were still unsure of what shape of beam they required. The only way 
they could determine what they required, was by going out and performing experiments 
to see. However, the shape of scanner that they used would determine the shape of the 
beam they got, and hence what sort of image they produced. If they got the shape of the 
scanner right, they would get the correct shape of beam, but as they did not know what 
shape of beam they required it made it veiy hard to produce the right shape of scanner 
from the outset. They had to decide on a shape, and see if it worked in practice.
There is a considerable amount of evidence that, as I have indicated with the cavity 
magnetron, the theory of how to design a scanner to produce the correct beam shape 
was incompletely understood. Even if it had been possible to calculate theoretically the 
correct shape required, as the scanners were hand-beaten, and there was no guarantee 
that they could be manufactured to fit the theoretical design. In practice, the best shape 
for the scanner was found by trial and error experimentation. Lovell had an idea about 
the best shape to make the scanner, but he did not yet know whether that design would 
work. The team had to go through a process of refining their apparatus and design 
similar to how they had worked on the 1.5m AI and centimetre AI systems previously.53 
Lovell's initial reasoning went like this:
In our first effort to achieve an appropriate beam shape with a scanner size which 
we felt could be reasonably fixed underneath the fuselage of the bomber, we decided to 
try a section of paraboloid 36 inches in aperture and 18 inches deep. The overall 
aperture would be close to that of the 28 inch paraboloid carried in Blenheim V6000, 
and hence the sensitivity should be the same. The greater diameter would give a 
somewhat improved resolution and we hoped that the 18 inch slice of the paraboloid 
would give an approximation to the beam shape required in the vertical direction.54
53 This process is described by Gooding in relation to Morpurgo’s refinement of his quark experiment. See 
Gooding (1992).
54 Lovell (1991), plOO.
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Lovell had worked with centimetre scanners since October 1939. He had gathered two 
and a half years of experience of how to design scanners for centimetre radar sets. 
However, his use of the word “hoped” is significant. The quote illustrates that Lovell 
was able to use his considerable experience to go in what he believed would be the right 
direction for building a scanner to do what he wanted. Nevertheless, his experience with 
scanners so far also indicated that it was highly unlikely that he would get exactly what 
he required first time. An apparatus would often behave in unexpected ways the first 
time it was used. Often it failed to work at all, as I have recounted with many of the 
apparatuses and components I have already described, but sometimes there were 
unexpected bonuses from this unpredictable behaviour. A good example of a benign 
unforeseen occurrence was with Hodgkin’s spiral scanning AI display. The first time he 
operated it in the air, he found that the screen showed the ground-retum from the 
centimetre beam as a horizontal line, parallel to the ground whatever the aircraft’s 
attitude. This meant that centimetre AI could also be used as an artificial horizon as well 
as a means of detecting other aircraft.
The other major decisions they had to make referred to how to synchronise the 
rotating timebase of the PPI with the rotation of the scanner, and at what speed to rotate 
the scanner. They determined these variables by factors such as the pulsewidth, pulse 
repetition frequency, maximum range required and maximum power available. 
Eventually they settled upon 80 rpm as “reasonable”.55 Still unsure as to which would 
be the more suitable type of power for the scanner, Lovell ordered both electrically and 
hydraulically powered prototypes. Both sorts had been tested for AI, and it seemed wise 
to Lovell to try out both types for H2S also. After settling all these design variables, they 
completed prototype units for the system ready. The units were tested briefly on the 
ground, to ensure they were wired up properly and produced the correct output. 
However, it was only in the air that they could be properly tested, so the next stage was 
to install them in an aircraft and commence flight-trials.
55 Lovell (1991), plOl.
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5.5.2 The First Flights.
After Halifax No. V9977 was delivered on 27th March, Lovell and his team fitted it 
with their experimental H2 S equipment in order to commence flight trials. These 
airborne trials were really essential, for it was only when the equipment was airborne that 
the team would have any idea how well the ground would be represented on the screen, 
and at what heights these representations would break down. Previous experience with 
AI had shown them that they could take nothing for granted about how radar would 
behave in the air (see chapters 2 and 4).
V9977 was equipped with a prototype magnetron-powered system This was 
designed and built by TRE using units from AI mark VII, with modifications to the 
display electronics that were necessary to produce a PPI picture rather then the 
range/azimuth display of the AI system. It also had a hydraulic-powered scanner built by 
Nash & Thompson. A second aircraft, Halifax No. R9490, arrived on April 12th and 
was fitted with the EMI-designed klystron system, and the Metropolitan Vickers 
electrically operated scanner. Thus they now had two aircraft fitted with the all the 
different sorts of equipment which they wished to trial.
According to Lovell, the aircraft was completely fitted with all the units by the 
evening of April 16th. However, it would not work at all immediately. They found that 
the 80 volt alternator that supplied the power for the electrical devices was initially 
inoperative, and so replaced it with a new unit. On the following morning, with this 
problem rectified, the equipment was first flown and tried. It was not an immediate 
success as Lovell recalled writing in 1991:
The equipment worked but very poorly. At 8000 feet altitude the range on towns 
was only four to five miles and the gaps and fades in the PPI picture implied that there 
must be something horribly wrong with the polar diagram of the scanner.56
56 Lovell (1991), pl03.
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This level of performance was far below that which they had already achieved with the 
modified AI system in the Blenheim. That the equipment failed to work on its first flight 
was unsurprising to the team, who were well used to having to redesign and modify 
equipment when it was first installed in aircraft. Unfortunately for Lovell, the first flight 
of this experimental system was also chosen as the flight when several important people 
from Whitehall were to have the system sho wn to them:
My brief diary note typifies the scene in which we were to work for many months:
... we had DC AS [Deputy Chief of Air Staff], DOR [Director of Operational Research], D of R 
[Director of Radar], DD of Ops [Deputy Director of Operations] and various others down on the 
HjS. Halifax rushed to be ready for them. Flew OK but too many loose ends to demonstrate 
properly.
The assembly of such high-ranking officers to witness the first airborne tests of an experimental 
system may seem remarkable. On that April morning it certainly seemed so to me and my diary 
entry records my irritation with Dee whom I thought should have had the scientific sense and 
power to prevent this.57
Lovell was understandably annoyed that he was asked to demonstrate something that 
had only just been installed and was still in a very tentative state. He knew after much 
experience with scientific work in general and radar work in particular that getting any 
apparatus to work first time is a very rare occurrence. The scientist has to spend time 
getting to “know” his equipment by adjusting it and operating it to narrow down areas 
that he doesn’t understand. This involves him building up a reserve of “know how” 
about its quirks.5** Furthermore, by using the term “test” Lovell is actually referring to a 
trial as opposed to a demonstration. Demonstrations, such as the Batt bicycle ride (see 
previous chapter) were performed when the equipment and techniques were more stable 
and easily reproducible, by the skilled personnel. The H2S equipment was very definitely 
not at this stage when Lovell was required to show it to the visitors.
57 Lovell (1991), pl03.
5** This know-how is embodied, tacit knowledge of the form first outlined by Polanyi (1959). However, a 
scientist would not refer to it as such.
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The main problem with the H2S set as it was then, was that the picture that was 
shown on the screen was very little use. It had gaps and fades in the image that made 
correlation of what was shown on the screen to what was on the ground, or on a map of 
the ground, next to impossible. The scientists possessed the knowledge, in the practical 
sense, to build 10cm electronic units that actually worked. Therefore their inability to 
produce the required result lay with the scanner, which was the only new and untested 
piece of equipment. This is borne out in Lovell's TRE Record, a personal scrap-book of 
his part in the development of H2S, where he described the polar diagram difficulties of 
the scanner as "probably caus[ing] more than 75% of all H2S difficulties."59
An account of the development work carried out on the scanner is given in a TRE 
Report of March 1943. I shall relate what it says here, although some of the experiments 
recounted leap a little ahead of the story (see overleaf for illustration). Lovell’s team 
performed initial experimentation by mounting the aerial on a trailer. A metal plate was 
mounted above the scanner to represent the fuselage, and they made measurements of 
the polar diagram from the scanner. At this stage the results they achieved were 
promising, as the shape of the polar diagram was close to that which they believed to be 
necessary for producing a good picture (see above). However, when the scanner was 
mounted in an aircraft and flown, the results they obtained were very poor and not at all 
what they expected. They conducted initial tests of the set-up at a flying height of 10000 
feet, and found a gap in the display at a range of 9 miles. The testers decided to modify 
the scanner by adding a wedge to the inside of the mirror. They made the decision to do 
this for two reasons. Firstly, they didn’t have time to have another scanner made. 
Secondly, their experience with working with AI scanners led them to try this method. 
They reasoned that the plate would focus part of the beam to go in the direction they 
wanted (see overleaf for scanner modification).
Unfortunately this modification didn't work either - it set up side lobes to the main 
beam which produced interference at lower altitudes. The modification also led the 
testers to believe that the fuselage might be having an effect on the poor picture. When 
they tested it, another gap appearing in the direction of flight - a major problem, as the
59 Lovell TRE Record, p5.
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Figure 5.4 The experimental H2S scanner. Diagram shows the waveguide feed, 
and the paraboloid dimensions. It was made from a cut-down 36” paraboloid.
Figure 5.5, 5.5a. The H2S scanner modification. Diagram, and photograph, 
showing the bar added to try and cure the gap and fade problem. Photograph 
from Lovell (1991), p!74.
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aircraft flies towards a target. A gap in the direction of flight made the target built-up 
area disappear from the screen. The plate moved the fade from 4-5 mile range to 12-15 
mile range, but never eliminated it from this scanner.
During a later flight where they followed an image of Sharpness Bridge from a range 
of 35 miles to zero gave a fade between 13 and 9 miles range. The testers thought that it 
might be the fuselage that was causing the interference. However, a subsequent run with 
the bomb doors (which were ahead of the scanner cupola) open, still had a fade in the 
same place. To try and combat this effect they added a plywood bar in front of the 
scanner. This further example of trial and error modification unfortunately also had no 
effect. It was symptomatic of Lovell’s assertion that they were constantly under political 
pressure to get the system working, without being able to conduct a satisfactory number 
of tests.
By the time of these later experiments H2S had already been rushed into service, due 
to the intense political pressure described earlier. This report is dated 16th March 1943, 
two months after the first operational use of H2S, and yet there were still unresolved 
problems which made its operation very difficult for all but the most skilled operators:60
A fundamental problem of HjS is the general ground return [this caused a bright 
area in the centre of the display which obliterated any detail at short ranges]. With 
maximum gain this can be seen out to 12 miles with the present aerial system. This 
distance seems to be the same for 10000 feet and 20000 feet. By reducing the receiver 
gain this ground return can be suppressed to allow a built up area to stand out by itself 
on the tube to within about 4 miles (ground range) of the aircraft position. Contact 
can be got right in to 2.5 miles ground range but with greater difficulty. If these last 
few miles could be made more presentable, HjS operation could be made much easier 
for service navigators. It is hoped that by a combination of polar diagram
60 HjS was originally fitted to pathfinder aircraft. The pathfinder idea was first tried in the middle of 1942. 
Highly experienced crews with proven excellence in bombing accuracy were creamed off into separate 
Squadrons and trained to drop flares and other markers, that the less skilled crews who followed them could 
aim at. As such, they were already highly skilled at conventional navigation techniques, and so H2S was 
originally used by them either to augment their other navigational means, or when conditions were 
completely unconducive to ordinary navigation (such as 10/10ths cloud). The pathfinder operators were 
therefore likely to be the calibre of men who would quickly learn the necessary interpretative skills to utilise 
the new method effectively, something that was not always the case with other more average men.
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measurements and measurements in flight the intensity of the ground return between 
0-4 miles can be the same as what is now from 4-12 miles.61
In 1942 the TRE men had experience of introducing new equipment into service. One of 
the more common problems they encountered was training operators to interpret the 
images on the screens. After the first difficulties with AI Marks 1-IV, the researchers 
gave careful thought to the design of the display. In the case of H2 S, service navigators 
from the Bomber Development Unit were involved with the TRE scientists from the 
beginning. Their contribution, as non-scientist representatives of the men who would 
actually operate the equipment, was to suggest modifications that would simplify the 
equipment’s operation. Sometimes the researchers could not produce the changes 
requested by the BDU men. This was the case here, and interpretation of the 
information was always a problem until much later, after H2S had been in operation for 
over a year. I shall show some pictures of typical displays and discuss the implications of 
the images presently.
At the same time (April 1942) that TRE conducted the first magnetron flights in 
V9977, the team at EMI were constructing their klystron version at their works. 
Bernard O’Kane, now assigned to TRE, was able to liaise with EMI over problems with 
H2 S. The EMI team was headed by Alan Blumlein, who had been a pioneer of the first 
commercially available television sets, and was "regarded as one of the best electronic 
engineers in the country".62 They brought their klystron version of H2 S to TRE on May 
14th, where it was fitted into the other Halifax R9490.
The first test flights of H2 S were not a great success. Despite Saward and his 
assistant Flight Lieutenant John Dickie being enthusiasts for the project, according to 
Lovell:
[Saye, Saward’s Superior] complained bitterly about the 'snowstorm' which is all 
he claimed to have seen on the PPI and his letter of complaint to the Air Ministry was
61 AVIA26/482.
62 Lovell (1991), pl07.
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responsible for a meeting summoned by the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS) 
on May 19th.63
This is clear evidence that it took someone skilled in operating H2 S to make any sense of 
the image on the scanner. The current version of the H2 S prototype was not suitable for 
demonstrating to sceptical senior RAF officers what the potential of the system was. 
This meeting cannot have been very supportive of H2 S, as O’Kane recalls it thus:
In my diaiy I have a note of a meeting (as you [Lovell] were present you no doubt 
have it too) at which Bomber Command said the system was operationally 
unacceptable. By that time EMI were well down the road.64
Bomber Command may well have been unsatisfied, but the continued pressure from the 
Cabinet ensured that the momentum of the project was maintained.
At this meeting the operational parameters of H2 S were redefined. This appears to 
have been an attempt to “save-face” on the project, as it clearly was not performing as 
well as the concept that had been “sold” to the Air Ministry, the changes to the 
specification were:
2 (a) That the system should be accurate enough to
guarantee that bombs should fall within an 
industrial or other selected area as target.
(b) That the Air Staff would be satisfied in 
the first instance if the range of the device 
enabled the aircraft to home on a built up 
area from 15 miles at 15000 feet.
3 Subject to there being no delay or interference 
with the development of the equipment and its 
introduction into the Service in a form which will 
fulfil this aim, it was agreed that details in
63 Lovell (1991), pl08.
64 OTCane/Lovell Correspondence, O'Kane to Lovell, 5/2/93.
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design to enable it to be used as a navigational aid 
to determine a specific area or target could be 
incorporated during later stages of development and 
operational trial.65
Although this directive offered hope, as it now called for a system with less stringent 
performance characteristics, just four days later Lovell was to write:
[F]lew in the Halifax. Very depressing, picture is extremely bad at the moment.66
As if this wasn't bad enough, when the klystron version was first airborne on June 2nd, 
that too suffered from "gaps, fades and poor range."67
By June 1942, after six months of development, the device on which Bomber 
Command was pinning its hopes was in very poor shape:
(i) The power source preferred by TRE was the magnetron, but the Cabinet would not 
sanction it to be used.
(ii) The klystron-equipped prototype performed very poorly, having too little power to 
give sufficient range.
(iii) The magnetron-equipped version performed just as poorly.
(iv) The image on the screen suffered from gaps and fades, and could not be interpreted 
well even by the original scientists, let alone RAF service navigators.
(v) Ad-hoc modifications to the scanner were not improving the picture produced.
The only positive thing for the team was that the specification of the apparatus that they 
had to produce had been weakened.
The performance of H2S was far from spectacular. The scientists, engineers and 
BDU staff who flew with it every day found it difficult to use, and in some cases useless.
65 Lovell TRE Record, p5.
66 Lovell (1991), pl08.
67 Lovell (1991), pl08.
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They had not yet produced a device which they could operate, and because of this they 
were unable to demonstrate it to superiors. They were also under constant pressure to 
deliver from Lindemann and members of the Cabinet. The prognosis for H2S was not 
promising.
5.6 To Operational Use
5.6.1 The Move to Malvern and the Loss of V9977
In early 1942, after an alert Photographic Interpreter noticed a strange “bowl” on a 
reconnaissance photograph, the British launched a Commando raid against a German 
radar equipment located on the coast of France. It resulted in the successful capture of 
pieces of the set, a Wurzburg (see chapter 6 for details of German radar equipment). 
The British did not know what to expect of the equipment, but were naturally very 
interested to see whether the Germans had matched their advances in the field of 
centimetre waves. Their monitoring of frequencies had hitherto revealed nothing in the 
10cm waveband, or below. TRE staff evaluated the equipment by dismantling the pieces 
recovered. Amongst other things, they learned that German equipment was well 
manufactured, but that this particular set worked on 80cm, and was not considered more 
technically advanced than equivalent British equipment. For the date of its inception 
(1938) it was superior to the contemporary British set, Chain Home.
The raid also sparked off a fear that TRE, located on the coast, could suffer a 
reprisal raid. As a consequence moves were made to relocate TRE to somewhere safer. 
Malvern College School was chosen, as it offered the necessary accommodation, and 
was located in the English Midlands, as far away from the coast as it was possible to get. 
The whole establishment moved their during the last week of May 1942.68
68 The Germans, well aware of the existence of Swanage due to the large Chain Home masts on the site, 
simply couldn't believe that the British would be so stupid as to put their top secret radar establishment in so 
accessible a place, and hence left it alone. Pritchard (1989), ch 2.
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During May further experimentation with the magnetron system, involving changes 
to the feed, were beginning to yield slightly better results in terms of the image produced 
on the scanner. Overall, though, both systems were still very poor. It is important to 
note that the TRE scientists believed that the problems with the magnetron system were 
soluble, as they had already achieved ranges of 35 miles with the magnetron-equipped 
modified AI. This meant that they kept faith with their apparatus rather than giving up, 
although, as O’Kane revealed, they subsequently discovered that the Al-set results were 
the result of CRT deficiencies rather than being good representations of the ground. By 
contrast they were not at all convinced about the klystron:
Although the klystron in the EMI prototype was capable of producing a peak 
power of 5 to 10 kilowatts, none of us believed that the Air Staff directive of 15 miles 
at 15000 feet could be achieved with that system.69
Lovell’s comment was written in 1991, so may be the benefit of hindsight. However, 
contemporary documentation does exist that shows that Dee was against using a 
klystron-equipped apparatus. The TRE scientists were very experienced with using the 
klystron, which had never given them as good results as magnetron-equipped apparatus. 
They did not, therefore, feel that they needed comparative tests to know that the klystron 
would be a non-starter.
Once the move to Malvern was completed, arrangements were made for the EMI 
engineers Blumlein, Browne and Blythen to visit in order to see the magnetron 
equipment (which was designed and built at TRE). They came down on 7th June, and 
accompanied Hensby and several RAF personnel attached to TRE on a flight over the 
Wye valley. Lovell and O'Kane were delayed, and couldn't attend. Tragically the 
aircraft crashed killing all the occupants and destroying the prototype magnetron 
equipment. As Lovell commented:
69 Lovell (1991), pl26.
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Only the magnetron was recognisable... and it is, perhaps, hardly surprising that I 
believed this to be the end of the H2 S project. We had lost important members of my 
small group, the key EMI staff, including the genius of Blumlein, who were to 
manufacture the equipment, and our only working H2 S equipment which was still far 
from meeting the Air Staff performance criterion.70
This was not the end of the project, despite the loss of many TRE and EMI personnel. 
Lovell was to reckon without the political pressure which was a feature of H2S 
development. Lindemann would not let even this stand in the way of progress, and on 
the day of the crash, Churchill memoed the Chief of the Air Staff expressing his desire 
that two squadrons be equipped with H2S by October. One of the technical implications 
of the crash was the addition of a height-above-ground tube to the standard display.71
This galvanised the surviving members of the TRE team into action, and Dee 
recorded his dissatisfaction with the klystron system at a meeting on June 10th.72 
Churchill's memo called for a meeting on H2 S a week later, but due to the war situation 
in Egypt, which had taken a turn for the worse and demanded all his time, the date for 
this meeting was changed to 3rd July.
5.6.2 The Magnetron/Klystron Dispute Resolved
At this meeting Churchill, wholly convinced of the immediate need for H2S, bullied 
the visitors (Dee and Lovell) into the position of having to produce 200 sets by October. 
Lovell's view was that the meeting was '[at] a level of fantasy that bore little relation to 
the world outside the cabinet room.'73 The immediate result of this meeting was that 
Lovell had to rush around the country visiting manufacturers in order to arrange for 
them to begin production of their experimental H2S. It was barely off the drawing 
board, he certainly did not believe it was ready for operational service. However, the
70 Lovell (1991), pl27.
71 Musgrove (1976).
72 API 136, p38.
73 Lovell (1991), pl35.
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intense pressure had some advantages as it allowed him to press the case for 
discontinuing klystron research. Lindemann came to see their prototype on July 10th, 
and by July 15th he had persuaded the Chief of the Air Staff to allow TRE to proceed 
solely with the magnetron version. Burcham performed the task of persuasion. He aided 
their cause by arguing that replacing the lost klystron-equipped units would delay 
progress even further.
The next problem was to see whether it was possible to destroy the magnetron 
mounted in the set. The experiments were not at all successful, usually rendering more 
damage to the aircraft (which would endanger the crew) than to the valve itself. As the 
RAF’s official history records:
The result of one of the most successful experiments was that a ten-foot hole was 
blown in the side of a Junkers-88 aircraft, and even then an expert was able to gauge 
the dimension of the magnetron from its fragments.74
It is interesting to note that the RAF mentioned that “an expert was able...” to evaluate 
the magnetron. Their own experience must have contributed to their fears about what 
would happen if German experts got hold of a magnetron. It also underlines the whole 
nature of expertise in radar, as their expert must have been someone who was familiar 
with electronic devices. This expert must have had practical experience of designing and 
building valves in order to assess the magnetron fragments.
As it proved impossible to actually destroy the magnetron, in September 1942 it was 
decided to use a small charge to render the valve unusable if captured. They then 
believed that if the valve was captured, its copying was inevitable. The official RAF 
History records the problems that the committee faced when they permitted magnetron 
use:
(i) development of similar installations for its bombers
(ii) jamming
74 API 136, p40. There is no information as to why a German aircraft was used for these experiments, 
unless that maybe the fuselage was from a crashed aircraft and British aircraft were repaired if they were in a 
usable condition.
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(iii) use of decoy targets
(iv) development of a receiver
(v) development of a raid tracking organisation to obtain information from H2S 
transmissions.
Only the last two were to prove serious problems, although the British could not know 
this at the time (see chapter 7).75
The problems facing Lovell and his team were very large, for, as he recalled, 'a 
complex of scientific, technological, political, industrial and operational issues were 
involved.'76 Fortunately help was on hand in the form of Renwick (DCD), and Don 
Bennett, who in July 1942 had just been put in charge of the newly formed Pathfinder 
Force (see footnote 60)
Bennett came to the TRE airfield, at Defford near Malvern, immediately after the 
meeting with Churchill on July 3rd. He took up residence in the Mess, and flew every 
day for a week with the klystron-equipped aircraft. On July 12th this was changed to a 
magnetron-equipped set. The performance of this equipment was markedly superior to 
the klystron-equipped set, for Lovell recalls that soon afterwards 'Bennett managed to 
get a fairly successful magnetron flight'77, and became a firm believer in the equipment. 
A “successful” trial at this time was one that had some sort of “blob” on the screen that 
could be definitely associated with a town on the ground, at any sort of range and height 
(see illustration 5.6). At this stage flights were conducted during daylight and calibration 
could be effected by looking out of the window. His support was helpful in persuading 
Lindemann to endorse the change to magnetron-equipped sets. The improvement in 
image-quality that the new magnetron-equipped set produced, happened within the space 
of a few days. Bennett was a highly skilled pilot and navigator, and it is likely that he 
would have been able to learn to interpret the images from the scientists very quickly, 
especially if they had just been improved. He would probably have been able to do this 
more easily than some for the other, more sceptical, senior officers who were still against 
the system. This ease must have persuaded him that there was a future in pursuing the
75 AP1136, pl04.
76 Lovell (1991), pl37.
77 Lovell (1991), pl39.
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system. Such faith would be especially likely if there was no other foreseeable 
alternative.
With both Bennett and Renwick firmly behind the project, the 'red-tape' issues 
involved in meeting the deadline of 50 sets by October became much easier for Lovell to 
overcome. _ However, there was one further problem, as Lovell noted in his diary:
Saturday August 8 [1942]. Another Renwick meeting in London yesterday, after 
another week of struggle.78
The struggle, as he notes was that they still had to make H2 S work to the point that they 
were happy with its performance and they could persuade others that towns could be 
seen using the equipment. They had only had partial success with this latter task so far.
5.6.3 Final Experiments and Operational Service
Fortunately for Lovell the main problems of production involved with meeting 
Churchill’s deadline were largely solved. Almost all the units were already in 
manufacture for production centimetre AI. His main remaining problem was the 
scanner, and the difficulties associated with it. Lovell saw the reasons for the lack of 
success with the scanner as due to their failure to undertake proper ground experiments 
in order to get the polar diagram of the scanner right before air-testing. When they had 
used the Blenheim, they achieved good results, but with the Halifax version there were 
problems as:
...there had been no appreciation of the radical difference between these full 
paraboloid, narrow beam, clear forward-looking installations and the performance of a 
truncated paraboloid suffering irregular scattering from the belly of a bomber. In the
78 Lovell (1991), pl41.
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event we were reduced to experimenting with ad hoc adjustments to the feed 
arrangements of the scanner with the bomber airborne at altitudes up to 18000 feet.79
These trial-and-error experiments were of a different type to the earlier ones with the 
wedge. They show that the improvements to the scanner were still being undertaken on 
a non-theoretical, practical basis.
At the same time as tiying to improve the display to their own satisfaction, Lovell 
and TRE were still trying to convince members of Bomber Command that H2S was a 
viable system. The new system was earmarked solely for the Pathfinder Force to begin 
with. When Pathfinder Force was originally formed, it was done so against the wishes of 
Harris who firstly believed that competition between his various Groups was good for 
improving results, and secondly that creaming off the better crews into an elite 
organisation would be bad for morale and create discord. This was certainly the case, 
and there was well-documented bad feeling between Bennett and Cochrane, head of 5 
Group (who, later on, performed the Dams raid).
The problem for Lovell was that someone had informed Harris, the head of Bomber 
Command, that:
‘the responses as seen on the PPI did not correspond to objects and areas which one 
would expect to see and that if an observer homed onto the most prominent return on 
his tube it would in any cases turn out to be other than a worthwhile objective.’ 
Although we were ourselves most dissatisfied with the appearance of the PPI picture 
these criticisms were a nonsense.80
The display was very difficult to interpret, and relied on being operated by people who 
were very skilled in making these interpretations. However, in this case it was quite 
possible that internecine jealousies were not aiding judgement, and that someone was 
rubbishing H2 S to Harris in order to get at Bennett. The fallout from this was that Lovell 
had to arrange further demomtrations at a period when he needed to be conducting
79 Lovell (1991), pl43.
80 Lovell (1991), pl41.
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more trials. Fortunately, a plea for help to the Bomber Development Unit provided him 
with several staff to assist O’Kane. After the crash he was the sole person left alive who 
had any experience of flying with H2 S. As such he had a very heavy responsibility and 
workload, and it was imperative that he passed on his knowledge as quickly as possible.
The next step was to send an H2S-equipped aircraft to BDU for trials. Lovell had 
to delay these from the end of August to the end of September because of further 
problems with the feed arrangements, when Halifax W7808 with the first EMI-produced 
installation finally went to BDU. This proved extremely fortunate for Lovell, though, as 
the EMI units were not prone to as many of the problems that beset the TRE-built 
equipment, as I shall relate.
Another problem for the group at this time (early Autumn 1942) was opposition to 
H2S from America. Two British personnel, Bowen and Robinson, were working in 
America at this time (see chapters 2 and 4 for their earlier contributions at TRE/AMRE). 
The Americans were developing their own form of centimetre ASV and began to turn 
their attention to whether the British experiments with centimetre radar were worth 
learning about. The Americans interpreted their town-finding results much less 
favourably than in Britain, and in a visit to TRE in July 1942, Rabi (the head of the US 
Radiation Laboratory) 'advocat[ed] violently the abandonment of H2 S. ' 8 1  According to 
Lovell, Dee received a letter from Robinson which purported that H2 S didn’t work in 
America, where they failed to find any distinction between the ground and built-up areas. 
There is a note to that effect in Dee's diary, dated 21/9/42:
Robinson reported town not seen on H2S in US at <10 miles even at 4000 feet!82
Lovell's interpretation of this was that Robinson was simply 'expressing the 
reasonable doubts of a scientist on the basis of tests carried out in an atmosphere far- 
removed from the political and military pressures to which H2S was subject in the UK'83.
81 Dee (unpubl.), 5/7/42.
82 Dee (unpubl.), 21/9/42.
83 Lovell (1991), pl46. In a letter from Robinson to Lovell (1/11/90), Robinson says that he believed that 
the U.S. researchers were not opposed to H2S, but simply expressing doubts about it.
Figure 5.6: Poor H2S picture quality, September 1942. The central ring shows 
the ground return quite clearly, which made interpretation of close-range images 
very’ difficult From Lovell (1991), pl45.
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The work is going well. BDU are pleased and the gaps are quite gone from 
the Halifax... we spent the day at BDU talking to the navigators using i t86
Here Lovell’s quote illustrates the co-operation between the BDU personnel conducting 
the trials, and the TRE staff making the equipment. The BDU navigators were 
evaluating the usability of the equipment in the hands of people who were skilled in the 
sense that they could learn to interpret the pictures, but not in the sense that they could 
build it. The extra month of experimentation had made the difference, coupled with the 
more reliable engineered EMI units.
The above quote is perhaps the crux of the issue of the initial success of H2S. The 
important thing for TRE was for them to persuade the RAF that they were giving them 
something that would be of assistance to them, and that would enable them to have more 
means at their disposal to navigate with than they presently had. So, although H2S failed 
to live up to expectations in one sense, in another it was better than what they had had 
before. Therefore this is probably why, when EMI had made some improvements to the 
picture quality, objections began to melt away.
OTCane, an expert at flying with and interpreting HjS pictures, taught the new 
operators his skills. By doing this he was able to make H2S usable. Lovell commented 
in 1991 that 'the skilled navigators of BDU found even the poor quality PPI picture 
invaluable when flying above thick cloud.'87 This was definitely an improvement on 
September, when Dee noted in his diary that Saundby (Deputy to Harris) had 
commented to the effect that H2S was “too complicated for all but an expert to use at 
this time.”88 However, they had improved the quality of the picture to the point where 
BDUs main complaint about H2S was not its usability, but its serviceability in the rushed 
form with which they had been supplied. In November, after two months of experience 
with flying with it, BDU recommended that it be used as a navigation aid throughout the 
whole journey, and not just for blind-bombing. This meant that one of the original
86 Lovell (1991), pl48.
87 Lovell (1991), pl48.
88 Dee (unpubl.) 19/9/43.
223
specifications, scrapped in July, had been reinstated after doing further experiments and 
trials.
Over the next two months EMI rushed to build 50 sets and equip two squadrons 
with the device. The final go-ahead about whether they could be used depended on 
Churchill’s interpretation of the war situation. During December 1942, the Russians 
turned the tide at Stalingrad, and although the war situation was still far from hopeful, 
Churchill authorised use of magnetron-equipped aircraft over enemy territory. H2S was 
first used operationally on 29th/30th January. Three nights later, on the second time it 
was used operationally, a set was lost over Holland. This set was found by the Germans.
That H2S was made useable in such a short space of time, was because the 
navigators were now able to learn how to interpret the image to navigate successfully. 
The problem, according to one navigator, was to:
...interpret correctly the seemingly indiscriminate arrangements of tiny glows that flicKered in 
curious patterns with each rotation of the scanner. Somehow I had to learn what represented 
salient features on the ground and ignore the mass of ill-defined reflections.89
The navigators had to develop the same embedded skill of learning to see, that the 
scientists did. Fortunately for them, the scientists had established what the correct thing 
to “see” actually was. The navigators could be taught by learning from the embodied 
knowledge, that the scientists made explicit for them.
When trials began at BDU, one of the navigators who worked with it was Fit. Lt. 
Killip. It was his report that led to the November recommendation. He was partly 
responsible for some of the changes that were made in map representation and 
navigation technique that came about through its introduction. He outlined in a 1945 
paper the impact that H2S had when it was introduced:
The original conception was a device to enable the operator to bomb a built-up 
area when placed within 15 mile (24km) by some other means. It was quickly 
appreciated, however, that here was a device with which, using care and imagination,
89 Mayhill (1991), p27.
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a navigator could find his way around Europe independently of ground organisations 
and limitations of range.90
Like the other navigator (who was actually a bomb-aimer, of which more shortly), Killip 
explained that there were difficulties with navigation:
It was soon realised that straightforward map-reading by H2S was quite out of the 
question. The picture was not easy to interpret, particularly in industrial areas, and it 
was decided that fixes by bearing and distance should only be obtained from really 
large towns or well isolated smaller towns 91
In order to assist the navigator, air-maps were redrawn to show salient cities in the shape 
that they appeared on the screen. This was done on the recommendation of Killip after 
extensive air trials. The Operational Research section started to assemble PPI Pictures in 
order to assist in map-making of targets in November 1943. ORS also set up an H2S 
training programme.92 This marked a change in convention between air maps being 
representations adapted from road maps, to air maps being representations designed for 
use with a piece of airborne equipment.
The system was now used in conjunction with dead reckoning navigation. The 
navigator would plot a track on the map, and any town that gave a suitably distinct 
image on the screen and was within 15 miles of the aircraft’s track should appear after a 
given time depending on the relative ground speed of the aircraft. The navigator could 
then use the appearance of towns to check that his wind-speed information was correct. 
If the town didn’t appear, or was not on the correct side of the track, then the aircraft 
was off course. However:
The difficulty... was this; would the navigator be able to cope with both the DR 
navigation and the H2S interpretation? Apart from the exceptionally capable few, this 
seemed impossible, and the bomb-aimer (in P[ath] F[inder] F[orce] often a qualified
90 Killip (1985), p399.
91 Killip (1985), p399.
92 AP3368. Unfortunately, I have no examples of what the changes actually looked like.
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navigator) was brought in to make a navigational team of two. These two sat side by side, 
to ensure good co-operation. The navigator would work on [dead-reckoning] and notify 
the operator when it became necessary to search for the next land-mark. The latter would 
meanwhile be watching the PPI, with a map in his hand, endeavouring to identify the 
landmarks independently. If at any time a particularly definite landmark was noticed, he 
would inform the navigator and *ske a fix.93
It was through the experience of actually working with the system that these 
changes were introduced. Using the system required considerable interpretative skill on 
the part of the navigator. This was made slightly easier with the redrawn maps, but some 
navigators were never able to use it effectively:
Some of the navigators and bomb-aimers thought H2S a dead loss and not worth 
the trouble, but I wanted to do more in the air than map-read, drop the bombs and man 
the front guns, ...94
Utilising it effectively depended very often on what lay on the track, as some 
features, especially water-based ones such as distinctive rivers or oddly shaped towns 
were represented much more clearly (see overleaf for picture):
The bomb-aimers... pencilled in the tracks and ETAs and sorted out prominent 
water and urban features which could possibly be deciphered on the H2S screens.95
What was important was that a considerable degree of interpretative skill was 
needed by the operator for him to make sense of what he saw, and that skill was 
something that had initially to be passed on by the persons who developed the original 
apparatus and first learned how to do the interpretation.
93 Killip (1985), p400.
94 Mayhill (1991), p27.
95 Mayhill (1991), p51.
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Figure 5.8 Navigation with H2S. The navigator / bomb-aimer would take fixes by 
using timed intervals to easily recognisable large towns. This became easier with 
the introduction of special maps that represented towns and cities in the same 




By the time H2 S was first used operationally, it had become a relatively stable 
artefact in terms of its design and construction. All the main decisions about what the 
purpose of the device was, and how it should be constructed had been taken. To a large 
extent, the uncertainties concerning the design of a scanner and feed arrangement that 
would produce a meaningful PPI picture were also resolved.
What can be drawn from this is that at this stage, the skill of the experimenters in 
making 10 centimetre radar work had been embodied into the equipment. However, in 
terms of the picture, there was another area of skill to be addressed. This was the skill of 
learning to interpret the picture.
As can be seen from the illustration 5.6, what was produced on the screen of an H2S 
radar was nothing like a map, which was the representation that most navigators would 
be lamiliar with. The scientists who were familiar with the programme of trials with the 
equipment were used to making allowances (reparation) for what they saw. They had 
developed skill in interpreting the 'splodges’ as something meaningful that they could 
interpret. In the period between October and January they were able to teach service 
navigators those skills, so that H2S could be used effectively on missions. This particular 
skill transfer also forced a change in the way that towns were represented on maps.
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Chapter 6: Radar Development in Germany Prior to the Discovery of H2 S
6.1 Introduction
In the previous three chapters I have covered the complete story of British radar, both 
metre wave and centimetre wave, since its inception in 1934/5 to the point of the 
development of the H2 S ground-mapping centimetric radar in 1942/3. Over these eight 
years, four of which were during war-time, British researchers made considerable advances 
in the field of radar development, and particularly in the field of centimetre-wave generation. 
Until 1940 they had little input from outside the country. In this year some information 
came into their hands from France (see chapter 2), and some came from the US after the 
Tizard Mission (see chapter 4). In particular Britain began a programme of co-operation 
with the US particularly in the field of centimetre waves, but it took until late 1942 before 
this really came into effect. Radar development in each country was until this time largely 
independent. The first centimetre radar to be used on flights over Germany was the H2S 
system. It was installed into British Bomber aircraft during December 1942/January 1943, 
and was used operationally for the first time at the end of the latter month. The second time 
it was used, on the night of 2/3 February, one of the H2S-equipped aircraft was shot down 
over Rotterdam in Holland, and pieces of the equipment were recovered by German 
investigators. Once the Germans realised what they had been presented with, they too 
commenced a centimetre research programme.
In this chapter I shall cover the progress made in Germany in designing and developing 
radar systems prior to the discovery of the British H2S set in February 1943. This date was 
a watershed for German radar development. The discovery led to a complete change in both 
the direction and the organisation of how research and development of radar was conducted 
in that country.
German workers began research into the possibilities of using radio waves for location 
in 1933, at around the same time as scientists in the other countries interested in this area. 
German research structure differed from British, in that the different armed services 
contracted out work to private firms to the exclusion of doing work in Government
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establishments. There was very little co-operation between the firms and the services, and 
little research work was done in Government Institutions. Competition and secrecy between 
firms and the Armed Services was a major feature of German research and development 
during the war.
Their researchers commenced experiments on very short wavelengths, of the order of 
centimetres, but were hampered by the lack of an electronic valve to generate these short 
waves at a suitable power. Because of this, they moved to longer wavelengths in order to 
get the power they required. This was also very different to the British, who commenced 
their research on metre-wavelengths and moved to shorter ones when the technology 
became available.
The German strategic outlook differed greatly to that in Britain, being primarily 
offensive in the first half of the war, and defensive in the latter. The strategic aims of the 
Germans were based around Hitler’s plans for Lebensraum, or conquest of Eastern Europe 
for “living-space”. Despite Hitler being an arch-opportunist in the way he set about 
conquering the territories he wanted, German military strategy was based around the 
aggressive waging of war and radar, thought of as being a defensive aid, played little part in 
their thinking. Their war-aims dictated the way they employed their radar technology, much 
the same as it did in Britain where Air-Defence was the prime-mover behind radar 
development. In Germany, the offensive stance led to the development of some superior 
radio bombing aids, but these were based on the Lorentz blind-landing system and so cannot 
be classified as radar. This stance meant that often where radar equipment of a high 
technical standard existed, in hindsight one could judge that it had not been used as 
effectively as it could have been. For example, the preparation of an air-defence strategy 
was completely overlooked by the Luftwaffe until events forced a re-think, in 1941. Early 
on in the war, between 1939 and 1941, British air-raids over Germany were ineffectual (see 
chapter 5). Consequently, air-defence was afforded a much lower priority than air-oflfence, 
and little thought was given to how radar might best serve this application. It was only in 
1942-3, when British bombing became far more than a minor irritant (helped by radar aids) 
that Germany was forced to develop an early-warning and centrally-controlled air-defence 
network comparable to that which existed in Britain in 1940.
229
6.2 Developments in the 1930s
6.2.1 The First Interest in Radio Reflection and Detection
_ The first ever detection apparatus to use radiowaves originated in Germany in 1904, in 
the shape of the telemobiloscope of Christian Hiilsmeyer (see chapter 2). The origins of the 
first attempts to produce in Germany a practical means of detection using radio waves can 
be traced back to the early 1930's. The origins of radar in Germany were to come from the 
direction of centimetre waves. Future events were to prove this deeply ironic.
The experiments performed in many countries concerning ionospheric work, and the 
developments made in component design in the 1920s and 1930s were widely published. 
One can assume that the results of this work from other countries was available to Germans 
disposed to look for it. Germany also had a significant radio-industry of its own during this 
time.
In 1929, Dr Rudolf Kiihnhold conducted experiments in echo-location for the German 
Navy. He was the Scientific Liaison Officer with the Civil Service Department of the Navy 
Communications research establishment at Kiel. The sonic device that he developed was 
able to measure both the range and bearing of targets via a twin receiving system. 
According to Pritchard:
...it occurred to [Kiihnhold] that this principle might be employed for the detection of 
centimetric wavelengths, and that the location of aircraft might also be possible.1
Kiihnhold was aware that there was no future with sound-locators for aircraft, because 
aircraft speeds were now a significant fraction of the speed of sound and were increasing. 
This, too, was the impetus for the beginning of research into radar in Britain (see chapter 2). 
This increase would in turn led to a decrease in the accuracy with which aircraft could be 
located.
1 Pritchard (1989), p32.
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In 1933 "a policy decision was made by the Navy to develop a radio-detection device."2 
This was largely at Kiihnhold's instigation, and a transmitter and receiver working on a 
wavelength of 13.5cm were ordered from the firm of Julius Pintsch. The transmitter 
produced lOOmw of power, and employed a Barkhausen-Kurz valve with antenna reflectors 
of 80cm diameter. He performed experiments where the equipment was trained on shipping 
in Kiel Harbour, but "only poor results were obtained. Clearly greater power was called for 
and this presented difficulties."3 Not much light is shed on this by any sources; Trenkle 
wrote only that "there were no demonstrable reflections, whatsoever."4
In the light of future happenings the decision to begin experimenting on very short 
wavelengths is an interesting one. It shows that the Germans originally thought along more 
adventurous lines than their British counterparts, which contrasts with later developments as 
I related in chapter 5 and will relate in chapter 7. At least one person in Germany was 
prepared to investigate the possibility of short wavelengths at the outset. What hampered 
him, as indeed it hampered the later British, was the lack of a suitable high-power valve in 
order to carry out research. The state of centimetric valve research at this time in Britain 
and America is covered more fully in chapter 3. However, by employing near-10cm waves 
and parabolic reflectors Kiihnhold’s thinking was, in the context of the successful direction 
taken in 1939/40 in Britain, very advanced. This should be borne in mind when considering 
the later German dismissal of very short wavelengths.
6.2.2 Commercial Concerns
Apart from Kiihnhold’s personal interest in the reflective properties of electromagnetic 
waves, the other interested party was his financial backers, the Torpedo Research 
Establishment of the German Navy. Their interest was in gaining greater accuracy in 
determining the range of their weapons.5 This is in contrast to the British, who were
2 Swords (1986), p92.
3 Pritchard (1989), p32.
4 Trenkle (1978), p25. Translated from the original German.
5 Pritchard (1989), p31.
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originally motivated by the desire to detect aircraft. In other words, the first German service 
to take an interest in using radiowaves as a means of detection did so because they saw them 
as a research tool, whereas in Britain the technological air-defence application was the 
driving force behind the research. It is possible that it was the German’s initial lack of 
success at short wavelengths that shaped their future attitudes to their exploitation. Very 
short waves were mistrusted after longer wavelengths satisfied the performance criteria of 
the Armed Services. This effect was certainly true in relation to attitudes at TRE to the 
klystron, which was regarded as a non-starter for H2 S in 1942, because of the difficult nature 
of the klystrons employed in AI research during 1940.
Kiihnhold !s initial lack of success led him to modify his equipment by purchasing a 
48cm wavelength glass-envelope, split-anode magnetron from Phillips in the Netherlands. 
These were a longer wavelength and a higher power than the previous valves he had used. 
Disappointed with the results, he also reverted to Yagi antennas in preference to the 
paraboloids. In any experimental set-up there are a large number of variables which could be 
contributing to problems when, as is usually the case, results do not match expectations. It 
is more likely that, rather than change every part of his set-up in one go, the experimenter 
will modify it in stages to lessen the impact of new and unknown components. This 
approach was taken by Faraday in his experiments,6 and it was also used by Morpurgo when 
developing his quark apparatus.7 Changing components is also often a source of difficulty in 
replication.8 These effects also occurred in British experience, as I relate and discuss in 
chapters 2 and 4. The paraboloid antenna was less well understood or used than the Yagi 
antenna at this time. Kiihnhold was trying to improve his result with a better-understood and 
more familiar component. By doing this, he was limiting the possible unpredictable 
components of his apparatus in order to proceed with the learning process more easily. This 
fits with Gooding’s analyses of other scientists’ learning endeavours, which illustrate that it 
is by practical interaction with their equipment that scientists learn how to operate it.
6 Gooding (1990), ch 6.
7 Gooding (1992).
8 Collins (1985), ch 3.
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As well as not obtaining satisfactory results initially, Kiihnhold also had problems with 
funding. The Torpedo Research Establishment had only a limited research budget, and were 
not overly enthusiastic about funding the further experiments that he planned to do. He tried 
to get further backing by making approaches to other German companies working in radio 
research. No-one else was interested in taking up the work which was regarded as risky and 
not very promising, so he decided to set up his own company along with his deputy, Dr 
Schultes, called GEMA (Gesellschaft fur Elektro-akustische und Mechanische Apparate; 
Company for Electro-acoustic and Mechanical Apparatus).
In late 1933 the Pintsch Company began experimenting with 13.5cm valves, using 
continuous-wave rather than pulse operation, just as Ktihnhold's apparatus did. Their 
experiments led to them to conclude that very short waves performed better over land than 
at sea, where reflections from the sea obscured the signal. They managed to achieve a range 
of 2km on a ship target in May 1934, but the results they got over land were better, doubling 
this figure.9
Learning of these results, and being spurred on by the competition under which German 
firms hoping to supply the military worked, Kuhnhold's team under Schultes set about 
improving their apparatus. One of the problems they had encountered with the CW 
operation of their equipment was that of stray radiation from the transmitter leaking into the 
receiver. This was a perennial problem for the early radar designers, which produced a 
number of different solutions. In particular this problem dogged the British AI until 1941 
(see chapter 4). Kuhnhold's new apparatus, using 1.5m paraboloids with Yagi antennae and a 
wavelength of 48cm, enabled him to produce far better results. The competition with 
Pintsch led to comparative testing between the two sets, during which they discovered that 
target aspect affected the received signal-strength, particularly so in the case of the 13.5cm 
Pintsch equipment. This result is important, as it is very likely to have had an effect on the 
perception of the reflective properties of 10 centimetre waves in German radar circles. This 
probably contributed to the anti-10 centimetre attitude, which led to the cessation of 
experiments in this area in 1940. Such antipathies also existed in Britain, in the form of 
opposition to the klystron for H2 S, and were a function of practical experience of actually
9 Pritchard (1989), p39.
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working with the apparatus to perform experiments.10 This contrasted to German 
objections which, as I explain in chapter 7, were based on theoretical calculations of how 
centimetre waves would behave.
By October 1934 GEMA felt sufficiently confident with their equipment to conduct a 
demonstration. There is an important distinction between a demonstration and a test; testing 
is usually done by experimenters when the apparatus is not properly understood and cannot 
be made to work properly to order. Demonstrations usually involve the public display of a 
technique or effect to convince others that such an effect is a ‘Tact”. The experimenter(s) 
are sufficiently competent enough at working with their apparatus to be able to produce the 
effect, or to know where to look and what to do if it doesn’t happen. When the distinction 
is blurred things are usually difficult for the experimenters, as was the case with Lovell and 
the pressure he faced to demonstrate H2 S when it was extremely new and un-tested. He was 
unable to demonstrate how it worked because he had not completed tests to learn how it 
worked.
This demonstration took place on October 24th 1934. Their equipment, working on a 
wavelength of 48cm, used two paraboloids: one for transmitting and one for receiving. The 
indicator was a voltmeter (unlike the British who used CRTs), and the apparatus operated in 
the CW mode. The transmitter and receiver were separated by 200m to try and reduce 
waves leaking from one to the other and affecting the received signal. The results of the 
demonstration were successful, as they managed to detect the research ship Welle, and in 
addition 'saw1 an aircraft passing overhead at a height of approximately 200m to a distance 
of 700m.11
An official of the Torpedo research Establishment was present at the demonstration, and 
recommended that 70,000 Marks be allocated to GEMA for further development of this 
equipment. The money was also accompanied by a set of recommendations; chief among 
these were that they should move to pulse operation, which would have several advantages. 
These advantages were those recognised in Britain, namely that a transmitter valve could be 
pulse to give a power output significantly higher than that gained during CW operation, as
10 Swords (1986), p94.
11 Swords (1986), p94.
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the valve was switched on and off very quickly which would not damage it as much (damage 
could still occur as Burcham and Atkinson often found out when trying to get ever higher 
peak-pulse powers from their klystron in 1940). Also, pulse operation would assist them to 
find a solution to the problem of leakage between the transmitter and the receiver by 
allowing them to isolate the two through blocking off the receiver when the transmitter pulse 
was in operation. Thirdly, range measurement would now be a possibility for them, 
especially if they made this improvement in conjunction with using a cathode-ray 
oscilloscope (This was also the method adopted in the British demonstrations). Other 
recommendations concerned specific types of valve and antenna that they considered to be 
improvements over those used in the demonstration.12
Unfortunately for the historian, there is very little detail available from any source about 
these early experiments. The greater number of sources which I have utilised for German 
material were secondary, as is evident from the footnoted date of the source. However, 
most of the secondary sources have a considerable primary input, as the authors either had 
access to original documents or were able to interview participants. Nevertheless, this 
should be borne in mind when one compares this information to the richer nature of primary 
British sources I have used in chapters 3, 4 and 5, and the German sources used in chapter 7.
From these early episodes it is possible to form an idea of the way radar research was 
organised and undertaken in Germany. The initial experiments were initiated by one person, 
Kiihnhold, but utilised a team of researchers from, and the resources of, the Torpedo 
Research Establishment. As a Service Research Establishment was paying for the research, 
the directions that the researchers took and the applications they considered were very highly 
geared towards what that Establishment wanted. Competition between firms for contracts, 
and the ensuing secrecy was a feature of German radar research from very early on. Such 
competition and secrecy between supposedly co-operating firms and services became a 
distinctive feature of the German radar research-effort, and these two factors differed greatly 
from Britain in the sense that they were officially encouraged. In Britain, by 1939 at least, 
there was supposedly official co-operation between firms, Services and Establishments
12 Swords (1986), p95. This is taken from an unpublished manuscript by H.K.V.Willisen, c. 1950, titled Die 
Geschichte der Funkmesstechnik bis 1935 (The history of radar-technology until 1935), and given to Swords 
by F.Trenkle.
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through CVD (see chapter 3). Other features that distinguished German and British 
research, such as the lack of one distinct research institute in Germany, will be discussed 
later.
In technical terms the approach of the German engineers differed quite markedly to their 
British counterparts, which could help to explain some attitudes that developed in Germany 
towards centimetre wave radar in the near future. The Germans set about the problem of 
detection by utilising the shortest waves they could generate, even at the very low powers at 
which this was then possible. They also began their experiments by adopting the 
continuous-wave method, rather than going for pulse operation. When results were hard to 
get, they changed their apparatus to use longer wavelengths at which higher powers were 
possible. This was is in contrast to the British, who started with a much longer wavelength 
because they felt they understood the technology more fully. Moving down the wavelengths 
was only seen as useful by some British researchers, and then only in conjunction with the 
specific AI project.
The experiments conducted at GEMA and Pintsch on 13.5cm did not give very 
convincing results. As a consequence of this, and the inability to improve the power 
available at these short wavelengths, both companies concentrated on higher wavelengths. 
However, one important discovery which they made was about the reflective behaviour of 
waves in the 10cm region. They noticed that the waves were scattered differently according 
to the orientation of the target (aspect), a result that a few years later was influential in the 
decision to stop research on radar in this wavelength area.
6.3 Developments to the Outbreak of War
The story of the development of German radar from 1936 up to and during the early 
part of the war is very similar in style to that of their initial developments in 1934/5. One of 
the more significant things that set German radar development apart from the British 
equivalent was that most development work was undertaken by the commercial sector as 
opposed to in Service or Government research establishments, as I will relate. Britain was
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the exception rather than the rule in having Government sponsored radar research towards a 
perceived goal. At this time most other countries were following a similar pattern to 
Germany.13
In this section I shall cover the progress made in Germany up until the beginning of the 
war. Because of the way German research was organised, I shall describe the events by 
looking at the research done by each the major firms involved in radar research in separate 
sub-sections, rather than by tracing development of particular types of radar (as I did for the 
British in chapter 2).
6.3.1 The Telefunken Company
During the 1920s and 1930s Telefimken was the largest manufacturer of electronic 
equipment in Germany. It also had a significant research and development department based 
in Berlin. In 1924 Dr Wilhelm Runge took over as head of Telefunken’s radio receiver 
laboratory. Over the next few years he worked hard to expand the laboratory in terms of the 
number and quality of its staff and the nature and scope of the research work they 
undertook.
In early 1934 Kiihnhold approached Runge and requested that Telefunken take over his 
embryonic radar research programme. At this time Kiihnhold was having difficulties in 
getting enough finance to continue with all the work he wished to do. Kiihnhold was aware 
that Runge was already engaged in work on short radio waves, with regards to using them 
for directional radio transmitters, and reasoned that he would be the best person to assist him 
in carrying on the work.
Unfortunately Runge didn’t exactly welcome Kiihnhold with open arms. His attitude 
was not positive, and he sent Kiihnhold away empty handed. According to one author:
13 For fiirther discussion of the way different strategic goals can affect the way the research process is 
organised and executed, see Beyerchen (1994).
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Als Dr Runge sich damals etwas skeptisch ausserte, fasste dies Dr Kiihnhold als offizielle 
stellungnahme der Firma Telefunken auf und veranlasste im Jahr 1934 die Grundung einer 
neuen Firma, GEMA.
[As Dr Runge at that time appeared somewhat sceptical, Dr Kiihnhold took this as being 
the official position of Telefunken and this gave rise him founding a new firm, GEMA, in 
1934.]14
Several authors relate that Runge and Kiihnhold didn't have good relations.15 Whilst 
disagreement between researchers on approach, or viability of certain ideas was not 
uncommon on either side, the nature of the way German research was organised exacerbated 
this disagreement. By encouraging secrecy and competition between services and between 
firms the government produced a fertile environment for personal animosity. In Britain the 
culture was more inclined toward co-operation, although this did not always prevent 
personal disagreements, as I have shown in Chapters 2 and 4 when I outlined how the 
animosity between Rowe and Bowen probably delayed both AI and H2 S.
When research into the possibilities of radio waves for detection purposes began in the 
early 1930’s, Germany was in the grips of the World depression. Understandably the 
majority of firms were unwilling or unable to spend money on the sort of long term research 
and development projects that radar represented, unless they also were in reception of 
assistance in the form of Government or military funding. Hitler's accession to power in 
1933, and the accompanying expansion in terms of military spending, went some way 
towards ameliorating this situation, but it left a legacy of caution on the part of most 
commercial concerns towards undertaking risky ventures. This partly explains Runge’s 
sceptical attitude towards Kuhnhold's proposal.
However, Hitler's accession also had other effects, one of which was a change of 
personnel in many firms. These changes were due mainly to a person’s Nazi Party links or 
racial origin; for example many Jews left voluntarily, or were forced out of what were often 
key positions in firms. This policy had a marked effect at Telefunken where Runge worked.
14 Trenkle (1986), p24.
15 See Swords (1986), Pritchard (1989), Kern (1994).
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Apart from Runge’s interest in short radio-waves, which led him to undertake a small 
amount of research involving American "Acorn" valves (see also Chapters 2 and 3), there 
was a further group at Telefunken interested in centimetre waves. This group was led by a 
Dr Ilberg, and they co-operated with a another group at the Telefunken Physics Laboratory 
under Dr Meissner. They carried out research into the characteristics of Barkhausen-Kurtz 
valves, the most often-used source of centimetre waves (albeit at very low powers) at this 
time.
According to Runge, in 1934:
We had a man in the firm called Captain Scharlau, who was advisor to our Export 
Sales Group. It turned out that he was an old party member... and one of the first jobs he 
was ordered to do... was to clean the firm of what [the Nazis] called the "opposing 
elements", in other words the Jews. Our director, Emil Mayer, was the first to go, and with 
him of course most of the company top brass. Mayer was replaced by a man called 
Schwab... and he, too, was... replaced by Dr Rukop.
Scharlau demanded that the company leadership, which to then had always catered for 
customer requirements, should now be reorientated. Telefunken must now look forward 
and carry out more research. They gave me an interim grant of 20000 Marks for early 
development (such as it was) of centimetric systems, and ordered Dr Ilberg's group to come 
under my jurisdiction. We made the best of a bad bargain...16
Runge’s centimetre group worked initially on investigating the directional qualities of 
very short waves in order to use them in a directional radio-telephony link for the army. In 
the course of their work they experimented with using Frequency Modulation (FM) in order 
to get a clearer signal (this method cuts out much of the noise from an analogue signal). 
During tests of their system at Friederichshaven in 1935, in the manner of several researchers 
over the years in different countries (see chapter 2), they noticed interference with their 
signal from passing ships and aircraft. In the summer of that year Runge decided to 
investigate these reflections further. He put a transmitting antenna on the ground, connected 
to a continuous wave transmitter, and placed a receiver next to it. As he described:
16 Pritchard (1989), p58. Quotation taken from Runge's memoirs (unpubl.), given to Pritchard by Runge.
239
As soon as I had switched everything on, I happened to notice one of Telefunken's own 
Junkers Ju52s at 5000 metres... and as it drew closer to the directional beam I noticed the 
[indicator] begin to flutter... [A]s the aircraft flew overhead, the needle went right over and 
began to move slowly between zero and full-scale deflection.17
The behaviour of the indicator was indicating a “beats” effect similar to that employed as a 
means of detection in the Daventry Experiment (see chapter 2), except that here it was a 
variometer that was being used as a detector rather than a CRT. In a curious reversal of 
Daventry, where the received signal was being calibrated by the appearance or non- 
appearance of the signal in relation to the aircraft’s passing, here Runge already accepted 
that it was the aircraft that was causing his indicator to move so the calibration of the “out- 
thereness” of the aeroplane was already confirmed in his mind.
When Run6e took these observations to Rukop, his department head, the latter treated 
them with the same scepticism that he had shown to Kuhnhold. Undeterred by this official 
apathy, Runge pressed ahead with his own experiments, apparently unaware of the work 
going on at other firms. He set a colleague, Dr Muth, the task of designing a pulse-circuit 
that operated at the tiny power of 15 watts peak. The pair continued their unofficial 
experiments until 1938, gradually learning more about how to improve their apparatus until 
they had a much more impressive system employing a 3m parabolic antenna. By this time 
they must have been pretty certain of how to make it work, as they now felt they could 
arrange a demonstration (rather than a test) to show they could detect aircraft at a range of 
5km. They showed their system and demonstrated these results to the Head of the 
Luftwaffe Procurements Section, General Udet, in the summer of 1938.18
In the meantime Kuhnhold’s GEMA had not been inactive, and in the intervening years 
they had developed a fully-operational early warning system called Freya which they had 
sold to the Navy. The Luftwaffe, in the manner of the times, was jealous of the Navy's
17 Pritchard (1989), p62.
18 Pritchard (1989), p64.
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equipment, but didn't want to purchase exactly the same model as the Navy had. 
Consequently, they ordered their own system from Telefunken. As Runge described:
To give you some idea of the state of chaos prevailing in the Services, the Luftwaffe in 
particular never seemed to know what they wanted. One department said one thing, and 
this was usually countermanded by another, but by 1939 things were beginning to sort 
themselves out, and in that year we received a firm order for an early-warning system 
which had to be much smaller than [GEMA's] Freya, and, more importantly, extremely 
mobile. To this end we designed an equipment with a 3m diameter parabolic reflector and 
a fixed dipole... Someone stuck a pin in the map and we called it the Wurzburg A.19
In this respect the Germans were hampered compared to their British counterparts, who had 
a very clearly defined set of operational parameters to work with. They were working with 
different perceptual filters depending on the strategic aims they were trying to meet; these 
determined the technological issues that were addressed.
Perceptual filters to technological development were very important to the story of 
German radar development, and the issue of the difference of technical, technological and 
operational change are explored by Beyerchen.20 He identifies the major differences thus: 
technical change is a matter of specific equipment, e.g. upgrading. Operational change is a 
change in the way specific equipments are employed. Technological change in a change in 
the context of the way wars (for example) are fought because of the introduction of a new 
technology, such as radar. New technologies shape the strategies of the possessors, and 
initially both the British and the Germans viewed radar as essentially a defensive technology. 
This suited British strategic thinking which in the late 1930’s was almost exclusively given 
over to defence. However, in Germany the lack of any well-defined perceptual goal meant 
that very often firms were not sure what they were supposed to produce. If they did know, 
they often produced only what they could produce given their current knowledge, rather 
than pushing in new directions to satisfy a far-reaching military proposal (as was the case in 
Britain with centimetre AI).
19 Pritchard (1989), p65. Quote from Runge's memoirs, unpubl.
20Beyerchen (1994), pp169-283.
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However, Runge’s somewhat dismissive statement quoted above plays down the extent 
to which the Wurzburg was an extremely well engineered piece of equipment. It was this set 
which was later captured in a commando raid on the French coast in early 1942 (which 
precipitated the move of TRE from Swanage to Malvern, see chapter 5), and which brought 
nothing but praise from the British experts who inspected it. Their praise was directed 
towards the quality of the engineering of the set, as:
(i) it was a robust, well-designed equipment,
(ii) it could be operated by relatively unskilled personnel,
(iii) it had a number of “black-boxed” units designed for easy removal and replacement in the 
field,
(iv)the set operated at a wavelength of around 48cm, and at powers of 8kw.
That this was possible was due to an incident in 1938, when the head of Telefimken's 
R&D department, Rukop, accompanied Kuhnhold of GEMA on a visit to the Navy. 
Kuhnhold was critical of Telefimken’s policy of pursuing radar research at these short 
wavelengths, on the basis that they (Telefiinken) were not up to the task of producing 
suitably high-powered valves. GEMA's Freya worked at a wavelength of 1.5m (similar to 
that which the British employed for their CHL system, though at this time only Bowen's 
experimental ASV and AI systems used such short waves).
Rukop was so incensed by these remarks that he initiated a programme to produce the 
requisite high-power/short-wavelength valves in a very short time. This valve was produced, 
and formed the basis of further experimental work that was incorporated into the Wurzburg 
after it was ordered in April 1939. It entered service in 1940, and was employed in the role 
of early-warning.21
Despite there being no details of the sequence of experiments and modifications that 
were available to me, working at around 50cm was not something that was outside the 
bounds of current technology. Certainly in Britain, both Bowen at AMRE and GEC were 
using valves (the micropup) that worked at this wavelength around 1939/40. What is 
important is that Telefiinken were the company who eventually had the task of 
manufacturing the centimetre radars developed from British technology. What they gained
21 Swords (1986), p98.
242
from their work at this time was an experience of working with parabolic reflectors, and 
shorter wavelengths. However, the really important shift in the types of technology and 
techniques used came in the ten centimetre region. For this researchers had to employ 
waveguides, matching, and special valves (conventional valve technology was reaching its 
limits at 50cm, see chapter 2). These were all things that were in the embryonic phase at this 
stage (1938/9), even if the Germans had the information from American experiments 
available to them. Therefore, their efforts with 50cm would have been of only limited 
assistance in helping them to understand centimetre equipment.
6.3.2 GEMA
GEMA was formed after Kiihnhold's approach to Runge in order to get co-operation 
and further funding proved inconclusive. This led to their demonstration of the 48cm 
equipment in October 1934, and the decision of the Torpedo Research Establishment to 
provide further funds for Kuhnhold to carry out more work.
Between then and May 1935, researchers at GEMA worked on producing a pulse 
transmitter with a peak power of 800 watts. Tests showed that they had made an 
improvement in the equipment's maximum range (it should be remembered that the operating 
wavelength was 48cm). Furthermore, the group started using a CRT for display, which 
enabled them to predict range with a much greater accuracy. The display showed both 
transmitted and received pulse, and had a calibrated range scale on the screen. 
Unfortunately, ranges attained against the ship Welle were only 4km, a much lower range 
than they had previously attained.22 In light of this they decided to change the operating 
frequency to 125MHz (0.8m), which would permit them to use valves with a much greater 
peak power, and a consequent increase in range (4km being pretty much useless for radar 
applications). However, this caused dispute between those who supported the change, and 
those who wished to continue working on 48cm.23
22 Pritchard (1989), p39.
23 Trenkle (1986), p27.
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At this time, May 1935, British experiments were still at the rudimentary stage of post- 
Daventry experiment, and they were still using wavelengths of 26m. It was not for a further 
two years that Bowen had an operational 1.5m set. This further underlines the difference in 
approach to the problem of detection at this time of the British and German engineers; 
namely the British tended to proceed along the lines of "get it working with understood 
technology and then improve", whereas the German attitude was "go for what we believe to 
represent the best technical solution even if it means improving the technology before it 
works satisfactorily".
The researchers at GEMA now felt able to demonstrate their 48cm equipment to the 
Navy. They were not under the same pressure as Lovell was in 1942, for example, as they 
were doing this original work off their own bat in order to get orders for equipment. This 
demonstration further strengthened GEMA's links with them, as they were able to track a 
ship to a distance of 15km, and at an accuracy of ± 0.15 of a degree. The Navy made 
further research funds available on the strength of these achievements. Over the next few 
months they conducted further experiments, and made improvements to both the 48cm 
equipment and the 82cm equipment. When they found that the ranges they could obtain 
with the 48cm equipment were not great enough to be useful, the dispute about whether to 
continue with it was resolved in favour of the 82cm equipment. They reasoned that any 
improvements made to the shorter-wave valves would result in a double improvement in the 
performance of the longer wave ones. By February 1936, they had constructed an 82cm 
equipment and subjected it to tests. In setting it up they didn’t arrange the antenna in the 
correct direction, which led them to detect an aircraft, rather than the ship that it was 
targeted at. Unfortunately there is no great detail about this fortunate “mistake”, but the 
aircraft was at a closer range (8km) than the supposed ship-target. I would presume that 
they were able to calibrate the range finding, and so associated the return from the nearer 
aircraft. This was an important step as it persuaded them that aircraft (being faster moving 
and smaller than ships) were also a potential target for their equipment to detect. They 
performed further tests over the next few days, where they followed aircraft out to greater 
distances, learning to “see” with their equipment to greater ranges.24
24 Pritchard (1989), p41
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GEMA's early research and its relationship with the Navy now presented that Service 
with two possibilities from the investigations they were sponsoring: detection of ships, and 
detection of aircraft. Each option was taken up. By 1938 GEMA had produced prototypes 
of two operational radars: Seetakt for ship to ship detection, and Freya for ship to air or 
ground to air detection. Both these systems employed 2.4m wavelengths, which were much 
longer than most other research in Germany, but still a great deal shorter than the British 
Chain Home, and its 13m wavelengths.25
By the outbreak of the war in September 1939 the GEMA company had considerable 
experience in designing and manufacturing high-quality radars. Their products were well 
engineered, but the technology they employed was no more advanced than the British 
technology of the time. It still utilised conventional glass-envelope valves and conventional 
electrical transmission methods. What was superior to the British was the amount of time 
they took to get it into service; British 1.5m AI, CHL and GCI were not introduced in the 
form of reliable manufactured units until late 1940, 18 months after the Germans. This is 
because the British attitude was to cany on experimenting and modifying prototype 
equipment, rather than design manufacturable units from the outset.
6.3.3 Lorenz
The only other firm to become significantly involved in radar before the outbreak of war 
was the Lorenz Company. Prior to their taking an interest in radar development, which was 
in 1936, they developed a blind-landing system that entered widespread usage among the 
world's airlines, and was even used by the RAF. The system worked by transmitting two 
overlapping beams, one transmitting Morse Code dots, and the other dashes, such that when 
the aeroplane flew along a line in-between the two beams they added together to make a 
continuous tone. Straying one way or the other from the centre would give the sound of 
either dots or dashes in the radio operator's headset. The two transmitters would be aligned
25 Trenkle (1986), p28-9.
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along a runway, such that the centre of the overlapping beams would be over the approach 
path for that runway.26
Due to the development of their blind-landing system, Lorenz had considerable 
experience of transmitting high-power directed radio waves. Lorenz also had an 
experienced valve laboratory, and in early 1936 they began experimentation into detection 0f 
objects using radio waves. Quite where the impetus for this research came from is not clear; 
Pritchard wrote that:
Without official invitation the valve laboratories of the Lorenz Company, under the 
energetic direction of Dr Herriger, developed new 'Acorn' valves as well as high power 
transmitting valves for their own radar research...27
Lorenz began their research with centimetre waves, but extreme difficulties in this area 
led to them increasing the wavelength they used, where the valve technology they employed 
was better understood. Trenkle made the point that:
Die Englander gingen um diese Zeit den umgekehrten Weg: hohe
Empfangerempfindlichkeit und hohe Senderleistung auf Kurzwelle mit grossen, 
feststehenden Antennen geringer Richtwirkung; nach Entwicklung einer genauen 
Entfemungsmesstechnik schrittweiser Ubergang zu kiiizeren Wellen.
[At this time Britain went in the opposite direction: higher receiver sensitivity and higher 
transmitter-performance with short-waves with bigger, fixed antenna; then afterwards 
development of an exact range-measuring technique and gradually transferring to shorter 
waves.]28
Possibly due to their experience of working with these systems, they were able to 
develop sensitive equipment that, by the Autumn of 1936, they were able to install aboard 
ships. Despite being viewed as "suspect" by the Nazis because of their involvement with 
foreign governments, General Martini, the Head of Luftwaffe Signals, took great interest in
26 The OBOE system for blind-bombing employed a similar idea (see chapter 5), as did the German's own 
blind-bombing system Knickebein.
27 Pritchard (1989), p41.
28 Trenkle (1986), p30.
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the firm and their results. As a consequence they pressed on with their developments in the 
hope of securing a Luftwaffe contract with its associated security and investment. Martini's 
association led to them being asked eventually to develop an anti-aircraft gunnery radar, 
which became known as the A2-Gerat. This system worked on 2.4m, and so employed 
-  similar technology to that used by GEMA.
6.3.4 Other Research Institutions
During 1935, in a general expansion of German Research in both the Universities and in 
firms, several Government Institutes came into being. This expansion took place because 
the Nazi Government wanted to expand the Armed Forces, which required technical and 
scientific research. This expansion was in contravention of the Versailles Treaty which 
forbade Germany a modem, large Army and Navy, and allowed them no Air Force at all. 
Most notable for my purposes amongst these were two institutions, the DVL29 and the 
FFO30. It is odd that although these institutes appear to have done a reasonable amount of 
research into the properties of centimetric waves by 1940, little of this information was 
utilised until 1943. Some work was done on reflectivity in 1939/40 by DVL on the 
reflective properties of waves of 14,20 and 50cm. They found that the surface roughness of 
the reflector was more important than the wavelength used in terms of reflectivity properties 
of the target.31
This work is also mentioned elsewhere, by Rode, where it is described as having been 
done in co-operation between DVL and Telefunken. They used a pulsed split-anode 
magnetron with a wavelength of 20cm in an equipment that in tests they were able to use to 
follow a Ju 52 aircraft in order to get a quantitative figure for the backscattering effects of 
aircraft. However, according to this author, there were included some
29 Drahtlos Luftelektrisch Versuchsgesellschaft Gr&feling (Wireless Air-electric Research Company, 
Grafeling.
30 Flugfunkforschungsinstitut (Air Radio Research Institute), Oberpfaffenhofen.
31 Trenkle (1986), p32.
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{f}alse statements on the frequency and geometric size dependencies of the backscatter 
coefficient which had some influence on the development of radar in Germany later on.
Further work in the spring of 1940 used 1:10 scale models, in conjunction with 6cm 
radiation (Wurzburg used 50cm waves). The results that the researchers gleaned from these 
experiments indicated to them that aircraft were extremely good at dispersing very short 
radio waves, to the point that the reflections would be undetectable. These results were to 




I mentioned earlier in this chapter, and in previous chapters, that the impetus for a 
particular application of radar came largely from wider consideration of strategic/tactical 
necessity. This topic is considered in detail by Beyerchen33, where the influence of military 
needs on the type of radars developed in Britain, the US and Germany between the Wars is 
examined. I have described his views on technical, technological and operational change in a 
preceding section.
This issue is particularly pertinent in the case of airborne radar. As I discussed in 
Chapter 2, the British, in particular Tizard, were very quick to see that building an airborne 
radar would be a solution to the particular problem of air defence against bombers at night. 
Radar had come into being as the solution to the problem of daylight air-defence. Night­
time air-defence was still viewed as a significant difficulty.34 Tizard's perceived solution to
32 Rode (1988).
33 Beyerchen (1994).
34 It is interesting that the British perceived that airborne radar in itself, in conjunction with Chain Home, 
would be sufficient to allow successful night-time air-defence. However, in practice, as is very often the 
case, airborne radar proved nearly useless without a lot of additional technical back-qp in the shape of GCI 
ground-control radar, which was more accurate than CH, improved aircraft designs fast-enough to catch the 
German bombers, and the practical skills that had to be evolved by the pilots and radar-operators in learning
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this problem was the installation of a miniature radar set into fighter aircraft, and Bowen was 
set the task of developing such a set in 1936. In a reversal of their policy with ground-based 
early-warning radar, where known technology was employed, Bowen and Tizard knew that 
the current technology was far from up to the job they wished to do.
However, in Germany an altogether different attitude and situation permeated almost 
every level and branch of radar design, development and operation. These views were 
coupled with a completely different set of assumptions of how any future military operations 
would be conducted, and consequently what part (if any) radar would play in strategic 
thinking. This affected the development of their radar in the following ways:
(i) German strategy was offensive, and used the Blitzkrieg35 tactics of quick, motorised 
assaults on a narrow front to penetrate enemy lines. Aircraft were attached to armoured 
groups and used for close-air support of the military. As a consequence air-defence, and the 
use of radar to aid it, was not a military priority.
(ii) The lack of interest in air-defence did not produce the same urgent requirement for the 
development of airborne radar, as it did in Britain.
(iii) German firms and research interests were not working together on this problem, as was 
the case (at least eventually), in Britain.
Conversely, scientists in Britain had started experimentation into airborne radar in 1936, and 
by the outbreak of war had considerable experience in the problems associated with such 
sets (see chapter 2). The Germans did have some experience of putting advanced radio 
equipment in aircraft, but this was through their X-Gerat apparatus. This was a radio 
bombing-aid developed from the Lorentz landing system mentioned earlier.
to use their equipment to make successful interceptions. All this meant that although airborne radar was 
first operational in 1939, it only really became useful by late 1940/early 1941.
35 Blitzkrieg (Lightning-war) was a revolutionary method of conducting warfare that utilised swift-moving 
armour attacks on a short front to punch holes through defences quickly, and encircle the opposing forces. It 
was also, of course, an essentially aggressive strategy. Blitzkrieg also relied heavily on closely integrated air 
bombardment in support of the ground forces. Therefore the Luftwaffe was organised quite differently to its 
British counterpart. Whereas the RAF had separate Bomber, Fighter, Coastal and Training Commands, the 
Luftwaffe was organised into four (later five) Luftflotte (Air-Fleets) that were tied directly to supporting 
particular Army Groups. Each Luftflotte had bombers that operated like long range aerial artillery, attacking 
troops and communications way behind enemy lines. There were also fighters assigned to protect the 
bombers. The strategy was evolved during the Spanish Civil War, and was later used to great effect in the 
invasions of Poland, France and the Low Countries.
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A prerequisite for effective use of the bomber aircraft was that of accuracy (a problem 
the British were also to encounter and face when their thoughts turned to the offensive - see 
chapter 4). If the bombers were to be useful, they had to be able to deliver their loads very 
accurately. Whilst this was not so great a problem during daylight, given air-superiority and 
well-tramed crews, night or cloudy conditions would mean no air operations. Consequently 
the Lorentz Blind-Landing system was adapted for use as a blind-bombing system.
It had features that were similar to the later British OBOE. Two overlapping beams 
were projected in the direction of the target, such that the area of overlap was not very wide 
and lay directly over the aiming point. Each beam was a transmitted Morse-code note, one 
containing dashes, the other dots. The two were timed so that when the operator listened to 
the received tone, if the aircraft was in the area of overlap he heard a continuous tone, and if 
the aircraft strayed hearing dots or dashes would tell him whether he was left or right of the 
centre-line, and therefore which way to move. In order to facilitate accurate bomb release, a 
third beam was transmitted that intersected with the main beam at a point on the run-up to 
the target. When the crossing beam was received, it started a clock-work timing mechanism 
that released the bombs after a certain time. The arrangement of timer and cross-beam were 
set in conjunction with the operational height of the aircraft in order to ensure that the 
release of the bombs was timed so they would hit the aiming point.36
This particular system was not a radar. Apart from some experiments into radio 
altimetry, very little was done at all by researchers in Germany in the area of airborne radar 
until 1940. This is unsurprising given the nature of the German strategy and war-aims, and 
the way their research and development was organised. As I mentioned earlier, the prime 
reason for developing airborne radar in Britain, and also the main impetus for developing 
centimetric radar, was the threat from attacking bombers. It was only after British strategy 
became more aggressive that radar became used for bombing purposes. German strategy 
was aggressive from the outset, and used air bombardment. Furthermore, such 
bombardment was also essentially tactical (in support of other operations) rather than 
strategic (an aim in itself). Strategic long-range bombing was the chief spur to British
36 The British were to suffer at the hands of this device, which was used on many occasions during the 
night-Blitz of Winter 1940-41. The story of its discovery, and British counter-measures to it, can be found in 
Jones (1978).
250
bombing-radar development, and this spur did not exist in Germany at this time. 
Competition and secrecy between firms also didn't aid the situation in Germany. 
Furthermore by the outbreak of war most firms had close relations with a particular 
customer for particular equipment that more than satisfied their production capacity. They 
therefore had little incentive to develop in new directions.
6.4.2 Later Developments up to January 1943
It was only in early 1940, after some experience of war, that the German High 
Command began to enquire whether airborne radar was practicable or not. Further months 
passed before any flight tests due to two problems, one familiar to British designers and the 
other not. Firstly, the German firms who began research in this area had to go through the 
process of actually constructing equipment that was small and light enough to fit into 
aircraft, something that had taken their British equivalents a similar amount of time between 
having the idea and fitting equipment into aircraft. Secondly, the Luftwaffe ordered that no 
antennas should protrude outside the aircraft so as not to impair aircraft speed or 
performance. This rule was only finally relaxed in February 1941. Such experience was not 
unique to Germany; Lovell had a similar problem in convincing Handley-Page to mount the 
external cupola for H2S on their Halifax bomber.
In 1939, Runge had worked on an experimental radio-altimeter designed to pull a 
bomber out of a dive at a certain minimum height. However, there was no real official 
interest and ccthe thing was far too big to go into an aircraft, so we put it in a shelf in the 
laboratory and forgot about it.”37 In the Summer of 1940 Martini, head of the Luftwaffe 
Signals, approached Runge with a view to Telefiinken building a small airborne radar system 
for the night-fighters in Holland to use against British bombers. Runge recalled the altimeter 
system, and decided to adapt it:
37 Runge’s memoirs, quoted in Pritchard (1989), p68.
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It would of course need a sensitive new receiver with a cathode-ray tube and, above 
all, a new type of directional antenna. Obviously, even a 1 metre diameter paraboloid with 
a Quirl [rotating dipole] would cause far too much air resistance. Well, to cut a long story 
short, we re-designed the original equipment and managed to make it much smaller - it 
was only assembly line work really - and we gave it an air test in August. Its range was 
only about 4 kilometres, and you could only track one aircraft at a time, and even then it 
had to be a steadily-flown target38
It is disappointing that there are no more details of the development of this rudimentary 
airborne radar. One would expect that they would have had to go through much the same 
processes that the British went through in designing and building theirs. However, Runge’s 
comments that the re-designing amounted to little more than assembly-line work are 
interesting. This probably suggests that he had little to do with the work personally, for if 
the British experience was anything to go by there was a lot that had to be done. For them, 
building airborne radar required the learning of a lot of practical knowledge about how to 
build and use airborne radar, and I believe that the Germans would have had to go through a 
similar process.
The Telefunken engineers installed the equipment, named Lichtenstein A in a. Me 110 
two-seater night-fighter in Autumn 1940, and sent it to a Luftwaffe squadron for trials. This 
was in principle a good idea, for it was only when the British actually used their AI in 
combat conditions that they worked out all the limitations of the system, many of which 
could not have been foreseen, and the best way to improve it and to use it. However, 
Telefiinken appear to have simply dispatched the aircraft and left the Luftwaffe pilots to get 
on with it, with no attempt being made by the builders to help train operators how to use it 
effectively.
According to Runge, for the first six months at the squadron the aircraft remained in the 
hangar, as the mainly aristocratic night-fighter pilots viewed the utilisation of such aids as 
“unsporting”. He only found this out when he questioned Martini about how the device was 
received. Shortly after his enquiries, a pilot of more ordinary origins was persuaded to use 
the radar equipped plane. After a period of trial and error he and his observer got to grips
38 Runge’s memoirs, quoted in Pritchard (1989), p68.
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with how to use the radar effectively (even though its performance was limited). He then 
successfully shot down several planes, to the point where he was nearing qualification for the 
Iron Cross, First Class. This was awarded to pilots who reached a certain “score” of 
downed aircraft. At this point he was grounded by his CO as it was not deemed satisfactory 
that he should receive such an award after using unsportsmanlike methods. _
Although this story may seem amazing, when viewed in the context of the German 
military and their War-situation at the time, it is not out of character. Firstly, during the 
winter of 1940/41 German bombers were successfully attacking British cities using radio 
methods, and were largely getting through unscathed (significant success with AI did not 
appear until May, by which point shortening nights and preparations for Barbarossa led to 
the Germans reducing their campaign against Britain). Conversely, the British bombing 
campaign during this time was largely ineffectual due to the inability of most navigators to 
get to their target by using dead-reckoning (see chapter 5). There was, therefore, no 
significant pressure on the Luftwaffe to get results by shooting down aeroplanes at night in 
1940/41 - the Flak batteries appeared to be coping significantly well with such aeroplanes as 
were coming over from Britain. This sometimes manifested itself in a more chivalrous 
attitude that did not survive after the Russian campaign and the bombing of cities began in 
earnest. This contrasted to the British, who felt immediately that their cities were under 
threat and were pursuing every means possible to stop the German raids that commenced in 
the winter of 1940.
The other reason for a lack of official interest in radar and other technological advances, 
apart from the fact that the Germans appeared to be winning the war with what they had, 
was the attitude of those at the top. Goring, head of the Luftwaffe and number 2 in the Nazi 
state was a former First World War fighter pilot, and was extremely ambivalent towards 
technological aids for his airforce. When shown the prototype Wurzburg he was so pleased 
he made his infamous and oft mis-quoted remark about adopting a Jewish surname if the 
Ruhr was bombed. At another demonstration he made a disparaging remark about not liking 
boxes filled with coils in aircraft. Furthermore he appointed cronies from his WW I flying
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days to prominent positions in the Luftwaffe, so the official attitude permeated down the 
structure.39
On the part of the pilots, this attitude, coupled with their distrust of new devices that 
ruined40 the aerodynamics of their aircraft, meant that they too often did not use the new 
devices given to them. In chapter 2 I described how when the British AI was introduced the 
reception for it was lukewarm due to its poor serviceability and a lack of appreciation of 
how to use it properly, together with the lack of training and other aids to create a proper 
system of night-time air defence. It is most probable that these complaints existed amongst 
German pilots too, coupled with the aerodynamics problem which was not as big an issue in 
Britain due to the different design of antenna. German designers got round the problem of 
making a narrow beam by using large, directional antenna for their longer-wave apparatus. 
British designers used a floodlighting method in AI Marks I-IV. Linked with the official 
attitude to radar in Germany, this mistrust contributed to an extreme lack of interest in air­
borne radar that manifested itself in a failure to pursue this direction until well into 1941.
The Lichtenstein A was modified by a Telefiinken team, and installed for further tests in 
a Heinkel aircraft. They obtained promising results with an external antenna array, but were 
forbidden from carrying on these experiments by the Luftwaffe order preventing external 
arrays. This was largely due to the attitude of the pilots, who refused to fly with the external 
aerials for the reasons described in footnote 40. After Runge’s experiments with an 
internally-mounted array (called Sagefisch) gave extremely poor results compared to the 
externally-mounted arrays, he finally persuaded Martini to rescind the order in October 
1941.
This led to the production of the modified Lichtenstein BC in February 1942. It had a 
very sensitive receiver, and worked on a wavelength of 90cm and a power of 1.5kW. 
During testing in the September of the previous year, the set, used in conjunction with a 
ground station, was successfully used in combat to shoot down six planes in one night. The
39 Pritchard (1989), pl48.
40 This was more than mere prejudice on the part of the pilots. The large external antenna received 
nicknames like “bedstead’', and altered the aerodynamic properties of the aircraft they were mounted on. 
They could reduce the maximum air-speed by some 30kph, and significantly impaired handling 
characteristics at low speeds. This had the effect of making low-speed manoeuvres, such as landing, much 
more dangerous.
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display was very similar to the British AI Mark IV, except it also had a range-only screen. 
The antenna were mounted in left/right, up/down pairs as in the British set.
The only other radar in operation by the end of 1942 was the GEMA Rostock ASV 
radar In the July of the previous year Atlas-Werke built a prototype ASV set, but little of 
this is known. Later that year, the Germans captured a Mark I ASV intact in an aeroplane 
in North Africa(which was based on Mark IV AI, and worked on the same wavelength). 
German radar of the time worked on a wavelength about half this wavelength, and was 
generally much smaller and lighter. They dismissed it rather contemptuously with the phrase 
viel Luft in den Geraten (much air in the apparatus), which meant that it had a lot of wasted 
space. It had no influence on German radar design, except to confirm German suspicions 
that Allied technology was inferior to their own.
6.5 Conclusions
The Germans’ strategic outlook and political situation had a very marked effect on the 
directions taken by their radar scientists. The aggressive stance that they took meant that 
their goals were very different from the British one of Air Defence. A consequence of this 
aggressive stance was that radar, perceived mainly as a defensive apparatus, was not pursued 
with the same vigour that other projects were.
Unfortunately there is a lack of material for the sort of detailed examination of radar 
development in Germany that I made of the British situation, but there are some conclusions 
that I can draw from what is available:
(i) German commercial firms were the main movers in radar research. This differed greatly 
with Britain where Government Establishments were the main sources of research. Another 
major difference with Britain was that the military services settled their own perceived needs 
by setting up contracts with particular firms. As a result, there was far more secrecy and 
rivalry between firms and services than there was in Germany.
(ii) By the end of 1942, German airborne radar was roughly in the same position in terms of 
types of equipment and in the level of technical complexity and advancement as the British
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metric equipment then in service. What the Germans lacked at this stage was a research 
programme in centimetre techniques. In terms of the utilisation of airborne radar, they 
lacked about a year’s operational experience compared to Britain.
(iii) In certain areas, such as the quality of their engineered equipment, they were ahead of 
the British. As a result they believed themselves to be a match for, if not better than, the 
Allies in this area.
At the end of 1942 / beginning of 1943 several major events took place to initiate a 
German centimetre research programme:
(i) The main one was the discovery of the British H2S in February 1943. This led them to 
realise, as I will explain in the next chapter, that other technologies and different directions 
were possible in radar design.
(ii) In Autumn 1942, the War situation began to deteriorate for Germany, and their economy 
was reorganised and put in the charge of Albert Speer. He began to change the attitudes 
that hampered many areas of German production, such as the endemic suspicion and secrecy 
between all areas of society and the military.
(iii) Another aspect of the deteriorating was situation was the increase in air-raids over 
Germany. This had the effect this had on forcing a re-appraisal of air-defence and airborne 
radar. This acted as a further stimulus to the centimetre programme, as the increase in air­
raids coincided with the discovery of H2S.
256
A Further Counterfactual Intermission
In the next chapter I will describe the situation in German radar research at the point, in 
February 1943, when they discovered centimetre radar. I will go on to examine how they 
went about uncovering what they could about this accidental discovery in the form of a 
captured H2 S set. However, it is possible to argue that centimetre research had a negative 
effect on the German war-effort, rather than a positive one, as it diverted resources away 
into what became an unproductive direction. This need not have been the case,
Firstly, as I have pointed out and will expand upon in the next chapter, the Germans did 
not believe centimetre waves to be useful for AI. The set they first captured was used for 
ground-mapping and navigation by strategic bombers. The Germans went on to attempt to 
rebuild and copy this set, despite them having no need at his time for such an application. 
Indeed, the Berlin copy had to be redesigned to fit into the smaller German aircraft.
Secondly, their belief that centimetres could not be used for AI was only changed after 
the discovery of British centimetre AI sets. This only occurred because an aircraft shot- 
down over the channel crashed on the French Coast. British Al-equipped aircraft were not 
authorised to fly over enemy territory, and it was only bad luck that presented the Germans 
with evidence for this application. It is very likely, given their prejudices, that they would 
not have considered AI experiments worth-while.
Given these conditions it is highly likely that if they had not received the gift of captured 
equipment, the Germans would not have commenced their centimetre programme, the 
equipment they had was sufficient for their needs at this time. What they lacked, was the 
organisation to use this equipment effectively. However, by late 1943 German night-time 
air-defence, faced with the pressure of Harris’ area-bombing strategy, had improved to the 
point that Harris had to call off the night-bombing of Berlin. This was due to the 
unacceptable casualty rate amongst British air-crews.41 Given this, the events that I describe 
in the next chapter were by no means certain to occur.
41 See Saward (1984).
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Chapter 7: German Centimetre Research
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters of this thesis I have been working towards this denouement.
I have described the origins of radar in both Britain (chapter 2) and Germany (chapter 6). 
I have described how microwave components were originated in Britain (chapter 3), how 
they were made into a radar system (chapter 4) and then into H2 S (chapter 5). In this 
chapter I describe what use the Germans made of their discovery of H2 S, and how this 
fits in with the questions that I outlined in chapter 1.
In the first section I go into some depth about the state of the German war economy. 
This differed quite significantly to that in Britain, and it is important to the story of 
German H2 S replication to identify these differences in order to assess whether they 
played any part in the ease (or lack of it) with which the Germans accomplished their 
goals. This section makes considerable use of information from Albert Speer’s Inside the 
Third Reich. Speer was in charge of the whole of the Nazi War Economy between 
1942-45. His analysis of the German economic situation at that time, coupled with 
supporting evidence which I have gleaned from my own archive work, is very useful in 
helping to uncover the pressures on German radar research that were external to the 
scientists’ problems of learning about their recent captured equipment.
In the next two sections I describe the impact of H2 S when it arrived, and then what 
use the Germans made of it. I assess what the Germans actually learned from H2S, and 
from where this knowledge came. I then take this information and use it to address some 
of the issues in Science Studies that I discussed in chapter 1. In particular, I want to re­
examine Collins’ ideas on replication in the light of the Germans’ experience with H2 S. In 
this chapter I will highlight instances of copying, and define the difference re-building, 
copying and replication. I will assess whether the re-building of H2 S by the Germans fits 
into the categories that Collins defines. In the next chapter, I will assess the findings of 
this chapter within the terms of the aims set out in chapter 1.
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7.2 The Change in the German War Economy 1942-3 and the Reasons for the lack 
of German Centimetre Research
One of the most striking differences in the circumstances between early British and 
German radar development lay in the way each side organised the relationships between 
the Services who required radar, the companies who built it and the researchers who 
developed it. In Germany there was not the same strategic goal of air Defence to spur 
the development of radar as there was in Britain. Fear of air attack was, for the British, 
the main reason for pursuing scientific means of air defence. This culminated in the 
development of the early-warning radar chain, and, ultimately, centimetric airborne radar. 
Importantly, radar was always seen as an important means of national survival, and was 
therefore awarded high priority from the very top levels of government. This had the 
effect, eventually, of centralising centimetric radar research into one government 
establishment. There were also many concerted efforts made to improve communication 
between different organisations concerned with developing, building and using radar, and 
between different levels within these organisations. It is fair to say that information 
exchanges, especially in the first year of the war, did not always go smoothly as the case 
of the Airborne Group in St Athan (see chapter 2) illustrates. Conversely, by 1942 at the 
height of the H2 S project Lovell was able to appeal almost directly to the Prime Minister, 
and to the head of his ministry, Sir Robert Renwick, in order to speed up bureaucratic 
processes that were slowing down aspects of his work.
By direct contrast, the whole culture of Nazi Germany worked in opposition to the 
free flow of information. As I described in the last chapter, radar development in 
Germany took the pattern of individual firms supplying the requirements of one Service, 
and sometimes even a particular branch of that Service. This was compounded by the 
rivalry, competition and secrecy between the Services and also the firms, such that 
information was not shared between them. Whilst this may have been acceptable in an 
atmosphere of peace-time private-enterprise competition, its continuation during war­
time seriously hampered efforts to standardise and streamline war-time production, as 
Speer found out when he took over the running of the economy in 1942. The situation in 
Industry and in the Armed Forces mirrored that in the Nazi Party, where the over-arching 
principles were “divide and rule”, and “expand one’s sphere of influence at the expense
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of others”. Speer, as a confidant of Hitler and a highly placed member of the Nazi 
government, was well equipped to observe these processes at work.
When the Second World War started, Britain set in motion a whole set of changes to 
the economy, many of which had direct influences on the development of radar. Some of 
them, such as setting up AMRE and CVD, were done before the war. Others, such as 
the employment of University scientists in government research establishments, and 
enforced co-operation between hitherto competing commercial firms, came soon 
afterwards. The British Government soon realised that the only way it could fight a war 
against Germany and maintain its commitment to the Empire, was to engage the whole 
populace in a policy of total war. A consequence of this policy was the centralisation of 
planning of production in order to make sure that scarce resources of labour and 
materials were not wasted in a duplication of effort. It was not always the case that such 
central planning could ensure swift and plentiful supply of vital components, if, for 
example, the necessary skills or production facilities simply did not exist in the first place. 
There were certainly shortages and mistakes were made, and one revisionist historian has 
reassessed the British war economy as having been a disaster, exemplified by the need to 
import large amounts of material from the U.S. because British workers and workshops 
were incapable of supplying sufficient amounts of the right quality at the right time.1 
Another example from a contemporary source showed that as late as January 1942, one 
of the reasons advanced for pursuing a klystron version of H2 S was that all the available 
magnetron-production capacity was taken up supplying the requirements for AI Mark 
VIII.2 The previous year, a deciding factor in taking the cavity magnetron to the USA on 
the Tizard Mission was the realisation that producing enough magnetrons to satisfy 
expected demand would take every single skilled machinist in the country!
Nevertheless, despite difficulties and setbacks, British policy was geared towards 
maximising co-operation. In some cases, where there was official scepticism or hostility 
towards certain radar devices which could have delayed projects, the objections were 
usually over-ridden either by a demonstration or a “Sunday Soviet” meeting (as in the 
official scepticism over the wisdom of pursuing centimetre research in 1940), or through
1 Barnett (1986).
2 AVIA15/1609, 37a (26/1/42).
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pressure exerted by the Prime-Minister through his association with CherweU (as in the 
case of H2 S).
In Britain radar research was hampered by economic events, even though there was 
a culture geared (paradoxically, in wartime) towards co-operation. In Germany the 
shape of the war economy also had a great effect on the way radar research, especially 
centimetric research, progressed. This was especially great because war-time conditions 
enhanced the natural Nazi inclination towards suspicion and excessive secrecy. In this 
section I wish to explore the impact of how the realities of economic life affected the 
centimetre research programme firstly, in killing it off in 1940, and secondly, in impeding 
it when it was restarted in 1943.
Speer has written of how great was the difference in attitude between Britain and 
Germany over the domestic approach to the war:
It remains one of the oddities of this war that Hitler demanded far less of his 
people than Churchill and Roosevelt did from their respective nations. The 
discrepancy between the total mobilisation of labour forces in democratic England and 
the casual treatment of this question in authoritarian Germany is proof of the regime’s 
anxiety not to risk any shift in the popular mood.3
It took a long time for the German4 war economy to become totally geared up in the 
same way as the British, and there are several reasons for this. Initially it wasn’t 
necessary, but when it was there was resistance to going over to the idea of Total War. 
However, the main reason why it took so long was because of Hitler himself.
Firstly, prosecution of the war was in the hands of Hitler, as supreme commander. 
In this, as in his Foreign Policy prior to the war, he had no overall strategy. He acted 
largely on gut feeling and intuition, which meant that there was no long-term planning in
3 Speer (1993 edn.), p300.
4 What Speer is alluding to in the quote, was his belief that in order to maintain support for a war of 
conquest, Hitler had to ensure that there was no lessening of the material standard of living for Germans. 
Correlli Barnett, and Speer himself, have argued that the German economy contained a great deal of 
slack that could have been used to increase production greatly. Speer attempted to do this, and was very 
successful despite damage to plant from air-raids and a shortage of raw materials. Conversely, the pre­
war British economy was very weak, and had to be mobilised in totality to avoid defeat In some areas it 
was unable to make up the shortfall, and had to be supplemented firstly by Commonwealth countries, 
and later by the USA through lend-lease. Barnett, in The Audit o f War, (Barnett (1986)), is seeking to 
show that the ailments of modem Britain were created by the wartime economy. His views in relation to 
the aircraft industry during and after the war are challenged by Edgerton (1992).
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any of his moves (unless one counts the aims listed in Mein Kampf, including a call for 
Lebensraum in the East). The speed of victory in the West, and initially in the East, took 
most people, including the military, completely by surprise. A long war was never 
Germany’s aim. The shrewder military commanders realised that, in the long run, 
Germany’s lack of raw materials would mean eventual defeat when pitched against the 
combined industrial might and raw-material base of the British Empire and the United 
States.
Up until the attack on Russia in 1941, the whole German economy was based on 
small “bursts” of war-activity in conjunction with their military campaigns. In between, 
the Forces would pause and re-equip, and Hitler would consider where next he should 
extend his territorial ambitions. This had the remarkable effect of initiating stop-go 
contracts for war-materials. Ammunition factories would work flat-out before and 
during campaigns to satisfy contracts, and stand down immediately afterwards, there was 
no long-term planning to maximise productive capacity in an efficient manner.5
Another consequence of this was that the economy never went over solely to 
producing war-goods. Even as late as 1941, production of consumer goods was only 3% 
below peace-time rates, whereas in Britain (although not in the USA, which had a far 
larger industrial base and did not need to maximise production in the same way), 
production of consumer goods ceased.6 The vast majority of workers were men, as 
women were forbidden from working by Nazi ideology. This meant that many men were 
working in factories, when they could have been replaced by women (as they were in 
Britain and the USA) and released to serve in the Armed Forces. Conversely, and 
equally bizarrely, many highly skilled workers and technicians were drafted to serve in 
front-line units when their skills would have been better employed in producing war- 
goods.
That this situation pertained was a combination of the incredibly wasteful Nazi 
bureaucracy, of a realisation by the Nazi leadership that it was important to avoid 
breeding conditions for discontent, especially if they were living a highly ostentatious 
lifestyle in the middle of a war, and of officials ‘Teathering their own nests” and diverting 
resources to their own pet projects. For example, thousands of construction workers
5 Speer (1993 edn.),p301.
6 Speer (1993 edn.), p310.
262
were employed in constructing Hitler’s grandiose building schemes, or official residences 
and concrete bunkers for Party dignitaries right up until the end of the war. Hitler had 
been around during the period immediately after the end of the First World War when 
popular discontent overthrew the Kaiser, and later threatened the Weimar regime with a 
Communist revolution. He was determined to keep the populace happy and subdued. 
Quick, easy victories and the trappings of peace even in wartime provided this internal 
stability until the external threat was of sufficient magnitude to cause a rethink in official 
policy.7
However, in February 1942 the stewardship of the German war-economy passed 
into the hands of Albert Speer, who had hitherto been part of the Nazi hierarchy in the 
guise of Hitler’s Chief Architect. Hitler had a considerable interest in architecture and 
used Speer as a confidant, which meant that Speer gained a large measure of personal 
influence with him. Hitler often chose to withdraw from the running of the War at 
stressful times, such as when campaigns were not going well, and discuss his plans for 
rebuilding Berlin with Speer.
Up until this point responsibility for running the economy had lain in the hands of 
two people: Goring, who ostensibly ran the Nazi Four Year Plan for the economy, and 
Dr Todt. Todt was a civil engineer who rose to prominence before the war by designing 
the Autobahnen. By the time of his death on February 7th 1942, he was responsible for 
roads, waterways and power-plants within the Reich, roads in the occupied territories, 
and armaments and munitions. He was the head of the Todt Organisation, a labour force 
of German and foreign construction workers used for major projects. During 1941/2 
these workers were constructing the West Wall defences along the European coastline, 
and U-Boat pens in France, under the auspices of Goring’s Four Year Plan. Goring was 
nominally the second in command of the Nazi state, and in charge of economic policy, 
although Hitler was always deliberately vague about such appointments in order to 
ensure no one individual got powerful enough to challenge him. Todt was killed in an 
aeroplane crash after visiting Hitler’s headquarters, following an inspection tour of 
construction work in Russia.
Todt’s replacement was Albert Speer, who systematically set about revitalising the 
Nazi economy. Because of the profound effect he had on German production it is worth
7 Speer (1993 edn.), p301.
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taking a look at what he achieved and how he achieved it, to see whether any of the 
changes he wrought could have had any effect on German radar research and production.
When Speer took over from Todt he was in his mid thirties, and was a trusted friend 
of Hitler. His rise within the “inner circle” was due to his becoming Hitler’s architect, 
and his responsibility for designing, in conjunction with Hitler, far-reaching schemes for 
rebuilding Berlin and Numberg. During the earlier part of the war he continued to run 
these building projects, but after the invasion of Russia in late 1941 the scope of his 
activities widened slightly. His construction duties meant he was in charge of 65,000 
workers engaged on the building schemes in these two cities.
As the German armies advanced through Russia between July and November 1941, 
they conquered huge swathes of territory and created very long supply lines. The 
German offensive ground to a halt as winter set in, primarily because of the length of 
these supply lines which caused huge problems for the armies. As the Russians retreated, 
they ripped up the railways and destroyed all rolling-stock and ancillary railway facilities 
such as coal sheds, water towers, signal boxes and stations. This meant the Germans had 
to rely initially on road transport. However, when winter arrived the conditions made 
road transportation practically impossible, as the roads churned to mud and then froze in 
deep ruts, and then engines froze in the intense cold. It was imperative to get the 
railways working again as soon as possible, but this was overlooked in the first flush of 
victory. Speer heard of the difficulties being faced by the armies in Russia, and 
recommended to Hitler that he be allowed to divert 30,000 of his workers from the 
(strictly speaking, non-essential) building projects into the repair of the Russian railways. 
Hitler took two weeks to come round to the idea, as he did not wish to slow down work 
on his cherished plans, but finally consented on December 27th 1941. Through the next 
month Speer made an inspection tour in Russia of the work being done by his men, and 
was due to fly out with Todt on the same plane, but cancelled after a long meeting with 
Hitler delayed his sleep. On awaking the next day, he was told the news of Todt’s death 
when the plane crashed, and was summoned to see Hitler. To Speer’s astonishment he 
was appointed Todt’s successor in all departments, not solely in construction which was 
the only thing he was vaguely qualified to do.8
8 Speer (1993 edn.), pp264-5.
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On first sight it would appear strange that Hitler should appoint a non-specialist to 
run such vital parts of the Nazi state during wartime, but:
...it was in keeping with Hitler’s dilettantism that he preferred to choose non­
specialists as his associates. After all, he had already appointed a wine-salesman as 
his Foreign Minister, his party philosopher as his Minister for Eastern Affairs, and an 
erstwhile fighter pilot as overseer of the entire economy. Now he was picking an 
architect of all people to be his Minister of Armaments. Undoubtedly Hitler preferred 
to fill positions of leadership with laymen. All his life he respected but distrusted 
professionals...9
By contrast Churchill liked to surround himself with expert opinion, as shown by his 
close relationship with Lindemann. This could have been a recipe for disaster, but 
fortunately for Hitler, Speer turned out to be exceptionally good at his new job. 
Although he was initially appalled at the size of the task that faced him, his experience in 
two key areas were of great benefit. Firstly, he understood the workings of the Nazi 
state and was sufficiently “in” with Hitler to be able to get the better of his colleagues, 
and secondly his experience with running large-scale construction projects had already 
given him an appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Nazi economy in terms 
of how things were done and how they might be improved.
No sooner had Speer been appointed than Goring showed his hand. As the number 
2 in the Nazi state, and the head of the economic Four Year Plan, Goring felt that he 
should be given command of the armaments programme and the war economy. This 
illustrated the way Hitler ran his “inner circle”; Goring felt that Speer’s appointment 
eroded his power base and threatened his standing with Hitler. Furthermore, Goring’s 
ostentatious lifestyle was supported by industrialists who used this as a means to get 
influence in tendering for contracts. On the day following Todt’s death Goring tried to 
ensure that Hitler gave him what he wanted, but Hitler’s mind was made up - Speer was 
in charge. In order to avoid Goring making trouble for him, Speer saw to it that he 
intimated to Goring that he viewed Goring as his superior. Satisfied that there was no 
threat to his lifestyle he acquiesced, letting Speer have a virtual free hand. This gave
9 Speer (1993 edn.), p280.
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Speer much greater scope for making what he saw as improvements to the way things 
were run.10
The first official engagement that Speer had to perform in his new role was to attend 
a conference arranged by Milch, head of the Air Ministry, to discuss the supply of 
armaments to and between the three Services. It was this conference that convinced 
Speer that he had to make changes in the current order of things. The main theme of this 
conference was that bureaucratic incompetence in the form of changing priorities, orders 
and disputes was significantly interfering with production. In the judgement of many of 
those attending, there was considerable slack in the economy that was not being taken up 
for these very reasons. The view of Industry, grudgingly supported by the three 
Services, was that there had to be a sole person to make the sort of decisions that were at 
that time leading to a state of confusion.11
Speer used this meeting firstly to strengthen his position with Hitler and then to 
begin the process of tackling the many problems. He had, he felt, an advantage gained 
through operating at a lower level in the order of things, as he had seen “many 
fundamental errors which would have remained hidden from me had I been at the top.”12 
The most over-reaching problem between the Services and Industry was the duplication 
of effort and equipment. An example of this was the different firms contracted to 
develop specific types of radar by each Service, who had no knowledge of what the other 
firms were doing (see chapter 6). This policy was deliberately fostered by the Services, 
who, according to Dr Brandt (Head of Centimetre Development at Telefimken), 
deliberately organised competition with other firms during peacetime to ensure that 
Telefimken did not become too powerful.13 Amazingly, this situation still pertained in 
wartime. Immediately after the Industrial Conference on February 13 th, Speer wrested a 
pledge from Milch to end the inter-service rivalry between the Luftwaffe, and the Army 
and Navy over procurement of equipment.
Only five days after his first conference, Speer had a further armaments-related 
conference in his own Ministry. Immediately preceding this he drew up a set of new
10 Speer (1993 edn.),p275.
11 Speer (1993 edn.), pp284-5.
12 Speer (1993 edn.), p287.
13 AVIA10/141, Report 5: “Interrogation of Herren Brandt & Kotowski by W.B.Lewis, 24/5/45.” Brandt 
was, amongst other things, Chief Manager of Development at Telefimken, and an advisor to General 
Martini, Head of Luftwaffe Signals.
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priorities for production, standardising as much as possible so that, for example, all ball­
bearings were ordered from the same manufacturers. Used to thinking in three 
dimensions as an architect, he drew out a three-dimensional schema of the new 
organisation to show to the heads of Industry and the Forces in order to explain how he 
was changing things.14 The conference duly endorsed his methods, and on March 21st 
1942 he was given sole authority in a decree by Hitler.
Speer’s approach owed a lot to a man called Rathenau, who had planned armaments 
production during the First World War. One of his assistants now worked in Todt’s 
office, which Speer inherited, and was able to advise him on details of what Rathenau 
believed. Rathenau applied the principle of “Industrial Self Responsibility”, whereby:
...considerable increases in production could be achieved by exchange of technical 
experiences, by division of labour from plant to plant, and by standardisation. As early 
'’s 1917 he declared that such methods could guarantee “ a doubling of production 
with no increase in labour costs.”15
Amazingly, these practices, fairly standard for modem production line methods, were not 
current in German factories at this time. As well as the limited contracts associated with 
the stop/start nature of campaigns mentioned earlier, very often each plant would be 
working on four or five contracts for different services at the same time. Speer took 
steps to ensure that each plant would handle only one product. In the light of the aims of 
this thesis it is also interesting to note the call for an “exchange of technical experiences” 
as a means of speeding up production. Speer did not elucidate further, but I take this to 
mean that he wanted engineers to engage in face-to-face co-operation.
Speer envisaged giving plant managers greater freedom to set and meet their own 
targets, and to enjoy a flexibility that had hitherto been denied them. For example, at 
Telefimken during the war it was impossible for the research staff to do their own 
research independently in areas which interested them. Officially they were only 
supposed to pursue research that related directly to a military contract. Later they got 
around this by doing some projects which fell into grey areas.16 Speer’s approach bore
14 Speer (1993 edn.), p288.
15 Speer (1993 edn.), p292.
16 AVIA10/141, Report 5.
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fruit in that six months after he started on this programme, production of all armaments 
had increased significantly. However, at no stage did it ever reach the levels attained 
during the First World War.
Speer continued to try to implement changes that he felt would improve production. 
He was certainly successful in these aims, as several sources testify.17 Furthermore, in 
many areas German production reached its peak at the height of the Allied bombing 
campaign. Allied bombing was supposed to severely impair German productive capacity. 
Speer also believed that the Allies’ other intended aim, that of destroying morale, failed 
to happen too. This is interesting, for it is clear that the Allied aims of destroying 
Germany’s production capacity and morale were far from reached. Speer believed that 
some actions, such as the Dams Raid in May 1943 and the Schweinfurth raids against 
ball-bearing factories in October of the same year came close to achieving the aims. 
However, a failure to repeat the attacks allowed these installations to resume production. 
It is not clear why the targets were not re-attacked, except that casualties were so high in 
both cases that maybe it was thought that the propaganda value, especially of the Dams 
raid, outweighed the actual level of achievement.18
However, the Allied Bomber Offensive had other unforeseen consequences on the 
war, which were less quantifiable. The British night-time air-raids tied up large parts of 
the German war-economy. For example, 50% of the German electronics industry was 
producing radars and communications equipment for air defence in 1944. Ten thousand 
guns were deployed defending cities rather than on the Eastern Front, as were several 
tens of thousands of troops to man them. Many more thousands of men were employed 
in emergency services engaged in dealing with the immediate and medium term effects of 
bombing, such as fire and ambulance workers and construction/demolition. It is very 
difficult to gauge what effect these resources would have had if they had been deployed 
elsewhere, but it is possible that they could have been enough to tip the balance in some 
of the decisive battles that Germany fought.19
17 See, for example, figures for production quoted in Saward (1984) and Webster & Frankland (1961).
18 Following the fiftieth anniversary of the Dams Raid, their has been a reinterpretation of the 
effectiveness of the raid. Historians now believe that the value was largely propaganda. Only the 
destruction of the earth-banked Sorpe Dam, which failed to occur, would have had the effect sought - 
that of stopping steel production in the Ruhr. BBC documentary, screened in May 1993.
19 Speer (1993 edn.), pp381-2.
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7.2.1 The Effects On the Electronics Industry
Speer’s reforms had only limited effect on the electronics industry. On the positive 
side, Milch’s discussions with Speer led to the appointment of General Martini to 
responsibility for radar for the Luftwaffe. He enthusiastically pursued contacts between 
that service and all the companies and establishments supplying it with radar equipment, 
in order to facilitate improvements in getting what the Luftwaffe wanted.20 
Unfortunately, there was still official indifference and ambivalence towards new 
technology. This attitude came right from the top, as Speer explained:
Hitler’s technical horizon... was limited by the First World War. His technical 
interests were narrowly restricted to the traditional weapons of the army and the navy.
In these areas he had continued to learn and steadily increase his knowledge, so that 
he frequently proposed convincing and usable innovations. But he had little feeling 
for such new developments as, for example, radar...21
In chapter 6 I recounted how Goring, too, had an ambivalent attitude towards radar. 
Milch shared this attitude, and according to Brandt (a Telefimken engineer), both of them 
disliked Martini. In true Nazi Party style, they replaced Martini with Dr Rottgart of 
Telefimken in February 1944. Rottgart was a Party man who was more supplicant to 
their wishes. Brandt complained that the new organisation became unwieldy.
Speer was especially concerned about the muddle over the conscription of personnel 
with considerable technical experience into the Services, rather than engaging them in 
research. For example, by the beginning of the war over 60% of all students had been 
called up. Furthermore, the number of electronics students fell by 50% over the period 
1932-9. This was partly due to conscription, but partly also because of the lack of 
lecturers due to racial persecution.22
Speer was also concerned about the low accord given to fundamental research. The 
latter state of affairs was the legacy of the short-termism affecting German thinking, 
which had manifested itself in an October 1940 decree from Hitler forbidding the pursuit 
of any research that would not come to fruition within a year. This order had the effect
20 AVIA10/141, Report 5.
21 Speer (1993 edn.), pp323-4.
22 Kcm (1994), pl79.
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of putting another nail into the coffin of German centimetre research pre-1943, of which 
more shortly. In May 1942 Speer met with General Fromm, in charge of conscription, 
who arranged for him to meet with German scientists engaged in nuclear research. On 
the strength of this second meeting, where, amongst others, Heisenberg complained of 
the lackjof personnel available for this research, Fromm offered to release several 
hundred conscripted scientists from military service.23 In order to raise the profile of 
science, Goring was persuaded to take over as head of the Reich Research Bureau 
(Reichsforschungsrat, RFR) in June 1942.24 However, these efforts did not bear fruit in 
terms of the electronics industry, as archived letters confirm. In August 1943, well into 
the beginning of the centimetre research programme, Professor Esau of Telefimken 
wrote to Plendl (Head of the High-Frequency Research Office of the RFR) urging that 
physicists should not be withdrawn into the Luftwaffe,25 and a further letter in September
1943 asking for an increase in personnel.26 This situation still pertained in 1944, as a 
lecture by Brandt at that time indicated:
Der menschensatz, nicht die technische Durchfuhrbarkeit bestimmte Tempo und 
Breite der Einfuhrung der neuen Technik. [The speed and scope with which this technique 
will be introduced will be decided by the manpower situation and not by technical ability to 
cany it out].27
Other difficulties inherent within the Nazi system, such as the obsessive secrecy, 
were extremely difficult for him to eradicate. The reflex behaviour of the past ten years 
could not be forgotten overnight. Speer tried to see that committees were formed, where 
ideas about how to improve production and eradicate mistakes could be discussed. 
There was considerable resistance to these on the part of factory owners, who were 
conservative towards change and fearful of criticising and being criticised, so they were 
of only limited success.28 A report on the phenomenon of secrecy, in conjunction with 
the employment of Hochschule (polytechnic) personnel, for the RFR written in June
1944 concluded that:
23 Speer (1993 edn.), pp315-6.
24 Speer (1993 edn.), p315.
25 R26m /132, letter 22/8/43.
26 R26III/132, letter 3/9/43.
27 RL39/515.
28 Speer (1993 edn.), p297.
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(i) Personnel in the Hochschulen wish to help with military research, but have no idea 
what is going on in this area due to excessive secrecy.
(ii) There is a lack of communication in this area, and consequently a duplication of 
work in certain projects.
(iii) Things are often treated as secrets which shouldn’t be.
(iv) There was a lack of co-ordination between firms on industrial processes.
(v) Material which the enemy already has a knowledge of should be made available for 
general release to the press and public. This would have the added benefit of 
countering Anglo-American propaganda about a lack of open-ness in Germany.29
These difficulties were still a problem in June 1944, so they go to show that Speer’s 
efforts were only partially successful at eradicating some of the Germans’ problems
Hitler’s order of October 1940 forbidding research was only one of the reasons why 
centimetre research failed to get under way in Germany before 1943. In the previous 
chapter I mentioned how research done at this time gave researchers the impression that 
the reflection of high-frequency waves by aircraft and other targets would be minimal, 
and so this line of research should not be continued (a similar thing nearly happened in 
Britain, see chapter 4). One author neatly summarised what were the reasons for 
Germany losing the initiative in high-frequency research:
(i) Hitler, Gdring and Milch’s ignorance.
(ii) Rivalry between the Navy and the Luftwaffe.
(iii) Rivalry between the Technical Office of the Luftwaffe, the Signal Service, and the 
Night-Fighter Service within the Luftwaffe.
(iv) Production capacity was one tenth of the Allies.
(v) There were nearly a hundred small research laboratories which w ere not allowed to 
exchange practical knowledge and expertise.
(vi) Many engineers and craftsmen were serving in front line units rather than doing 
research.
(vii) Until 1942, there were no manuals and no training schools for radar.30
29 R26III/140 Report on Secrecy, June 1944.
30 Aders (1978), p74.
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This bears out what I have written in the previous chapter, and what I have quoted from 
Speer in this chapter.31 But he also added:
Last but not least there was the long-lasting erroneous evaluation of the centimetre 
waveband and its usefulness for location and orientation purposes that led to the 
German inferiority in electronic technology.
In November 1942, only a few weeks before the discovery of the first British 
centimetre navigation radar in a shot-down bomber, the chief of Telefimken 
Laboratories, Dr Runge, said that very little could be achieved with centimetre waves, 
and that only at great expense. Thereupon the centimetre research laboratory was 
disbanded to concentrate all available technicians on further development of the 50cm 
and 2.4m wavebands, of which much was expected. This decision shows clearly that 
the research establishments and the industry had no idea what the fighting units really 
required...32
Runge, as head of the largest electronics firm in Germany, would have had considerable 
influence over what research was carried out by his firm. This was another shortfall of 
the policy of leaving research to autonomous firms, and the culture of authority prevalent 
in Germany. The British were not without similar instances, though, as the experience of 
Rowe and Bowen (see chapter 2) also illustrates.
The above quote illustrates that the kind of lessons that the British learnt early in the 
war, and especially during 1940 with the implementation of the early 1.5m AI equipments 
(see chapter 2), were still to be learned in Germany. A lack of communication between 
the user (the RAF) and the designers (AMRE) led to confusion over what was wrong 
with the equipment. This resulted in the minimum range fiasco. Subsequently the RAF 
became more involved with the inception of radar devices, but often in practice 
AMRE/TRE had to do a certain amount of “selling” of their devices. This process was 
eased by the later adoption of Operational Research.33
31 The British instituted training for radar operators very early on in relation to Chain Home, in 1938/9. 
The lesson of the necessity to train operators and mechanics was reinforced with AI Marks I-III in the 
winter of 1939/40, see chapter 2.
32 Aders (1978), p74.
33 See Air Publication 3368 (1963) for retails of how Operational Research was originated in Britain.
See also chapter 4.
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Runge’s beliefs were due to the research, related in chapter 6, that claimed to show 
that reflection from aircraft when illuminated by 10cm would be minimal. Brandt’s 
immediate post-war interview with British Intelligence confirmed this:
Mr Brandt made an interesting statement on why German research did not 
proceed with the development of centimetre radar until 1943, when H2S arrived In 
spite of disagreement from a number of people, Dr Runge, an eminent and much 
respected engineer and scientist, claimed to have proved it was not worthwhile 
proceeding below 20cm because the equivalent number of dipoles for an aircraft did 
not go on increasing proportionally as X was reduced He based all his arguments on 
this theoretical curve he produced. Somebody later found a slip in the analysis he had 
employed [see overleaf for diagram].34
This idea that centimetre waves might be mirrored away rather than reflected was upheld 
by Dr Esau, too, as Pritchard related.35
Runge’s scientific, political and social status within the Nazi hierarchy as “an 
eminent and much respected engineer and scientist” meant that although others may have 
disagreed with his conclusions, the issue of the non-reflection of centimetre waves was 
decided in his favour. He had a higher status than those who disagreed with him and this 
meant that he was able to carry the argument. Happenings like this were a particularly 
prevalent facet of Nazi society, where deference to authority was regarded as the norm.36 
As there was no scope for dispute within the firm, and Runge had produced a graph 
which “proved” his case, it was only the later discovery of an artefact that appeared to 
refute his argument (the H2S set, see next section) that allowed the debate and enquiry to 
be reopened.
In the next sections I shall outline how the Germans dealt with this particular 
discovery that refuted the accepted “truth” about centimetre wavelengths and radar. I 
have explored the background to the German war economy because, in order to make a 
comparison, it is necessary to consider all the areas of science and society that differed
34 AVIA10/141, Report 9.
35 Pritchard (1989), p87.
36 See Collins (1985), ch 4 for discussion of how social processes affect the closure of debate in instances 
of controversial science.
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Figure 7.1: German curve relating wavelength to equivalent number of dipoles, 
this curve was used to assess whether going to shorter wavelengths was beneficial. 
From AVIA10/141.
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from Britain. In particular, support for centimetre radar in Britain was always 
forthcoming and at a very high level.
The situation in Britain differed greatly from the German experience, as I have 
shown in this section by examining Speer’s account, confirmed by several other sources 
(some original):
(i) support for radar projects in Germany was often, at best, ambivalent and at worst 
downright hostile. This was often the case with senior members of the Nazi Party, like 
Goring.
(ii) The Germans suffered greatly from conscription of their key personnel. In Britain, 
key scientists were identified pre-war and recruited into government research 
laboratories.
(iii) due to obsessive levels of secrecy, there were always difficulties in communication 
between different levels in an organisation, and between organisations.
(iv) finally, towards the end of the war, the Germans suffered an almost complete 
collapse of their state.
All these points should be bom in mind when viewing what happened to German 
centimetre research, as they made the German experience very different to that of the 
British.
7.3 Initial Reactions to the Discovery of H2S
On the night of February 2nd/3rd 1943, one of the British Pathfinder H2S-equipped 
Stirling Bombers, on only the second mission of the new equipment, was shot down over 
Holland. There were at least two other captures, later in 1943, of equipment that was 
more intact than this, but this was to prove the most significant because it forced a 
complete rethink of German radar research. It was standard practice for teams of 
electronic engineers from firms like Telefimken to strip any aircraft wreckage in order to 
examine the equipment it carried. The H2S set was discovered, and taken to Telefimken 
in Berlin for assessment. The one biggest fear for the British about using the magnetron 
in H2S was that it was the only magnetron-equipped device that would have any 
possibility of enemy capture, for its whole purpose was as a navigation aid over enemy
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territory (see chapter 5 for details of the discussion over this). The other magnetron- 
equipped radars were either used only within or above British soil, or else were installed 
on ships. Assessments by British experts of the time they predicted that it would take to 
copy the magnetron varied from 3 months to 2 years.37 In the end, the most persuasive 
argument for using the device was that it would help them to destroy the German’s 
industrial base, and that even if it were not used there was every possibility that the 
Germans would develop it anyway.38
The Germans possibly had the opportunity to develop the cavity magnetron before 
their discovery of a British one in 1943. The Japanese had begun researching into split- 
anode magnetrons in 1937. Their work led them to build a 10cm ship-search radar. The 
prototype became operational in October 1941, and 100 production sets were delivered 
by June 1942, as one of the engineers who worked on it related:
The No.22 radar (A, = 10cm) had a capability of detecting surface targets at a 
distance of 35km and proved the importance of 10cm radar, but it had no capability of 
detecting an aircraft as the antenna was designed for horizontal rotation only. The 
navy staffs considered air defence to be more important and for this purpose only the 
meter wavelength was necessary. Further, we had no information that microwave 
radars were being used by England, the USA and Germany... However... we, the radar 
engineers, had confidence that the principle of radar is the usage of microwaves.
39Therefore, we did not stop our research although there were many criticisms.
Furthermore, as early as 1941 the Japanese had developed a sealed-off cavity magnetron, 
which bears a striking resemblance to the Randall/Boot device of the previous year (see 
overleaf for picture):
We... completed a prototype on an all-metal magnetron in 1941, but we could not 
proceed any further due to the shortage of materials for the permanent magnets and of 
manufacturing facilities.40
37 Batt (1991), pl07.
38 Saward (1984), pl55.
39 Nakajima (1988), p249.
40 Nakajima (1988), p255.
Figure 7.2: Japanese cavity magnetron, 1941. Compare this to the British 
magnetrons, figures 3.2, 3 .3,3.4. From Nakajima (1988), p256.
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However, the level of information exchange between the Axis powers was far below 
the norm of that for the Allied powers, where British revelations to the Empire and to the 
USA paved the way for full information exchanges between these countries. This did not 
always guarantee good results (such as the problems over whether the Americans could 
make H2 S work - see chapter 5), but it did at least avoid the sort of situation where 
something as major as the cavity magnetron could be invented in one country and 
unheard of in one with which it was supposed to be co-operating.
The problem was that the Germans generally believed themselves to be technically 
superior to other nations, which often meant that they failed to take note of other 
countries’ innovations. Therefore, even if the Japanese had informed them of their cavity 
magnetron, there is no guarantee that they would have used the information. This was 
certainly the case with the Russian cavity magnetron, which was invented in 1939 and 
published freely (albeit in a Russian journal). One German researcher, under 
interrogation immediately after the war, indicated that published material on the Russian 
cavity magnetron reached Germany in 1940 but that no interest was shown until the 
discovery of the British version in 1943. The same source said that the Germans viewed 
Italy as suspect, and technical liaison between the two countries was not close. There 
was some liaison with the Japanese, but they “gave little away, even if asked”, and 
besides the Germans thought they had nothing to learn from them41. A German 
Wurzburg radar was sent to Japan for licensed production in 1943, but according to a 
Japanese researcher this was the sole co-operative venture between the two powers.42
The immediate German reaction to their discovery of the H2 S set was to set up a 
committee to discuss the implications of the find. They realised very quickly that the 
equipment was a centimetric device. As the device was discovered near Rotterdam, it 
was given that name, and the committee became the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Rotterdam 
(AGR). The committee minutes form a useful source of information about what the 
Germans thought of and did with their discovery.
One of the important questions to ask at this point, is how did the Germans realise 
that the device that they had been presented with was a centimetric device? The AGR 
minutes do not give any detailed information on this point, and I have been unable to
41 AVIA10/142, Report 14.
42 Nakajima (1988), p257.
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locate any other information that might give the same level of detail that I have been able 
to find about the British experience (sadly, Telefimken were unable to furnish me with 
any information as their archive was destroyed or dispersed after the war). However, we 
can conjecture how they might have come to this conclusion.
The first point to make is that the H2 S set was examined by German electronic 
experts. The Germans were not working in a vacuum, they were part of the general 
Western scientific culture that had shared beliefs and equipment up until the outbreak of 
the war. As such, the German electronics experts would share a lot of common 
knowledge about the usage of certain types of electronic components. Secondly, as the 
H2S set was stalled in a bomber aircraft, they could make intelligent guesses about the 
purposes of the equipment form this information.
H2S contained several components that were new to the Germans, such as the reflex 
klystron and the cavity magnetron. However, it also contained many components that 
would have been familiar to the German engineers. What this would have told them was 
the wavelength that the equipment worked at. They knew what waveguides were for, 
and they knew that the dimensions of conventional glass-envelope valves were in 
proportion to the wavelength that they were used at. The sort of information that they 
could have gleaned from this was readily available as it was knowledge that was 
culturally shared.
However, there is another important point to make here. The Germans were able to 
work out on initial inspection that the device worked using centimetre waves by virtue of 
their inclusion in a common scientific culture with the British scientists who built the 
device. But what the H2S set could not tell them on a cursory examination, was the 
local, tacit knowledge of the scientists that had gone into solving the particular problems 
that they had encountered in getting H2S to work, and in operating H2S successfully in its 
intended role. In the next section I will analyse in greater depth what exactly the 
Germans were able to learn from the artefact they had received.
The first meeting of the AGR was convened on February 22nd 1943. Most of the 
senior figures in German radar were present, from the military, and from the companies 
and research interests. At this first meeting, the main problem that was tackled was the 
allocation of research contracts amongst the various firms. Telefimken, as the largest 
company with the most “clout”, got the lion’s share. It shows how the fact that the
Ill
Germans had no central organisation for doing this sort of work (as the British did) 
meant that they had to settle questions such as this before actually getting down to the 
problem of investigating the equipment.
One of the first difficulties that they faced was that the British were using polythene 
cores for their coaxial cables. The Germans did not have the resources for making this 
plastic which was, at the time, very new. A further difficulty was that they were still 
unsure of what the device was actually for, as both the display unit and the scanner had 
been destroyed when the bomber had crashed. As they only had a limited amount of 
information to go on, they initially surmised that it was a detector for night-fighters. 
They also decided to develop a detector for 10cm radiation which they could install in 
aircraft and submarines. This was to be named Naxos.*3 They realised that if British 
bombers were broadcasting 10cm radiation and they could detect it, they would be able 
to either chase British bombers (in the case of German fighter-aircraft) or avoid them (in 
the case of German submarines). They also took the decision to try and re-build the set. 
Re-building, in this case, was not the same as replication. I take replication to mean 
building a copy of the equipment which may differ from the original slightly. In this case, 
the Germans wanted to use the apparatus that they actually had. The H2S set was not 
complete, however, so they would have to check all the circuits to find any damaged 
components and replace them with either copies or versions of their own components, 
they would also have to try and work out which bits if the equipment were missing, what 
the missing pieces were for, and then try and build something to take their place. On the 
face of it, it was a tall order.
When Goring heard of the discovery, soon after the crash, he remarked that:
We must admit that in this sphere the British and the Americans are far ahead of 
us. I expected them to be advanced, but I never thought that they would get so far 
ahead. I did hope that if we were behind we could at least be in the same race.44
One suspects that some of the more far-sighted German engineers would have been 
irritated by such remarks, given Goring’s attitude to radar and the fact that much 
research had been cancelled (especially that in centimetres). One positive thing about the
43 Brandt (1953), 22/3/43.
44 Pritchard (1989), p88.
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discovery was that it demonstrated to the Germans that 10cm radiation must be useful 
for something, so it gave a much needed boost to the moribund German radar industry, 
which was riven at this time by internal disagreement over the reopened and recently 
closed dispute about centimetre waves. Ironically, just as investigations into Rotterdam 
began to get underway, the RAF bombed Berlin on 1st March. During this raid the 
Telefimken works, including the captured H2 S units, were severely damaged.
At the next meeting on March 17th, the investigations had progressed. Through the 
interrogation of a POW they had learned that the captured equipment was used both for 
ground-mapping, and for blind-bombing. They believed (correctly, although they had no 
direct evidence for this) that the sets were used by Pathfinder45 aircraft to drop target- 
markers for other aircraft to aim at. It is important to note that they needed the 
testimony of someone who actually used the device to confirm exactly what it was for. 
However, the bomb-aimers using the device would not be familiar with the construction 
of the device, so they would not be able to reveal tacit knowledge about how to build 
one.46 Also, because the scanner had been destroyed, they missed the second feature of 
the set (apart from the centimetre wave usage), that it used a PPI presentation with a 
rotating scanner. At the same meeting Dr Steimel revealed that the magnetron gave out 
9.15cm radiation at a power of between 20 and 30 kW, a power massively higher than 
anything available so far in Germany at the same wavelength, and that the efficiency was 
around 10%. The wave output was very stable, the frequency not varying significantly. 
Arrangements were made with the firm Sanitas to build copies of the valve for the 
German rebuilt Rotterdam.47
Apart from the question of how they actually managed to re-build and then copy 
H2 S, another important question we should ask, is why would they want to copy it in the 
first place? H2 S was a bombing radar, and the Germans did not posses any long-range 
bombers. Indeed, they possessed very few aircraft big enough to carry the massive re­
built H2 S equipment at all:
45 See previous chapter for a description of Pathfinder tactics.
46 Aircrew survival rates from damaged aircraft were only in the region of 20%, so it is remarkable that 
they were able to get any information from captured RAF personnel so quickly, given also that FfeS was 
only installed in a veiy small percentage of aircraft at this time. AP3368 (1963).
47 Brandt (1953), 17/3/43.
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[The Germans had] a curious mixture of admiration for the British technique and 
a low opinion of its actual construction. To the German designer it was a constant source 
of wonder that his British counterpart used such (comparatively) large components on a 
large chassis and put the lot into an even larger cabinet. Such profligacy offended his 
sense of order and compactness.48
The capture of another, less damaged apparatus in May 1943 helped considerably, to 
the extent that by the June 1st meeting Herr Maas was able to say that they had learned 
new technical details. He was able to reveal that the [local] oscillator was a type of 
klystron, and the antenna used 3 dipoles; information unavailable from the first 
equipment because it had been destroyed. By this meeting the reconstruction of all the 
electronic units was completed, and work had just begun in installing the units into an 
aircraft. The twelve H2 S units49 are shown below:
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Control Unit












Dr Brandt was now to prepare a programme for flight testing.50
Apart from the reconstruction programme, the discovery of the existence of 
centimetre waves as a viable option for certain types of radar led the Germans to restart 
fundamental research into the area. They were not starting from the beginning, because 
very short wavelengths had been the original choice some ten years earlier for Runge. 
Despite the various subsequent official orders prohibiting any research in this area, one or 
two researchers at Telefimken had maintained an interest.
The other line of development which came out of the discovery of H2 S at this was 
the Naxos series of passive warning devices. Naxos was one of the first applications 
envisaged after the discovery of H2S, as I explained above. The Germans realised that 
any device mounted in a bomber that broadcasted powerful centimetre waves, would
48 Pritchard (1989), p91.
49 AVIA26/487, 5/7/43.
50 Brandt (1953), 1/6/43.
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present them with a means of passive detection of British bombers. However, by mid 
1943 the prototype centimetre receivers had not progressed to the stage of flight testing.
7.4 Rotterdam and Berlin
The decision to re-build Rotterdam had a profound influence on German thinking in 
relation to how to use centimetre waves for radar. As I mentioned earlier, the H2 S 
apparatus was bulky and heavy and designed for use in British four-engined heavy 
bombers. It consisted, in all, of twelve separate units as I detailed on the previous page. 
The Germans had to install the first re-built Rotterdam into an aircraft that was roughly 
equivalent to the British bombers. The only suitable one was the Condor, a large four- 
engined aircraft designed for long maritime patrols. However, the first time the whole 
re-built set was made to work was from one of the Flak-Towers51 in Berlin. The rotating 
scanner and PPI picture underlined power of the device, as the scanner showed clear 
returns from prominent buildings on the Berlin sky-line. This initial viewing was meant 
to give them some indication as to what they might expect from the device when it would 
be finally flown. However, what they actually saw, as the British found when they first 
flew centimetric AI (see chapter 4), was a great surprise, for the device was far more 
powerful than they had believed would be the case.52
At this stage, in the summer of 1943, there was still a belief by people such as Runge 
that centimetre waves were unsuitable for detecting aircraft. They still thought that the 
waves would be mirrored away from smaller objects, rather than reflected and detected 
as they were with H2 S. No British cm AI sets had been captured by this time, so they 
still assumed that the only British airborne radar was H2 S. On the basis of these beliefs 
the AGR took the decision not only to re-build the captured British equipment, but also 
to redesign it as something smaller, lighter and more suitable to German bombing needs. 
Whether this particular application was the most appropriate to their overall needs, when
51 The Flak Towers were large concrete buildings, some ten storeys high, that had Flak batteries and 
search-lights mounted on their roofs. The buildings were bomb-proof and provided accommodation for 
the Flak personnel. They were built in response to the increase in bombing that began in 1942 when Air 
Chief Marshall Sir Arthur Harris was appointed as head of Bomber Command, and the US entered the 
war.
52 Brandt (1953), 22/6/43.
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the war situation for Germany was turning towards the defensive, is debatable. 
However, talk of military defeat was tantamount to treason, and it was only the following 
year after the decisive battles on the Eastern front and the Invasion in the West that the 
more shrewd Germans began to realise that the war was turning inexorably against them. 
In 1943, Hitler still dreamed of eventually bombing America. Nevertheless, the June 
meeting also approved the commencement of a programme to build a wholly-German 
centimetre radar, named Berlin. It was to use the German copy of the British 
magnetron, named LMS10, and to consist of four units53 (as oppose to Rotterdam's 
twelve):
High-Frequency Pulse Generator and Receiver & Viewing Power Supply
Head (incl. Low-Frequency Apparatus
Transmitter Unit) Unit
Berlin was to be smaller and lighter then Rotterdam, in order to be fitted in Germany’s 
smaller, lighter twin-engined bombers.54
At the July meeting the AGR was told that a programme for research on the airborne 
Rotterdam had been agreed. The purpose of the flights were to test its performance 
against various types of terrain and also to see if it could detect ships and submarines. 
Four LMS10 magnetron copies had been manufactured by this meeting, and it was 
reported that in a short time they expected to be making 10 per week.55
In the summer of 1943, a British AI Mark VIII set was recovered from a Mosquito 
night-fighter shot down over the Channel coast. This was unfortunate for the British, as 
they had made a policy decision not to fly the cavity magnetron over enemy territory 
(apart from in H2S). The Germans interrogated the radar operator from this aircraft in 
order to find out the purpose of the set. He gave them details of the set’s capabilities, 
such as its range.56 It is unclear how the Germans actually extracted this information 
from their prisoner. Under the terms of the Geneva Convention, prisoners were only
53 RL39/515.
54 Brandt (1953), 22/6/43.
55 Brandt (1953), 23/7/43.
56 AVIA26/1154.
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required to give their name rank and number, and airmen were not supposed to give any 
information about the equipment they carried. It is possible that he was tortured in order 
to obtain the information, but he may just have answered the questions the Germans put 
to him. The British used to obtain information about German equipment by listening to 
prisoners’ conversations, when the prisoners thought they couldn’t be overheard. In this 
way R.V.Jones was able to gain information about the Knickebein blind-bombing system 
(see chapter 6 for details of this system).57
By the meeting on 9th September, the AGR reported a Rotterdam had been installed 
in a Heinkel Hel 11 and was being used for flight-testing of the apparatus. After a short 
period of testing, they were amazed to find that not only did coastlines show up, but also 
differences between built-up areas and open countryside. Later that year, as the Allied 
Bomber-offensive on Berlin heightened, the Germans’ thoughts turned away from their 
offensive-oriented ground-mapping usage of Berlin. They decided to look for other 
means of employing centimetre radar in a defensive manner apart from the aircraft- 
mounted receiver, Naxos. Incredibly, despite the discovery of the Mark VIII centimetric 
AI, there were still sceptical voices as to whether centimetre waves could ever be used to 
locate aircraft. This was a clear instance of sceptical theorists challenging practical 
scientists. In order to find out if aircraft detection was possible, Telefimken engineers 
installed Berlin units into a Wurzburg radar. At the same time as a “high-frequency 
physicist” was explaining that they would be lucky to get ranges of 8km on aircraft, this 
hybrid equipment was giving ranges of 30km.58 Unfortunately, Reuter did not say who 
this physicist was, but it is comparable to the situation that Dee faced over whether to 
continue with centimetre AI in 1940 (see chapter 4). The men working on the 
equipment, by virtue of their practical knowledge of how to get the best from it, were 
able to make it perform far better than the theorists predicted.
On February 8th 1944, Brandt gave a lecture to an audience of high-ranking 
Luftwaffe officers, including Field Marshall Milch (Air Minister). The purpose of this 
lecture was to give an overview of the state of affairs in centimetre research at this time, 
and to confirm the shift in policy away from the offensive utilisation of Berlin in a 
ground-mapping radar for bombers towards applications that were more defensive.
57 Jones (1978).
58 Reuter (1971), pi 17.
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These included the Naxos detector, various ground-based early-warning radars, and a 
variant of Berlin to be used as an AI radar. As I mentioned in the last chapter, German 
engineers had to a certain extent solved the problem of the ground-retum and AI by 
using large, externally-mounted antennae on their night-fighter aircraft. However, 
although this meant that the maximum range of their AI sets was comparable to British 
centimetre AI, the aerials were unpopular with the pilots as they impede the performance 
of the aircraft.
Brandt’s lecture is a remarkable document. It outlines that some Germans had 
realised just how far they would have to change their methods of research if they wanted 
to compete in the centimetre-technology war. Brandt showed a considerable degree of 
awareness of what the British had to go through when they develop H2 S, as he described 
to his audience how he believed events had happened in Britain:
In the eariy stages they worked with comparatively incomplete equipment. They 
used equipment which was very much in its experimental stages and had to overcome 
all kinds of “teething troubles” connected with equipment and technique. In the early 
stages, technicians were sent out on flights because the fundamental significance of the 
project was fully appreciated. They recognised that radar was the eyes of the fighting
units and that these sets were at their best when their wavelengths were nearest to light
59waves.
He highlighted that radar was a project of “fundamental significance”, because the 
Germans had had many difficulties in introducing radar to service against the opposition 
of the men who had to use it. The case of Lichtenstein clearly illustrates this point, 
although their opposition was hardly surprising given the way the large and obvious 
external antennas hindered their night-fighters’ performance. In order to tackle this 
problem, Brandt argued for the introduction of an approach very similar to that taken by 
the British with their Operational Research:
We must realise that in the course of introducing the Berlin equipment, we shall 
also have to employ an increasing number of technicians; we are in complete 
agreement with the Luftwaffe Technical Control Office that failure in this respect 
would be a grave mistake, the result of which would be reluctance on the part of our
59 API 136, p631.
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forces to introduce this equipment, whereas, it is, in fact, our aim to introduce 
something entirely new.60
The rest of Brandt’s lecture concerned the state of their research on centimetres. He 
outlined the various projects which they foresaw would be necessary, such as Naxos, and 
other types of early-warning radar. Also mentioned were the various Flak and Naval 
radars planned for centimetre production, and how work was progressing on 
countermeasures to centimetre radar. His concluding remarks covered his concern over 
the lack of personnel at the disposal of the radar industry:
[T]he manpower with which we are called upon to manage at the moment is much 
too small. We need considerably more men to do all that has to be done. The speed 
and scope with which this technique will be introduced will be decided by the 
manpower and not the technical ability to carry it out.61
This remark indicates how much faith the Germans still had in their technical ability, 
despite the setbacks that they had suffered in the radar war. They were also aware by 
this time of the British and American 3 cm equipments coming into service, and they 
suspected that the Allies were probably researching into the 1cm area, which was the 
case. Brandt’s remarks about manpower levels are significant. Taken on their own, we 
would have to be careful about assigning too much importance to them. They could 
have been Brandt “fighting his comer” with senior military men, to make sure his project 
got more support. However, when taken in the context of the supporting evidence from 
Speer and the archival evidence, we can see that Brandt’s complaints were most probably 
valid.
Over the next year the Germans worked steadily on the new field of centimetre 
research, experimenting with their rebuilt sets and investigating the field with the 
resources available. In the Summer of 1944 they conducted trials between their rebuilt 
sets and their replicated ones (Rotterdam vs. Berlin). The difficulties over fitting an H2 S 
sized aerial into their own aircraft led them to develop a new type of antenna using 
dielectric polyrods. This type of antenna was also developed for use in Naxos. They also
60 API 136, p631.
61 API 136, p635.
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commenced work on a Berlin Night-Fighter system, which was more suited to the 
immediate requirements. From October 1944 onwards the RAF/USAF bomber offensive 
and the increasingly critical situation at the front hampered further research and 
development, and at the capitulation there were only a few sets of each type actually 
fitted into aircraft. Examples of these, and some of the personnel who designed them, 
were captured by the Allies when they entered Germany in May and June 1945. The 
equipment was examined and the scientists/engineers interrogated. The written 
summaries of these interrogations, in the form of Intelligence Digests and held in British 
archives, form the basis of the next section
7.5 Difficulties in Copying, and their Significance
7.5.1 Replication
One of the central themes investigated by this thesis is that of knowledge transfer 
through technological artefacts. Specifically, it concerns the captured H2S and AI sets 
that gave the Germans knowledge of microwave radar. In his 1985 work Changing 
Order, Collins claims that replication of new scientific results is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve without the transfer of personnel who are able to use their 
skilfully-acquired tacit knowledge to assist in the process. As he claims:
Proposition Two: Skill-like knowledge travels best (or only) through accomplished 
practitioners.62
On the face of it, this assertion would appear to have been refuted in the case of 
microwave radar, Britain, and Germany. The Germans were able to replicate the British 
results; they not only rebuilt H2S, but designed their own system based on it. If we 
accept this, what implications does it have for Collins’ claims? Or are we able to look 
further and square what happened with Collins’ views.
62 Collins (1985), p73.
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The important thing to consider is a point I made in the previous section about the 
difference between general, cultural scientific knowledge, and specific, embodied or 
embedded practically acquired local knowledge. The centimetre radars that the Germans 
discovered contained elements of both. The German scientists were highly skilled in the 
field of electronics, like their allied counterparts. As I discussed, they would be able to 
deduce what the radars were actually for, and what type of radiation they utilised, by 
being able to recognise some of the components within the sets that were not new to 
them. This information was supplemented by interrogating the equipment’s operators. 
They were able to work out what most of the unknown components were for by applying 
their knowledge about what the rest of the components did. What they could not do 
initially, was build working microwave radars. When they first discovered H2 S they did 
not possess the embodied tacit knowledge about the set that the British had learned by 
doing it in the first place. However, non-possession of this knowledge did not make 
replication impossible, it just made it difficult as I will show.
When H2 S arrived in Germany it was still a very crude system that required much 
further refinement. The technology of H2S was embedded but it still required operation 
by a skilled person. This was someone who was able operate the controls to produce an 
image, and who could interpret the image on the screen and use it to navigate with. 
Interviewing captured operators enabled the Germans to speed up the identification of 
what H2S was for. In this case skilled personnel were able to provide key information. 
However the information was not about how to build H2 S, but how to operate it. The 
navigators provided the Germans with the first piece of information they needed to 
successfully re-build the system - what the “correct result” of operating it should be.
In chapters 2-5 I have chronicled the development of British microwave radar in 
some detail. It is very clear from that story that the British had a lot of problems 
developing microwave radar then H2 S. They only solved these problems by a protracted 
period of trial-and-error experimentation, modifying both their equipment and their ideas 
about its operation as they went along. I hope that I have been able to demonstrate some 
of the high level of experimental skill, acquired through several years of actually working 
with the equipment, that had to be put into the device in order to get it to the operational 
state. There are not the same types of sources available to tell what happened with the
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German investigation of their find, but it is likely that they had to go through the same 
processes. There are some sources which back up this view.
My account of British development is detailed because I was very lucky to be able to 
consult original documents in the form of progress reports and some papers that 
described the development of centimetre component and radar. Furthermore, as Britain 
was one of the victors of the Second World War, and as radar was part of that victory, 
many of the developers have written up their experiences as memoirs to show the part 
they played in developing their “war-winning” invention. This provides another 
important and rich source of information. I was also able to interview some of the 
personnel involved who were able to furnish me with other details not mentioned in these 
books, or give their impressions on how they saw events at certain times. The Germans, 
most probably because they were the losers, have not written of their experiences in any 
numbers. What has been written has usually been communicated to other authors in the 
form of interviews or short, unpublished memoirs. German researchers tended to be 
older than their British counterparts, and most of them are either dead or untraceable. 
Furthermore, their archive record is far from complete, for the reason that many records 
were destroyed or went missing. This makes life more difficult, but there are some 
original sources which can be used.
So what would have gone through the German investigators’ minds when they first 
came across H2 S? This is of course an impossible question to answer without access to 
any sources, but we know that they were electronics experts and would therefore share 
the same scientific and technical culture of the British who designed the system.. They 
would have known that the equipment was electronic, and came from a bomber. 
Therefore its purpose must have been something that a piece of electronic equipment 
could conceivably perform in a bomber aircraft, which narrowed down the possibilities 
considerably. It was mentioned in the minutes of the first AGR committee meeting that 
they recognised quickly that the equipment was a centimetre radar of some sort. At first 
glance this might seem strange, given that in many quarters German theorists did not 
believe that even if they could produce centimetre waves at high powers (which they 
could not), they would be any use in radar.
Nevertheless, on closer examination this is not so odd. The Germans had knowledge 
of radar, and also that one could use radio waves of different wavelengths for many
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different applications. They had simply not conceived of the idea of a ground-mapping 
radar, as they had no use for one. There is no reason to assume that when presented with 
the physical evidence of how it could be done, by using centimetre wavelengths, that they 
would continue to believe it was not possible to build one. Their background cultural, 
scientific and technological knowledge, allowed them to recognise what was the likely 
purpose of the equipment, and on what wavelength it worked, before interrogating any 
prisoners. The Germans had built radar sets, and knew what form they took in terms of 
the kinds of components and their arrangement within circuits, and the different modules 
(mixer, transmitter, receiver, etc.) required. It is highly likely that they would have 
recognised these modules for what they were (a radar), rather than as, say, a radio set. 
Furthermore, the Germans were also not completely ignorant of centimetre technology as 
a whole. They did not know of the cavity magnetron, but they knew of several other 
centimetre valves even though these only produced much lower powers. They were also 
aware of the significance of co-axial cables and waveguides as carriers of centimetre 
radiation, even if they did not fully understand how to use them. In other words, they did 
not have the specific skills needed to use these components in radar, because they had 
not attempted to build one and thus acquire them in the form of practical, embodied 
knowledge.
In chapter five I described the anxiety of the British over whether to allow the 
practically indestructible cavity magnetron to be flown over enemy territory. The worry 
was that the Germans would be able to copy the valve very quickly and easily and use it 
against the Allies in a relatively short space of time. This anxiety was founded on the 
British knowing from their own experience of examining captured equipment what the 
Germans experts, or people with shared cultural knowledge, would be able to do. 
However, what the British were unable to evaluate was how much general knowledge 
the Germans had, and how long it would take them to acquire the skills to duplicate the 
valves and then use them. Despite them knowing that the Germans were unfamiliar with 
the cavity magnetron, they thought that it would be likely that the Germans would not 
take long to recognise that it was a high-power centimetre transmitting valve. There 
were certain facets of its construction that I believe would have been sufficiently 
culturally general to give its purpose away. Firstly, it was mounted between the poles of 
a large electromagnet, indicating a high field-strength applied along the axis of the
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cathode, just as in the glass-envelope split-anode magnetron. The high field-strength 
would indicate to them that the valve produced high powers. Secondly, another 
confirmation that it produced high powers was that it had cooling fins to dissipate heat (a 
by-product of high-power operation) and required a power input of several hundred 
kilowatts. The power supply necessitated large transformers, which were another item of 
well-understood technology. Therefore, it would be pretty obvious to anyone familiar 
with electronic components that they were looking at a valve designed to produce high 
powers at centimetre wavelengths Furthermore, there were only a few applications that 
required high power radio waves of short wavelengths, and radar was one of them.
Their shared scientific background with the British would have enabled the Germans 
to work out the purpose of H2S. However, just because they knew what their booty was 
for, doesn’t mean they could actually get it to work properly. In order to do this, they 
would need to acquire much additional information. They would need to know whether 
they had all necessary components, and replace any that were missing or damaged. 
Secondly, they would have to learn how to put all the components together to produce 
the correct result - a PPI picture. The Germans did know, through their questioning of a 
captured operator, something of what they should expect to see. I will now explore 
whether replicating the H2 S set proved impossible, as Collins claims, or just difficult. If 
the latter is the case, then we need to see what made the replication possible, and what 
form it took.
The Germans themselves appear to have believed that they were quite capable not 
only of replicating centimetre radar, but also of improving it. Given the nature of their 
regime, it is possible that the scientists and engineers involved would make claims that 
they were as technically competent as the Allies. When their superiors found it hard to 
tolerate failure, they may well have chosen to argue that any problems with progress 
were due to deficiencies in manpower and resource allocation (although these certainly 
did have an influence and cannot be discounted), rather than an inability to do what the 
Allies had already proven was possible. So failure to replicate by the Germans may have 
been for one of two reasons. Firstly, their copy may have missed something important 
because they didn’t have a piece of important tacit knowledge, and didn’t learn what they 
had missed at a later stage. Secondly, they may have been impeded in their work because 
they lacked enough personnel to pursue the investigation quickly and successfully. The
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Germans believed the latter, which was true to some extent, but the former was also very 
much the case.
-  7.5.2 The German Magnetron
The German copy of the British CV64 magnetron as found in the Mark II (10cm) 
H2S units captured, was called LMS 10(G). Several examples of the German valve were 
examined by British experts immediately after the war. Their report makes interesting 
reading, as it draws out some of the deficiencies and lack of understanding that the 
Germans had about magnetron manufacture, even though they tried to copy it exactly. 
The British expert who examined the German copy possessed all the necessary tacit 
knowledge about cavity magnetron design and manufacture, so he was ideally placed to 
identify any discrepancies between the two.
The wavelength of LMS 10(G) varied between 9cm and 9.14cm (compared to the 
British CV64’s 9.1cm). Its anode block was manufactured from pure copper, which did 
not aid the process of exact copying as the report stated:
In general the internal finish is not outstanding. The segment holes show 
machining marks from the boring operation, and the slots in one sample examined by 
microscope showed a pronounced taper in the radial direction. There is quite a wide 
variation in the dimensions of the slots in any one block. This is probably a result of 
the choice of block material.63
The Germans had also not used the Gold-Seal method of the British magnetron (see 
chapter 3). This is unsurprising, because it was a complicated process invented just 
before the war by GEC, and would not have been available to the Germans. Therefore 
they had to use a method that they did understand. They soldered the end plates onto the 
block, but the results were not as good as they would have been if they had known about 
and used the British method:
63 AVIA26/860.
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The whole assembly is brazed or soldered by an eutectic process, whereas CV64 
has gold-sealed end plates. Small particles of solder were found attached to the straps 
and to the ends of the block, which was in some places pitted by the action of the 
flux.64
It is unclear as to whether the Germans werelorced to use pure copper (rather than a 
slightly hardened copper alloy as the British did), or did so out of ignorance. The small 
variances in the dimensions of the resonant cavities caused by using a softer material had 
an effect on the stability of the wavelength of the valve. Wavelength stability was a great 
problem for the British, too, when they were learning about the valve in 1940-41. It led 
to them having to test every valve they manufactured to measure its precise output. The 
quality of production was not good because of this, and a significant proportion of the 
valves were unusable. Microwave circuits were very sensitive to changes in wavelength 
because the physical dimensions of the components, such as the coaxial cables and 
waveguides, had a marked effect on the efficiency of the transmitted power. If the 
wavelength of the magnetron did not match that to which the other components were 
designed, it would not work efficiently.
Early British magnetrons were also prone to what was known as “mode-jumping”. 
The frequency of the output would suddenly change to one of the harmonics of the 
primary wavelength. New valves also had to be tested to see whether they were prone to 
exhibiting this effect. The problem was solved by the invention of “straps” in late 1941, 
by Sayers at Birmingham University. They were small pieces of wire linking alternate 
anode segments, which allowed the magnetron to be pre-tuned to a standardised 
wavelength and stopped it from changing mode of oscillation.
Tuning the valve by distortion of the strap was done by Allied manufacturers at the 
factory, thus ensuring that the valve was tuned to a standardised wavelength. However, 
knowing the significance of the straps, and that they could be used in this way, would not 
be apparent to a person who did not possess the tacit knowledge of the builders. This 
was the case when the Germans discovered the valve, and obviously later on because the 
British did not capture any valves until May 1945. The report related that in this case the 




The straps are a mirror image of the straps in CV64 and are set slightly farther 
away from the ends of the block. It would appear that no attempt has been made to tune 
the block by distortion of the straps.65
This copying without full comprehension is known as “Chinese Copying” in engineering 
circles. The problem was that by simply trying to copy the artefact, they had no idea 
whether they had got everything set up properly. So, on the face of it the two may have 
appeared to be the same, but in practice they hadn’t got the design correct. This was 
evident, because the Germans failed to achieve the same performance with their valve as 
they got from the British valves they were trying to copy:
The other three samples [out of eight] gave poor efficiency (approximately 10%) 
and had a wavelength scatter up to 9.14 cms... It would appear that some form of coding is 
applied after the initial test to classify samples according to wavelength. The centring of 
samples near 9.0 cms is compatible with the theory that a Chinese copy of CV64 has been 
attempted. Before setting of the straps CV64 has a wavelength between 8.9 and 9.0cms 
and the setting operation consists of increasing the capacity to bring the wavelength to 
9.1cms. This may be to some extent confirmed by the presence of some low efficiency 
samples badly off tune, possibly due to poor jigging and distortion during machining and 
assembly, no pretuning having been attempted66
The Allied view on the captured German valve is consistent with the idea that they 
did not have a full understanding of how to make a proper cavity magnetron that could 
produce the “correct” result every time. They required (i) the possession of knowledge 
of how to tune a magnetron by strap distortion, which was not obvious from simply 
copying the strapping, and (ii) certain manufacturing techniques that were either 
unavailable or unknown to the Germans. This was confirmed in an allied report of the 
interrogation of Dr Esau of Telefunken, who admitted that the significance of strapping 
was not understood, and that a cast of the straps were made in order to get the “correct” 
setting. Esau also said that German magnetrons were consistently 5% less efficient (the 




to the bewilderment of the technicians 67 Further confirmation of their lack of complete 
understanding came from a Telefunken report of June 1944. This stated that they 
believed that the key to tuning magnetrons lay in the relationship between the valve 
geometry and the applied voltage, rather than in how the anode segments were 
“strapped” together.68 This agrees with TRE’s belief that the Germans had no 
understanding of how to tune the valve by adjusting the straps. Therefore their own 
magnetron was not an exact copy of its British counterpart; it was not a proper 
replication and did not behave in the same fashion. However, it did perform well enough 
for them to use it, so in another sense they had managed to replicate the valve. What this 
tells us is that the transfer of tacit knowledge about magnetron building would have made 
the replication easier and better, but lack of it did not make it impossible.
7.5.3 Chinese Copies, Collins and Replication
From the evidence of the how the Germans got on with copying the cavity 
magnetron, we can draw some conclusions about Chinese copying, and Collins’ views on 
replication. I define a “Chinese Copy” as copy of an artefact that has been done as well 
as possible, given the level of knowledge of the copiers. The term “Chinese copy” 
usually means that this has not been done with complete understanding, for the copy is 
not as good as the original. So what does this tell us about Replication? Firstly, when a 
replication is being attempted in Collins terms, what is important is that it is the effect 
which is replicated which is the measure of the success of replication.
Collins’ investigation centred on whether a scientist could replicate a TEA-laser.69 
He knew if he’d done it successfully because the equipment failed to work if he hadn’t. 
However, in this instance of replication, Collins is concerned with the transfer of 
algorithmic knowledge. He contends that algorithmic knowledge is not sufficient by 
itself to allow replication. In this case, the Germans were presented with an artefact 
which gave them some of the British tacit knowledge - knowledge which had already
67 AVIA39/10, Paragraph 206.
68 RL39/593, Section X “Bericht des Dr Steimel uber den Stand der Zenti-Rohren technik.” [Report by 
Dr Steimel on the situation of centimetre valve technology]
69 Collins (1985), ch 3.
294
been embedded into the device. Chinese copying can allow replication in this instance, 
because the copier can unwittingly transfer the essential knowledge into his copy. But it 
would appear, from this instance, that having an artefact does not guarantee the ability to 
replicate equipment successfully if we adhere to a strict definition of success. But it does 
increase the chance of being able to replicate equipment, especially if exact performance 
copying is not a measure of successful replication. In this case, the Germans had done 
what they wanted to, but they did not do so with every valve.
That the Germans did not in fact manage to replicate everything successfully is 
confirmed in a report from January 1945. A scientist of the German Radiolocation 
Commission complained that:
Telefunken AG. which, inexplicably, was entrusted with the bulk of 
developments since the last war is unable to copy enemy valves which have been used for
70years.
The comment shows that the Germans still had problems in copying some valves, due to 
their lack of tacit knowledge.
The difficulties that the Germans had in some areas with copying, meant that 
sometimes they didn’t copy exactly but used a component or technique with which they 
were familiar. An example of this was the German decision to use a split-anode 
magnetron as a local oscillator in their Rotterdam and Berlin sets, rather than a reflex 
klystron as the British did. This could have been because they actually appreciated the 
unstable nature of the klystron, as the British found in 1940/1, and were prejudiced 
against using it. This was the view that Brandt put forward in interrogation.71 However, 
there is some evidence that they were initially confused by the fact that the klystron was 
in a non-standard form, and didn’t recognise it as such. Lovell wrote that on meeting 
Professor Hachenburg in 1977, a fellow radio-astronomer, he learned that Hachenberg 
had been part of the team assigned to examine Rotterdam. According to him, it was not 
the cavity magnetron which proved impossible to decipher, but the purpose of the “soft- 
Sutton” (reflex) klystron as part of the T/R set-up.72 This view is confirmed by the
70 R26HI/86, Section 5 “Discussion with Director Speicher of the Radiolocation Commission.”
71 AVIA10/141 Report 14 “Centimetre Valves.”
72 Lovell (1992), pl07.
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report of the interrogation of Dr Esau, who admitted to his questioners that they had had 
trouble with T/R boxes.73 The Local Oscillator klystron employed by the British was not 
discovered until late 1943, in an intact H2 S. 7 4  This was the second set that they 
discovered. Their confusion over what it actually did, and the late discovery of a 
conventional klystron ,may have been the reason why the Germans used the split-anode 
magnetron instead. However, some of the German researchers were unhappy with the 
decision. One revealed in interrogation that he believed that “the British used the 
klystron for a good reason.”75
7.5.4 Berlin and the Acquisition of Tacit Knowledge
Despite the problems they had in some areas, on the whole the Germans appeared 
very optimistic about their research programme. A February 1944 document listing the 
virtues of Berlin compared to H2 S stated that:
The H2S set had volume of over 21 cubic feet, whilst the German set, which has 
the same technical performance, has a volume of under nine cubic feet The weight of 
the H2S was 235kg; the German set although made entirely of steel in order to avoid 
using materials in short supply, weighs only 180kg. When comparing this to other 
German airborne equipment one must bear in mind that nearly all these are 
constructed of light metals. Since the same performance was desired, the number of 
valves could not be reduced; about 50 valves have been retained, but they are 
practically all normal radio valves.76
The claim made by Brandt in this statement was a strong one. It was also not strictly 
true. The difficulties they had with copying the cavity magnetron showed that this was 
not the case. Furthermore, the British examined a Berlin set immediately after the end of 
the war, and we can see another view of the Germans’ success from what they thought of
73 AVIA39/7 Paragraph 41 “German centimetre research: Dr Esau.”
74 AVIA39/10 Paragraph 109 “Development of CRTs, magnetrons, klystrons and triodes.”
75 AVIA10/142, Paragraph 6 “Receivers.”
76 API 136, p636.
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the Germans’ efforts. Their descriptions, summarised by me from the report, are in the 
following table (italics are mine):77
• TRE Report T1927: Berlin Gerat
1: Summary • Designed from captured H2S Mark H  -
• Circuits very similar; where no German valves existed’ 
copies o f British valves were made.
•  Antenna consists of dielectric elements (not designed for 
optimum polar diagram).
• Scanning speed (6.7 rev/s) faster than H2S.
• Fewer units in installation.
• Performance not checked.
2: Introduction • The set examined was probably for naval use.
• Berlin was not in general service by the end of the European 
war.
• The aerial is not a copy.
3 Comparison with 
H2S Equipment
3.2 Modulator and 
Transmitter
• The standard H2S modulator unit is the Type 64. The earlier 
Type 65 used +2kV and -2kV for the artificial line and spark 
gap, as does Berlin. (Type 64 uses 0, -4kV)
• There is provision for charging choke for line charge. The 
pulse repetition frequency is 750 as oppose to 1500 for H2S 
which implies resonant charging in Berlin.
• The output is the same as Type 64, but the pulse shape is 
not as good.
• The integral Modulator Unit power supply is a 450V power- 
pack (H2S has a 300V separate unit).
• The relay circuit has been redesigned, and is more self 




• The time delay (Modulator and power unit of H2 S) has been 
combined into the Modulator.
• The spark-gap valve is a close copy o f CV85, though 
smaller and with an improved method o f mounting. The 
general performance o f the valve is similar to CV85.
•  The pulse transformer was sealed, so it was unexamined.
• The transmitter valve, LMS 10(G) is a copy of CV64.
3.3 Display Comes in three parts:
• Power supply, waveform generator, timing circuits and 
Intermediate Frequency amplifier.
• Indicator unit containing height and PPI tubes, local 
oscillator, output amplifier.
• Control unit containing on-off switches, range & height 
drums.
In general the display unit is a wire-for-wire copyy except for 




• Free-running multivibrator with time-constants of 18 and 
60km. The recurrence frequency of 1500Hz is identical to 
H2S Mark II.
• The output is squared by a further valve, then fed to a Miller 
integrator valve which gives a linear saw-tooth circuit 
clearer than H2S Mark II.
• The saw-tooth wave is fed to a phase splitter and the grids 
of push-pull output pentodes. It has a self contained power 
pack, rated 300V and 120mA, which feeds this output stage 
only.
• The plate-to-plate output is stepped down by the output 
transformer and fed to a rotating coil in the indicator. 
Conversion (voltage to current waveform) relies on 
pentodes. There is no feedback for linear scan.
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• The saw-tooth wave is fed from the Miller valve to a 
transitron with variable ground bias. This provides a 
negative synchronised signal fo r the modulator, which is 
identical to H2S Mark II.
• The sav.T-tooth wave then goes to a cathode follower which 
feeds a high-tension tube. This is a step-up transformer.
• The original square-wave phase is reversed by a valve with a 
small anode load. The signal and markers are mixed in, and 
the output from the timing circuits is brought in in parallel.
3.3.3 Timing Circuits • These are copied exactly. They retain the anti-flutter 
stabilising valve. There are changes in the anode resistance 
from 51 to 47 kQ, and condensers from 0.01 to 0.05pF.
3.3.4 IF Amplifier • Copied exactly, with a 13 MHz midband frequency and 3 
MHz bandwidth.
3.3.5 Indicator Unit •  The nearest British equivalent is the “M” screen
• There is 4kV between anode and cathode. The flat, 5” tube 
has electrostatic focus and magnetic deflection.
• The deflection coils are driven by a motor.
4 Conclusion • There is very little weight-saving on H2S Mark II.
• Berlin is very similar to H2S in terms o f circuits.
• The aerial and its associated units are different.
• The plugs and sockets are easy to use.
• The set was not operated as a whole. Units were tested 
individually.
This British analysis noted several things which support the idea that the Germans had 
still not fully understood all the workings of H2 S, even by 1945. Their inability to 
achieve the same levels of performance as the British set had not hindered them, though, 
and in other areas had pursued lines of research to surpass the British equipment. They 
mentioned that Berlin was a wire-for-wire copy in many cases, in terms of the circuits. 
Where the Germans had identified that a British valve performed the same function as
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one they already manufactured, they used their own valve. If they did not manufacture 
one a valve for a certain task, they copied the British version (as they did with their 
LMS 10(G)). The British were unable to verify German claims about Berlin's 
performance as they had not tested the equipment as a whole. They did test the units 
individually. Comments such as “pulse-shape not as good” indicate that some areas were 
deficient, and “improved method of mounting” and “circuit cleaner than H2 S” that they 
had improved the equipment in others. The British report did not mention the relative 
sizes of the equipment. By August 1945 the German programme had been running for 
two years, so it is not surprising that they had managed to improve some components. 
This supports the idea that they were developing their own areas of tacit knowledge 
about centimetre radar, even to the point of designing a new aerial.
At the meeting in February 1944 of the AGR the Germans’ confidence in their own 
abilities extended beyond their belief in Berlin 3s technical progress. They indicated that 
they were nearly ready to commence a production run, and that testing would soon 
begin:
The German set is constructed in such a manner that no fitting or bench assembly 
is necessary and thus large numbers can be produced without difficulty. We have 
produced an experimental series of ten sets, five of which have been tested and are 
ready for use. The prototype, after having had its ground tests, has been installed in an 
aircraft in the past few days and is now ready for flight tests. Furthermore, an initial 
series of 100 sets has been planned and production of these will begin in March 
(1944).78
This confidence was unfounded, as by the end of the war only 10 experimental sets had 
been produced. When they did commence air-testing, they, too, discovered what the 
British already knew. H2 S, or Berlin in this case, required a lot of work to be made to 
operate successfully. When they began air tests, they found it very difficult to get the 
performance they wanted straight away. Testing over-ran their schedule and the 
proposed 100 sets were never built.
At the Rotterdam Committee meeting of the 31st May 1944, some of the difficulties 
that the scientists were beginning to experience with the equipment were discussed.
78 API 136, p636.
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They were running comparative trials between three types of equipment, Rotterdam 
Nachbau (the first, rebuilt H2S), Rotterdam Wiesbaden (a complete, captured example of 
H2S), and the prototype Berlin apparatus. The problems that the Germans were having 
were more or less identical to those experienced by their British counterparts during their 
_ flight trials. The main problem they faced was that of Nullstelle, or gaps and fades in the 
picture on the screen. At this point they were still trying to identify the relationship 
between the type of aircraft used and the influence this had on the way the picture 
behaved. Different types of aircraft had different body shapes, and different places for 
locating the scanner. These all affected the image produced. This compared directly to 
the problems the British had in getting the scanner shape right to nullify gaps and fades, 
(see chapter 5).79 They conducted their comparison by taking a photograph of all three 
PPI pictures over the Muritz See, a very distinctively-shaped lake near Berlin. The 
pictures are shown overleaf. All three images are indistinct in different ways.
As was noted in the British report, Berlin employed a new type of antenna. This 
was a six-pronged dielectric antenna rather than the paraboloid with waveguide feed that 
H2S used. This antenna was developed originally for the German Naxos 10cm detector. 
In a report on this Naxos antenna, the British expert who examined it conceded that the 
Germans had made a significant advance in developing their own solution to the problem 
of the H2S antenna being too large for their aircraft (see overleaf for illustrations), he 
also noted that they had done it by practical experiment rather than by theoretical work:
It may also be of interest to record here that investigation has shown that the 
Germans developed their dielectric aerials first from an experimental standpoint and 
they subsequently generalised their results on the basis of a satisfactory working 
theory; they found that the important dimensions for the solid dielectric aerial were the 
diameters at the beginning and end of the coned portion which determined the aerial 
impedance and the matching of it to space.80
In the next chapter I will assess the contribution made by practical learning (or 
embodiment of practical skill) in the re-building of H2S in comparison to Gooding’s 
theories of learning by doing, and Collins’ theories of replication.
79 RL39/537, Section II.
80 AVIA26/825.
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Figure7.3 Muritz See Map and intact H2S (Rotterdam-Wiesbadcn) picture.
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Figure 7.4: R o tte rd a m !B e r lin  pictures of Muritz See. Comparative photos from 
rebuilt H2S (N a c h b a u ), intact H2S (W iesb a d en ) and B e r lin . From RL39/537.
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Figure 7.5: N a x o s lB e r im  polyrod dipole scanner. Specially developed diople 
scanner, original to the Germans, it was smaller and lighter than the H2S 
scanner, and better suited to German aircraft
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The airborne trials showed the Germans that they had only partially succeeded in 
replicating the British equipment, in terms of producing an artefact that exactly 
reproduced the phenomena of the original. This was shown by the comparisons of the 
performance of their re-built set, and the redesigned set, with the intact original (as the 
illustrations indicate). The former two apparatus did produce pictures, but they did not 
match the performance of the original. However, when they set about adapting it and 
redesigning it to suit their own uses and competences at manufacturing, they started 
produce images that did approach the British results. This was because they began to 
learn the necessary skills required to build centimetre radar, as the British did when they 
first developed H2 S. They were flying with the equipment, modifying it, and picking up 
embodied practical knowledge about airborne centimetre radar. They also felt that with 
Berlin they had improved on the original in some ways:
The problems of reproducing the British set in the form of the Berlin set taxed the 
combined efforts of our technicians and industry to the utmost in order to make the 
complicated H2S set both portable and capable of operating under German 
requirements. Instead of the 14 component parts, we in Germany have managed with 
four main parts which, with the exception of one, do not require operating. Instead of 
the 60 cable leads to connect up the various pieces of equipment, we have 11 multi­
plugs. Everything has been done to retain the performance and potentialities of the set 
whilst adapting it to German requirements.81
This view was supported in some areas by the British experts, who commented in the 
report above that they found the German plugs “small and easy to use, as well as other 
comments that I have already noted.”82
This German report of February 1944 believed, prior to the commencement of air- 
trials, that the screen-presentation of Berlin was as good as the British H2 S. This wasn’t 
the case, as they later found out. Nevertheless despite the atmosphere of optimism about 
their illusory success, there was a prescient warning on the difficulties of actually using 
the pictures:
81 API 136, p636.
82 AVIA26/929, Section 4.
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It must be mentioned that the performance of [Berlin] is dependent on the 
personnel being able to extract from this ground scanner its full potentialities. We in 
the industry fear operators will be disappointed when they receive the first sets. They 
just have to learn to interpret the pictures obtained. The presentation on the British 
and German sets is certainly the same, the German one may be slightly better. The 
exploitation of the military possibilities which these pictures provide is exclusively in 
the hands of the personnel operating the sets.83
By making these points, the writers of the report were agreeing exactly with the British 
experience again, namely that possession of a certain technology didn’t necessarily mean 
that it was useful. In order to use H2 S effectively, the British had to train their operators 
to interpret the images on the screen. This was a difficult skill to learn, and not everyone 
managed to do it, as I indicated in chapter 5. In this quote, they also unwittingly pointed 
out the other major problem facing Germany in February 1944. This was the problem of 
strategy. The Germans were more in need of effective night-fighters than aids for 
strategic bombing. They possessed no strategic bombers and were using all their aircraft 
production capacity to produce fighters.
It is interesting to note that H2 S was proving to be a bit of a double-edged weapon 
for the British at this time, although they were unaware of it. The Naxos receivers 
allowed German night-fighter pilots to follow the 10cm radiation-emitting bomber 
stream. Operating H2 S provided the Germans with a powerful indication of the British 
presence in their skies. Bomber losses mounted at the same time as intelligence reports 
indicated that the Germans had developed a warning receiver.84 On 21st July, Lovell 
wrote that:
Dalton-Morris, the Chief Signals Officer of Bomber Command visited TRE to 
complain about the heavy losses over the Ruhr and said that they suspected the German 
night fighters were getting into the bomber stream by using Naxos to home on to the 
H2S transmission. Indeed, he said that a captured German night fighter pilot had 
already claimed to have shot down one of our bombers ‘by using Naxos’.85
83 API 136, p636.
84 This information was gained by listening to transmissions of pilots, which were continually 
monitored. The information was then assessed by experts, such as R. V. Jones.
85 Lovell (1991), p234.
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This also shows that the British, too, interrogated prisoners. I am not aware that any 
coercive techniques were used, but if prisoners gave information freely it had to be 
checked. There was always the possibility that the prisoner was trying to spread 
misinformation. Shortly after this, British crews were ordered not to use H2S, except for 
a few pathfinder aircraft. This was a big blow to TRE, as it undermined faith in their 
equipment. Rowe asked Dee to investigate the difficulties.
Earlier in the summer of 1944, Lovell and his colleagues had developed a device 
called Fishpond as a method of combating night-fighters. The map display produced on 
the H2S screen carefully ignored all the echoes received between the aircraft and the 
ground, in order to ensure that the map image was only of ground features. Lovell had 
the idea of using the reflections from between the aircraft and the ground on a separate 
display. This would show all the aircraft in relation to the bomber containing the 
Fishpond set. It would not show aircraft above the bomber, but the classic interception 
manoeuvre of night-fighters meant that this didn’t matter. Night-fighters would 
approach the bomber from behind and slightly below. They generally moved quicker 
than bombers, so this manoeuvre allowed them to pull the nose of their aircraft up and 
lose speed, matching their speed to that of the bomber, approaching from below also 
gave the benefit that their aircraft would only be visible from the rear gun-turret, and not 
the upper turret too, and also would not be silhouetted against the night sky but hidden 
against the blacked-out ground. The theory of using Fishpond was that aircraft keeping 
in relative position to the bomber would be other bombers in the stream, and those that 
moved in relation to the aircraft would most likely be enemy night-fighters manoeuvring 
into position for an attack.86 Fishpond did actually work this way in practice, which 
showed the remarkable improvements made by the British in the sensitivity of their 
equipment in the 18 months since the introduction of H2S.
Nevertheless, something had to be done about H2S to restore the confidence of the 
crews. Dee went to discuss its usage with R.V.Jones, and with the bomber squadrons. 
He wrote a report at the beginning of September comparing both aircraft losses and 
bombing accuracy with and without using H2S. He found that bombing losses had 
decreased from 4% to 2% during the period of H2S use, and bombing accuracy had 
increased. He concluded that H2S was an asset to bomber aircraft. Furthermore Wing
86 Lovell (1991), chapter 29.
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Commander Saward, the Officer in charge of radar at Bomber Command, discovered 
that the remarks made by the German POW about Naxos were a myth:
Squadron Leader W.H.Thompson of my staff was a fluent German linguist, and I 
arranged for him to interrogate the German pilot who had recently been shot down and 
made a prisoner of war and who was alleged to have made statements about the use of 
Naxos. Oddly, the Naxos equipment had not been installed in his aircraft, which was 
reasonably intact in its crashed condition. This interrogation took place at Trent Park, 
near Cockfosters in Hertfordshire, on 14 October. The prisoner of war explained to 
Thompson what he knew of the system and how it was used, describing in some detail 
the method of presentation of the information it received. He also stated, most 
emphatically, that the device was designed to be used only to locate the bomber stream, 
the instrument being crude to the extreme, providing no measurement of range or 
accurate bearing of H2S transmissions. This German went on to say that for attack the 
fighter relied on instructions from his Ground Night Fighter Control and the use of his 
radar interception equipment known as SN2 [Lichtenstein], which was comparable to 
Britain’s AI.87
At the same time as Saward was interviewing one POW, information concerning 
another German device called Flensburg was extracted from another. This device was 
discovered installed in an aircraft which landed in Britain by mistake. It was used for 
detecting transmissions form ‘Monica’, a 1.5m active radar which was installed in the 
rear of bombers to indicate the presence of night fighters. ‘Monica’ was being 
superseded by Fishpond, but in the Autumn of 1944 was still fitted to some aircraft. 
Flensburg gave German night-fighter pilots very accurate range and bearing information 
by homing onto the ‘Monica’ transmissions. The earlier problems of high losses were 
attributed to ‘Monica’, and the equipment was withdrawn immediately. Saward 
concluded that Naxos may well have been of propaganda value to the Germans, in that 
fear of its usage made Bomber Command cease using H2S for a period.
During the middle of 1944 thoughts at Telefunken and in military circles in Germany 
turned towards producing a centimetre AI set. After the invasion in June 1944, bomber 
aircraft which had been attacking invasion targets in France, resumed strategic bombing 
in Germany. The increased success of the bombers compared to the previous year led to
87 Saward (1985), p i 13.
305
pressure for a new AI radar. This resulted in the Berlin N l, of which only one was 
flight-tested before the war ended, in February 1945. The aircraft in which it was 
installed was captured intact and evaluated, but I have been unable to locate any details 
of its performance (see overleaf for pictures).
7.6 Conclusions
In this chapter I have related what the situation was like in German research, and 
how the Germans copied H2 S radar. I have also begun to indicate how the findings of 
this chapter in relation to the replication of H2 S affect the work of, in particular, Collins. 
I have developed the ideas of replication in the terms of what knowledge can be 
transmitted by artefacts. I have looked at what a Chinese Copy does, and whether 
successful copying requires the transmission of tacit knowledge about how to build 
equipment.
In the final chapter I want to readdress these ideas in a broader sense, bringing in 
themes form the introduction and from the rest of the thesis. In particular, I wish to 
assess what impact my findings have had on the role of scientific practice in creating 
knowledge, and how such knowledge travels by when it is embodied and embedded. I 
will also look again at replication, expanding the issues I have raised in this chapter and 
comparing it to another investigation, on the transmission of knowledge about nuclear 
weapons. I will then summarise my findings in terms of a reappraisal of some of the 
literature on scientific practice, knowledge and replication.
Figure 7.6: B e r lin  N 1  nose aerial. The scanner for the night-fighter AI version of 
B e r lin . From Kummritz (1988), p225.
Figure 7.7: Captured German B e r lin  set Lovell is seen showing the set to Sir 




In this final chapter I wish to draw together the central themes of this thesis, which I 
outlined in chapter 1. Those themes cover the way scientific knowledge is made, how it 
becomes embodied as skill or embedded in an artefact, and how it is communicated or 
transferred. I will assess these ideas in relation to the history of centimetre radar, and to 
authors within the fields of History of Science and Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
whose work forms the basis of the original analysis.
8.2 Practical Experimental Skill and Tacit Knowledge
8.2.1 Background, Common Knowledge
In The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions,* Kuhn set out the idea of the scientific 
paradigm. The paradigm was the shared knowledge of a community of scientists. In 
order to become a scientist, the aspirant had to learn a world-view and a way of behaving 
and doing that permitted him to become fully-fledged. The idea of scientists joining a 
community, or culture, with unarticulated rules and ‘"ways of going on” is one that has 
been subsequently developed by other authors in the field of SSK.
Kuhn discussed the idea of groups of scientists sharing the same paradigm, or 
world-view. He also formed the notion of a serious anomaly within the paradigm 
triggering a period of revolution, where the old paradigm was questioned, and scientists 
switched allegiance to a new paradigm that explained the phenomenon which triggered 
the revolution. He then developed the idea that different fields of science would share 
certain points of view that bound them to the scientific culture as a whole. However, 
Biologists, for example, would have different views in some areas to Chemists. Within a 
field, smaller groups based within national boundaries, or laboratories, or even
1 Kuhn (1970).
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individuals within a laboratory may also not share the same views (or paradigm) on all 
matters within their field.
The aspects of their beliefs that are shared form the basis of background, common 
scientific knowledge. These common aspects may take the form of ideas, theories, 
techniques or artefacts, but it is their shared aspects which allow scientists to 
communicate with each other. In Kuhn’s analysis, failure to reach common ground when 
an anomaly occurred was the reason for a period of paradigm shift, or scientific 
controversy. These controversial aspects of science, which highlight the differences in 
beliefs between communities of science, also highlight the social aspects of science and 
have therefore been much studied by Sociologists of Scientific Knowledge.2
In chapter 7 ,1 discussed the idea that German scientists shared a common scientific 
knowledge with their British counterparts. Both British and German radar scientists and 
engineers had similar scientific backgrounds. They would have had areas of common 
knowledge about the components and techniques they used, because of their training, 
and because they had both been developing and building radar for seven to eight years by 
1943, when the Germans discovered H2S. However, they did not share some types of 
knowledge due to their physical isolation, which was exacerbated by the war. In the next 
sections I will look at what knowledge the groups didn’t originally share, and how this 
knowledge later did come to be shared.
8.2.2 Embodied Tacit Knowledge
In section 1.2.2 I discussed the origins and subsequent development of the terms 
“know-how” and ‘"tacit knowledge” within the field of science studies. Whilst many in 
SSK have looked at science from a social perspective, Gooding and Pickering, amongst 
others, have examined it from a practical angle. Gooding in particular has looked closely 
at the fine structure of experiment. By using his own research on Faraday, and 
Pickering’s on Morpurgo, he has developed a schemata of the way scientists acquire 
knowledge.
2 See, for example, Shapin(1979).
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Based on Ryle’s examination of the difference between theoretical and practical 
knowledge, which shows that one can know how to do certain tasks without necessarily 
being able to articulate how, Gooding extends this analysis to the experimental arena. 
Scientists engage the world through the fine structure of their experiments, modifying 
their ideas, their competences and their apparatus by constant trial and error. The 
important point is that the scientist learns manipulative techniques that give him a “feel” 
for how to solve a scientific problem with a certain piece of apparatus.3
When approaching a problem, the scientist will draw on his theoretical, cognitive 
and practical resources in order to decide how to set up his apparatus. The scientist’s 
practical resources can be termed his tacit knowledge. This term, as I explained in 
section 1.2.2, was first coined by Polanyi4, but it has been refined by Collins.5 The term 
refers to the practical skill of the experimenter that is embodied within him. Tacit 
knowledge can be of two sorts, embodied “know-how” that cannot be made explicit, and 
embodied “know-how” which can. However, with the latter type, as Collins explains, it 
is sometimes the case that originally one does not know that one knows how to do 
something. In this case tacit knowledge is made explicit when others try to replicate an 
apparatus, and the replicators cannot reproduce the apparatus and its effect. This causes 
the original experimenter to look for the reason why, and in so doing, he will make 
explicit some of the tacit knowledge embodied within him.
I have found Gooding’s ideas about the practical acquisition of knowledge through 
experimental trial and error to be bom out by my own work. Radar research and 
development was almost entirely experimentally based, to the point where the researchers 
did not have clearly defined theoretical ideas about what they had achieved, even if they 
did know how to produce an effect. This had a converse, in that there were some 
experiments where they could not get equipment to work properly (as in the case of 
H2S), because they had failed to develop the necessary practical skills to make it work.
British radar workers grew up during a period when radio emerged into general 
society, having previously been the preserve of scientists and the military. The 1920s and 
1930s saw a rapid expansion in interest in radio because of the growth in commercial 





practical skills in working with electronics in the process.6 Many of these enthusiastic 
amateurs were youngsters, whose interest led them to enter careers in science and 
technology in the 1930s, and who subsequently ended up in radar research during the 
war. Lovell revealed in interview that:
[PJeople like myself, we had been dealing with electronics, the control of cloud 
chambers and things like that. In my case, I had as a boy been a wireless fan. I was 
generally acquainted with these things.7
I highlighted in chapters 3 and 4 how some of the innovations in centimetre radar 
came from men who were physicists, rather than specialist radio engineers. The thinking 
behind using these men was that they would have the experience of being able to work 
with electronic apparatus, but they would not have the shared background of 
conventional electronics wisdom which believed that centimetre radar “could not be 
done”. However, having a physics background was not a pre-requisite, and not all of the 
researchers in Britain were physicists. Some came from other disciplines. This may seem 
strange at first, but the situation in University research in the 1930s was much different to 
how it is at present. Researchers were expected to build a lot of their equipment 
themselves, with the assistance of the laboratory technicians. This also applied to the 
non-physicists who joined the radar team, as Lovell described to me:
[W]hen Hodgkin was sent to me at St. Athan, he was a physiologist and I thought 
he’d know nothing about [electronics] but of course he’d already done the most 
precise electronic work using cathode ray oscilloscopes on conduction through nerve 
fibres. It wasn’t unusual in those days for young researchers. The same applied to 
Pringle who was a zoologist. They were all very clued up.8
Practical ability in electronics was widespread amongst British radar researchers. This 
was less true in Germany in the 1930s, but during the 1920s the same interest in radio 
pertained.
6 Hughes (1993a).
7 Lovell, interview with author 1/12/92.
8 Lovell, interview with author 1/12/92.
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When these men conducted their research in wartime, different pressures pertained 
to those of their University laboratories. They needed to get their work done quickly, for 
success was now defined in the terms of a life or death struggle. Their practical abilities 
stood them in good stead in order to do this. In Britain, Lovell revealed that:
There was not much time for theoiy at that stage in the war... [OJne did one’s 
own reading and private cognitions, but there were not theorists about... I think that 
all the people who assembled at C-Site during the summer of 1940, they were 
absolutely first class experimentalists, and I think you’d have the greatest difficulty in 
collecting a similar lot now.9
Lovell’s views confirm how important practical ability was not only in terms of my 
analysis of events, which accords with Gooding’s views, but also in the eyes of the 
scientists themselves. They respected the abilities of their colleagues in making the 
apparatus work. Furthermore, many of the centimetre scientists subsequently had 
distinguished careers, earning honours such as Nobel Prizes, knighthoods and 
Fellowships of the Royal Society, so Lovell’s comments about the quality of his 
colleagues are not entirely hubristic.
German researchers, although not as well documented as their British colleagues, 
had their own struggles between scientists with practical knowledge of how to make 
radar sets work, and theorists who drew conclusions without recourse to experiment. 
Centimetre research was cancelled in the first place, because someone with a theoretical 
viewpoint which discounted the possibility of using centimetre waves in radar had the 
status to order the work to cease. Later, when that work was reopened, other 
theoreticians cast doubt on whether centimetre radar would work when it was already 
being operated.
Embedded tacit knowledge did not only occur in the form of knowing how to build 
apparatus. When the set was manufactured and put into service, people had to be trained 
how to operate the equipment. Very often interpretation of the image on the radar 
screen was not a straightforward matter, as was the case with H2 S. As I described in 
chapter 5, learning how to use H2 S was difficult, and not all operators managed it 
successfully. When they had learned how to do it, they’d acquired operating skill, or
9 Lovell, interview with author 1/12/92.
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tacit knowledge. Given the equipment, a skilled operator would (i) be able to set it up to 
work properly, (ii) know if it wasn’t working properly and (iii) be able to go through 
simple procedures to try and make it work if it didn’t. A skilled operator would be able 
to reveal what the correct output of the device should be. In other words, they would be 
-  able to reveal what constituted the proper “outcome” of the apparatus.
Embodied tacit knowledge is developed in the first instance by individuals or very 
small groups who work closely together. It is localised knowledge about how to do 
something. However, this localised knowledge must at some point be transferable, or it 
would remain forever confined to the individual or small group. Gooding has developed 
the idea further to show how embodied knowledge can become embedded into 
apparatus. I will discuss what this process entails, and how it relates to radar in the next 
section.
8.2.3 Embedded Tacit Knowledge
When a scientist or group of scientists commence research into a new area, they 
bring to bear their intellectual, cognitive, social and practical resources to characterise 
the problem they wish to investigate. Part of this process involves building apparatus 
suitable for investigating the problem. This process does not strictly have a beginning 
and an end: it is cumulative and ongoing. Even when scientists move into a new area, 
they draw on their reserves of explicit, group knowledge and their tacit, practical 
knowledge to set up the apparatus they want to use, and to then use it to reproduce 
experimental results.
However, the world does not always behave predictably, and very often experiments 
do not work as they are expected. This often occurs in the form of the experiment not 
working at all. The experimenters then have to modify their equipment to see whether it 
is possible for them to produce the effect they wish to see, or whether they are going in 
the wrong direction and a new approach is required. This process of trial and error, and 
refinement both of apparatus and theoretical ideas, has been described by Gooding in 
relation to Faraday’s10 rotation motor, and Morpurgo’s11 quark detector. Faraday
10 Gooding (1990a).
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modified his manipulations of his apparatus, the apparatus itself, and his ideas and 
theories about what he was observing and discovering, in order to investigate new 
magnetic and electric effects. His ongoing discoveries and modifications of his 
apparatus, technique and theories caused him to change his ideas about what he saw as 
he went along. This cognitive process also caused him to modify his equipment, as he 
became better equated with its and his possibilities. The same process occurred with 
Morpurgo’s team, as they strove to design a suitable quark detector, before they even 
commenced experimentation.
In both cases, the experimenters increased their embodied knowledge about how to 
manipulate their equipment to produce an effect. When they were able to produce this 
effect relatively easily, they were then able to modify the equipment so that they did not 
have to rely on their own skill to produce the effect any more. They could then move 
onto new areas. In other words, they had embedded their embodied skill and tacit 
knowledge into the apparatus. The skill now required was the skill of operating the 
equipment, not the skill of building it.
This process was very important in the history of radar. In order to turn the 
laboratory apparatus into a production radar, the skill of the original experimenters had 
to be embedded into the equipment. This was the process of engineering, such that it 
could be manufactured in large numbers, and operated by persons who were not skilled 
in building it. The embedding process stabilises the tacit knowledge of the original 
experimenters into the equipment. Sometimes during the process of learning how to 
operate equipment, it works better than expected on the first trial. This was the case 
with the cavity magnetron, and also with the first centimetre AI, as I relate in chapters 3 
and 4. Randall and Boot’s original cavity magnetron produced far more power than they 
expected after they got it to work (they had trouble making sure everything was 
connected up properly to start with). When Hodgkin first flew with his spiral-scan AI, he 
was surprised to see the ground represented as a straight line on the screen. This 
unexpected effect was very useful as a horizon indicator.
The first production H2S sets were not fully stable, as they were prone to break 
down during operation. Unfortunately, whilst being perfectly capable of operating the 
set and interpreting the images in order to navigate, the operators could not make them
11 Gooding (1992).
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operate if they did break down. They were able to use an algorithmic set of procedures 
for fault-finding,12 but beyond that if the set broke down it took a mechanic to fix it. The 
mechanic would posess more embodied knowledge about the electronics of the 
equipment, which would increase as he learned whilst doing his repairs, but even he 
would not be able to build it from scratch. Modification of design flaws had to come 
from further trial and error experimentation by the original scientists.
The trial and error process would increase the expertise of the scientist in knowing 
how to build radar. At the same time, his expertise would be transferred into the 
apparatus as embedded knowledge. By so doing, he made the apparatus into an entity 
that was stable in operation, in that it produced stable, repeatable effects. This stable 
entity could then be manufactured into production apparatus. Production apparatus 
could be used by operators who did not have the same level of experimental tacit 
knowledge as the scientists, and repaired by fitters who, again, did not have the same 
level of experimental tacit knowledge as the scientists. Importantly, knowledge 
embedded in apparatus could be transferred, which I will discuss in section 8.3.
8.2.4 Communication
A further important process in the acquisition of scientific knowledge, is the 
communication of that knowledge. In section 1.2.3 I indicated that I would be seeking 
to highlight instances of the communication of scientific knowledge on three levels. 
These three levels are within small groups of scientists, between groups of scientists, and 
between nations.
Collins’ work has shown that the transfer of skilled personnel, who have embodied 
tacit knowledge, greatly aids the replication of scientific apparatus13 (I will discuss the 
issue of whether this process is necessary for replication, or just sufficient, in the next 
section). When I examined the development of radar, especially the development of the 
early British metric AI, and then centimetre AI, I discovered that the availability of 
practically skilled personnel aided the process of development. Within the research team,
12 RAF Bomber Command “5 Group Aircraft Drills”, RAF Museum.
13 Collins (1985).
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close contact between skilled scientists could facilitate the trial and error process of 
acquiring embodied tacit knowledge. For example, during the development of centimetre 
AI during the summer of 1940, the research team occupied a single hut. As a 
consequence they were exposed to the work of other members of the group on a 
frequent basis. If a problem with one particular piece of apparatus arose, a colleague, 
who may or may not have had other practical skills to bear on the problem could be 
brought in to assist. Frequent discussions and demonstrations within the group led to the 
sharing of ideas, and colleagues were on hand to teach their skills to others. Clearly, co­
operation on this level was a good thing for British radar.
Non-co-operation within a group was a much rarer thing. The nearest thing I found 
to it was Bainbridge-Bell’s scepticism about the first early warning experiments in 1935, 
which I related in chapter 2. He eventually left the group because of these differences. 
The other instance was the disagreements between Bowen and Rowe which occurred in 
1940, and were again related in chapter 2. Strictly speaking Bowen and Rowe weren’t 
within the same group. Rowe was in charge of Bowen, but Bowen was working on a 
separate field. However, their antagonism meant that the centimetre radar group were 
removed from the main research establishment where they had access to resources such 
as skilled colleagues and scientific information. Furthermore, when the centimetre group 
was re-established at Worth Matravers, Bowen’s embodied tacit knowledge was denied 
to the team.
The second level of communication, between groups, featured very strongly in the 
development of radar. This type of communication has also drawn a great deal of 
attention within the field of SSK, for it is when knowledge is communicated between 
groups, that one can see the social process within science at work. The same dynamics 
that allow the transmission of embodied tacit knowledge within a group, also facilitate 
the transmission of that knowledge between groups. The classic case study of transfer of 
knowledge between groups is Collins’ examination of the replication of the TEA laser.14 
Collins has claimed that the laser was only replicated because of the transfer of tacit 
knowledge by skilled personnel. In other words, the transfer of embodied tacit 
knowledge is necessary to effect replication of scientific apparatus and effects.
14 Collins (1985).
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The other thing that the interaction between scientific groups allows us to see, is the 
role of social processes in the settling of scientific disputes. SSK makes strong claims 
about the role that status has in the outcome of disputes, as another Collins case-study 
examines. Collins argues that when results are in dispute, the experimenter’s regress 
arises. This occurs when one side fail to replicate, and challenge the results of the first 
experiment. The first experimenter challenges the apparatus of the second experiment, or 
the experimenter’s techniques. As the dispute cannot be resolved by a claim to nature, it 
is the status of the disputees which resolves the dispute. The side which enjoys the most 
support within the wider scientific community will win.
When the free exchange of ideas and information did not occur between different 
groups in Britain, progress suffered as a result. This was clearly illustrated by the 
problem of minimum range (chapter 2), the dispute between GEC and AMRE (chapter 
4), and the American scepticism about H2 S (chapter 5). In all these cases, groups away 
from the main group (who possessed the practical ability of how to build and use the 
radar in question) challenged this group about some aspect of their work. In each case, 
the AMRE/TRE group had the dispute resolved in their favour because they had 
developed the practical ability with their apparatus to be able to demonstrate their 
findings to higher authority.
In contrast, co-operation between groups speeded up progress, as was the situation 
with the experimental cavity magnetron. Megaw’s trips to Paris to learn about Gutton’s 
tungsten cathode, and his visits to Birmingham to learn about Randall and Boot’s cavity 
magnetron design, allowed him to come up with a superior engineered cavity magnetron.
In Germany, the political system encouraged a culture of secrecy and competition 
between the services, industry, and the research establishments. To a certain extent this 
was remedied with the arrival of Albert Speer, who tried to encourage more co-operation 
(see chapter 7). He was not able to resolve the situation completely, however, and as the 
British example showed, fragmentation and non-co-operation had a retarding effect on 
radar development.
There was of course no overt communication about scientific matters between 
Britain and Germany during the war. The British communicated their knowledge fully 
with the Americans, and with other members of the Commonwealth (in particular 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand), but this did not always lead to complete agreement
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as the case of H2S in Britain and America showed (see chapter 5). In the next section I 
wish to look at the types of communication between Britain and Germany over the 
rebuilding and replication of H2S. There was no personal contact between the builders of 
the system. What communication there was, came through a transfer of embedded 
knowledge in the form of the apparatus, H2S, and embodied skill about using it. Both 
forms of knowledge are not, according to Collins, sufficient to allow replication. It is 
this claim which I shall investigate in the next section.
8.3 The Replication of Centimetre Radar
In this section I wish to examine the implications of the successful replication of 
centimetre radar by the Germans, for the understanding of how replication works. 
Collins summarises his views on replication thus:
Proposition one: Transfer of skill-like knowledge is capricious.
Proposition two: Skill-like knowledge travels best (or only) through 
accomplished practitioners.
Proposition three: Experimental ability has the character of a skill that can be 
acquired and developed with practice. Like a skill, it cannot be fully explicated 
or absolutely established.
Proposition four: Experimental ability is invisible in its passage and in those 
who posses it.
Proposition five: Proper working of the apparatus, parts of the apparatus and 
the experimenter are defined by the ability to take part introducing the proper 
experimental outcome. Other indicators cannot be found.15
In these five propositions, Collins concentrates on the social dimension of knowledge 
transfer. In particular, he is stating that non-explicable experimental skill is a necessary 
component for reproducing experimental results, and that that skill can only be 
transferred by personal contact between skilled experimenters.
However, there are two other means of transferring scientific knowledge, apart from 
via a skilled experimenter. Knowledge can be transferred via a set of algorithmic
15 Collins (1985), pp 73-4.
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instructions, and also via a scientific or technological artefact. The question I wish to 
settle in this section, is whether scientific knowledge can be transferred by these other 
means without the concomitant transfer of skilled personnel. If we take this strong case 
to be true, as I believe Collins does (see proposition 2 above), then we have argued that 
knowledge is not transferable without skilled personnel to aid replication. _
In a recent paper,16 Mackenzie & Spinardi have followed the progress of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons from the West to the East. In particular, they have 
looked at the process of the original replication of the U.S. fission and fusion weapons in 
Russia and in China. This occurred after the transfer of documentary information 
through non-skilled personnel only. Mackenzie & Spinardi found that there was no 
transfer of skilled personnel:
We would not claim that our results are identical with those of the paradigmatic 
sociological studies of the role of tacit knowledge in science. Thus Collins found that 
only those who had direct personal contact with a group which had previously had 
build [sic] a working “TEA laser* were able successfully to build one. That is not the 
case for nuclear weapons. The Soviets, for example, successfully built an atomic bomb 
without direct personal contact with the Manhattan Project. The contacts with Fuchs 
were through the intelligence service intermediaries, and as Collins has emphasised, 
where tacit knowledge is concerned we would expect that “no-one could act as a 
middle-man unless he himself was practised in that skill,” which these intermediaries 
would not have been.17
So, Mackenzie & Spinardi have shown that it is possible to replicate a highly complex 
scientific and technological project, solely through the transfer of algorithmic 
knowledge. What the replicators of the original results did have over the original 
experimenters was the knowledge that the desired outcome was possible. However, 
despite their knowledge of the outcome, the replicators of the American fission bomb 
did not have an easy or quick task ahead of them:
[NJeither the existence of previous programs, nor the leakage of knowledge from 
them, have made nuclear weapons design and fabrication a trivial task. None of the
16 MacKenzie & Spinardi (1994).
17 MacKenzie & Spinardi (1994), p32.
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subsequent programs to build a fission bomb was any faster than the original 
Manhattan project; several of them (notably the Russian and Chinese efforts) grew to 
reach a similar scale. Nor was this merely a consequence of technological and 
industrial backwardness. Even in the 1970s, it took South Africa, by then a relatively 
advanced industrial country, nine years from the beginning of its uranium enrichment 
program to being able to fabricate even a single bomb with the simplest of Manhattan 
project designs.18
The acquisition of knowledge abut nuclear weapons was hardest, in terms of the length 
of time it took, when the replicating country had no previous knowledge about nuclear 
weapons. Once that initial hurdle had been crossed, it became easier:
Nuclear weapons technologies are not uniform in the balance of algorithmic and 
tacit knowledge they demand... The design of a fission bomb is more demanding in 
terms of the acquisition of tacit knowledge than the design of a “secondary” to turn such 
a weapon into a hydrogen bomb. Whilst subsequent fission bomb programs were all 
slower than the American program, hydrogen bombs were faster. It took the Americans 
over seven years to move from their first fission to their first full thermonuclear 
explosion; the Soviet Union made the move in four years, and the Chinese in three. The 
most difficult and most crucial step in acquiring a nuclear arsenal is the first one;
19thereafter it gets easier.
Mackenzie & Spinardi’s conclusion, based on this study, is that personal contact 
between nuclear weapons scientists was not necessary for the replication of those 
weapons:
The historical record shows... that direct personal contact with a previous, 
successful, program is not a prerequisite of successful construction of an atomic 
bomb... [TJhe record of the spread of nuclear weaponry supports only the more modest 
conclusion; that if only algorithmic and not tacit knowledge from previous programs is 
available, the subsequent development of nuclear weapons is more like independent re- 
invention than copying.20
18 MacKenzie & Spinardi (1994), p32.
19 MacKenzie & Spinardi (1994), p32.
20 MacKenzie & Spinardi (1994), pp32-3.
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MacKenzie & Spinardi state explicitly that tacit knowledge is not necessary for 
replication. What they also state implicitly, is that the replication of nuclear weapons, 
given only the possession of algorithmic knowledge, required the acquisition of embodied 
tacit knowledge about how to build nuclear weapons. It was the acquisition of this 
knowledge that took the time, and gave the programmes the character of “independent 
re-invention”. This was evidenced by the shorter time it took the Soviet and Chinese 
weapons engineers to build fusion weapons after the Americans had built theirs. The 
replicators had by this time acquired nuclear weapon building skill, and, coupled with 
their knowledge of the outcome (that fusion weapons could be built successfully), this 
speeded up the later replication.
The case of replication through the transfer of technological artefacts, which I am 
seeking to show by looking at the replication of H2S, does not agree with Collins* 
assertion that the replication requires knowledge transfer via skilled personnel either. 
However, this case study deals with replication when artefacts are transferred, and this 
differs from when only algorithmic knowledge is transferred.
In the case of H2S, there were two types of skill that could have been transferred via 
personnel: tacit knowledge about how to build the equipment, and tacit knowledge abut 
how to operate it. The latter information was transferred to the Germans by an operator, 
and by so doing he gave them knowledge about what the correct outcome of operating 
the apparatus should be. However, no radar-building tacit knowledge was transferred. 
The Germans received a partial apparatus first, in March 1943, and then received a 
complete one in the Autumn of that year.
As I detailed in chapters 3 ,4  and 5, the builders of H2S and its components acquired 
a great deal of tacit knowledge about building this radar. They did this by engaging in 
the sort of learning process detailed by Gooding, and described in section 8.2.2. This 
process also ensured that their embodied knowledge became embedded in the apparatus. 
It was through the embedding this knowledge that persons who were not skilled radar 
builders could acquire tacit knowledge about how to operate H2S.
The Germans did not originally receive a complete, working H2S. However, they 
did receive knowledge about how a complete, fully working H2S should operate. When 
they finally acquired a working, complete H2S they had already begun a programme of 
research designed for them to begin acquiring tacit knowledge about centimetre radar.
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The Germans were able to replicate H2 S, in that they took a working equipment and 
produced the correct outcome of operating it, or getting a picture on the screen. They 
had to acquire the more subtle skills of navigational interpretation by using it; in other 
words by trial and error learning. However, they were also able to replicate it in the 
sense that they were able to build their own system, that also produced these “ correct” 
results. They only did so by themselves acquiring tacit radar-building skills. 
Nevertheless, they were able to build their own system in a time quicker than the original 
builders. This was despite the difficulties inherent in the structure of their research 
operation (see chapter 7) which acted as a further brake on the speed of their research by 
preventing close contact and co-operation between researchers. That they did manage to 
replicate the equipment must have meant that the transfer of artefacts speeded up the 
process of replication. So we can draw the conclusion that artefacts speed up replication 
more than just the transfer of algorithmic knowledge. I shall draw further general 
conclusions about knowledge transfer via artefact, but first I will characterise them by 
assessing what I believe would have been the case in some situations other than what 
actually happened.
If the Germans had captured an intact H2 S, but had not captured anyone to tell them 
what it was or how to operate it, I believe that very soon they would have been able to 
replicate it in the sense of getting it to produce the correct “outcome” - an image on the 
screen. This would have been because German electronics experts possessed shared 
background knowledge with their British counterparts about airborne radar, and some 
centimetre components. Through trial and error experimentation by “fiddling” with the 
equipment (and possibly reading the labels), they would have worked out how to operate 
H2S. Once they knew how to operate it, they would still have had to acquire tacit radar- 
building knowledge through trial and error experimentation, just as the original builders 
did. If they had possessed tacit knowledge about how to operate it, as indeed they did 
(but they didn’t posses a complete equipment), then they could have skipped the process 
of acquiring operating knowledge by trial and error.
If the Germans had been able to get hold of one of the builders who was sympathetic 
to them, together with a working example of H2 S, they would have been able to copy the 
set far quicker. This would have been because a transfer of tacit embodied knowledge 
would have occurred. There is no doubt that transfer of knowledge in this way facilitates
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replication. Replication by copying can occur without this knowledge, but there is no 
guarantee that it will occur. In some cases, as with the copying of the magnetron, 
replication was done without full acquisition of the tacit knowledge of the original 
builder. The original performance, or an acceptable version of it, may be replicated, but 
there was no guarantee that this would occur. The original artefact contained the 
embedded tacit knowledge of the builder. This allowed operation by a non-skilled 
person, but did not make copying a foregone conclusion. The replicator may have been 
able to copy it without acquiring the same building tacit knowledge as the original 
builder, but unless this knowledge was acquired, then it may not have happened.
In summary, I would propose the following as conclusions to be drawn about 
replication:
(i) Scientists share background knowledge through membership of a common scientific 
culture. The closer scientists are in terms of their subject, their work, and in their 
physical proximity, the larger this common knowledge is.
(ii) The process of trial and error experimentation leads scientists to acquire local, 
embodied tacit knowledge. This becomes embedded into technological artefacts through 
further trial and error experimentation by the original scientist(s).
(iii) Persons who are not skilled at building the original artefact, can become skilled at 
operating it, because the original experimenter’s tacit knowledge becomes embedded 
into it.
(iv) Transfer of algorithmic knowledge gives the slowest transfer of knowledge, because 
the process of learning by hands-on experimental trial and error, in order to acquire 
builder’s tacit knowledge, has to take place.
(v) Transfer of artefacts, plus shared background knowledge, acts in a similar way to 
transfer of algorithmic knowledge. Replication of outcome can take place once the 
correct outcome has been learnt through trial and error operation. Replication of the 
equipment in terms of copying can take place without the acquisition of further embodied 
building knowledge, although this is not guaranteed.
(vi) Transfer of artefacts, plus the process of trial and error experimentation leads to 
replication by copying. This can sometimes be quicker than the original experimentation, 
given possession of knowledge of the outcome (how to operate the equipment).
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(vii) Transfer of artefacts, plus transfer of personnel skilled in operation, does away with 
the necessity for the process of trial and error learning required to operate the equipment.
(viii) Transfer of artefacts plus transfer of embodied tacit knowledge of how to build the 
apparatus ensures replication takes place, and takes place speedily.
(ix) Free transfer of artefacts, embodied operating and building knowledge, and 
algorithmic knowledge is the best way to ensure quick replication.
8.4 Thoughts and Suggestions
There are some aspects of my work that I feel I should bring to the attention to the 
reader, having completed the writing up of this thesis. Firstly, my research has entailed 
using one technique not normally associated with the historian, namely that of interview. 
I also wish to comment on my impressions of my findings, and what I believe to be 
possibilities for building on my work.
I found the use of interview to be a valuable tool in my research. Naturally, 
interview can only be considered when there are participants alive to recount their 
experiences and impressions, which means that its scope is limited to the very recent in 
historical terms. The most useful aspect of interview for me was that it enabled me to (i) 
check on unclear aspects of participants’ own writings, be they from their original 
material or from books they had written subsequently, and (ii) I was able to get 
impressions and anecdotes that are not generally available in primary and secondary 
sources. With the growth of sound archives and interviews, this resource will be more 
important to the historian of the future. One proviso is that they will be reliant on the 
questions and questioners of the past, whereas I was able to dictate my own agenda in 
this respect.
I was generally extremely happy with the amount of material I was able to find and 
use on British developments. I was able to make use of a wealth of primary material 
including reports, laboratory notebooks, diaries and interviews. These enabled me to 
prepare a detailed record of the genesis of British centimetric radar. For various reasons 
I was not able to do the same with German radar. I was unable to track down any 
participants to interview. German researchers, by the nature of their University system,
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were older than equivalent British researchers and most if not all of them are now dead 
(as are many of their British counterparts). The German archives were not as complete 
as the British for two reasons. Firstly, much German research was undertaken at a 
commercial company, Telefunken. Its modem day successor, AEG, had no record of its 
wartime work. They were unable to tell me what had happened to their records, except 
that they suspected they were either removed by the Russians, or destroyed in the 
bombing or the capitulation, or both. Secondly, other records suffered the same fate as 
those from Telefunken. Fortunately, some material remained for me to use, namely 
British intelligence assessments and the Rotterdam minutes. From these I was able to 
extract a surprisingly large amount of relevant and useful information.
Finally, I believe that I have been able to make a contribution to the debate about 
tacit knowledge through my work asl summarised above. I have also created a historical 
interpretation of British and German centimetric radar development, which has not been 
attempted before to my knowledge. I believe that there are three further threads that 
could be continued from my work.
The first would be to compare the work in Britain with the work the Tizard Mission 
initiated in the USA. In chapter 5 I relate briefly how research at the Radiation 
Laboratory in the US, which ostensibly was co-operating fully with its British 
counterpart, did not always come to the same conclusions as AMRE/TRE. Closer 
examination of this disagreement by me did not fall within the scope or budget of this 
thesis.
Examination of the Japanese research on centimetre radar is a further area that could 
be investigated. The Japanese copied some British and American radars, but developed 
their own series of cavity magnetrons before they saw any Allied versions. I also feel that 
an investigation of the Japanese research, their copying of Allied equipment, and their 
apparent non-co-operation with their German Allies would provide fruitful ground for 
further work.
Finally, an interesting project to arise out of this work would be to follow the 
process of the building of H2S in more detail. One would look even more closely at the 
minutiae of the way the H2S team operated in the laboratory and conducted their flight 
trials. This work could then be extended to cover the role of the Operational Research 
teams, composed of RAF personnel, in the process of development. The personnel from
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the commercial firms who would actually build the apparatus would make a good topic 
for investigation. One could then go on to look at the way the equipment was introduced 
into service, by following the processes of setting up training programmes for the fitters 
who would install and maintain the equipment and the navigators who would operate it. 
Such a study would be able to uncover the different ways in which practical, theoretical 
and algorithmic knowledge is created, refined and implemented in an unusual situation.
325
Bibliography
I have split the bibliography into two sections: unpublished, and published material. 
The former section contains any material which is not published, namely interviews, 
correspondence, private notebooks, and material held in archives. The latter contains all 
other sources which are published and freely available, such as books, papers in academic 
journals and video material. I made this distinction as opposed to the more traditional 
primary/secondary one, as some sources proved difficult to classify in that way.
Unpublished
1.1 General
Brandt, L. (ed.) (1953) Sitzungsprotokolle der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Rotterdam, 22/2/43- 
1/9/44. [Minutes o f the Rotterdam Committee, 22/2/43-1/9/44.]
Burcham, W.E., Laboratory Notebook (unpublished) 1940-41.
Hughes, J. (1993a) The Radioactivists: Community, Controversy and the Rise o f Nuclear 
Physics, Cambridge University PhD Thesis.
Hughes, J. (1993b) “Bridging the Gap Physics, the Universities and Industry in Britain, 
1918-1940, unpublished paper.
Mackenzie, D. & Spinardi, G (1994) “Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the 
Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons.”, unpublished pre-print.
Passveer, B. (1993) Coding and Decoding: The Skill o f Medical X-Ray Photographs, 
unpublished paper.
1.2 Interviews
Batt, R., interview between author and Batt, 7/3/93.
Burcham, W.E, interview between author and Burcham, 15/2/93. 
Clayton, Sir Robert, interview between author and Clayton, 10/9/92. 
Lovell, A.C.B., interview between author and Lovell, 1/12/92.
326
1.3 John Rylands University Library, Manchester
Burcham/Lovell Correspondence.
Dee, P.I. (1940-5) Personal Record o f work at TRE, unpublished. Included in Lovell (1945) 
TRE Record.
W.B.Lewis Papers, John Rylands Library, Manchester University. Correspondence and 
papers collected during the writing of the Obituary of W.B.Lewis.
Lovell, A.C.B. (1945) TRE Record, unpublished.
Lovell, A.C.B., general correspondence re Echoes o f War, 1989-91.
O'Kane/Lovell Correspondence.
van der Hulst/Lovell Correspondence, 1981-82.
1.4 Public Records Office, Kew
AIR14/3591 “Comparative Development of British and Enemy Radar, 1945.”
AIR20/1686 “German Radar Sets: Fu Ge 220 and Fu Ge 227, July 1944.”
AIR20/4222 “Disclosure of Information to the Public, Dec 1940-Aug.l945.”
AVIAlO/118 “Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee - Reports (1945): Radio 
and Radar Research Establishment of the German Service Ministries.”
AVIA10/141 “CIOS Report on Telefunken GmbH (1945).”
AVLA10/142 “CIOS Interrogation of Prof. Scherzer ofBHF (Munich, 1945).”
AVIA15/1609 "RDF H2S Technical Policy."
AVIA26/60 TRE Report T1058 “Uniformity of some Production Magnetrons (CV44) 
Supplied for use in AI Mk VIII, 18/3/42.”
AVIA26/259 TRE Report T1257 “Manual on centimetre waves for use in RDF (Sept. 
1942).”
AVIA26/329 TRE Report T1327 "Appendix to C.M. manual: The Magnetron." 
AVIA26/487 TRE Report T1485 “Preliminary Schedule of Mk HI H2S” 5/7/43.
327
AVIA26/504 TRE Report T1502 “Development of Magnetrons. Technical Monograph.” 
AVIA26/482 TRE Report T1480 "H2S Aerial System" 16/3/43.
AVIA26/825 TRE Report T1823 “Naxos Homing Aerials” 5/9/45.
AVIA26/860 TRE Report T1858 “The German Magnetron Type LMSIO(G)” 17/5/45. 
AVIA26/929 TRE Report T1927 “Berlin Geraf\
AVIA26/1154 “Interrogation of Oberstleutnant Hentz and Major Aschel at ADI(K), 
15/6/45.”
AVIA26/1541 “Interrogation of Dr Scholtz, 4/7/45.”
AVIA36/1 “TRE Technical Journal, July 1944 (Issue 1).”
AVIA36/2 “TRE Technical Journal, Oct. 1944 (Issue 2).”
AVIA36/3 “TRE Technical Journal, Jan 1945 (Issue 3).”
AV1A39/7 “Radio Techniques.”
AVIA39/10 Section 1.5 “Interrogation of Dr Esau.”
AVIA39/19 “German Radar Equipment Index.”
1.5 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz
R26II/29 “Stand der Hochffequenzforschung in den Monaten juli-Okt 1944.” [Standing of 
High-Frequency Research in the months of July to October 1944]
R26III/86 “Meflnahmen zur Bomberkampfung auf dem Gebiet der Hochfrequenz - Stand 
der Arbeiten bei der Forschungsfuhrung der Luftwaffe - Jan 1945.” [Measures against 
bombers in the area of high-frequencies - situation of the work of the Research Bureau of 
the Luftwaffe - Jan 1945]
R26III/132 “Administrative Correspondence re Special Research on High-Frequencies by 
Professor Esau.”
R26III/140 “Correspondence on Security within the Recihsforschungsrat (RFR)”
328
1.6 Militararchiv, Freiburg
RL36/52 “Kommando der Erprobungstellen der Luftwaffe: Aktennotis Uber 
Besprechunspunkte in Nominten am 2 und 3/7/43.” [Luftwaffe Approvals Wing: Actions 
from discussion points at meetings on 2 and 3/7/43.]
RL39/515 “Uberblick uber den Jetztigen Stand der Erkentnisse und die Plannung auf dem 
der Zentimeter Technik” - vortrag gehalten an 8/2/44 in einer Sitzung unter dem Vorsitz von 
G.F.Marschall Milch in Hermann-Goring-Saal. Vortragender: Dipl.Ing. BRANDT. [Survey 
of the situation of Research and Plans for Centimetre Radar - lecture given 8/2/44 in the 
presence of Field-Marshall Milch, Hermann Goring Saal. Lecturer: Engineer Brandt.]
RL39/536 “Die Anlage Berlin, 8/3/44.” [Berlin Technical Manual, 8/3/44]
RL39/537 “Die Arbeitsgemeinschaft “Rotterdam” in der Sonder Kommission 
Funkmesstechnik, 31/5/44.” [The working-committee “Rotterdam” of the Radar Special 
Commission, 31/5/44]
RL39/593 Telefunken Bericht: EF-08 Juni \944[Telefunken Report: EF-08, June 1944]
1.7 RAF Museum, Hendon
Air Publication 1093C (1946) Introductory Survey o f Principles and Equipment, Air 
Ministry: London.
Air Publication 1093D (1946 ) Introductory Survey o f Principles and Equipment Part II: A 
non-technical account o f selected airborne equipments, Air Ministry: London.
Air Publication 1136 (1956) The Second World War 1939-45 Royal Air Force Signals (III) 
Aircraft Radio, Air Ministry: London
Air Publication 2890L “H2S Equipment Mark IIC (ARI5990) and Mark IIA (ARI 5583).” 
CD 0419A “H2S Instruction Manual, August 1943.”
CD 0419B “Bomber Command H2S (Fishpond) Instruction Manual, November 1943.”
5 Group, R.A.F. Bomber Command “5 Group Aircraft Drills, 27/3/44.”
HQ Bomber Command, Sigs. Branch “War in the Ether - Europe 1939-45.”
329
Published
Aders, G. (1978) Geschichte der Deutschen Nachtjagd 1917-45, Stuttgart: Motorbuch 
Verlag. Also published as (1979) The History o f the German Nightfighter Force 1917-45, 
London: Jane’s, transl. Vamags-Baginskis, A.
Air Publication 3368 (1963) The Originsand Development o f Operational research in the 
Royal Air Force, London: HMSO.
Atkinson, J. (1990) “Work at Worth Matravers and TRE Malvern” in Burcham, W. (1990, 
Ed.) Fifty Years o f the Cavity Magnetron: Proceedings O f A One Day Symposium, 21st 
February 1990, Birmingham: Birmingham University School of Physics and Space Research, 
pp24-31.
BBC Video (1988) The Secret War, vol. 1, BBC Enterprises.
Barnett, C (1986) The Audit o f War: the Illusion and Reality o f Britain as a Great Nation, 
London: Macmillan.
Batt, R.G. (1990) “Why Ten Centimetres?”, in Burcham, W. (1990, Ed)  Fifty Years o f the 
Cavity Magnetron: Proceedings O f A One Day Symposium, 21st February 1990, 
Birmingham: Birmingham University School of Physics and Space Research, pp32-37.
Batt, R. (1991) The Radar Army: Winning the War o f the Airwaves, London: Robert Hale.
Bekker, C. (1980) Augen Durch Nacht undNebel: Die Radar Story, Herford: Mittler 
Verlag. [Eyes through fog and night: the radar story]
Bennett, D. (1955) Pathfinder, London: Hale.
Beyerchen, A.D. (1977) Politics and the Physics Community in the Third Reich, London: 
Yale University Press.
Beyerchen, A (1994) "On strategic goals as perceptual filters: interwar responses to the 
military potential of radar in Germany, the UK and the US." in Blumtritt, O., Petzold, H., & 
Aspray, W. (Eds., 1994) Tracking the History o f Radar, Munchen: Deutsches Museum.
Bloor, D (1976) Knowledge and Social Imagery, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Blumtritt, O., Petzold, H., & Aspray, W. (1994) Tracking the History o f Radar, Munchen: 
Deutsches Museum.
Boot, H.A.H. & Randall, J.T. (1946) “The Cavity Magnetron.”, in J.I.E.E. 93 ptIIIA, p926.
Boot, H.A.H. & Randall, J.T. (1976) “Historical Notes on the Cavity Magnetron.”, in 
I.E.E.E. Transactions on Electron Devices 23 7, pp724-29.
Bowen, E.G. (1987) Radar Days, Bristol: Adam Hilger.
Brandon, L. (1961) Night Flyer, London: William Kimber & Co.
Brittain, J.E. (1985) “The magnetron and the development of the microwave age.”, in 
Physics Today 38(7), pp60-67.
Burcham, W.E. (1985) “The Development of Centimetric Airborne Interception”, in J.I.E.E. 
132 A 6.
Burcham, W. (1990, Ed.) Fifty Years o f the Cavity Magnetron: Proceedings O f A One Day 
Symposium, 21st February 1990, Birmingham: Birmingham University School of Physics and 
Space Research.
Burcham, W.E. & Shearman, E.D.R. (1990) Fifty years o f the Cavity Magnetron, 
Birmingham: Birmingham University School of Physics and Space Research.
Bums, R. (1988a, Ed.) History o f Radar Development to 1945, London: Peter Peregrinus.
Bums, R. (1988b) “The background to the development of the cavity magnetron.” in Bums, 
R. (1988a, Ed.) History o f Radar Development to 1945, London: Peter Peregrinus.
Callick, E.B. (1990) Metres to Microwaves, London: Peter Peregrinus.
Chalmers, A. (1990) Science and i t ’s Fabrication, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
Chisholm, R. (1953) Cover o f Darkness, London: Chatto & Windus.
Churchill, W. S. (1951) The Second World War vol 4 The Hinge o f Fate, London: Cassell.
Clarke, R.W. (1962) The Rise o f the Boffins, London: Phoenix House.
Clarke, R.W. (1965) Tizard, London: Methuen.
Clayton, R.J. & Agar, J. (1989) The GEC Research Laboratories 1919-1984, London: Peter 
Peregrinus.
Clayton, R.J. & Agar, J. (1991) ^ 4 Scientist’s War: The War Diary o f Sir Clifford Paterson 
1939-45, London: Peter Peregrinus.
Cockcroft, J.D. (1985) “Memories of Radar Research.”, in J.I.E.E. 132 A 6,.
331
Collins, G.B. (1948) Microwave Magnetrons, McGraw Hill.
Collins, H.M. (1985) Changing Order, London: Sage.
Dippy, R.J. (1946) "Gee: a radio navigation aid." in J.I.E.E. 93 ptIIIA p468.
Edge, D. & Mulkay, M. (1976) Astronomy Transformed: the Emergence o f Radio 
Astronomy in Britain, New York: Wiley Interscience.
Edgerton, D. (1991) England and the Aeroplane: an Essay on a Militant and Technological 
Nation, London: Macmillan.
Fisher, D.E. (1988) Radar: the decisive weapon o f W. W.II, London: Hale.
Foley, F.M. (1991) "History of Naval Radar 1935-1945: A History of the Silica Valve." in 
Journal o f Naval Science 17 No.3, ppl 54-65.
Forster, G (1988) “German Experiments in jamming H2S airborne radar.”, in Bums, R. 
(1988a, Ed.) History o f Radar Development to 1945, London: Peter Peregrinus.
Galison, P.(1987) How Experiments End, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Genuth, S. (1988) “Microwave Radar, the Atomic Bomb and the background to U.S. 
Research Priorities in World War II.”, in Science Technology and Human Values 13 pp276- 
289.
Gimbel, J. (1990) Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.
Girbig, W. (1975) Six Months to Oblivion: The Eclipse o f the Luftwaffe Fighter Force, 
London: Ian Allan, transl. Simpkin, R.
Ginzton (1976) “The $100 Idea.”, in I.E.E.E. Transactions on Electron Devices 23 7, 
pp714-23.
Gooding, D.C. (1990a) Experiment and the Making o f Meaning, Dordrecht; Kluwer 
Academic Publishers.
Gooding, D.C. (1990b) “Theory and observation: the experimental nexus.”, in International 
Studies in the Philosophy o f Science 4 2, ppl 31-47.
Gooding, D.C. (1992) “Putting Agency Back into Experiment.”, in Pickering, A. (1992a, 
Ed.) Science as Practice and Culture, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
332
Gooding, D.C. (1993) “Situating a Twentieth Century Scientist”, review of Frederic L. 
Holmes (1991) Ham Krebs: The Formation o f a Scientific Life, Vol. 1: 1900-1933.
Oxford: OUP., in EASST-Newsletter 12 3.
Gooding, D.C., Pinch, T. & Schaffer, S. (1989, Eds.) The Uses o f Experiment, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Guerlac, H. (1988) Radar in World War II, New York: Tomash.
Gunston, B. (1976) Night Fighters: a Development & Combat History, Cambridge: Patrick 
Stephens Ltd.
HMSO (1945) Radar; a report on science at war, London: HMSO.
Hackmann, W.D. (1984) Seek and Strike, London: HMSO.
Hall, A.R. (1962) The Scientific Revolution 1500-1800, London: Longmans Green & Co.
Hanbury-Brown, R. (1991) Boffin: a Personal Story o f the Early Days o f Radar, Radio 
Astronomy and Quantum Optics, Bristol: Adam Hilger.
Hodgkin, A (1992) Chance and Design: Reminisces o f Science in Peace and War, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Howard-Williams, J. (1976) Night Intruder, London: David & Charles.
Hull, A.W. (1921a), “The effect of a uniform magnetic field on the motion of electrons 
between co-axial cylinders.” in Phys. Review XIV pp 163-6.
Hull, A.W. (1921b), “The Magnetron.” in J.A.I.EE. XL (9) pp715-23.
Jones, F.E. (1946) "Oboe: a precision ground controlled blind-bombing system." in J.I.E.E. 
93 ptIIIA, p496.
Jones, R.V. (1978) Most Secret War, London: Hamish Hamilton.
Jones, R.V. (1985) "The History of Radar", in Physics Bulletin 36, pp417-20.
Jones, R.V. (1989) Reflectiom on Intelligence, London: Heinemann.
Kern, U (1994) "Review concerning the History of German Radar Technology up to 1945.", 
in Blumtritt, O., Petzold, H., & Aspray, W. (1994) Tracking the History o f Radar,
Munchen: Deutsches Museum.
333
Killip, E.L. (1985) “H2 S and the navigator.”, in I.E.E. Proceedings 132 ptA, No. 6, pp399- 
400. Reprinted from TRE Journal, January 1945.
Kuhn, T (1970) The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Kuhn, T. (1977) The Essential Tension, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Kummritz, H. (1988) “German Radar Development to 1945.”, in Bums, R. (1988a, Ed.) 
History o f Radar Development to 1945, London: Peter Peregrinus.
Latour, B. (1988) The Pasteurisation o f France, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Lovell, A.C.B. (1985) “Historical Note on H2 S ”, in I.E.E. Proceedings 132 ptA, No. 6.
Lovell, A.C.B. (1991) Echoes o f War: the Story o f H2S Radar, Bristol: Hilger.
Lovell, A.C.B. (1992) Astronomer by Chance, London: Macmillan.
Lovell, A.C.B. & Hurst, D.G. (1988) "Wilfrid Bennett Lewis" in Biog. Mem. R. Soc. 34, 
p453.
Mayhill, R. (1991) Bombs on Target, London: Patrick Stephens Ltd.
Megaw, E.C.S. (1946) “The high power pulsed magnetron, a review of early 
developments.”, in J.I.E.E. 93 ptlllA, p977.
Millar, G. (1974) The Bruneval Raid: Flashpoint o f the Radar War, London: Bodley Head.
Molyneux-Berry, R.B. (1988) “Dr. Henri Gutton, French radar pioneer.” in Bums, R. 
(1988a, Ed.) History o f Radar Development to 1945, London: Peter Peregrinus.
Moon, P. (1990) “Work at Birmingham.”, in Burcham, W. (1990, Ed.) Fifty Years o f the 
Cavity Magnetron: Proceedings O f A One Day Symposium, 21st February 1990, 
Birmingham: Birmingham University School of Physics and Space Research.
Muirhead, C. (1987) Diary o f a Bomb-Aimer, Spellmount.
Musgrave, G. (1976) Pathfinder Force: a History o f 8 Group, London: MacDonald &
Janes.
Nakajima, S. (1988) “The history of Japanese radar development to 1945.” in Bums, R. 
(1988a, Ed.) History o f Radar Development to 1945, London: Peter Peregrinus.
Neale, B.T. (1985) "CH - The First Operational Radar.", The GEC Journal o f Research 3:2, 
pp73-83.
334
Nissen, J., with Cockerill, A.W. (1989) Winning the Radar War, London: Hale.
Norberg, A.L. & Seidel, R.W. (1994) “The Contexts for the Development of Radar: a 
Comparison of Efforts in the United States and the United Kingdom in the 1930s.” in 
Blumtritt, O., Petzold, H., & Aspray, W. (1994) Tracking the History o f Radar, Mtinchen: 
Deutsches Museum.
Oliphant, Sir Mark (1990), in Burcham, W. (1991, Ed.) Fifty Years o f the Cavity 
Magnetron: Proceedings O f A One Day Symposium, 21st February 1990, Birmingham: 
Birmingham University School of Physics and Space Research.
Orgell, N. (1985) “History of Fighter Direction.”, in JJ.E.E. 132 A 6.
Pickering, A. (1992a, Ed.) Science as Practice and Culture, Chicago: Chicago University 
Press.
Pickering, A. (1992b) “From Science as Knowledge to Science as Practice.”, in Pickering, 
A. (1992a, Ed.) Science as Practice and Culture, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Pope, S.W. (1985) “Aircraft Electronics 1939-1945.”, in Electronic Technology 19.
Polanyi, Michael (1959) The Study o f Man, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Price, A (1973) Battle over the Reich, London: Ian Allan.
Price, A. (1977) Instruments o f Darkness, London; MacDonald & Janes.
Pritchard, D. (1989) The Radar War: Germany's Pioneering Achievement 1904-45, 
Wellingborough: Patrick Stephens Ltd.
Putnam, H. (1978) Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London: Routledge, Keegan & Paul.
Randall, J.T. (1946a) “The Cavity Magnetron.”, in Physics Society 58 III, pp247-52.
Randall, J.T. (1946b) “Radar and the Magnetron.”, in Journal o f the Royal Society o f Arts 
323, pp303-14.
Rawnsley, C.F. & Wright, R. (1957) Night Fighter, London: Collins.
Reeves, A.H. (1985) “Oboe: history and development.” in J.I.E.E. 132 A 6.
Reuter, F. (1971) Funkmef: Der Wntwicklung undder Einsatz des RADAR-Verfahrens in 
Deutschland bis zum Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
335
[Radar: The Development and Operation o f RADAR-Processes in Germany to the end o f 
the Second World War]
Robinson, D.M. (1983) "British Microwave Radar 1939-41." in Proceedings o f the 
American Philosophical Society 127 pp26-31.
Rode, B. (1988) "Early German Experiments on Radar Backscattering of Aircraft." in 
Bums, R. (1988a, Ed.) History o f Radar Development to 1945, London: Peter Peregrinus.
Rodgers, J. (1985) Navigator’s Log: o f a Tour in Bomber Command, Merlin.,
Rowe, A.P. (1948) One Story o f Radar, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Runge, W. (1988) “A Personal Reminiscence.”, in Bums, R. (1988a, Ed.) History o f Radar 
Development to 1945, London: Peter Peregrinus.
Ryle, G. (1949) The Concept o f Mind, London: Hutchinson.
Sarkowski, H (1983) Beruhmte Bordfungerate; Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der 
Electrotechnik, Grafenau: Expert Verlag. [Famous Airborne Radars: A Contribution to the 
History of Electrical Technology]
Saward, D. (1959) The Bomber's Eye, London: Cassell.
Saward, D. (1984) ’Bomber'Harris, London: Cassell.
Saward, D. (1985) Bernard Lovell: a biography, London: Hale.
Sayers, J. (1990) “Work at Birmingham.”, in Burcham, W. (1990, Ed.) Fifty Years o f the 
Cavity Magnetron: Proceedings O f A One Day Symposium, 21st February 1990, 
Birmingham: Birmingham University School of Physics and Space Research.
Schaffer, S. (1989) “Glass works: Newton’s prisms and the uses of experiment.”, in 
Gooding, D.C., Pinch, T. & Schaffer, S. (1989, Eds.) The Uses o f Experiment, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Shapin, S. (1979) “The Politics of Observation: Cerebral Anatomy and Social interests in the 
Edinburgh Phrenology Disputes”, in Collins, H.M. (1982) Sociology o f Scientific 
Knowledge, a Sourcebook, Bath: Bath University Press.
Shapin, S. & Schaffer, S. (1985) Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the 
Experimental Life, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Shearman, E.D.R. & Land, D.V. (1985) “The beginnings of cm radar in the UK.”, in History 
o f Radar Development to 1945,1.E.E. Seminar.
336
Skolnik, M. (1985) “50 Years of Radar.”, in I.E.E.E. Proceedings 73, pp 182-97.
Smith, C. & Wise, N. (1989) Energy and Empire, London; Cornell University Press.
Snow, C.P. (1961) Science and Government, London: Oxford University Press.
Speer, A. (1993 edn.) Inside the Third Reich, London: Warner. Originally published 19701
Streetly, M. (1978) Confound and Destroy: 100 Group and the Bomber Support Campaign, 
London: MacDonald & Janes.
Susskind, C. (1968) "Relative Roles of Science and Technology in Early Radar." in Actes 
XIIeme Congress International History o f Science, Paris.
Swords, S. S. (1986) Technical history o f the beginnings o f RADAR, London: Peter 
Peregrinus.
Trenkle, F (1986) Die deutschen Funkmepverfahren bis 1945, Heidelberg: Huthig Verlag. 
[German Radar Development to 1945]
Watson-Watt, Sir R.A. (1957) Three Steps to Victory, London: Odham's Press.
Webster, Sir C. and Frankland, N. (1961) The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 
London: HMSO, 4 vols.
Wilkins, M.H.F. (1985) “John Turton Randall.”, in Biographical Memoirs o f Members o f 
the Royal Society, pp492-533.
Willshaw, W.E. & Rushforth, L. et al (1946) “The high-power pulsed magnetron, 
Development and design for radar applications.”, in J.I.E.E. 93 ptIIIA No.5, p985.
Willshaw, W.E. (1985) “Microwave magnetrons: a brief history of research and 
development.”, in GEC Journal o f Research 3 2, pp84-91.
Wood, D. & Dempster, N. (1961) The Narrow Margin, London: Arrow.
Woolgar, S. (1988) Science: the Very Idea, London: Tavistock.
